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CHAPTER 1  
 INTRODUCTION 
 
When discussing the future of the European Union (EU), scholars have often noted that European 
market integration has not been followed by equivalent social measures and that national 
industrial relations systems have come under pressure (Leibfried and Pierson 1999; Scharpf 
2015; Streeck 2014). In this setting, trade unions as intermediary organizations between citizens 
and the state can play a central role: for example, by promoting social welfare or by holding 
governments and corporations in the EU accountable when social rights are threatened, thus 
contributing to more democratic legitimacy (Erne 2008; Streeck and Hassel 2003). What is more, 
trade unions can play an important role in mediating the effects of austerity measures, 
countering non-democratic forces, or integrating diverse social groups (Bieler and Erne 2014; 
Gourevitch et al. 2016; Larsson et al. 2010). Dealing with expanding markets and governing 
structures has always been a challenge for unions. As markets grew in the 19th century, unions 
had to follow suit by expanding their spheres of influence and eventually developed institutional 
structures to keep up with nation-building processes (Martin and Ross 1999c: 312). However, 
when it comes to establishing trade union   
organizations in the European arena, the results have been mixed. Understanding how European 
trade union federations have developed historically can eventually help to identify factors that 
hinder or promote more effective labor representation. The study of these factors in the 
construction sector, where European integration and the free movement of labor and services 
has had a particular impact, is the topic of this dissertation. 
In research on trade union internationalization two opposing strategies from trade unions 
towards Europe have been distinguished. On the one hand, researchers have identified 
numerous reasons why competitive pressures prevail and transnational labor cooperation is 
likely to fail (Cerny 1997; Meardi 2010; Pulignano 2006; Sadowski et al. 2002; Streeck 1992). On 
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the other hand, some theories have predicted that as markets and polities expand, transnational 
cooperation would increase and/or describe a growing coordination of trade union activities 
(Bieler 2009; Bieling and Schulten 2002; Erne 2008; Haas 1964; Hyman 1999a; Moody 1998; 
Munck 2002; Schulten 1995; Weinert 2007).  
 
1.1 EUROPEAN COOPERATION AND NATIONAL COMPETITION 
MEMBERSHIP-DRIVEN THEORIES: NATIONAL COMPETITION 
A national membership-oriented perspective concentrates on the embeddedness of unions in 
their national industrial relations systems, within which a union’s members are traditionally 
represented. This approach highlights the fact that the diversity of national bargaining traditions 
and trade union characteristics (such as the identity, membership, and role of unions) make it 
difficult for unions from different national models to find common responses (Baumann et al. 
1996: 331). The different legal frameworks (e.g., the extent of state involvement in wage 
bargaining, the accepted means of collective action, and the participation of unions in social 
security systems) present additional obstacles to increased coordination. This perspective 
suggests that the social partner’s roots in national institutional arrangements make it difficult for 
unions to cooperate (Beyers and Kerremans 2007; Busemeyer et al. 2008; Della Porta and Caiani 
2006; Hyman 2002b, 2007; Martin and Ross 1999c; Streeck 1992). Martin has claimed that trade 
unionism is so deeply embedded in national institutions and the clear-cut employer and 
government bargaining partners at the national level that unions have particular difficulties in 
dealing with multilevel settings (Martin 1996: 6). Ebbinghaus has even argued that the manifold 
threats and problems unions are facing even makes them more embedded in their national 
welfare systems (Ebbinghaus 2002: 456), and Hyman has postulated that internationalization 
enhances these differences (Hyman 2007). Dølvik has argued that social partners agree to types 
of Europeanization “that do not seriously affect the basic functioning of their national (belief) 
systems of industrial relations, unless the latter are conceived to be in such a deep crisis that 
radical change appears urgent or unavoidable” (Dølvik 1997: 27). 
A more competition-centered perspective on the national membership-oriented approach 
argues that in a setting of rising interdependence among EU member states, unions would 
concentrate on maintaining their national competitiveness (Cerny 1997; Pulignano 2006; Streeck 
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1992). For example, several authors have highlighted the potentially competitive nature of 
European Works Councils (EWCs) (Fetzer 2008a; Hancké 2000; Streeck 1997). For example, 
Fetzer has concluded that within the General Motors Works Council, cooperation has remained 
weak and based on local self-interest (Fetzer 2008a: 289). A study by Valeria Pulignano supports 
this perspective on EWCs, which she argues to be “ineffective at controlling inter-union 
competition in cases of transnational restructuring” (Pulignano 2006: 615). According to several 
observers, this competition might be aggravated by the balance of power on the European level 
where the EU is a “supranational liberalization engine” (Streeck 1998: 3), which has given 
employer associations the opportunity to exploit a less regulated system of industrial 
governance (Dufresne 2011; Sadowski et al. 2002; Waddington 2005). In addition, the Brussels 
method of policymaking has been criticized as technocratic and lacking in public involvement 
(Eriksen 2001; European Commission 2003; Habermas 2011; Héritier 1999), which enhances 
trade unions’ reliance on their national routes of participation. 
Other authors have argued that the hesitation to transfer competencies and control to 
international partnerships makes it difficult to find common responses (Behrens et al. 2003). For 
example, Sadowski and colleagues have contended that “there are important reasons why 
[unions] should oppose such centralization [of union activities on the European level]. […] The 
weak interest of national unions to delegate bargaining authority and resources to European 
actors [is a] major factor of the slow progress towards a European coordination of collective 
bargaining” (Sadowski et al. 2002: 18). Bernaciak has analyzed German-Polish union cooperation 
and has argued that cost-benefit calculations guide transnational cooperation, particularly in 
company mergers: “Unions cooperated transnationally when no local negotiation channel was 
available to the German unionists and the Polish unionists benefited more from the assistance of 
their Western counterparts than from local solutions” (Bernaciak 2010a: 119). 
 
INFLUENCE-DRIVEN THEORIES: AS MARKETS AND POLITIES EXPAND, TRADE UNIONS EXPAND 
In contrast with membership-driven theories, influence-driven theories highlight the role of a 
changing environment for trade union Europeanization. According to this line of thought, as 
markets and polities expand, trade unions will also strive to expand their activities (Anner et al. 
2006; Barton and Fairbrother 2007; Beckert et al. 2004; Bieler and Lindberg 2010; Croucher et 
al. 2003a; Erne 2008). These approaches anticipate that unions will respond to Europeanization 
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with cooperation, because trade unions are confronted with several institutional pull factors 
toward the EU level. 
First, the EU has developed into a supranational body with legislative, executive, and judiciary 
functions. Lawmaking – and thus classical areas of labor activity such as bargaining procedures, 
lobbying, and political debate – is no longer confined to the national realm. What is more, EU 
legislation touches on core elements of national social models. A much-discussed illustration of 
this impact on labor is the European Court of Justice rulings in the Laval, Ruffert, and Luxembourg 
cases concerning the 1996 Posting of Workers Directive, which have challenged established 
procedures of collective bargaining by questioning the host country principle (Cremers et al. 
2007). 
Second, the EU, following a logic of market integration (Streeck 1998: 3), is a regional bloc 
mirroring international liberalization pressures. Associated with this process are the “four 
freedoms”: the free movement of goods, services, people, and capital. As the European search 
for national debt problems has revealed, the common currency has intertwined national policies 
more than ever. The internal market has made national responses increasingly insufficient and 
provides a strong impetus for trade union cooperation on issues ranging from migration issues 
to common health standards to macroeconomic coordination (Dufresne 2011; Erne 2008; Greer 
et al. 2011; Reutter and Rütters 2003).  
Third, unlike in any other region worldwide, the common institutions at the European level 
facilitate international union cooperation. For example, EWCs provide a legal basis for joint 
European labor representation on company level, which has been optimistically described as a 
new form of Euro-corporatism (Knutsen 1997; Lecher et al. 1998; Schulten 1992), and the 
European Social Dialogue offers a forum for debate among the social partners (Degryse and 
Pochet 2011, 2011; Waddington 2011).  
As economic integration deepens and sectoral internationalization intensifies (Degryse and 
Pochet 2011), scholars have described that trade unions extend their transnational cooperation 
and expand their strategies to the international level (Abbott 2007; Bieler 2006; ITF 2015). In 
accordance with Haas’ functionalist spill-over logic (Haas 1964), organized interests have been 
seen as likely to rationally accept Brussels as a new arena of policymaking and transfer their 
activities to Europe, “where the action was” (Streeck and Schmitter 1991: 133). In addition, the 
similarities in culture between Brussels administration and leaders of large interest groups 
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seemed to make it more likely that these two groups would reciprocally support a 
supranationalization of organized interests (Streeck and Schmitter 1991).  
What this perspective highlights is that as industries become more global and production chains 
more intertwined, trade unions have good reasons to cooperate and stretch their willingness to 
act beyond national borders. These approaches are embedded in general concepts of solidarity, 
social movements, or participative democracy (Bieler et al. 2006; Erne 2008; Gajewska 2009; 
Smith et al. 1997). Unions, as well as other organizations, are considered likely to adapt their 
operations and the structures in which they operate as their environment changes, although 
they might be especially prone to an “organizational time-lag” in relation to their institutional 
setting (Warner 1972: 51). Historically, unions have developed in conjunction with the nation 
state (Streeck and Hassel 2003). Early labor unions either underwent a gradual learning process 
toward establishing a broader geographical reach when it became clear that local representation 
alone was not efficient enough, or they developed into larger organizations based on political 
class action (Hyman 1999b). For example, as Roland Erne has noted, it took German unions quite 
some time, and many “acts of transregional solidarity,” to establish a sense of cross-regional 
togetherness (Erne 2008: 27). Olson has cited the example of the United States, where it took 
more than five decades until the first local unions developed into national unions (Olson 1965: 
66). 
 
1.2 OUTCOME: A DOMINANT ORGANIZATIONAL PATTERN 
The de facto outcome of organizational trade union Europeanization makes both assumptions – 
European integration leading to either increasing national competition between trade unions or 
increasing European cooperation between labor organizations - seem unsatisfactory. Instead, 
the empirically observed organizational outcome seems to correspond to neither of these two 
theoretical expectations. In principle, multiple organizational responses to European integration 
are imaginable (Erne 2008; Hyman 2001; Platzer and Müller 2009). On the one hand, there could 
be no cooperation at all. European federations would then serve as intergovernmental 
instruments of exchange without any additional capacities or coordinating functions vis-à-vis 
their members. Such a weak Europeanization outcome would correspond to national 
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membership-oriented theories. International federations would only serve to provide 
information on ongoing European issues. 
On the other hand, European unions could develop into supranational organizations with 
steering functions, including sufficient resources and competencies to coordinate and finance 
strikes and engage in collective bargaining and services for workers (Platzer and Müller 2009: 
836). Such a stronger form of Europeanization would correspond to the assumptions of 
European influence theories. Trade unions could also, for example, develop into transnational 
unions directly representing (migrant) workers from all over Europe (Greer et al. 2013). The 
International Transport Workers’ Federation is an example of an international federation that 
has succeeded in establishing a transnational welfare funding scheme by concluding collective 
agreements for seafarers (Anner et al. 2006: 16). In between these two poles – transnational 
organization and national individualism – lay a plethora of strategic alternatives for trade union 
organization. 
Despite these different options, however, the organizational outcomes of trade union 
Europeanization across sectors seem to converge to a coordinator with limited steering 
capacities (for more details, see Chapter 2). Most cases from the literature recount a similar 
Europeanization outcome (Müller et al. 2010: 58ff). The material resources of these federations 
are limited and have only increased minimally over the years (Martin and Ross 2001; Müller et 
al. 2010). The federations usually start out as regional subdivisions of their international 
counterparts: the global union federations. In the mid-1960s, regional committees for Europe 
existed for the metalworking (1963), chemicals (1958), construction (1958), transportation 
(1958), and service sectors (1964/65) (Degryse 2013). Beginning in the 1970s, these regional 
committees began founding autonomous European federations (e.g., the European 
Metalworkers’ Federation in 1971 and the European Federation for Building and Woodworkers 
in 1974) with the aim of providing information services concerning the newly emerging European 
governing structure (EFBWW 2008a; Henning and Clairmont 2011). At this time, European trade 
union organizations became more coordinated on a cross-sectoral level. This development was 
marked by the founding of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) – the umbrella 
organization of trade unions at the European level – in 1973 (Degryse 2013). The early European 
labor federations were often no more than small secretariats sometimes not even located in 
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Brussels but rather situated in the offices of one of their national affiliates. Over the years, almost 
all of the federations established independent secretariats in Brussels. 
In the 1990s and 2000s, some of these committees and federations merged and created large, 
integrated federations such as the European Services Workers’ Union (UNIEurope, a union that 
represents 330 affiliates in Europe, and the European Federation Federation of Food, Agriculture 
and Tourism Unions (EFFAT), which represents 120 national unions (EFFAT 2013; UNI Europa 
2016). In 2012, the federations from the metal, chemicals, and textiles sectors merged to found 
IndustriALL, a federation now representing almost 7 million workers (IndustriAll 2016). The 
inner-union separation between the mostly social democrat tradition of the ETUC and Christian 
and communist unions also came to an end (Hyman 2005b; Stöckl 1986: 18ff). In 2016, 10 
sectoral European federations were represented within the ETUC, ranging from the small 
European Alliance for Art and Entertainment to the large federations with several million 
members such as UNI and IndustriALL (ETUC 2016). The staff numbers of the most important 
federations reveal that even though European integration has accelerated and increased in 
impact over the years, the largest secretariats of the European federation – the secretariats of 
IndustriALL and UNI Europe – still only count roughly 25 members each (IndustriAll 2016; UNI 
Europa 2016). The ETUC employs about 60 full-time staff members (Hix and Høyland 2011). 
Given the fact that many national federations have hundreds of administrative and political 
secretaries, this is an astoundingly small number. In comparison, the German umbrella 
organization Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) alone has approximately 750 staff members, 
and the British Trades Union Congress (TUC) has about 200 staff members (TUC 2013). 
In terms of responsibilities, even though European integration has increased and the 
membership base of the federations is continually diversifying, this has not led to more 
competencies for the European federations, let alone a centralization of decision-making 
processes on the European level (Müller et al. 2010: 57). In the conclusion of a large comparative 
research project on European trade union secretariats, the authors summarize that the 
European transformation process has not led to any significant strengthening of the functional 
profile of the federations, which have primarily served as forums for information exchange and 
service provision and have only developed limited supranational steering functions (Müller et al. 
2010: 54; Platzer and Müller 2009: 836). The federations mostly operate on a “task force” basis 
for individual issue areas, and none of the EU federations have developed tendencies toward 
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taking up a hierarchical steering position to engage its members in compliant political behavior 
(Müller et al. 2010: 57; Platzer and Müller 2009: 836; Schulten 2002). Instead, European unions 
seem to “struggle to identify strategies of transnational solidarity” (Bieler and Erne 2014: 22). 
Other authors’ findings support this point (Baumann et al. 1996; Hyman 2015; Stöckl 1986). This 
is also apparent in the three classical areas of trade union activities: bargaining, political 
representation, and services (Clegg 1976). Collective bargaining coordination remains mainly 
informational, although several sectors have agreed upon non-binding wage bargaining standard 
formulas (Arrowsmith and Marginson 2006, 2006; CLR Member2 2011; Dufresne 2011; Mermet 
2002; Schulten 2002; Visser 2007b). Instead, many federations have focused on the company 
level and actively support the establishment of EWCs (ETUI 2016; Waddington 2011). A main 
feature of trade unions – the organization of strikes – remains the responsibility of national 
federations. Political representation is achieved through lobbying the Commission, often jointly 
as a sector together with the employer federation via the European Social Dialogue (Degryse and 
Pochet 2011; Dølvik 1999; Keller 2003; Pochet et al. 2009). Services are mainly provided in the 
form of Commission-funded information, training, and coordination activities for the national 
affiliates, who act as mediators for their own members. Representation of individual members 
across borders remains mostly based on bilateral cooperation agreements between national 
unions (Delbar and Walthéry 2000; Schulten 1998). 
Although this summary seems to speak for the competition hypothesis, this perspective alone 
tends to neglect research pointing toward transnational cooperation. A distinct European level 
of industrial relations for social dialogue and company representation has emerged, and 
European trade unions have engaged in transnational coordination on numerous occasions 
(Dølvik 1997; Erne 2008; Gajewska 2009). The number of European projects initiated by trade 
unions illustrates that unions have repeatedly engaged in joint activities at the European level 
(Arnold 2008; Cremers et al. 2007; Croucher et al. 2003a; Fetzer 2008b; Gross 2001). 
Bronfenbrenner has demonstrated how global organizations have organized campaigns and 
resistance against transnational restructuring on a number of occasions (Bronfenbrenner et al. 
1998; Bronfenbrenner 2007). Other authors have highlighted how trade unions have fought to 
establish labor standards along global production chains and worked to establish transnational 
regulations (Anner et al. 2006, 2006, 2006; Brandl and Lawatsch 1999; Fichter and Sydow 2002; 
Helfen and Fichter 2013). Erne has described cross-border solidarity in company merger 
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processes among European trade unions (Erne 2008), and Katarzyna Gayewska has 
demonstrated that unions are “learning organizations” and that transnational mobilization can 
occur despite differences in interest and identity (Gajewska 2008: 118). Other authors have 
highlighted successful joint mobilization campaigns such as the Service Directive (Arnold 2008; 
Bernaciak 2010b; Cremers et al. 2007; Druker 1998). At the international level, Koch-Baumgarten 
has demonstrated how the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) has succeeded in 
establishing a multinational working standards regime despite differences in national interests 
(Koch-Baumgarten 1998). For example, the ITF has established a transnational welfare funding 
scheme for seafarers (Anner et al. 2006: 16; ITF 2015). Nautilus, a union representing maritime 
professionals from Switzerland, the UK, and the Netherlands, is a transnational union in the 
making, though with only limited coverage (Nautilus International 2011).  
Similarly, theories suggesting growing transnational unionism also tend to miss part of the 
picture. Despite optimistic expectations for increased cooperation and adaptive pressures of 
European integration, European trade union federations seem to remain in organizational forms 
with limited resources and only weak coordinating functions (Hyman 2015; Müller et al. 2010). 
The historian Buschak summarizes this perspective as follows: “The simple, compellingly obvious 
step of responding to the foundation of a supra-national institution like the European Economic 
Community with an equally supra-national trade union structure was not taken” (Buschak 2003: 
2). This has led trade unionists and researchers to point out that European unions have “adopted 
a defensive orientation” (Waddington 2005: 518), contend that European trade union policy “is 
still in a rather sad state” (Schmidt-Hullmann 2009b: 244), and ask if unions are facing “strategic 
paralysis” (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013: 192). Kieess and Seeliger have summarized 
the debate with their book title, arguing that European trade unions are positioned “Between 
Institutionalization and Defensive Battle” (2018).  
Based on these two conflicting positions of transnationalism and nationalism, an open question 
for trade union research remains: why have the European trade union federations mostly taken 
the mixed form of coordinating platforms rather than developed into federations with more 
supranational functions (as European influence theories might expect) or remained 
intergovernmental instruments of exchange without any additional capacities (as national 
membership theories might expect)? 
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1.3 AN EXTREME CASE: THE CONSTRUCTION SECTOR – HIGH PRESSURE FOR 
EUROPEAN COOPERATION AND INTENSE COMPETITION 
The construction sector is a particularly interesting case for examining this question in greater 
detail. This sector constitutes an extreme case since pressure for European coordination in this 
industry is particularly high while competitive pressures among workers are also especially 
intense. Investigating labor cooperation in this sector can provide further insights into the 
mechanisms shaping European trade union organization. This dissertation explores union 
organization in the construction sector by studying the case of the European Federation of 
Building and Woodworkers (EFBWW). The basic idea is that the organizational form of European 
trade union federations reveals more about the long-term structure of European labor 
cooperation than do studies of single activities with diverse outcomes (such as in merger cases 
or within the Social Dialogue) or comparative studies on national unions, which exclude a large 
number of unions influencing European politics.  
The construction sector has been subject to an extreme form of Europeanization compared with 
other sectors, because the pressures of European integration in this industry have been 
particularly salient, especially with regard to freedom of movement and services (Lillie and Greer 
2007: 551). The EFBWW has had to deal with more competition within the sector than “any other 
federation” (Platzer and Müller 2009: 584). The “special character of the sector” (Cremers 2006a: 
172) and the extreme form of Europeanization apparent in the construction sector also make it 
a critical case where it is possible to clearly observe the pressures of European integration, such 
as the potential effects of labor migration and enlargement (Lubanski and Pedersen 2004: 12). 
Thus, the construction sector is prone to two opposing dynamics: on the one hand, the growing 
importance of EU regulations and an increase in migrant labor, which leads proponents of the 
influence hypothesis to assume that cooperation will increase. On the other hand, enhanced 
competition might lead proponents of the membership competition hypothesis to assume that 
cooperation will decrease. However, this study reveals that neither of these two assumptions is 
true on its own. Based on the description of the EFBWW in Platzer and Müller’s Handbook of 
International Trade Union Federations and this study’s observational data, the organizational 
outcome of trade union organization in the construction sector paints a mixed picture: at first, 
the federation developed continuously from an intergovernmental instrument of exchange to a 
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coordination forum with limited steering functions in the 1990s, which fits with the influence 
hypothesis. With increasing European integration, trade unions seem to have intensified their 
cooperation and organizational structure. However, since then, despite a growing EU, the 
introduction of the “four freedoms,” a common currency, and rising migration (with European 
Court of Justice rulings questioning the host country principle between 2005 and 2008), the 
organizational form of the European federation in the construction sector does not seem to have 
changed significantly, indicating that Europeanization has reached a certain level at which 
European federations are not substantially strengthened (as influence theories might predict), 
but also not substantially weakened (as membership competition theories might predict).  
Harold Lewis, former Secretary General of the International Transport Workers Federation, once 
said: “the international trade union movement is more than the sum of its parts and has something 
of a life of its own.” (2003: 341). Following this thought, instead of focusing on the national level 
or on single case studies of key activities as is often done in trade union research, this dissertation 
focuses on long-term structural developments on the European level. Empirically, research on 
the different paths of trade union Europeanization is still in its fledgling stages. Although a couple 
of studies have been written about the umbrella organization ETUC (Dølvik 1999, 2000; Dürmeier 
and Grundheber-Pilgram 1996; Goetschy 1996; Hoffmann 1998; Martin and Ross 2001; Taylor 
and Mathers 2004), very few studies have been published on the different European sectoral 
trade union organizations (Henning 2013; Kirchner 1977; Platzer 1991; Platzer and Müller 2009; 
Stöckl 1986). The focus on the EU-level outcome makes it possible to identify structural patterns 
over time. Such a research design avoids a widespread interpretation bias where case studies at 
a specific point in time are used as examples for Europeanization or nationalization, although 
both trends may co-exist in the same sector and among the same trade unions. For example, a 
study on a transnational construction site may suggest cooperation, whereas a study on a merger 
case in the same sector may provide more evidence in support of the membership competition 
thesis. The construction sector is a particularly interesting case because the Europeanization 
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1.4 DEVELOPING AN EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
Neither of the explanations the literature has provided so far alone suffices to explain why 
European trade union cooperation has taken its current form. This is not surprising, because the 
logics shaping a trade union are diverse and not necessarily uniform. Within a single federation, 
numerous – often opposing – stimuli exist, and the organizational outcome is likely to reflect 
these different streams. Trade unions are confronted with competing influences, but little is 
known about how these competing powers shape the structure of European trade unions, 
because there are surprisingly few publications that examine the organizational side of European 
trade unionism (Koch-Baumgarten 1999; Platzer and Müller 2009; Reutter and Rütters 2003; Rüb 
2009). What is more, a deep analysis of European coordination in the construction sector can 
provide insights into the competing rationales guiding international collaboration and the 
processes leading to organizational stabilization. 
The research literature highlights the fact that each logic in an organizational setting brings with 
it tensions and potential tradeoff situations. The explanation developed in this thesis is based on 
a synthesis of both influence and membership-based explanations into a more general 
framework of union Europeanization. A perspective integrating competing logics can provide a 
bridge between structural macro-perspectives and organizational micro-perspectives (Thornton 
and Ocasio 2008). 
Based on the reflection of business associations, Schmitter and Streeck have derived a general 
dilemma of organized interest between a logic of membership and a logic of influence (1999 
[1981]). On the one hand, organized interest associations need to offer services to their 
members in order to assure their own supply with resources (e.g., in the form of membership 
fees); on the other hand, organized interest associations are dependent on influencing their 
environment and gaining resources in return (e.g., recognition) in order to secure their members’ 
support (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 19). Translated to European unions, this means that 
serving national membership and expanding the range of influence beyond the national arena 
might lead to a tradeoff. Member interests might not always correspond to the goals of European 
coordination (Hyman 2005a: 3; Waddington 2005: 52). What is more, each additional 
administrative level might develop its own interests and an independent form of what Child et 
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al. have called the “logic of goal implementation” (Child et al. 1973). This logic reflects the idea 
that union administration may not always share the goals and priorities of union members (Child 
et al. 1973: 73f). Together, the following three factors lead to a “triangle of trade union 
organization” that shapes trade union’s responses to Europe: membership (goal formation), 
influence (institutional environment), and administrative (goal implementation) dynamics.  
Based on these observations, the first research question of this thesis is “How has the form of 
Europeanization adopted by the EFBWW been shaped by the competing organizational logics of 
membership, influence, and administration?” The dilemmas that develop from these three 
competing logics might lead unions to become stuck in a repetitive pattern of dealing with these 
dilemmas. Unions are often structured in a way that reflects the conditions of their founding 
years (Warner 1972: 51). Born out of diverging founding conditions and industry-specific 
structures, union organization on the national level is often viewed as a “frozen” landscape and 
is predestined for an analysis of path-dependent structures (Ebbinghaus 1993: 16). In this line of 
thinking, critical junctures are defining moments in time setting the direction for all subsequent 
developments (Collier and Collier 1991). Applying Pierson’s line of argumentation to European 
trade unions, the prevalence of multilateral institutions that are difficult to change, power 
asymmetries among the members, multilevel administration, the difficulty of collective action, 
and the slow-moving and ambiguous nature of many joint decisions all make European trade 
union federations particularly prone to the development of stable paths (Pierson 2000: 252). 
Martin and Ross have argued that “[trade unions] are ‘path dependent’, constrained 
organizationally by their pasts. They tend to move in directions that will not threaten shared 
ideas, values, and habits and their organizational learning will be skewed towards what is already 
known” (Martin and Ross 1999a: 4). However, whereas comparative industrial relations research 
relies heavily on the idea of national heritage and path dependence, this approach has not yet 
been applied to the European trade union federations and their distinctly European path.  
While the idea of organizational logics can help single out underlying conflicts, a detailed 
investigation over time can help understand how exactly the dynamics between logics unfold, 
and from which critical junctures onwards subsequent response options are increasingly 
narrowed (Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2004). In order to understand these processes, a perspective 
based on the idea of self-reinforcing mechanisms leading to a (potentially) locked-in pattern 
offers hypotheses explaining why and at which point in time a particular form of cooperation has 
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emerged over another (Pierson 2004; Sydow et al. 2009; Thelen 1999). Path dependence theory 
help single out critical junctures explaining why certain responses become inscribed in the 
organization, constraining the way in which the organization develops. 
A perspective focusing on the unintended processes often happening below the surface of active 
strategizing can make it easier to understand the circumstances under which unions are likely to 
repeat patterns that, in the long run, can lead to a stable organizational form constraining 
alternative options. This thesis assumes that, similar to the institutionalization process at the 
national level (Streeck and Hassel 2003), early developments and self-reinforcing mechanisms 
have restricted the way in which trade unions engage on the European level. A path dependency 
approach suggests that even though the organizations may adapt to environmental pressures in 
one way or another, this adaptation is restricted by the shadow of the past (Thelen 1999: 387). 
Critical junctures may set the course for longer periods of time (Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2004; 
Schreyögg and Sydow 2011). Path dependence theory can serve as a toolkit offering a number 
of mechanisms with which we are able to integrate previous analyses in a theoretical framework 
explaining why certain European organizational forms emerge. More precisely, five mechanisms 
are identified – learning, coordination, complementarity, adaptive expectations, and power – 
that may set into motion feedback loops that keep actors on a once-established path (Mahoney 
2000; Pierson 2000; Schreyögg and Sydow 2011).  
Based on these theoretical assumptions, the second research question is, "What key critical 
junctures explain the formation and stabilization of the present form of Europeanization?" Both of 
these research questions focus on the unfolding of long-term processes in order to analyze how 
the logics of membership, influence, and administration shape the organizational form of trade 
union cooperation. What is more, the lasting effect of decisions made during critical junctures 
can, over time, lead to self-reinforcing processes. However, as Capoccia and Kelemen have 
emphasized, “[d]espite the theoretical and practical importance of critical junctures, […] analyses 
of path dependence often devote little attention to them.” (2007: 341). Since previous research 
has often focused on case studies of labor coordination in short time periods (e.g., concerning 
specific directives such as the Posted Workers Directive or activity areas such as company 
agreements), attention to timing and sequence can help understand dynamics that only unfold 
over longer stretches of time. Since previous studies on trade unions only offer a few starting 
points for this perspective, this dissertation uses literature from path dependence theory,  
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literature on membership organizations, and Europeanization studies to address the research 
questions.  
 
1.5 SUMMARY AND OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
The identification of possible responses by trade union to European integration has provided 
possible outcomes from weak to strong Europeanization, which are discussed further in Chapter 
2. A brief overview of the development of European trade union federations has indicated that 
a dominant outcome of trade union Europeanization seems to have emerged in the form of 
coordinating organizations with limited resources. Based on the idea of competing logics with 
individual tradeoffs for the organization, this thesis focuses on (1) explaining the outcome in 
terms of these organizational logics and (2) asking what critical junctures explain the formation 
and stabilization of the present form of Europeanization. By adopting both a transnational and a 
historic perspective, the study is able to focus on the large-scale developments across six 
decades. By classifying theoretical outcomes between weak and strong Europeanization and 
identifying the outcome based on these criteria (see Chapter 2), a pitfall of case selection is 
avoided: namely, that a study of Europeanization on the EU level will indicate Europeanization 
and a study on the national level will highlight nationalization (Erne 2008: 4). 
In order to answer the questions posed, this dissertation proceeds as follows: the next two 
chapters build up the theoretical groundwork of this thesis. Chapter 2 conceptualizes 
Europeanization for this thesis and asks which potential outcomes of trade union 
Europeanization are possible based on the existing literature. The chapter then proceeds to 
synthesize previous descriptions of outcomes and describes six alternative organizational forms 
of European trade unionism.  
While Chapter 2 is concerned with a taxonomy of possible outcomes of Europeanization, Chapter 
3 develops an explanatory framework for these outcomes. After briefly reviewing existing 
approaches, a schema for investigating European labor federations based on the logics of 
membership, administration, and influence is developed. Among each pair of these logics, 
conflicting rationalities can lead to constraint patterns, which are investigated in more detail in 
the second section of the chapter. A number of organizational tensions resulting from the unique 
multilevel setting of the EU are outlined. The concluding theoretical section discusses the 
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importance of sequence and timing in the way these tensions unfold. It explains how path 
dependence theories can add to an understanding of trade union Europeanization and outlines 
how a number of self-reinforcing mechanisms could play out in trade unions.  
Chapter 4 describes the rationale for the case selection and the methodology of the empirical 
study and outlines the process of data collection and analysis. This chapter also describes how 
the logics are investigated and how a path can be analyzed empirically. 
The empirical analysis in Chapter 5 is devoted to the first research question and to the 
identification of critical junctures, which is a prerequisite for answering the second research 
question. The investigation describes how outcomes in three organizational phases can each be 
explained by the interplay between the logic of influence, membership, and administration. In 
each phase, constraining conflicts between pairs of logics are identified, which explain the 
organizational outcome. With its focus on sequences and critical events, the chapter also serves 
as a chronological frame for the second research question. Chapter 5 identifies a shift of the 
organizational form in the mid-1980s to the early 1990s. This shift is explained by three key 
events: (1) the introduction of Commission funding for labor cooperation, (2) a new and active 
administration, and (3) increasing diversity of the membership. According to path dependence 
theory, such critical junctures can be a starting point for explaining the formation and 
stabilization of current organizational forms. The results indicate that the medium-level form of 
Europeanization is an effect of external pull factors toward stronger European cooperation and 
unintended internal consequences, potentially reducing the member’s support for strengthening 
the European federations. As the membership adapts to the expectation that external resources 
will be provided and the administration navigates these expectations, the dependency on 
external resources from the influence logic is likely to increase over time. This shift can be 
explained by key events in each logic.  
Chapter 6 turns its focus to the second research question, particularly the question of 
stabilization. The basic idea is that tensions embodied in the EFBWW might have become self-
reinforcing at certain points. The chapter’s conclusions imply that stable organizational patterns 
have developed: (1) a stable organizational form as coordinator of non-binding standards, (2) a 
persistent pattern of funding by the European Commission, and (3) a stable division of labor and 
pattern of affiliation fees between the international federation Building and Woodworkers 
International (BWI) and the European federation EFBWW. The results seem to indicate that 
 
Henni Appell  Workers of Europe Unite!? - Explaining the Form of European Labor Organization 30 
stabilization appears to have been driven by resource dependencies and adaptive expectations, 
or the “dark side” of the pattern. In addition, alternative organizational routes such as the idea 
of European migrant workers’ unions have not succeeded. However, this study argues that in 
political systems, transformation is always an option. In the case of the EFBWW, more open and 
versatile structures exist, which challenges the idea of strategic lock-in and highlights the “bright 
side” of the EFBWW’s organizational pattern, allowing the EFBWW to use external dependencies 
to achieve political goals. 
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with a summary in the context of the theoretical approach 
of this thesis, suggestions for further research and an assessment of the methodology. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 POSSIBLE OUTCOMES: INTRODUCING ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS OF 
TRADE UNION EUROPEANIZATION  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
There is no “one size fits all” approach for trade unions to respond to economic integration. This 
section demonstrates that, in theory, a number of outcomes are possible, but European sectoral 
federations have converged toward one dominant form. The chapter proceeds in the following 
steps: first, uses of the concepts of transnationalization and Europeanization are introduced. 
Second, following from these concepts, an analytical grid for classifying possible trade union 
responses to European integration is developed. Recent literature has identified a number of 
organizational forms of international trade union federations. Six organizational modes of 
transnationalization are defined which outline the role of the organization, the type of 
membership within the organization, and the main arena of activity. Third, this chapter describes 
the Europeanization outcome this dissertation seeks to explain and illustrates the conversion of 
European sectoral trade union federations toward a dominant organizational form. 
 
2.2 CONCEPTUALIZING EUROPEANIZATION 
Europeanization as a concept often oscillates between explanatory frameworks and normative 
approaches. For example, Roland Erne has argued that trade union cooperation can be 
important for fostering a European transnational democracy (Erne 2008). Similarly, Gajewska 
has contended that workers’ cooperation can contribute to a feeling of transnational solidarity, 
which might support the emergence of a European identity (Gajewska 2008, 2009). In 
revitalization literature, transnationalization has been identified as one of the six main strategic 
devices for regaining trade union capacities (Turner 2004). In such a sense of the word, the 
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concept itself may suggest Europeanization as the best option. Other authors such as Grote and 
Lang have argued that Europeanization touches upon core elements of organizational structure: 
“In the very last instance, [Europeanization] targets […] the very raison d’être of national interest 
associations” (Grote and Lang 2003: 229). This ambivalence between Europeanization as the 
hope of regaining organizational capacities and Europeanization as the danger of losing 
organizational power is a recurring theme in trade union research. “Europeanization” can refer 
to both the transformation of organizations, institutions, identities, or other constructs and to 
the process of European integration through supranational legislation. Therefore, when speaking 
of “Europeanization” it is important to be clear what is being explained. In empirical studies on 
trade union organizations, there are four main uses of the concepts of transnationalization and 
Europeanization: in the first two approaches, Europeanization is part of the outcome that needs 
to be explained, while the last two treat Europeanization as the cause of a transformation. 
First, transnationalization can refer to the emergence of transnational rules or institutions as 
distinct social structures (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Djelic et al. 2012; Hale and Held 2011; 
Platzer and Müller 2009). These approaches focus on horizontal processes of coordination 
(Radaelli and Pasquier 2008: 38). Transnationalization is viewed as a sphere with its own identity, 
implying a transnational arena that consists of more than cross-national exchange processes 
(Djelic and Quack 2008: 300). Analogously, Europeanization understood in this sense concerns 
the “emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance” 
(Risse et al. 2001: 2). From these perspectives, Europeanization is regarded as the outcome or 
dependent variable that needs to be explained. For example, Pernicka and Glassner have studied 
the driving factors for horizontal Europeanization in wage bargaining (Pernicka and Glassner 
2012). Other approaches have argued that Europeanization has already occurred but that there 
are different types or qualities of Europeanization. Studies with such an approach examine, for 
example, the evolution of transnational social movements (Della Porta et al. 2009; Della Porta 
and Kriesi 1999; Khagram et al. 2002; Smith et al. 1997). In trade union research, these studies 
have focused on detailed studies of international trade union organizations such as the ITF (Koch-
Baumgarten 1998) and the ETUC (Dølvik 1997, 1999), or on the emergence of Global Union 
Federations (Reutter 1998).  
The second approach conceptualizes Europeanization on a vertical scale and views 
Europeanization or transnationalization as the outcome of transformation of national trade 
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unionism. These bottom-up perspectives view transnational organizations as an extension of 
national trade unionism (Hyman 2002a). In empirical research, these approaches focus mainly 
on the study of national trade union organizations and the evolution of transnational structures 
emerging from national practices (Fetzer 2005; Greven 2003; Mittag 2010; Moody 1998; Rüb 
2009; Teague 1989). The main difference from horizontal approaches is that the bottom-up 
perspectives take the organizational form of national organizations as the outcome, while 
horizontal approaches consider the distinct social structure of transnational organizations the 
outcome.  
Third, transnationalization or Europeanization can refer to the transformation of domestic 
institutions and politics through transnational or European dynamics (Bache 2008; Knill and 
Lehmkuhl 2002; Risse et al. 2001). Such a top-down approach also studies vertical dynamics but 
treats Europeanization as the independent variable, investigating the influence of the European 
level on national member states (Börzel and Panke 2015; Börzel and Risse 2000). In trade union 
research, this transformation of national organizations through European integration is often 
explored in studies analyzing national responses to specific issues. For example, one important 
topic for these studies has been trade union’s reactions to the free movement of labor: Krings 
has investigated how continental and Anglo-Saxon unions have responded to increased labor 
migration (Krings 2009); Dølvik, Eldring, and others have studied Nordic responses to migrant 
labor from other EU countries (Dølvik and Eldring 2006; Eldring et al. 2009); and Hardy and 
Fitzgerald have investigated Polish responses to migration (Hardy and Fitzgerald 2010).  
A fourth perspective also investigates European integration/transnationalization as the cause of 
transformation, but from a horizontal approach. This line of research investigates reactions to 
specific issues on the European level. For example, Lillie and Greer have studied responses to 
migration in the European construction sector on the transnational level (Lillie and Greer 2007). 
Other authors have investigated responses to European lawmaking on a sectoral level, such as 
in the case of freedom of services (Arnold 2008; Bernaciak 2010b; Cremers et al. 2007; Druker 
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Table 1: Uses of Transnationalization/Europeanization in Empirical Research 
Transnationalization/Europeanization as 





Outcome of transnational/European organization as 
distinct social structure  
 
(4) Horizontal: 
Cause of transnational/European organization as 
distinct social structure  
 
(2) Bottom-Up:  
Outcome of transformation of national organizations 
 
(3) Top-Down: 
Cause of transformation of national organizations 
 
Of the four ways of conceptualizing Europeanization described above, this study is interested in 
explaining the horizontal trade union organization on the European level (see Number 1 in Table 
1). Therefore, the following section proceeds as follows: in the first step, a literature review 
offers several hypothetical outcomes of transformation of national organizations (bottom-up 
approach). Based on these assumptions of national trade union’s reactions to Europe, possible 
horizontal coordination outcomes are described. Chapter 3 then develops theoretical 
approaches that can help explain the dominant outcome described in this chapter. 
 
2.3 HOW UNIONS COULD RESPOND TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
2.3.1 BOTTOM-UP OUTCOMES: NATIONAL OR EUROPEAN-LEVEL ORIENTATION 
In the literature, there are a number of bottom-up approaches outlining possible strategies taken 
by national unions, which can each lead to different organizational outcomes. Two main 
alternatives for unions are described. First, national unions can opt for either a European or 
national orientation (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1994; Erne 2008; Hyman 2005b). Several authors 
have described Europeanization and (re)nationalization as two options on a vertical scale (Dølvik 
2002; Ebbinghaus and Visser 1994; Erne 2008; Hyman 2005b). Ebbinghaus and Visser have 
argued that unions might pursue a “nationalist-oppositional” strategy, which is based on 
principal opposition toward transnational trade unionism where the nation state is seen as the 
adequate realm for securing labor rights (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1994: 233). These 
(re)nationalization strategies reject the European project due to its liberal ideology (Erne 2008: 
3) or are pursued to counter competitive pressures from integration. The French Confédération 
générale du travail (CGT) is often cited as an example for this kind of position (Ebbinghaus and 
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Visser 1994: 233; Hyman 2005b: 12), which Hyman calls “No, because” (Hyman 2005b: 12). 
According to Hyman’s classification, this type of union opposes European integration (“No”), 
since free markets are seen as capitalist conspiracy to “undermine workers’ protections” 
(“because”) (Hyman 2005b: 12). 
A further (re)nationalization option is the “national-particularistic” position (Ebbinghaus and 
Visser 1994: 233) or, in Hyman’s words, the “no, unless” position (Hyman 2005b: 12). This type 
of position is equally defensive of the national polity as home of labor’s interests, but the 
potential of the EU to integrate a social dimension is acknowledged. Examples for this position 
are the British TUC and the unions of the Nordic countries (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1994: 234; 
Hyman 2005b: 12). Others have pointed out that renationalization can also occur when unions 
engage in concerted national actions that might exacerbate competitive pressures (Bieling and 
Schulten 2001; Marginson et al. 2003: 182).  
The motivation of Europeanization strategies is ambiguous: on the one hand, Europeanization is 
simply seen as the only possible option to counteract increased cross-border mobilization and 
influence EU legislation; on the other hand, unions might be convinced of the European idea 
based on the idea of solidarity without borders (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1994: 234). The first 
Europeanization option is what Ebbinghaus and Visser have called the “transnational-
opportunistic strategy” and what Hyman has called the “Yes, if” option (Ebbinghaus and Visser 
1994: 234; Hyman 2005b: 12). Ebbinghaus and Visser have argued that employer strategies often 
follow such an opportunistic concept but that trade unions, albeit their positive view of collective 
action, often pursue the strategy of national interests as well. The second Europeanization 
option represents the idea of a supranational position in which class interests precede territorial 
interests (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1994: 234).  
A further hypothetical strategy is the orientation toward the company arena. An orientation 
toward activities on the firm level allows laborers to address the transnationalization of 
companies directly without, as Lillie and Greer have emphasized, having to refer to governments 
and employers as potentially unreliable partners (Lillie and Greer 2007: 573). Analytically, the 
company-level can be treated as a subdivision of both transnationalization and nationalization 
strategies. Efforts establishing labor standards along the production cycle through international 
framework agreements or transnational works councils requires union networks that work in 
both national and transnational arenas (Fichter and Meardi 2006; Marginson 2016).  
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A final option that has been given little attention in the literature on union transnationalization 
is that unions might not engage in Europeanization but instead “skip” a level and pursue 
internationalization strategies. In this case, Europe would simply be a subdivision of the 
international level, and the focus would be on establishing global cooperation. Europeanization 
is mostly a synonym for changes with regard to European integration. It is seldom understood as 
a purely geographical term and is mainly confined to the study of the EU and its accession 
countries. However, this focus on Europeanization instead of transnationalization tends to blend 
out the global nature of production and the limited scope of European governance. It might seem 
unlikely that a trade union in a member state of the EU would neglect the European level 
completely; however, the motivation for pursuing an internationalization strategy approach 
instead of an Europeanization approach might be, for instance, that the sectoral issues are 
mainly international (and not European), or that there are financial restrictions in terms of 
financing both global and European work. 
 
2.3.2 HORIZONTAL COORDINATION OUTCOMES: ORGANIZATIONAL MODES OF 
EUROPEANIZATION 
Based on conscious or unconscious choices regarding nationalization or Europeanization, 
European labor could evolve into a variety of different organizational modes of horizontal 
coordination. Over the years, a number of conceptualizations have been used. A start was made 
by Ebbinghaus and Visser, who have developed a broad overview of theoretical options for union 
Europeanization (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1994: 229ff). They have distinguished between three 
types of Europeanization outcomes: first, a “hierarchy-option,” according to which the 
development of transnational unions would follow the logic of the development of national 
unions, which also needed time to evolve from local to centralized national organizations 
(Ebbinghaus and Visser 1994: 229). The second option they have defined is the “market-option,” 
in which trade unions negotiate transnationally with mutual benefits for all participants 
(Ebbinghaus and Visser 1994: 230). The third option is the “network-option,” in which trade 
unions engage in information exchange across borders and on different levels with different 
degrees of formalization (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1994: 230).  
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Hyman has distinguished between three main organizational types: agitation, bureaucracy, and 
diplomacy (Hyman 2002a). Contrary to Ebbinghaus and Visser, who have considered national 
unions as members of international organizations, Hyman has described international 
organizational types based on individual workers as members. Agitation describes an 
international movement-style trade unionism based on mass mobilization and grassroots 
activism with a short-term focus (Hyman 2002a: 6). In Hyman’s bureaucratic mode, decisions are 
determined hierarchically, the organization’s strategic perspective is longer term, and central 
decision-making is generally observed (Hyman 2002a: 6f). In the diplomatic model, which is a 
particular form of bureaucratization, international trade unions act as consultants for 
international organizations such as the International Labor Organization (ILO), taking up a 
position as social partner on the international level (Hyman 2002a: 8). 
Larsson has argued that transnational trade union cooperation can evolve into four distinct 
forms: first, “communication networks” for multilateral information exchange; second, loose 
“coordination networks” within which unions coordinate their activities; third, “cooperation 
networks” where “common measures and activities on a ‘case for case’ basis” are developed; 
and fourth, transnational “meta-organization[s]” that can act independently for their national 
affiliates (Larsson 2012: 153). 
Erne has identified democratization and technocratization as two options for either 
Europeanization or renationalization (Erne 2008). Four potential outcomes emerged: a 
technocratic renationalization strategy focuses on national competitiveness, whereas a 
democratic renationalization strategy aims at reestablishing a national social democratic model 
(Erne 2008: 3). Euro-technocratization in turn refers to a strategy of union diplomacy on the 
European level detached from contentious national politics (Erne 2008: 3). Erne’s Euro-
democratization describes a mode where unions engage in collective action in the European or 
national arena (Erne 2008: 3).  
A project from the University of Applied Sciences in Fulda also uses thoughts from multilevel 
governance (Scharpf 2001) and European interest intermediation (Eising and Kohler-Koch 2005) 
and adapts these to transnational unions (Platzer and Müller 2009; Platzer and Müller 2011; Rüb 
2009). The analytical grid developed by Rüb (2009) and applied in a comparative project led by 
Platzer and Müller (Platzer and Müller 2009) can be used as a tool to classify the functional profile 
of transnational organizations. Five modes of transnational problem-solving with corresponding 
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roles for the transnational federation have been established (Platzer and Müller 2009; Rüb 
2009): competitive mutual adjustment (instrument), communicative rapprochement (forum), 
international negotiation of non-binding standards (coordination platform), international 
negotiation of binding standards (regulatory platform), and hierarchical direction of 
supranational organization (supranational organization). 
In a system of competitive mutual adjustment, the national affiliates pursue their own 
transnational politics without coordination (Platzer and Müller 2009: 45; Rüb 2009: 83). By a 
process of action and reaction motivated by competitive pressures, they are led to the decisions 
of their peers. The transnational organization functions as an instrument used by certain groups 
of unions to achieve specific goals. This setting has parallels to Ernes technocratic nationalization 
outcome (Erne 2008: 3).  
A second transnationalization outcome is communicative rapprochement (Rüb 2009: 85), which 
has several parallels to the “network option” outlined by Ebbinghaus and Visser (1994). The 
actors engage in a form of “trade union diplomacy” (Hyman 2002a; Platzer and Müller 2009: 45), 
exchanging information and experiences. This form of communication can provide the basis for 
further coordination. The transnational federation may, but does not have to, provide a forum 
for this exchange process. This outcome relates to Erne’s Euro-technocratization model and 
Hyman’s “labor diplomat” idea (Erne 2008; Hyman 2002a). 
In the third transnationalization outcome, “international negotiation of non-binding standards,” 
national strategies are coordinated on the international level via joint agreements or codes of 
conduct (Platzer and Müller 2009: 46; Rüb 2009: 87). The transnational organization functions 
as a coordination platform for these activities. Hyman’s agitator model is compatible with this 
mode insofar as internationalization in this setting can also occur from below (Hyman 2002a). 
In the fourth mode, the national affiliates negotiate binding standards (Platzer and Müller 2009: 
46f; Rüb 2009: 89). In such a constellation, the national affiliates coordinate their activities just 
as in the third mode, but the transnational organization has limited regulatory steering functions. 
Furthermore, due to the binding nature of the decisions, the organization is able to act in a more 
autonomous way when dealing with government institutions and employers. The transnational 
organization also has the function of monitoring compliance on the national level. 
The fifth mode – hierarchical steering via a supranational organization – already names the 
function of the transnational organization (Platzer and Müller 2009: 47; Rüb 2009: 89). The 
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national members transfer competencies to the international level, which steers decision-
making and implements decisions. The last two modes have parallels with Hyman’s bureaucratic 
mode, where long-term decisions are determined from the top down (Hyman 2002a: 6f). 
These authors have pointed out that this mode could eventually enable a supranational trade 
union. However, there is a difference between a hierarchical steering organization with national 
affiliates as members and a transnational union whose members are individual workers. Since 
the supranational nature of the EU is a unique structure with distinct supranational lawmaking 
abilities, there are parallels to emerging national structures. Therefore, this thesis proposes a 
sixth hypothetical mode: the transnational union that functions just like a national union with 
services for individual members. In a transnational union, employees join the transnational union 
without having to be a member of a national union. The idea is similar to Ebbinghaus and Visser’s 
vision of the hierarchy option (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1994: 229), in which the transnational 
unions would eventually take up the same responsibilities as a national union. A rare example of 
such a union type is Nautilus (Nautilus International 2011). If one follows Leibfried and takes the 
United States or the German Reich as historical analogies for the increasing integration of the EU 
(Leibfried 1993), this option seems to be a potential next step. 
In summary, this structure describes an evolutionary system of Europeanization outcomes from 
the organization as an instrument with a weak Europeanization outcome to the organization as 
a supranational actor representing a strong Europeanization outcome. The organizational modes 
broadly correspond to a progressive development from nationalization to transnationalization, 
with Europeanization as an intermediate option. The table below integrates these ideas and 
displays the variety of possible responses to European integration from weak (unions that remain 
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Table 2: Modes of Transnational Organization  
























g Horizontal Coordination 
Outcomes: Organizational 
Modes  
Role of Transnational 
organization  
Members Main Arena 
National/European/Transnational 
6 Transnational labor cooperation Transnational 
representation 
Individuals Europeanization/transnationalization 




National affiliates Europeanization/transnationalization 




National affiliates Europeanization/transnationalization 
3 International negotiation of non-
binding standards 
Coordination National affiliates Europeanization/transnationalization 
2 Communicative rapprochement Forum National affiliates Europeanization/transnationalization 
1 Competitive mutual adjustment Instrument National affiliates (Re)nationalization  
Table 2 summarizes the six horizontal coordination outcomes described above, from competitive 
mutual adjustment to transnational labor cooperation. Each of these organizational modes 
corresponds to a specific role of the transnational organization. In the mode of international 
negotiation of binding standards, for example, the transnational organization has steering and 
monitoring functions. The third column summarizes the type of membership within each 
organizational outcome. While Europeanization outcomes (1) through (5) coordinate national 
affiliates as members, a transnational union would include individual workers as members. The 
last column clarifies the main arena of activities and is based on Erne’s description of two primary 
options for unions: Europeanization (or – more broadly speaking – transnationalization) and 
nationalization. While all options from (2) to (6) expect some form of Europeanization outcome, 
in the weakest form of cooperation, the main arena remains national. This scale provides a 
framework for analyzing the organizational outcomes of European trade union federations. 
However, in real life these typologies are not always as clear-cut as the scale might suggest. Not 
every federation fits clearly into one box at any point in time. However, with such a framework 
at hand, it is easier to categorize broad, long-term developments. The underlying causes of these 
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2.4 WORKERS OF EUROPE UNITE!? – THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN 
FEDERATIONS  
On the scale of outcomes described above, European trade unions have remained on an 
intermediate level at Stage 3 to 4. European trade unions have been able to engage in 
transnational action by, for example, politicizing transnational mergers and restructuring (Erne 
2008) and acting as negotiating partners in the European Social Dialogue (Pochet 2005) or as 
lobbyists by, for example, successfully influencing the Service Directive (Arnold 2008). They have 
developed membership service, limited bargaining coordination, and political representation. 
However, European trade union federations have not developed into supranational 
organizations with hierarchical steering functions, but instead seem to have converged toward 
a coordinating mode. “Structural Europeanization” in the sense of hierarchical steering has not 
developed significantly (Meardi 2010: 99).  
The following overview considers the most important European industry federations and 
summarizes the organizational forms the federations have taken. This overview is based on the 
study on European trade union federations conducted by Platzer and Müller (Platzer and Müller 
2009), which is the only reference available covering all federations. These authors have based 
their assessment on a scale ranging from mutual competitive adjustment to hierarchical steering. 
With the addition of the category transnational cooperation, this can be transferred a scale from 
1 to 6 (see Chapter 2.3). This stylized scale makes it possible to see which organizational forms 
dominate. Within these organizational forms, unions might engage in a variety of key activities. 
In order to operationalize this scale, Platzer and Müller have defined “member-oriented 
policies,” “company-policies,” and “sectoral-regulative policies” as core functions of trade unions 
(Platzer and Müller 2009: 51ff). The following paragraphs summarize the organizational 
development of the six major European trade union federations. 
In May 2012, the three federations in the metal, chemicals, and textile sector merged to form 
the IndustriALL European Trade Union. It is too early to ascertain which kind of organizational 
mode IndustriALL has developed; therefore, the summaries concentrate on the previous 
independent federations. The largest of the sectoral federations, the European Metalworkers’ 
Federation (EMF), has developed from being an information provider to taking up a more 
professionalized and active coordinating role (Henning and Clairmont 2011: 15; Platzer and 
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Müller 2009). The EMF is often regarded as a pioneer and pace-setter in terms of European 
coordination, particularly in the field of wage bargaining coordination (Dufresne 2011: 77; 
Schulten 2002: 11). In the field of company bargaining, the organization has even developed 
steering capacities by establishing binding standards for members through, for example, the EMF 
guidelines for European company negotiations (Henning and Clairmont 2011: 31). Faced with 
enormous shifts in the EMF’s sectoral and institutional environment, the main transformation of 
the EMF from information provider to strategic coordinator came about in the early 1990s 
(Platzer and Müller 2009: 475). However, this coordinating role remains limited by a reduced 
financial basis and the federation’s strong dependence on financial and infrastructural support 
from the EU Commission (Platzer and Müller 2009: 475). 
The early 1990s were also a time of change for the European Mine, Chemical and Energy 
Workers Federation (EMCEF). Platzer and Müller have emphasized that, parallel to increased 
economic integration in the chemical sector since the 1990s, the EMCEF has developed 
intensified information exchange among its members (Platzer and Müller 2009: 475). However, 
the EMCEF’s endowment with resources is even less generous than the EMF’s and has not 
increased significantly since the organization was founded (Platzer and Müller 2009: 520). Bieler 
has also emphasized that the EMCEF has developed the transnational level to a lesser extent 
than other sectors (Bieler 2005: 448). This view is supported by another study on the EMCEF 
according to which organizational Europeanization in the sector is limited despite intense 
competitive pressures (Le Queux and Fajertag 2001). A stronger profile of the EMCEF remains 
restricted to those areas in which either EMCEF provides access to European decision-makers or 
EMCEF activities do not touch upon national autonomy (Platzer and Müller 2009: 475). Given the 
increase of European regulation in the sector, the EMCEF faces severe limits in terms of financial 
support and staff (Waddington 2006a: 332) and has increasingly turned toward external donors 
to secure funds (Platzer and Müller 2009: 518). In terms of organizational structure, the EMCEF’s 
main responsibility remains securing the information flow between the national and European 
levels (Platzer and Müller 2009: 519), although EMCEF also has developed policy frameworks 
and a coordinating committee for EWCs (Waddington 2006a). Despite the increased willingness 
of national affiliates to build up European structures (Le Queux and Fajertag 2001: 130), the 
discrepancy between rhetoric and action remains problematic, since the EMCEF has few means 
to secure compliance (Platzer and Müller 2009: 520). A similar situation can be observed in the 
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European Trade Union Federation for Textiles, Clothing and Leather (ETUF-TCL). Although the 
federation has developed coordinating functions, particularly by negotiating soft regulations in 
the sectoral social dialogue, further extension of its responsibilities and capacities remains 
restricted due to a lack of resources (Platzer and Müller 2009: 668). 
In the transport sector (represented by the European Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF), the 
organizational form also tends to converge toward the role of the federation as an information 
and service provider (Platzer and Müller 2009: 552) with an approach that is sometimes 
described as “technocratic” by officials from the ITF (Turnbull 2006: 313). Apart from the primary 
function of information exchange, the ETF has been able to act as a steering organization in a 
limited number of cases regarding the negotiation of collective agreements in the sectoral social 
dialogue (Platzer and Müller 2009: 553).  
In the European Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU), the main functions of the 
organization are those of an information provider, a forum for information exchange, and to a 
limited extent, a negotiator of non-binding rules in the sectoral social dialogue (Bieler 2005: 475f; 
Platzer and Müller 2009: 651f). In the 1990s, EPSU developed from a loosely cooperating 
network of federations into a more independent European federation with distinct 
responsibilities to coordinate information exchange and negotiation guidelines (Platzer and 
Müller 2009: 651f). EPSU has also been a forerunner when it comes to forging coalitions with 
other social movements, such as in privatization struggles (Bieler 2005: 476). Platzer and Müller 
have concluded that this organization has developed into a coordination platform (Platzer and 
Müller 2009: 651f). 
UNI Europa, the European services workers union, was created by a merger of four smaller 
federations in 2000, leading to a diverse sectoral membership structure. UNI Europe’s 
organizational structure is a bit different from that of national federations because it is the only 
European federation formally embedded in an international federation: in this case, UNI Global. 
In addition, the sectors within the federation have relatively autonomous areas of responsibility, 
making it more difficult to coordinate across sectors and pinpoint one organizational form 
(Darling 2007). Apart from the expansion of information and service provision for its members 
(Platzer and Müller 2009: 625f), UNI Europe has become increasingly involved in the active and 
independent representation of its membership regarding, for example, the revision of the 
Service Directive (Arnold 2008: 13; Darling 2007). A clear assessment is difficult, but Platzer and 
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Müller have noted that the federation has in some sectoral issue areas (e.g., on lifelong learning 
in the graphics sector) developed steering qualities with a stronger role of the secretariat (Platzer 
and Müller 2009: 625). However, despite these developments toward a European coordinating 
role, Platzer and Müller conclude with the remark that a more proactive policy of UNI Europe 
with supranational projects remains restricted (Platzer and Müller 2009: 627). 
The European Federation of Trade Unions in the Food, Agriculture and Tourism, EFFAT, is, like 
UNI, a merged federation that was founded in 2000. Also like UNI, it is characterized by the 
sectoral legacies and diversities of its founding federations. Nevertheless, the organization has 
taken up coordinating functions in several areas, particularly in the area of company policies 
(Platzer and Müller 2009: 689f) and, to a limited extent, by coordinating collective bargaining 
within the International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and 
Allied Workers' Associations (IUF) (Leonard et al. 2007). However, positive synergies from the 
merger seem to be limited, and the stagnating resources make it difficult for the federation to 
take up a stronger role despite the leadership’s intentions to forward European coordination 
(Fattmann 2010; Platzer and Müller 2009: 689).  
Similar to the development in the chemical, metal, and public sectors, increasing European 
integration in the late 1980s and early 1990s led to changes in union organization in the 
European building sector. In the 1990s, the EFBWW began to develop into the coordination 
platform it is today with increased responsibilities for the secretariat. Platzer and Müller have 
concluded that the organization has developed from a forum and information provider to a 
coordination platform with steps toward a steering committee (Platzer and Müller 2009: 585). 
Erne has even argued that the EFBWW has contributed to Euro-democratization through its 
mobilizing and exchange strategies (Erne 2008: 95). Again, however, these authors have noted 
the restrictions of the federation in terms of resources, which have limited additional 
supranational structures (Platzer and Müller 2009: 586).  
The literature summarized above provides a valuable tool for grouping European trade union 
federation’s organizational outcomes and highlighting cross-sectoral trends. The following graph 
summarizes the organizational modes of the sectoral federations portrayed above in a very 
stylized, simple form. 
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Figure 1: Organizational Forms of Selected European Trade Union Federations  
(Platzer and Müller 2009)  
 
 Organizational Mode  Role of Transnational 
Organization  
6 Transnational labor cooperation Transnational representation 
5 Hierarchical direction of supranational organization Supranational authority 
4 International negotiation of binding standards Steering and monitoring 
3 International negotiation of non-binding standards Coordination 
2 Communicative rapprochement Forum 
1 Competitive mutual adjustment Instrument 
 
Although the reality of European trade unionism is much more complex, this graph illustrates an 
overall pattern. The numbers from one to six correspond to the organizational forms from 
instrument (1) to transnational labor cooperation (6). Despite differences in the concrete 
manifestation of these forms, all the federations appear to have developed into coordinating 
organizations with limited tendencies toward steering organizations, especially in the field of 
company representation. Across all federations, the organizational form has converged toward 
a similar organizational outcome. What can be deducted from Platzer and Müller’s handbook is 
that all these federations reached this organizational form after a transformational period that 
began at roughly the same time in the early 1990s. This conclusion is emphasized by Müller et 
al., who have emphasized that in none of the federations were the transnational secretariats 
significantly extended during the past two decades, despite growing European integration 
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2.5 SUMMARY  
This chapter has outlined a way of systematizing outcomes of transnational labor organization. 
Although the description of the organizational modes might imply an evolutionary process of 
transnational trade unionism, the review of existing organizational forms indicates that trade 
unions seem to be set on an intermediate form of Europeanization and face limitations in terms 
of resources for the secretariats and with regard to an increased steering role. This organizational 
outcome appears to have stabilized in the 1990s. Far from continually developing more 
capacities, the European trade union federations converged on a status that allowed them to 
coordinate but has not led to a significant increase in the resources required to face deepening 
European integration. Although multiple options for Europeanization are available, the European 
trade union federations have followed a similar path on which the European federations have 
converged toward a coordinating role with weak resources, which has remained relatively stable 
over the past 20 years (Müller et al. 2010: 55). The graph above also illustrates that there is a 
common path of Europeanization despite differences in size or industry. The observed reality is 
a “mixed bag”: neither theories expecting cooperation due to European influences nor theories 
expecting nationalization due to membership competition explain the current outcome. On the 
one hand, European federations have not significantly gained structural capacities even though 
the number of affiliates grew due to enlargement and the number of labor issues decided on the 
EU level rose. On the other hand, all federations have developed a medium-level degree of 
Europeanization despite competitive pressures. This observation is particularly apparent in the 
construction sector, where the freedom of movement and increased labor competition have 
been particularly salient. Thus, there is reason to suspect that the EFBWW, which represents 
labor in the construction industry, is a critical case when it comes to analyzing organizational 
persistence despite counterfactual developments in the institutional, political, and economic 
environment.  
There is a lack of a systematic framework for identifying the main factors explaining outcomes 
of trade union Europeanization. Therefore, the next chapter establishes the framework for the 
empirical investigation of these outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 3 





This chapter develops a framework for explaining which factors led to the Europeanization 
outcomes described in Chapter 2. It begins with an organizational theory of trade unions to 
identify variables that influence the outcomes of European trade union organizations. Three 
main logics are identified (Child et al. 1973; Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]): the logic of 
influence, the logic of administration, and the logic of membership. However, the description of 
these three logics also demonstrates that each of the logics can be in conflict with the others. 
The logics in turn define actors’ interests within the organization. In dealing with the resulting 
dilemmas, the actors within the organization are likely to develop structural patterns. These 
patterns may become increasingly stable over time. For example, the repetition of individual 
behavior due to learning effects or an organizational drive toward established routines can spur 
a recurring cycle, leading to a dominant organizational form. At the European level, stabilizing 
mechanisms are particularly salient since the aggregation of conflicting logics might lead to 
unintended structural consequences. Thus, third, a broad theoretical framework is required to 
explain how  European trade union federations become constrained. Path dependency concepts 
focus on long-term effects of early events and critical junctures (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007; 
Pierson 2004; Thelen 1999), making it possible to retrospectively understand at which points in 
time dominant patterns emerge below the surface of active strategizing. Actors are caught in 
structures shaped by early decisions, and mechanisms of reproduction create obstacles to 
change that are increasingly difficult to overcome. Path dependence theory offers a number of 
mechanisms that help to explain such a process.  
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3.2 EXISTING EXPLANATIONS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The existing literature on European trade unionism explains European coordination from 
different vantage points. Although the literature on the organizational outcomes of trade union 
structures is still in its infancy (Platzer and Müller 2011), it is possible to deduce several 
explanations from European industrial relations research. Membership-driven theories 
concentrate on national union’s reactions to European integration (Beyers and Kerremans 2007; 
Busemeyer et al. 2008; Della Porta and Caiani 2006; Hyman 2002b, 2007; Martin and Ross 1999c; 
Streeck 1992). These studies focus on internal union dynamics and cross-national variety among 
members’ interests, which shape the ability and willingness of unions to cooperate across 
borders (Bernaciak 2008; Visser and Ebbinghaus 1992). This line of reasoning points to the 
members’ interests in national autonomy, which hinder unions in pursuing intensified 
cooperation (Bieling and Schulten 2001; Schulten 2010). In addition, trade unions’ dependency 
on their national membership as a basis for their financial resources is argued to hinder them in 
internationalizing (Pernicka and Glassner 2012). In a large-scale study questioning national 
unionists, Larsson has identified, among others, differences in financial resources and internal 
priority issues as primary factors impeding transnational cooperation (Larsson 2012). Less 
significant, according to Larsson’s survey, are differences in language and culture. Other studies 
highlight the fact that competitive pressures and differences in national industrial relations 
systems make cooperation unlikely (Cerny 1997; Pulignano 2006; Sadowski et al. 2002; Streeck 
1992). 
Influence-driven theories, on the other hand, are based on a functionalist understanding of 
European cooperation where cooperation increases as markets expand (Abbott 2007; Anner et 
al. 2006; Barton and Fairbrother 2007; Beckert et al. 2004; Bieler and Lindberg 2010; Croucher 
et al. 2003a; Erne 2008). Ramsay has described this approach as “evolutionary optimism,” where 
union organization is seen as a developing from national to transnational based on the activities 
of multinational firms (Ramsay 1999: 195). 
This line of thinking also has a normative aspect that highlights that the creation of a European 
polity, and financial globalization makes transnational cooperation indispensable (Bieler and 
Lindberg 2010; Erne 2008; Keune 2008; Marginson and Sisson 2006). Explanations focusing on 
sectoral differences highlight the fact that the organization of the industry itself shapes the 
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extent of cooperation (Anner et al. 2006; Marginson et al. 2003; Pochet 2009). Intensifying 
internationalization is considered a pull factor for trade unions to increase their cooperation and 
become less defensive in their position toward international capital (Jacobi 2006). Glassner and 
Pernicka have argued that market internationalization only leads to an increase in European 
strategizing by national unions if it is accompanied by institutional developments such as the 
European Monetary Union, the creation of EWC directives, or European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
rulings (2012). 
Both the membership and the influence-oriented lines of reasoning are informed by research on 
European instruments of industrial relations. Research on EWCs and company-level agreements 
has revealed that they can serve as driving forces for both cooperation and regime competition 
(Banyuls et al. 2008; Croucher et al. 2003b; Fetzer 2008a; Jürgens and Krzywdzinski 2010; 
Waddington 2011). Studies on the European Social Dialogue highlight that sectoral dialogue can 
lead to common responses on the European level, but is impeded by both diverging cross-
national interests and conflicts with employer federations over the binding nature of agreements 
(Degryse 2015; Degryse and Pochet 2011; Dølvik 1999). Empirical case studies on transnational 
campaigning have in turn shown how national unions have coordinated their actions in multiple 
issue areas (Arnold 2008; Bronfenbrenner et al. 1998; Bronfenbrenner 2007; Greven 2003). Case 
study research on mergers has highlighted the fact that trade unions have been willing to 
cooperate across borders and have been able to politicize competitive pressures for their 
purposes (Erne 2002, 2008; Gajewska 2009). In collective bargaining coordination, the results 
are mixed: although there are a number of cross-border agreements, the impact is fragmented 
and institutional structures for European coordination are weak (Dufresne and Mermet 2002; 
Glassner and Pochet 2011). 
However, if both membership and influence-driven explanations for Europeanization outcomes 
can underpin their assumptions with results from empirical case studies, what does that mean 
for a European federation? It implies that within a federation there are competing logics that 
could account for the outcome described in Chapter 2. Both approaches seem to be incomplete 
without the other. Furthermore, it is unlikely that one side alone can explain a diverse and 
complex setting such as a European trade union organization. Instead, trade unions are most 
likely shaped by both streams. Empirically, very little is known about the organizational 
development of European trade union structures. The framework for this thesis takes both 
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explanations into account and illustrates how an organizational structure develops over time in 
the interplay between membership and influence logics, each involving individual tradeoffs for 
the organization. Apart from these two better known perspectives, little has been written about 
the role of multilevel administration in trade unions, which can take on a life of its own. Although 
organizational theories of trade unionism have emphasized the importance of internal trade 
union structures, this perspective has been neglected in international trade union research (Child 
et al. 1973; Heery and Kelly 1994; Warner 1972).  
This chapter explains the nature of international federations faced with three competing 
challenges: (1) a supranational institutional setting, (2) dual representation of individual 
members by the national affiliates and of the national affiliates by the European federation, and 
(3) multilevel administration. Theories on national associations provide a number of variables 
that are helpful in understanding organizational outcomes in terms of organizational logics. The 
following section adapts this literature to European trade union federations. It develops a 
framework for the study of European trade union organizations by integrating two strands of 
literature: the first is a theory of organized business associations based on a logic of influence 
and a logic of membership (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]), and the second is classical 
organizational theories of trade unions (Child et al. 1973; Donaldson and Warner 1974; Warner 
1972), particularly Child, Loveridge, and Warner’s framework based on the twin rationales of 
representation and administration (Child et al. 1973). The synthesis of these perspectives results 
in a “triangle of trade union organization.” The three logics in this triangle determine the 
organizational essentials, goal realization, and resource provision (van Waarden 1992: 522). 
Based on these thoughts, the first research question has the aim of shedding light on the 
organizational path of the EFBWW:  
How has the form of Europeanization adopted by the EFBWW been shaped by the competing 
organizational logics of membership, influence, and administration? 
This first research question focuses on explaining the outcome of organizational trade union 
Europeanization in the construction sector. Chapter 2 has demonstrated, in a very stylized form, 
that the relatively stable organizational outcome of European trade union federations in the past 
two decades indicates that some additional forces might be at work that have settled the 
federations into their current form. Furthermore, in the multilevel setting of the EU, the tensions 
between the logics shaping the European federations are likely to be more pronounced. From a 
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theoretical point of view, European federations can become stuck in a dilemma if, for example, 
the balance between two logics permanently tips toward one of these logics. This “hunch” is 
strengthened by the following observations: 
(1) Trade union structures at the national level are constrained organizationally by divisions from 
the past (Ebbinghaus 1993; Martin and Ross 1999a; Warner 1972), leading to the conclusion that 
similar stabilization processes might be at work at the European level. 
(2) Trade unionists themselves have repeatedly voiced concerns over trade union’s difficulties 
acting at the European level (Dribbusch 2015; Schmidt-Hullmann 2009b), indicating that their 
ability to actively develop organizational strategies might be constrained. 
In a path-dependent process, the available options become increasingly fewer over time, 
eventually leading to a “lock-in”. Historical institutionalism highlights the lasting effect of 
decisions made during critical junctures (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007: 341). These choices 
exclude other courses of action and set in motion the formation of institutions that create self-
reinforcing path-dependent processes. The second research question asks which turning points 
define the development of the EFBWW. The focus lies on explaining the historical evolution of the 
federation into its current form: 
What key critical junctures explain the formation and stabilization of the present form of 
Europeanization? 
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.3 reviews the literature on the logics of influence, 
membership, and administration and applies these to union federations. Section 3.4 aims to 
conceptually develop the idea of logics being in tension and describes how each pair of logics 
can develop tradeoffs. The section concludes with an outline of a number of tensions in the 
specific setting of multilevel trade union federations. The idea is to eventually explain the 
structures in Chapter 2 in terms of how the logics interact. The framework provides an analytical 
grid, but organizational outcomes are not always clear-cut. Since logics develop over time and 
interact simultaneously, the framework serves as a tool to analyze the different streams 
interacting within an organization. 
Section 3.5 provides the analytical grid for analyzing critical junctures. It outlines why history 
matters and demonstrates what the study of trade union Europeanization could learn from 
approaches analyzing path dependent processes. The section closes with a review of six potential 
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self-reinforcing mechanisms and develops ideas regarding how these mechanisms could play out 
in trade union federations. 
 
3.3 THREE LOGICS SHAPING EUROPEAN TRADE UNION FEDERATIONS 
European trade union federations, which are umbrella organizations in a supranational setting, 
are unique forms of organizations. In order to define what influences a European federation’s 
organizational structure, it is helpful to examine the classical definitions of trade unions and 
compare these to European federations. Trade unions are “mutual-benefit” organizations (Child 
et al. 1973: 71) that cannot be analyzed like, for example, a business organization (Offe and 
Wiesenthal 1980; Warner 1972: 49). In the traditional sense of the term, unions engage in 
collective bargaining, company representation, job protection, political action, and services for 
workers (Clegg 1976). In the International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, 
Wolfgang Streeck defines labor unions as “interest associations of workers in waged 
employment. They are formed to improve the market situation and the life chances of their 
member by representing them in the labor market, at the workplace, and in the polity, and in 
particular by collectively regulating their members’ terms of employment” (Streeck 2001: 8214). 
For Child et al., “the term ‘trade union’ [refers] to any organization the officials of which attempt 
to enter into job regulation and collective bargaining with employers on behalf of its members” 
(Child et al. 1973: 71). 
Four aspects define European trade union federations. The first is that European trade unions 
are membership associations: their basic function is to “organize, aggregate, articulate and 
represent” (Platzer and Müller 2009: 36, translation by the author) members’ interests. Second, 
they are intermediary organizations that act as go-betweens among their members (or potential 
members in their domain of action) and their respondents in the political field (such as the state 
or business interest associations) (van Waarden 1992: 522). Third, European trade union 
federations are umbrella organizations that are in some respects similar to national umbrella 
organizations such as the DGB or the British TUC. Hassel has noted that umbrella organizations 
have a special role: they need to derive their importance from either their leading role in 
collective bargaining policy or their political relevance; if they fail to fulfill these functions, their 
influence is minimal (Hassel 2003: 108). The federations described in Chapter 2 represent 
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sectors. Thus, it could be argued that they also constitute a branch of the European umbrella 
organization ETUC with the task of taking action in matters concerning the sector. The role of an 
umbrella organization is different than that of a single trade union. The European umbrella 
organization must fulfill the task of dual representation: the federation responds to its members 
– the national affiliates – who in turn have to respond to the needs of their individual members. 
Fourth, European trade union federations are also administrative structures and in this respect 
are similar to other categories of organizations (Child et al. 1973: 72). 
The original theories of trade unions as organizations date back several decades (Child et al. 
1973; Warner 1972). Schmitter and Streeck have provided a framework for analyzing organized 
interest groups by developing a detailed set of variables for studying business associations (Koch-
Baumgarten 1998; Platzer and Müller 2009; Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]). At the heart of 
the theory lies the dichotomous nature of organized interests between members on the one 
hand and the institutional influences of state agencies and bipartite organizations on the other 
hand (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 19). Schmitter and Streeck have called these two poles 
the “logic of membership” and the “logic of influence.” Schmitter and Streeck’s analytical 
hypothesis is that any organizational property of organized interest associations is the result of 
the tension between these two poles (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 19). Malcolm Warner 
has also discussed the question of the degree to which the environment influences the structural 
functions of unions. One of the first to take on an organizational theory of unions, Warner has 
described a core of members and administrative staff, a second “layer” of potential members 
(realm of recruitment), and a third layer: the industrial environment (Warner 1972: 50). The 
more distant environment then includes the economic and institutional setting more generally. 
For Child et al., trade unions are torn between the twin rationales of administration and 
representation: “administrative rationality may conflict with the ideal of widespread 
membership involvement in the representative process […]. Representative rationality 
emphasizes, in contrast, a flexibility of operations to suit the needs of different membership 
groups” (Child et al. 1973: 77f). The two rationales of representation and administration may be 
a source of conflict: the logic of effective goal-implementation (administration) would favor a 
hierarchical system, whereas a logic of goal-formation (representation) is based on a vertical 
division of power and bottom-up decision-making (Child et al. 1973: 78). On the other hand, 
Child et al. have acknowledged that the two logics can also complement each other. Trade union 
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administrations, relying on the active involvement of their membership, profit from a high 
participation rate when attempting to achieve their goals (Child et al. 1973: 79). 
For Streeck and Schmitter, the interest association is a function of the logic of influence and the 
logic of membership. However, in the analysis of European interest federations, an additional 
aspect warrants particular attention: the distance between national membership and European  
representation makes it likely that the inward working logic of administration achieves greater 
force. For example, a study on European Commission bureaucrats has indicated that top 
Commission managers favor supranationalism irrespective of their nationality or their 
professional experience and thus develop an independent “Commission identity” irrespective of 
political leadership (Ellinas and Suleiman 2011). In a European umbrella organization, the 
administration as an intermediary between influence and membership is likely to have more 
room for interpretation than within a national organization. This idea has also been considered 
in more recent studies on bureaucratic autonomy and on the staff’s role in international 
organizations (Bauer and Ege 2016; Christensen et al. 2017; Parízek 2017). However, this 
research on the specific role of international administrative structures is still limited, and there 
is work to be done on developing a systematic framework of how the different logics of influence, 
membership, and administration shape organizational outcomes. Furthermore, previous 
research has mostly concentrated on international governmental organizations (such as the 
Commission or the WTO). Therefore, this thesis proposes adding the logic of administration as 
an additional logic to the classical dual setting of Streeck and Schmitter and suggests adding and 
adapting their framework to trade union federations. In summary, this framework contends that 
European trade union organizations are a function of the logics of influence, membership, and 
administration. The following sections describe each logic in more detail. 
 
3.3.1 LOGIC OF INFLUENCE 
The logic of influence describes the mutual exchange of the interest organization with external 
institutions, most importantly government organizations and employer organizations. From 
these respondents in the political field, the goal addressees, associations are in need 
“recognition, access and concessions” (van Waarden 1992: 523). At the same time, the 
characteristics of the environment – that is, the “logic of influence” – shape the organizational 
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properties of an association by structuring the way in which associations can address their goals 
(Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]; Warner 1972). For Warner, the complexity and 
heterogeneity of the environment structure the organization’s level of specialization and its 
functional profile (Warner 1972: 56f). Streeck and Schmitter have specified several variables for 
describing the logic of influence. For example, the state shapes the conditions under which an 
association can be established and defines the access options for unions. It can support 
associations by providing favorable legislative conditions. Other forms of support may be 
recognition as a social partner, the transformation into law of social or technical standards 
established by the association, or exclusive access for the association to the administration 
(Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 30ff). For the affiliates, the attractiveness of being a member 
of the association rises with the level of influence the organization has. This in turn increases the 
power and autonomous capacity of the association vis-à-vis its members (Schmitter and Streeck 
1999 [1981]: 19). Warner has noted that the state can also shape the degree of centralization 
within a union when, for example, there is a necessity to act as strong bargaining partners with 
the state (Warner 1972: 51).  
Table 3: Influence 
(Child et al. 1973; Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]) 





Other non-state organizations  
Goal addressee, resources 
(finances, access, information) 
 
For Schmitter and Streeck, two aspects in the logic of influence determine a business 
association’s organizational form: interactions with the state and interactions with organized 
labor. For trade unions, the latter translates to interactions with organized capital. The following 
section loosely adapts a number of core variables to European federations. 
INTERACTIONS WITH THE STATE  
For Schmitter and Streeck, interactions with the state relate to the reciprocal exchange 
relationship among the association and state agencies (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 31ff). 
In the case of European trade union federations (ETUFs), this concerns general European 
conditions and national conditions. In the EU, this makes the analysis extremely complex. 
Therefore, a pragmatic approach should be applied in which only those aspects that are reflected 
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on the European level are examined. Schmitter and Streeck have used a fourfold distinction 
between general/sectoral conditions and direct and indirect influences.  
General conditions affecting the relationship between the state and ETUFs should first include 
the institutional and legal setting under which the federation operates in the EU. Following 
Schmitter and Streeck, the description of the setting must include information on industrial 
relations such as legislation on company representation, collective bargaining, institutionalized 
social partnerships, and the general legislation on trade union rights (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 
[1981]: 31ff).  
A further variable concerns resources. For Schmitter and Streeck, resources are a core element 
in enabling organizational development of interest associations, and direct transactions are one 
feature of interactions with the state (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 33, 78). The resources 
provided to ETUFs by government authorities are a central aspect of analysis. These resources 
can contain, for example, support in terms of technical equipment, facilities, or translation. 
Resources provided by the state might also include funds provided for conducting projects or 
meetings. European trade union federations are non-profit organizations. Resources in terms of 
personnel, finances, or location determine the room the organization has to maneuver. There 
are few studies on unions’ internal financial management, perhaps because data is often difficult 
to come by and the topic is rather atypical for industrial relations scholars. Willmann, Morris, 
and Aston have studied the financial background of unions in Britain and the US and have 
defined, for example, employer’s provision of facilities for representation as one of the financial 
sources for unions (Willman et al. 1993). At the EU level, the provision of Commission resources 
– for example, by using facilities for translation of meetings and securing project funding – could 
play a role (Martin and Ross 2001). There is a further aspect that Schmitter and Streeck have 
mentioned briefly: the conditions under which the resources are provided are likely to be 
particularly important for the structure of the organization. The extent of subsidized program 
payments to associations in the sector (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 31ff) and the 
conditions under which these payments are made are two aspects that are particularly salient at 
the European level. The allocation of resources shapes the opportunity structure for unions. For 
example, resources that are only provided under the condition that certain criteria (in terms of 
policy issues, actors, etc.) are met define which activities trade unions can carry out. The next 
point touches upon a similar aspect, namely the institutionalized options for access to the state 
 
Henni Appell  Workers of Europe Unite!? - Explaining the Form of European Labor Organization 57 
(Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 31ff). On the European level, this particularly concerns the 
Commission and the European Parliament (e.g., tripartite consultation bodies). A further variable 
mentioned by Schmitter and Streeck – the control of European political institutions by social 
democratic or labor parties – is important for describing the general political setting (Schmitter 
and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 31ff). It is assumed that parties from this political spectrum are 
friendlier toward workers’ rights than other parties are, thus enabling unions to thrive and 
limiting privileged access to business interests. 
There are also a number of sector-specific variables that determine the relationship between the 
state and ETUFs described by Schmitter and Streeck (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 35), 
including the configurations of state agencies for dealing with the sector, the information needs 
of European agencies in the sector, and the presence of specialized institutions of consultation 
and representation in the sector (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 31ff). Indirect conditions 
affecting the sector are the degree and type of European regulation of the sector, the extent of 
government purchases from sector, the extent of public ownership in the sector, the status of 
the sector in terms of growth and employment objectives of public authorities, the extent of 
international/EU trade dependence, the extent of international/EU capital dependence, and the 
extent of vulnerability to international/EU competition (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 
31ff). 
INTERACTIONS WITH ORGANIZED CAPITAL  
The next set of influence variables defined by Schmitter and Streeck relate to the interactions 
with social partners (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 38ff). Translated to the analysis of 
ETUFs, general conditions include institutionalized capital-labor interactions, state involvement 
in wage determination, and the centralization and unification of European employers. Indirect 
factors conditioning the reciprocal behavior of unions and capital are the range and scope of 
European social policy regulation, the social democratic control of state institutions, and 
international/European dependence and vulnerability (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 40). 
Following Schmitter and Streeck, the factors influencing the organizational development of 
ETUFs are the status of the sector in EU treaties and the possibility of legislative threats, the 
extent of cross-national competition in the sector, and the internationalization/Europeanization 
of companies in the sector (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 40) . 
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The sector-specific conditions Schmitter and Streeck have mentioned are the relative importance 
of company bargaining, the way in which trade unions (for the analysis of ETUFs, employer 
organizations) are structured, tripartite and bipartite bargaining arrangements and forums in the 
sector, and the status of the sector in national trade union policies (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 
[1981]: 40). Based on Schmitter and Streeck’s argumentation concerning business associations, 
factors conditioning an ETUF’s behavior toward capital are the labor intensity, the sector’s 
position in national wage structures, and the overall employer representation in the sector 
(Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 40). This also includes the structure of companies in the 
sector and the willingness of employers to participate in European collective bargaining as two 
further variables that condition the behavior of organized capital toward unions. 
All of these variables together tell a story about the environment shaping organizational options 
for Europeanization. The list of variables provided by Schmitter and Streeck adapted here for 
ETUFs provides a research guideline for what needs to be taken into consideration when 
describing the influences affecting an ETUF’s organizational form. Depending on the specific 
characteristics of the sector and the European configuration of employer associations and state 
regulations, impetus for coordinated action on a European scale can be lower or higher. For 
example, a highly internationalized sector with firms operating across borders, European 
involvement in legislation affecting the sector, employer associations willing to engage in 
bipartite dialogue, and state subsidies for cross-national programs will probably lead to a higher 
impetus for Europeanization than a setting where national legislation is the main focus, 
government involvement in the sector is organized on a national level, and the structure of firms 
is mostly local or national. However, as the overview of ETUFs in Chapter 2 has shown, most 
ETUFs, whatever their sectoral conditions, seem to have converged on a medium scale of 
Europeanization. Thus, what is required for a better understanding of trade union 
Europeanization is a more comprehensive view of additional logics forming organizational 
development and the way in which the balance between these logics “pushes” or “pulls” 
Europeanization. The next two sections take a closer look at the logic of membership and the 
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3.3.2 LOGIC OF MEMBERSHIP 
According to Schmitter and Streeck, members expect benefits from their attachment to the 
interest association, which the association must offer by extracting them from employers and 
the government (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 19). Associations can perform a number of 
functions for their members. Within an association, the members collect, coordinate, and 
aggregate interests in order to formulate and articulate common goals. In turn, van Waarden has 
pointed out that associations receive resources such as “finance, manpower, information, 
participation in actions, loyalty and discipline” from the members in their domain (van Waarden 
1992: 523). Offe and Wiesenthal have noted that this capacity of the union to achieve the 
members’ “willingness to act” is a central feature of labor associations (Offe and Wiesenthal 
1980: 80). Child et al.’s rationale of representation (Child et al. 1973) emphasizes the deliberative 
process of policy-making. By looking at the representative logic of a trade union, it is possible to 
learn how decisions are made within the organization. This can be a “duplication of functions in 
order to build checks and balances into union control, a multiplicity of communications in order 
to allow the maximum possible interchange and collation of opinion, and a holding back of 
decision-making until every viewpoint has been expressed” (Child et al. 1973: 77f). For Child, 
Loveridge, and Warner, the representative logic is thus equivalent to the logic of membership, 
which is inherently defined by the way in which members formulate their goals. Schmitter and 
Streeck’s logic of membership includes all conditions related to the potential constituents of the 
organization. In contrast to Child et al., Schmitter and Streeck see the logic of goal formation as 
a distinctive logic shaping the federation (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 23). However, in 
trade union associations an analysis of membership is tightly bound to the analysis of how 
members deliberate and discuss within a federation, since trade unions are by definition 
individual membership organizations – in contrast, for example, to business organizations (Offe 
and Wiesenthal 1980; Warner 1972: 49). Thus, studying membership and goal formation within 
a trade union federation go hand in hand. Streeck and Schmitter have listed a number of factors 
determining the willingness to form and participate in associations: number, equality among the 
members, internal and external competition, interdependence, heterogeneity, turnover, 
profitability and growth, and social cohesion (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 25–30).  
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Table 4: Logic of Membership 
(Child et al. 1973; ETUC 2008a; Offe and Wiesenthal 1980; Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]) 




Individual workers  
 
Goal formation, “willingness to 
act,” resources (financial, 
personnel-related, political) 
 
The following section identifies a number of variables that are in one way or another expected 
to shape the organizational character of ETUFs. This section takes Schmitter and Streeck’s 
variables, which were developed for business associations, as a starting point and amends and 
adapts them to the analysis of ETUFs.  
The first variable is the number of affiliates of a federation (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 
25). The number of affiliates of a federation is likely to determine the ability to engage in 
collective action and the extent to which an organization needs to develop structures to address 
the needs of all members. The equality of resources (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 25) 
among the members is a second aspect and translates to two variables – financial resources 
(wealth) and the number of individual members (size) – since the European federations are 
membership organizations themselves. A further variable is the rate of membership growth 
among the affiliates (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 27), which determines the financial 
resources available to the members and therefore to the European association. 
The extent to which the affiliate’s members are subject to direct competition with each other 
and with external actors is a further factor determining the character of the European federation 
(Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 26). This can relate to competition within the EU between, 
for example, Western and Eastern European construction workers, or from within and outside 
of the EU (e.g., between migrant workers without working permits and EU citizens).  
A further variable is heterogeneity (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 25–29). For trade unions, 
this aspect could describe the differences among the members in terms of political cleavages 
(identity, religion, political views), functional cleavages (white-blue collar, craft-industry, public-
private) and cultural heritage (nationality, language). The extent of heterogeneity could affect 
the organizational form of a European federation. A small and homogeneous membership base 
seems to be more likely to agree to European coordination or a harmonization of organizational 
structures than a large and heterogeneous membership base. Heterogeneity also concerns the 
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geographical scope and regional distribution of members. The regional distribution of members 
is likely to determine the focus of the organization’s policy decisions.  
A further important aspect is the turnover of membership (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 
27). This variable describes the extent to which the members are exchanged and/or disappear 
over time. Depending on the volatility of the membership, the organizational structure may 
develop into a stronger or weaker form. A high turnover makes it necessary for the 
administration to refocus continuously and integrate and acquire new members. This can lead 
to turmoil, but also to a steady impetus for renewal. A high turnover can also be a permanent 
threat to an organization, especially if members often use the exit option in internal negotiations. 
A low turnover of membership, on the other hand, may enhance stability but can also lead to 
negative side effects such as a resistance to change. In sum, the configurations of the logic of 
membership offer various conclusions on the outcome of Europeanization, depending on the 
specific constellation. A highly competitive membership structure could lead to more 
cooperation in order to mitigate competition and find European solutions to common problems, 
but it could also lead to enhanced competition and national approaches. What it comes down to 
is finding out which type of membership is more or less prone to developing joint approaches. 
Given the complexity of interaction among all of these variables, a causally reconstructive 
qualitative analysis with the goal of exploring the potential influences on the organizational form 
is useful for discerning those specific variables that determine higher or lower degrees of 
Europeanization. A third perspective includes those aspects relating to the administration of a 
European organization; the next section takes a closer look at this logic. 
 
3.3.3 LOGIC OF ADMINISTRATION 
The starting point of the “logic of administration” is the thought that union administration may 
not always share the goals and priorities of union members (Child et al. 1973: 73f). This calls into 
question a homogeneous structure in which members’ democratically legitimized decisions are 
implemented one to one by union officials sharing these goals. The administrative rationality 
refers to the organizational structures of goal implementation. Child et al. describe 
administrative rationality as “the design of an organization in such a way that specified tasks or 
outcomes are attained with certainty and economy. These conditions appear in many instances 
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to require a routinization of operations, specialization of functions, directness of communication, 
and speed in decision-making” (Child et al. 1973: 77). This perspective attempts to do more than 
merely describe the formal structure of the organization. For example, it includes “soft” criteria 
such as the way in which staff members are selected, or day-to-day communication with the 
members. For Warner, the administrative structure of a trade union consists of a “core” – usually 
the head office of the union – and “intervening buffers,” meaning the administrations filtering 
the information between environment and organization, as well as the members (Warner 1972: 
53). Warner has also noted the importance of shedding light on the organizational 
interdependence of “component parts of the union in relation to the core head office” (Warner 
1972: 53). He has argued that focusing on these sublevel exchange relationships is crucial, 
because it turns attention to the centers of power apart from formal structures (Warner 1972). 
Child et al. have drawn up a “cycle of union activity” between the representative system, union 
leadership, union administration, and union membership, which is briefly described as follows 
(Child et al. 1973: 83): depending on the active involvement of the members, pressures are 
placed on union members (the representative system). The union leadership interprets these 
pressures, in part based on the perceived strength of the members’ views and in part based on 
other aspects considered important by the leadership (Child et al. 1973: 83). This is then 
translated into decisions and actions taken on behalf of the union. Streeck and Kenworthy have 
noted that experts have an important intermediary function in organizations since they interpret 
collective goals, “making them more acceptable to the organization’s interlocutors (more 
“moderate”) and thus more likely to be accomplished (more “realistic”)” (Streeck and Kenworthy 
2005: 450). Following from this logic, the congruence of members’ expectations with the union’s 
actions again defines the extent and content of the pressure on the union officials. 
Table 5: Logic of Administration 
(Child et al. 1973; Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]) 
Logic Actors Role  
Administration  
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The following section explores a number of issues concerning administrative rationality 
mentioned by Child et al. (1973) and develops these thoughts further with respect to the 
workings of a European federation. 
UNION PROFESSIONALS AND THE ROLE OF THE SECRETARIAT 
One factor to which administrative rationality may refer is the type of staff member working in 
a federation. The topic of union professionals is not overly popular among industrial relations 
scholars, but over the years a number of studies have brought some insight to the topic (Boraston 
and Clegg 1975; Clegg et al. 1961; Heery and Kelly 1994; Kelly and Heery 1994). For example, 
Kelly and Heery have argued that the political orientation and values of trade union officials are 
important for understanding the relationship of a union with its members (Kelly and Heery 1994). 
Their argument is that union officials are “rarely motivated by notions of personal 
aggrandizement or material self-interest, but [are] heavily influenced by ideological conceptions 
of the aims and values of trade unionism and collective bargaining” (Kelly and Heery 1994: 193). 
From extensive data on union staff in Britain, they have established three types of officers: the 
“managerialist,” who is usually older and right-wing-oriented; the “regulationist” pragmatic 
type; and the “leader,” who mostly belongs to the younger generation and is left-wing-oriented 
(Kelly and Heery 1994: 193).  
Furthermore, it makes a difference if unions select trade unionists to work in their Brussels office 
at the end of their career or at the beginning of their career. It also makes a difference if staff 
members have a practical background, if they come from a strong network at the national level, 
and if they have an academic background. Further differences might include knowledge of 
European politics or experience in practical trade union work in the union’s sector (e.g., as a 
company representative). Additionally, a staff member coming from the job with experience in 
bargaining on the national level will probably have an entirely different style of negotiating. 
Furthermore, it makes a difference if European trade union staff speak several languages and 
are familiar with the legal workings of the EU or if they are fluent only in their mother tongue. 
All of these factors will affect the internal workings of the organization and its style of policy-
making. 
Hyman has also described the tension that can arise if different types of international unionists 
meet: “[both the agitator and the bureaucrat attempt] to spread and consolidate union 
organization, both nationally and internationally, but with very different conceptions ('bottom-
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up' and 'top-down') as to how this might best be achieved” (Hyman 2002a: 1). This observation 
indicates that the type of professional working in the federation will also have implications for 
the type of relationship the union has with its members. Heery and Kelly have argued that trade 
unions’ styles of communication with their members in Britain have changed over the years. The 
first phase of “professional unionism” was marked by expert union representatives providing 
assistance to passive members (Heery and Kelly 1994: 2f). The second phase of “participative 
unionism” was characterized by the union official as an enabler of membership participation 
(Heery and Kelly 1994: 4f). In the third phase of “managerial unionism,” union members are seen 
as consumers who must be provided with services developed by the union (Heery and Kelly 1994: 
7f). Although this chronological change pattern has sparked a good deal of criticism (Ackers 1995; 
Smith 1995), the typology is useful for showing which kinds of different functional profiles union 
officials can have vis-à-vis the union membership.  
The beliefs and background of union leadership also affect the workings of a union. This aspect 
concerns the ideological orientation of the union’s leadership (Child et al. 1973: 83) as well as 
the national and union identity heritage. In an international federation, union staff and 
leadership come from different national systems of industrial relations with very different views 
on what constitutes the “normal” labor-employer relationship. The familiarity with different 
instruments of industrial relations, such as works councils or sectoral collective agreements, 
varies from country to country. For example, while the German system promotes sectoral wage 
bargaining, in Britain collective bargaining occurs at the plant or company level (EIROnline 2009a, 
2009b). Thus, the national background will probably also determine which aspects the 
organization is most familiar with and will thus handle with the greatest ease.  
The official (and unofficial) mandate of the secretariat is a further element of administrative 
rationality. Platzer and Müller have identified three potential roles for the administration: pure 
administrative qualities, active moderation of decision-making, and strategic initiation of 
transnational actions (Platzer and Müller 2009: 44). In the case of collectively agreed-upon goals, 
the federation needs to ensure that strategic goals that were once agreed upon are actually 
complied with. This capacity depends on several prerequisites: a) the acceptance of collectively 
binding rules by the affiliates because they are viewed as legitimate, b) effective monitoring by 
the European federation, and c) a mediating and regulating function of the European federation 
in case of difficulties.  
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DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES 
As Child et al. have noted, a further aspect of administrative rationality is the frequency of 
delegate meetings (Child et al. 1973: 78). In terms of representative democracy, it makes a 
difference if meetings of all delegates are held annually, biannually, or every four years. On the 
other hand, frequent large meetings absorb a lot of administrative energy that might be better 
focused on other activities. In the era of the internet and fast-paced communication, personal 
meetings are also not the only way to organize cooperation. Meetings of executive committees 
and committees on special issues via virtual networks can be further manifestations of 
administrative rationality, and how often these committees meet and who participates in the 
meetings can indicate which members actively participate and how the administrative day-to-
day work is connected to the national affiliates. 
 
3.4 WHY EUROPEAN TRADE UNION FEDERATIONS MIGHT BE CONSTRAINED 
In short, an ETUF is shaped by three logics: the logic of influence relates to the external 
addressees such as the state or employers; the logic of membership relates to the internal 
workings and interests of the workers; and administration relates to the interests of the staff 
itself. From the logics of trade union organization outlined above, a “triangle of European trade 
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Figure 2: Triangle of Trade Union Organization  
Own figure based on Child et al. 1973; Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]; Streeck and Kenworthy 2005 
 
 
3.4.1 CONFLICTING RATIONALITIES 
Between each of the three logics, organizational tensions emerge for European trade unions. 
Although all three dimensions coexist, each pair of logics helps insulate a specific set of tensions: 
the tension between membership and influence, the tension between influence and 
administration, and the tension between administration and membership.  
Each logic refers to particular goals and demands defining the structure of the organization 
(Friedland and Alford 1991; Thornton et al. 2012; Thornton and Ocasio 2008). These different 
organizing frameworks are interpreted by the actors within the organization (Friedland and 
Alford 1991). This perspective highlights the fact that regularized individual and organizational 
behavior can only be explained in the interplay between different social and institutional logics 
(Thornton and Ocasio 2008). The usefulness of this approach lies in acknowledging and singling 
out the simultaneous but often opposing currents shaping an organization. Lepsius has 
emphasized this point and has argued that the logics and values inherent in institutions shape 
the way in which actors perceive themselves and their interests (Lepsius 1990). For example, 
Hyman has argued that unions’ strategies are determined by union identities based on class, 
market, or society (Hyman 1994, 2001). Based on these identities, different types of unions 
emerge: market bargainers, mobilizers of class opposition, and partners in social integration 
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(Hyman 1994). These inherited identities in turn shape and reinforce workers’ individual 
activism, models of unionism, and eventually national industrial relations’ regimes.  
Tensions Leading to Persistent Struggles 
Each tension can potentially lead to a tradeoff situation with conflicting institutional pressures 
(Alford and Friedland 1985; Kraatz and Block 2008; Meyer and Rowan 1977). Institutional theory 
has highlighted the fact that these competing logics can lead to a dilemma where following one 
rationale may require neglecting another, thus potentially endangering organizational legitimacy 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). It might be that the tension reaches the surface or that is dormant 
and actors are unaware of its existence, but either way, the resulting dilemma defines the way 
in which individuals act within the organization and in turn shape the organizational logic 
themselves. In any institution, all logics will interact simultaneously. Much like in a musical chord, 
tensions overlap and occur at the same time. The way in which actors resolve these tensions can 
spur vicious cycles. Sometimes openly and sometimes below the surface, organizations are faced 
with the task of dissolving these tensions. If these conflicts remain in a state of balance, a 
persistent pattern of conflict resolution can emerge. For example, Jackson and Müllenborn have 
contended that German codetermination embodies conflicts between different value systems 
of management and labor representation (Jackson and Muellenborn 2012: 491). Weber has 
famously laid out how bureaucracy and democracy are inherently in conflict with each other, 
because the implementation of democratic legislation can in itself lead to bureaucratic 
dominance (Weber 2002). A perspective outlining the inherent institutional tensions can reveal 
both why internal struggles persist and why certain arrangements are beneficial for the 
organization despite other strategic options. The following section begins by reviewing the 
nature of the three tensions. A second section outlines the aggravated tensions in a multilevel 
system. 
 
3.4.2 TENSIONS IN TRADE UNION FEDERATIONS 
LOGIC OF MEMBERSHIP VERSUS LOGIC OF INFLUENCE 
The first quandary describes the dilemma of balancing goal formulation among a diverse logic of 
membership (goal formation) while simultaneously addressing the logic of influence with a 
unified voice (goal addressee). In this dilemma, effective resource exchange with the goal 
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addressee conflicts with participatory goal formation among the membership. A dilemma is 
understood as a situation in which actors must choose among competing alternatives, each with 
its benefits and pitfalls (Smith and Lewis 2011: 387). Organizations must secure resources and 
engage in goal realization (van Waarden 1992: 522). Schmitter and Streeck have noted that 
interest organizations are confronted with a difficult situation: on the one hand, associations 
must offer services and incentives to their members in able to secure funds to survive (logic of 
membership), but on the other hand, interest organizations are dependent on resources from 
their institutional environment such as the ability to provide members with a voice in the political 
field (logic of influence) (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 19). In order to secure these 
resources (e.g., concessions, access, and information) and achieve goal realization, the 
association must extract concessions from their environment. The environment in turn only 
grants these in exchange for certain goods and services from the association itself, and vice versa 
(van Waarden 1992: 523). Unions must assure their members that their intermediary function 
can provide added benefits, such as a collective voice in the political field in order to realize their 
goals (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 19). Only if the members believe that this is the case 
will further provision of resources to the organization be ensured (van Waarden 1992: 523). The 
more negotiations with benefits for the members take place, the more powerful the organization 
will become (Czada 1995). A strong and unified membership base can reinforce an association’s 
position and influence (Schneider and Grote 2006). However, successful exchange processes are 
dependent on the organization’s ability to work inwards toward compromises by its own 
membership. This can result in a dilemma: if the organization extracts concessions from the 
members in order to speak with a common voice, this might heighten the ability to lead 
successful negotiations but can in turn lead to exit strategies of those members that do not feel 
represented by the compromise. Thus, the more resources the organization extracts from the 
political sphere by speaking with a unified voice, the more difficult it can become to integrate 
diverse membership. Therefore, if the federation tilts toward the logic of influence, this can 
result in a lack of care for the needs of its membership (Schneider and Grote 2006; Wagemann 
2014).  
The balance between influence and membership may become mutually reinforcing: in the first 
case, the process can result in a negative feedback spiral in which the membership no longer 
feels represented by the association, thus reducing its influence, which again distances the 
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membership from the association. In the second case, which Schneider and Grote have described 
for business associations, positive feedback processes enhance the organization’s influence 
when membership increases, thus leading to stronger power to influence political decisions, 
which again increases the appeal of the association (Schneider and Grote 2006). If these 
processes are translated to the potential organizational outcomes defined in Chapter 2, in terms 
of outcome, a weaker involvement of membership seems more likely to result in a more 
instrumental role for the transnational organization. A homogenous and strong membership 
base, on the other hand, might be more willing to grant steering and monitoring competencies 
to the international federation in return for successful influence. However, a clear-cut 
assessment depends on a variety of other factors such as the openness of the political system to 
influence from the association or the availability of an employer counterpart for negotiations. It 
might also be that a strong membership has no interest in a stronger role for the federation. In 
turn, a weak membership base could also lead to alternative organizational forms such as a 
transnational union, skipping the national affiliates altogether. 
LOGIC OF MEMBERSHIP VERSUS LOGIC OF ADMINISTRATION 
The tension between the logic of membership (goal formation) and the logic of administration 
(goal implementation) results from the idea that the administration of a labor organization might 
develop practices and interests that are different from those of the membership they represent. 
In this setting, a participatory goal formation conflicts with an effective goal implementation. In 
European federations, increased administrative autonomy stems from the unique setting of 
policymaking in a European context. Müller et al. have pointed out that the role of 
institutionalized and informal lobbying is greater on the European level, intensifying the 
embeddedness in European policymaking (Platzer and Müller 2011: 56) and leading to “labor 
diplomacy” (the term “labor diplomacy” was made popular by Hyman and was “invented” by 
Lewis Lorwin (Hyman 2002a: 8)). The “Dilemma of Labor Diplomacy” describes the potential for 
conflict between European specialists and local unionists, which can lead to a decoupling of the 
logic of administration and the logic of membership. This dilemma embodies tensions between 
the trade union as movement and as organization: in the movement model, the members are 
actively engaged in grassroots activities, but hierarchical steering of the organization can weaken 
this membership enthusiasm to such a degree that international unionism is no longer effective 
(Hyman 2002a). The idea of different interests among administration and membership stems 
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from the concept that the administrative staff is likely to become attached to their tasks and 
projects by, for example, learning processes (Kim 2005; Levitt and March 1988), routinization 
(Cyert and March 1963) or escalating commitment (Staw 1976). In labor organizations where 
union officials often have considerable discretion in the way they exercise their jobs (Kelly and 
Heery 1994: 197), this process of attachment is likely to be even greater. In a large study on union 
officials and industrial relations managers, Watson found that union officials are “‘intensely 
committed’, relatively autonomous individuals who experience more personal stress and pressure 
but more freedom and autonomy to do the job in their own particular way” (Watson 1988: 179). 
With increasing administrative power, however, the member’s “willingness to act” (Offe and 
Wiesenthal 1980: 80) might be reduced to such an extent that effective implementation is 
rendered impossible (Hyman 2002a: 7). 
Although the general orientation of the organization is determined by the boards of the trade 
union, depending on the level of control the administration will have considerable room for 
interpretation in its day-to-day work, as Child et al. have pointed out (Child et al. 1973: 83). 
Therefore, the administrative logic of European-level administration can become decoupled 
from the logic of membership. This tension between logics is not only a conflict of control but 
also a dilemma of European labor expertise. The complexity of European politics necessitates a 
high level of specialization (Radaelli 1999). For example, in order to receive external funding for 
trade union projects, staff members need to become familiar with the different ways of receiving 
resources for their projects. Union officials with an academic background in European politics 
might heighten efficiency since they are well trained in speaking the “European language” of 
Brussels; on the other hand, it might mean that contact with the national trade unionist on the 
ground is more distant. Bernaciak et al. have mentioned this tension in international trade union 
policy, which is torn between the “needs of effective strategy” enacted by specialists and 
“vigorous democracy” in which all union members are involved (Bernaciak et al. 2014: 78). For 
example, a case study by Erne demonstrates how crucial it can be for a successful EWC 
representation if EU-level company representatives can build on experience as local union 
activists and familiarity with intercultural work environments (Erne 2008: 193).  
The size of a union is also relevant for the role of the administration. The administrative 
rationality of a small federation with a one-figure number of national affiliates – as has been the 
case during the founding years of many federations with only six affiliates from Germany, France, 
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Italy, and the BeNeLux states – will probably be much more controlled by its members than the 
administration of a large federation. Within a small federation, delegates usually know each 
other in person and come to terms on disputed issues on a personal basis. Furthermore, a 
federation with a continuous and stable membership base will be more likely to profit from a 
positive learning curve. Higher predictability of the other members’ behavior can increase 
stability. In a large federation, the influences become more heterogeneous (Child et al. 1973), 
and it is likely that the administration will develop structures for mediating among the diversified 
membership. As the number of delegates rises and responsibility for decisions is distributed 
among more and more members, it is likely that the administration will become increasingly 
important as an actor in its own right.  
The tension between legitimate goal formation and effective goal implementation can lead to a 
setting in which the administration follows a different logic than the representation of the 
member’s goals. The way in which the administration deals with the representation of the 
membership is likely to have an impact on the type of organizational outcome of the federation. 
The more the association engages in forms of labor diplomacy, the more detached the 
association might become from the national affiliate’s membership base. This may in turn make 
it difficult for the national affiliates to persuade their members to transfer steering competencies 
to the federation. On the other hand, a strong and participative administration might have 
positive feedback effects on the member’s feeling of being represented in the federation. A 
forceful type of administration such as the union leader type identified by Kelly and Heery (Kelly 
and Heery 1994: 193) might also be interested in advancing the role of the federation. 
LOGIC OF ADMINISTRATION VERSUS LOGIC OF INFLUENCE 
The third tension exists between the logic of administration (goal implementation) and the logic 
of influence (goal addressee). At first glance, these logics seem to offer less potential for conflict 
since both logics relate to the way in which the organization reaches its goals. However, the 
conflict emerges between the need of the administration to cooperate with the actors in its 
institutional environment (effective resource exchange) and the administration’s (effective goal 
implementation) need to maintain a professional distance and relate to the interests of the 
membership. In labor unions, the contentious nature of politics is especially important since 
unions derive much of their power from fighting conflictive issues, as Martin and Ross have 
noted: “Unions are hard-won organizations based on the accumulation of ‘movement’ resources 
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such as shared values of solidarity, mass-mobilization capacities, and supporter willingness to 
take risk for the cause” (Martin and Ross 2001: 53). Dølvik has also contended, “An assumed 
precondition for the build-up of union strength at the European level is that trade unions develop 
the capacity to underpin their potential political and institutional influence by conflictual 
industrial power” (Dølvik 1997: 26). In the revitalization literature, establishing international links 
is also seen as one means to regain the initiative on the national level (Lillie and Martínez Lucio 
2004). Hyman has highlighted the dilemma of trade unions seeking to find modes of 
representation that allow them to parallel some of the national industrial relations structures on 
the European level, while on the other hand, trade unions are accountable to their members, 
who often oppose the character of the EU as a free market community (Hyman 2005b: 3). Within 
the organization, this can result in the dilemma of representing the members’ doubts regarding 
the European project and at the same time participating in the European institutional setting. An 
example of this is the European Sectoral Social Dialogue, which aims to establish social 
partnership with employers. For some, the Social Dialogue is viewed as a means of slowly 
bringing social partnership to the European arena (Pochet et al. 2009). Another perspective 
considers the Social Dialogue a threat to legitimate national action and meaningful European 
collective bargaining coordination (Dufresne 2011: 22). Hyman has argued that it is more difficult 
to forcefully question the “neoliberal ideology” if trade unions act as a bargaining partner 
(Hyman 2005b: 3).  
For the organization, the tension between these two logics lies in the conflict between 
contention and cooperation. The administration can gain power, personal benefits (such as 
access to a Brussels elite), and concessions from its environment by cooperating. Over time, 
however, overly cooperative labor officials can lead to a suppression of conflictive movement 
strategies.  
The table below summarizes the organizational conflicts among the three logics: 
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Table 6: Tensions in ETUFs 
Pairs of Organizational Logics Tension  Potential for Constraining 
Conflicts 
Membership –  
influence 
Goal formation (“willingness to 
act”) vs. resource exchange 
 
Resources from members 
(“willingness to act”) vs. 
resources from institutional 
settings 
Administration –  
membership 
Goal implementation vs. goal 
formation  
Diplomacy vs. participation 
 
Administration –  
influence 
Goal implementation vs. 
resource exchange 




3.4.3 TENSIONS IN A MULTILEVEL SETTING 
In the multilevel setting of European or international union federations, additional tensions 
emerge. These are the tensions between different membership groups, between different 
administrative levels, and between different spheres of influence. These challenges of a 
multilevel system play out in different ways: 
MULTILEVEL INFLUENCES 
The internationalization of politics means that the arena of decision-making shifts and the 
distribution of power changes (Schneider and Grote 2006), resulting in different access options 
and constraints for national interest organizations. Europeanization in particular implies that 
European policymaking becomes part of domestic politics (Börzel and Risse 2000), meaning that 
influencing politics becomes more complex. The diversity of national settings and the 
supranational setting of the EU pose a significant challenge for European federations. Thus, in 
lieu of adapting the organizational setting to a single logic of influence, the European federation 
develops in the shadow of multiple, often competing, influences. A particularity of the European 
setting is that trade unions often have to decide in which arena to pursue their goals: nationally, 
in Europe, or even internationally. National trade unions will increasingly have to coordinate 
their political representation and activities across various levels (Eising 2007). The variety of 
options in the multilevel system of the EU can spur conflicts over the appropriate arena of activity 
for, for example, the harmonization of collective bargaining rules. The multilevel influences of 
the EU also enhance coordination and information needs in lobbying activities. On the other 
 
Henni Appell  Workers of Europe Unite!? - Explaining the Form of European Labor Organization 74 
hand, the power shift from the national to the European level can mean that traditional routes 
of contention are no longer appropriate, and national trade unions find themselves confronted 
with a much more diverse supranational setting. In addition, alternative forms of transnational 
organization, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or social movements, have gained 
importance and are challenging traditional ways of addressing worker’s issues in, for example, 
the fields of fair trade and workers’ rights in multinational companies (Armbruster-Sandoval 
2005; Gallin 2000; Imig and Tarrow 1997; Smith et al. 1997). At the same time, the more diverse 
access points at the European level also provide business associations with new options to 
influence policymaking. These associations often have more resources to represent their 
interests (Mazey and Richardson 2015). This means that ETUFs are confronted with a complex 
setting of interests and more flexible, issue-specific forms of global representation with whom 
they compete for influence. 
MULTILEVEL MEMBERSHIP 
In a European federation, the logic of membership comprises two levels: the national affiliates 
and the individual members of the national affiliates. Serving national associations and serving 
individual workers imply very different tasks for the organization. One of the main differences is 
that European federations communicate more with organizations and their professionalized 
staff members than with national associations, who have more direct contact with individual 
members. However, communication with individual members and national affiliates also 
overlaps, such as in the case of EWC representatives.  
In a multilevel setting, the tension between different groups of membership needs to be 
balanced by the European federation. International federations therefore devote much time and 
energy to maintaining and developing the internal structure of the federation (Reutter 1998: 19). 
A European federation’s logic of membership is likely to be characterized by cleavages: (1) the 
imbalance of power between large unions from high-wage countries and smaller unions and/or 
unions from low-wage countries due to their financial status and membership fees; (2) the 
discrepancies in policy goals, such as different material interests among unions from high-wage 
countries and unions from low-wage countries or unions from EU or non-EU member states; (3) 
the discrepancies in culture and language; and (4) differences in union identity. These divisions 
have consequences for the influential power of unions (Ebbinghaus 1993). On the national level, 
the affiliates have to deal with the growing heterogeneity of the workforce. For example, 
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European federations are shaped by the legacies of social democrat, Christian, and communist 
unions, which used to divide the European and international trade union landscape. Traditions 
that favor company representation rather than political mobilization also divide European labor 
(Kohl 1993). To provide another example, an organization with members only from EU countries 
may develop a stronger focus on EU policy instruments such as the Social Dialogue than an 
organization with members from outside the EU. The level of geographical heterogeneity among 
European federations has risen, mainly due to EU enlargement rounds. Heterogeneity in terms 
of geographical scope goes hand in hand with diversity in terms of language, culture, and 
identity.  
Hyman has identified the triangle between class, market, and society (Kohl 1993) as the 
geometry of union identity (Hyman 2001: 4). He has summarized the three ideological 
orientations as follows: “In the first, unions are interest organizations with predominantly labor 
market functions; in the second, vehicles for raising workers’ status in the society more generally 
and hence advancing social justice; in the third, ‘schools of war’ in the struggle between labor 
and capital” (Hyman 2001: 1f). Furthermore, Hyman writes, “Business unions focus on the 
market; integrative unions on society; radical-oppositional unions on class” (Hyman 2001: 1f).  
Ebbinghaus has identified three main cleavages that define unions in Europe: the cleavage 
between labor and capital, the cleavage between church and state, and the cleavage between 
reformists and revolutionaries (Ebbinghaus 1993: 216). Ebbinghaus has further established three 
functional distinctions, namely the cleavages between craft and industrial unions, between 
white and blue collar workers, and between unions organizing public sector and private sector 
employees. 
The cleavages within the membership can lead to a dilemma in which a common voice gives the 
European federation more force but simultaneously endangers the representation of the diverse 
membership and their identification with the European federation. When internal competition 
is fierce (e.g., workers from different sites in merger cases), this dilemma is particularly apparent. 
For example, in a very heterogeneous federation, a dominant group shaping the “common voice” 
might emerge. In federations where the discrepancy between large/wealthy and poor/small 
unions is extreme, smaller affiliates are likely to be overpowered by other affiliates. For example, 
Moody has argued that the dominance of the large affiliates from Europe (Germany, Scandinavia, 
the UK), the US, and Japan has shaped the politics of the Global Union Federations (Moody 1998: 
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235). If they are particularly dominant actors, some national affiliates might also become 
frustrated with the material restrictions of joint activities conducted by the European federation 
and choose to engage in unilateral action, meaning that they might choose to “go at it alone” 
(Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 25) or, more positively, to become the locomotive of 
organizational development. This in turn can lead less powerful members to lose interest in the 
federation. In large organizations, the likelihood of segmentation increases, meaning that some 
members engage in joint projects and develop personal relations while other members remain 
outside or, as Streeck and Schmitter have noted, develop free rider behavior (Schmitter and 
Streeck 1999 [1981]: 25). This might lead to a process in which weaker members are increasingly 
less engaged in collective activities and become less responsive/compliant with joint actions, 
while the strong group of actors becomes increasingly important. This may eventually lead to a 
division of the organization into passive and active members. Wealthier members might also 
regulate financial deficits, leading to further empowerment within the organization. In 
organizations with affiliates with a very unequal distribution of wealth, the administration might 
develop toward satisfying the needs of the core members and neglecting the needs of the 
weaker members.  
Alternatively, the organization may decide upon a “lowest common denominator” goal in which 
controversial questions are set aside. Consequently, the European administration will 
continuously struggle to develop a synthesis between representing diverse interests and 
speaking with a strong voice. In order to fulfill the expectations of its membership, the 
administration may rely on their belief that their interests are strongly represented. In an 
analysis of the British TUC, Carmen Bauer has pointed out that the importance of bringing the 
diverse interests into line must be justified continuously vis-à-vis the affiliates and the individual 
trade union members (Bauer 1994: 80). If this succeeds, the stability of the administration vis-à-
vis its membership will increases with every successful “act of influence” by the federation 
(Reutter 1998: 19f). 
MULTILEVEL ADMINISTRATION 
In a European federation, the tension among different administrative logics may develop on two 
dimensions: on the horizontal dimension, the cleavages relate to differences among the 
administrative traditions of the national affiliates. These cleavages mostly reflect the tensions 
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among different logics of membership, whereby inherited national administrative traditions 
complicate cooperation.  
On the vertical dimension, the tension between international, European, and national labor 
officials is likely to spark rivalry. National affiliates might fear competition from multilevel 
administration and, as Warner has suggested, the subunits of an organization might start to 
compete with the head for power (Warner 1972). In turn, European labor officials might be 
threatened by discussions about deeper cooperation at the international level. This dilemma of 
resource distribution concerns the tradeoff situation of transferring responsibilities between the 
international, European, and national administrations. Every new task or coordinating role that 
is transferred to the European level of administration affects the resources of national 
administrations. This results in a setting in which favoring a strengthened role of the European 
federation equals reducing the capacity of national federations, and thus possibly endangering 
national union jobs. A number of outcomes can emerge: first, the federation could remain in a 
stalemate situation in which no additional responsibilities are transferred to the European level 
and the national level maintains its level of control. Second, the European level might be given 
additional tasks, but only if the resources for these activities come from additional funds (e.g., 
via external support or increases in membership fees). Third, the European level receives 
additional responsibilities, but national administrative responsibilities are reduced. Fourth, 
European-level responsibilities are reduced in favor of maintaining or strengthening national-
level administrative responsibilities. This dilemma of resource provision is not confined to the 
national/European dichotomy; it concerns all levels of an organization: international, regional, 
national, and local.  
On the other hand, resources geared toward Europe do not always result in concrete benefits 
for members, so it is often difficult for national affiliates to persuade their members to allocate 
sufficient resources to the European level. European federations have had to master a significant 
growth of national affiliates in the past decades, particularly in the run up to enlargement 
rounds. The federations have also had to cope with a diminishing membership basis within their 
national affiliates. Internal restructuring and mergers have absorbed additional resources 
(Sadowski et al. 2002: 16). Such a dual process is likely to lead to a stalemate: if the numbers of 
affiliates and the geographical scope rises but the actual number of members remains stable, 
the financial resources of the European federation might remain locked in at the same stage 
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where they were before membership increased, even if environmental conditions change. This 
in turn means that the European level is likely to be underfinanced and must turn to other 
sources to ensure the survival of its projects. It is probably rare that an official in any 
administration finds its funds to be sufficient. Juggling scarce resources is a dilemma faced by 
most voluntary organizations. 
Like most voluntary organizations, the trade union administration in a European federation is 
likely to choose one or a combination of the following pathways to secure additional resources: 
first, the administration can turn to its members for additional assistance. This can take the form 
of asking for additional fees or increasing the dues for members. This option presupposes that 
members are willing and able to pay the price for securing a stronger financial basis for the 
federation. On the other hand, the administration might not ask for additional structural funding 
but may turn to affiliates for individual support: for example, through staff time from national 
officials or specific project funds. This is similar to what any national official would do when 
turning to the union membership to organize seminars, demonstrations, etc. Apart from 
increasing participation rates in the union, fostering the involvement of members is an important 
means of saving money (Willman et al. 1993). Second, the administration can try to secure funds 
from outside the organization. This option depends on the incentive structure in the influence 
dimension and the availability of funds. Martin and Ross have argued that the support through 
Commission funding has been responsible for much of the European activities of the cross-
sectoral ETUC (Martin and Ross 2001). This claim has not been empirically tested in more detail 
for the European sectoral federations. What Martin and Ross have only marginally discussed are 
the consequences of what they call the “Dilemma of Borrowed Resources” (Martin and Ross 
2001): The external funds are likely to make the administration more accountable to the 
conditions of resource provision from outside the organization than to the original providers of 
resources from within the organization (i.e., the members). 
 
3.5 THE IMPORTANCE OF TIMING 
Schmitter and Streeck highlight that the exchange relationships among the logics can 
theoretically lead to a “self-reproducing solution,” such as when the logic of influence and the 
logic of membership interact in a way that is beneficial for both sides, eventually stabilizing the 
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organizational form of an association (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 31). When this balance 
tilts, one of the logics assumes greater power (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 31). The more 
one logic dominates and becomes the primary reference for actors, the more conflict with other 
logics develops (Jackson and Muellenborn 2012: 489). The sequence and timing of events play a 
central role in the way these tensions are resolved. Simply stated, history matters. As initial 
choices are made (consciously or subconsciously), options narrow (Mahoney 2000). In unions, 
the interconnectedness of membership and influence enhances these dynamics. One action 
pattern becomes dominant, excluding alternatives and defining the organizational structure of a 
federation for years to come. For example, early unionism developed out of workers’ specific 
needs to form craft, industrial, or enterprise unions, which in turn shaped the more general 
industrial relations setting (e.g., voluntarism or corporatism) (McIlroy 1995; WINDOLF 1989). The 
idea that history matters is popular in trade union research; for example, Waddington has argued 
more broadly that union movements rely on “positions of influence secured in the past” 
(Waddington 2005: 520), and Martin has contended that trade union’s “historic development 
has geared their strategies and structures to national arenas” (Martin 1996: 6).  
Path dependence theory can help explore beyond the more general claim that history matters 
and explain why certain response patterns become dominant, what drives adaptation, and which 
dynamics can lead to the freezing of such a pattern (Ebbinghaus 1993; Pierson 2004; Thelen 
2001). In static models of organizations, time does not matter, but in the spirit of path 
dependence, one step sets the route for the following steps, constraining parameters and 
binding an organization to a structure despite a changing environment. For example, a path 
dependence perspective could also help explain why trade unions are struggling to integrate 
migrant workers into their organizations despite a significant increase in foreign labor (Berntsen 
and Lillie 2016; Greer et al. 2011; Krings 2009; Milkman 2006). 
 
3.5.1 CRITICAL JUNCTURES SETTING THE COURSE 
Europeanization and path dependence initially seem to describe two opposite processes. 
Europeanization suggests movement, adaptation, and change. Path dependence describes the 
opposite of such an adaptive process: stability, inertia, and lock-in. This dichotomy, however, 
neglects the possibility that Europeanization in itself can follow a path. Djelic and Quack, for 
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example, have come to the conclusion that the concept of path dependence needs to be adapted 
to open systems where national paths transform and transnational paths emerge (Djelic and 
Quack 2007). The strength of the concept then lies in explaining a setting where specific types of 
union organization on the European level have evolved despite other potential outcomes. For 
example, Ebbinghaus and Visser have demonstrated that the cleavages apparent in the early 
years of an industrial relations regime determine the identities and roles of national trade unions 
(Ebbinghaus 1993; Ebbinghaus and Visser 1998, 2001), indicating that institutional 
configurations from decades ago create a bias and shape the way trade unions react to Europe 
in the present. Historical institutionalists have focused on the importance of long-term social 
processes in explaining national variety (Bresnitz 2008; Collier and Collier 1991; Mahoney 2003; 
Thelen 2002). The idea of path dependence gained widespread popularity when David described 
why keyboard letters are arranged in such a seemingly impractical way. He showed how a 
typewriter marketing gag (QWERTYUIOP – TYPEWRITER) has persisted until today despite better 
alternatives (David 1985). The concept became popular in economics because it highlights the 
dynamics of increasing returns in path-dependent processes, resulting in the lock-in of a main 
technology, product, or company (Arthur 1994). The compelling storytelling behind a path-
dependent development has made the idea popular across disciplines. Although the theoretical 
framework has since been used in very different settings, path-dependent processes are 
characterized by several distinctive factors (Ebbinghaus 2005; Pierson 2004; Schreyögg and 
Sydow 2011; Thelen 2002): 
First, theories of path dependence point to early events that have a significant and larger impact 
on later events and define the course of the story to such an extent that it is difficult to deviate 
from this path (Mahoney 2000: 510). Events taking place at an earlier point in time have a 
significantly higher impact than the same event would have had at a later stage (Mahoney 2000: 
512). For example, Martens has argued that European trade union structures are imprinted by 
the first institutionalization processes on the European level, which was intended to achieve a 
balance of interests among the national member organizations (Martens 2003). The idea is that 
the original setting of the organization’s founding will leave traces defining its further 
development (Stinchcombe 1965). This idea of legacies and initial conditions is central to 
historical institutionalist approaches (Collier and Collier 1991; Thelen 1999). This phase of initial 
conditions shaping subsequent actions has been called the “preformation phase” (Schreyögg and 
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Sydow 2011: 323). During this period, a number of different outcomes is imaginable, although in 
political processes the variety of initial options is usually limited (Thelen 1999: 388ff). The 
subsequent development during this period is not predictable: the randomness and contingency 
of the early events is a central issue for path dependency concepts (Beyer 2010; Capoccia and 
Kelemen 2007; Mahoney 2000). However, Aminzade has noted that power can play a central 
role in this “pre-determined” phase, since “individual actors often exercise substantial power to 
channel the direction of subsequent events along a particular path” (Aminzade 1992: 463). 
These early events are closely related to the concept of critical junctures, whereby historical 
continuity is based on specific and defining historical events that exclude alternative 
developments (Collier and Collier 1991; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). During these moments in time, 
actors are still able to actively shape the agenda and choose subsequent political routes 
(Capoccia 2015: 2). During the critical juncture, the window of opportunity closes and the specific 
historical configuration of the time creates legacies shaping institutions for years to come 
(Ebbinghaus 2005; Thelen 1999). This argument is popular in comparative politics, such as in 
Lipset and Rokkan’s classical “freezing hypothesis,” according to which the European party 
cleavages of the 1960s were frozen in the party structures of the 1920s (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). 
Another classic example is Collier and Collier’s study on critical junctures, the labor movement, 
and regime change in Latin America (Collier and Collier 1991). A critical juncture with long-term 
political implications was the radical increase of corporations’ public affairs offices in Washington 
in the 1970s, which led to a significant and ongoing rise of lobbying and corporate political 
financing in the United States (Hacker and Pierson 2011). 
For Collier and Collier, a critical juncture is a point in time that sets off a distinct legacy 
maintained by mechanisms of reproduction (Collier and Collier 1991). For identifying a critical 
juncture, it is crucial to determine these mechanisms, leading to a stability of core elements of 
the legacy (Collier and Collier 1991: 31). The phase that follows the critical juncture is called the 
“formation phase,” during which a “dominant action pattern” emerges (Schreyögg and Sydow 
2011: 324). At the same time, other routes become less likely (Bennett and Elman 2006: 252). 
Self-reinforcing loops strengthen a once-established path into a specific direction, leading to 
institutionalization and thereby excluding alternative trajectories (Ebbinghaus 2005: 14ff). These 
institutionalization processes are defined by social mechanisms driven by positive feedback 
(Arthur 1989; David 1997, 2008). According to Pierson, politics are particularly predisposed to 
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such processes due to the central role of collective action, the prevalence of rigid institutions, 
power asymmetries in politics, and the ambiguity of outcomes of political processes (Pierson 
2000: 252). Douglas North has pointed to institutions’ susceptibility to increasing returns 
processes (North 1981, 1992). However, political institutions are not per definition path-
dependent. A core element of path dependence theory is its ability to go beyond purely stating 
that “history matters” in order to explain how the legacies of critical junctures are reproduced 
(Beyer 2010). Focusing on social mechanisms is central to advancing from pure storytelling to 
explanatory relationships (Hedström and Swedberg 1996). Social mechanisms are important for 
path dependency because they explicitly refer to “recurrent processes” leading to a “specific kind 
of outcome” (Mayntz 2004: 241). Schreyögg and Sydow have defined four self-reinforcing 
mechanisms in path dependence concepts that they deem the most important for organizations: 
learning, coordination, complementary and adaptive expectations effects (Schreyögg and Sydow 
2011: 324). In political settings, other self-reinforcing mechanisms could also be at play. As 
Pierson and Thelen have highlighted, power plays a central role in politics (Pierson 2000; Thelen 
1999). Moreover, trade unions, which are “intermediary organizations” (Streeck and Kenworthy 
2005: 450) between their membership and the political environment, are particularly prone to 
resource dependency (Beyers and Kerremans 2007; Levesque and Murray 2010). These self-
reinforcing mechanisms provide a language for describing how tensions between logics can 
develop into particular forms of union organization. 
 
3.5.2 SELF-REINFORCING MECHANISMS 
LEARNING 
Learning effects refer to the positive spiral of knowledge that emerges when actors continuously 
repeat certain actions and become more effective in these actions (Pierson 2000: 254; Schreyögg 
and Sydow 2011: 326). For example, trade union officials are likely to develop positive learning 
spirals when dealing with established instruments of European industrial relations such as 
company representation in EWCs. Among EWC representatives, Huijgen et al. have observed 
learning processes as the driving force for developing collective identities (Huijgen et al. 2007). 
Established routines increase the efficiency of these activities over time and reduce the search 
for alternatives. Tarrow has called the established routines of social movements “repertoires of 
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contention” (Tarrow 1993). The ease with which these repertoires are used is likely to increase 
over time, slowly internalizing certain once-established routes of action. This repertoire can in 
turn make reorientation difficult, such as when dealing with types of employees within trade 
unions (migrant workers, self-employed) other than the classical male full-time worker (Milkman 
2006; Zoll 2003).  
COORDINATION 
The mechanism of coordination effects describes an incentive structure that arises when a 
particular behavior becomes more beneficial to the individual actor and more actors therefore 
behave in the same way (Pierson 2000: 254; Schreyögg and Sydow 2011: 325). The benefits of 
rule-guided behavior increase over time, leading to a self-reinforcing process. For example, the 
European coordination of collective bargaining can incite such an effect in a positive way 
(Gollbach and Schulten 2000). Path dependence means that such initially beneficial choices can 
become negative over time, but the positive experiences of the past enhance the obstacles to 
change (Berthod 2011). For example, in ETUFs, coordination in the Social Dialogue can be 
beneficial because it brings employers and trade unions to the table, enabling increased 
European representation regarding European issues. The negotiation of joint rules in the field of 
health and safety, for example, can level the playing field for both trade unions and employers 
and reduce competitive pressures. However, initially beneficial coordination can have negative 
drawbacks for unions if the joint negotiation of rules replaces potentially more beneficial 
legislation (Degryse 2011: 13; Keller 1996: 208). 
COMPLEMENTARITY 
The idea of complementary effects expresses an additional surplus that derives from the 
combination of two interrelated practices (Schreyögg and Sydow 2011: 324). Complementarities 
can become self-reinforcing when actors orient their strategic behavior based on already existing 
institutions (Beyer 2010). This type of mechanism is popular in the Varieties of Capitalism 
literature, which explains different outcomes of national political economies with institutional 
complementarities (Hall and Soskice 2001). Thelen and Kume have highlighted 
complementarities between the emergence of the German and Japanese labor movements, 
whose differences where enhanced by the diverging systems of vocational training (Thelen and 
Kume 1999). The multilevel setting of the EU is especially prone to interaction effects. The 
interaction of the three logics of influence, membership, and administration can lead to 
 
Henni Appell  Workers of Europe Unite!? - Explaining the Form of European Labor Organization 84 
combined effects that in the long run become self-reinforcing since changing one action pattern 
can have repercussions for another action pattern. For example, the orientation toward the logic 
of influence can initially result in the complementary benefit of strengthening the membership’s 
attachment to the federation. Over time, this balance can shift and lead to a neglect of the logic 
of membership in favor of influence. Over time, the complementarity between the two logics 
can lead to a dialectical situation in which the logic of influence gains more and more importance. 
Furthermore, coordination problems, implicit practices, and problems related to timing make 
changes in complementary practices particularly difficult (Brynjolfsson and Milgrom 2013). 
ADAPTIVE EXPECTATIONS 
Adaptive expectations describe the idea that actors adjust their behavior based on the 
anticipated actions of others (Pierson 2000: 254; Schreyögg and Sydow 2011: 325). The idea is 
that this process of adaptation leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy (Pierson 2000: 254). Adaptive 
expectation in a European membership association can play out in several ways. For example, if 
the administration is based on securing external resources, the members of an organization are 
likely to adapt their behavior based on the provision of these external funds. Alternatively, 
adaptive expectations may play out among the membership. For instance, national affiliates 
might adapt their strategies based on the expectation of what a dominant member might do. 
Finally, the ETUF may develop its strategies in conjunction with other actors in the institutional 
field. If the employer side, for example, does not engage in European-level bargaining, ETUFs will 
shift their activities to other areas (e.g., company instruments). 
POWER 
The fifth mechanism is often neglected by organizational scholars of path dependence but is an 
important feature in political settings. Power mechanisms indicate that certain actors or groups 
of actors benefit from institutional arrangements in a way that perpetuates and increases their 
power (Lukes 2005; Pierson 2000). Briefly summarized, certain configurations in a society give 
powerful groups the ability to exploit more opportunities, marginalize other groups, and change 
the abilities and preferences of society via dominant norms, providing them with more power in 
return, and so on (Lukes 2005). Arguments relating to power are particularly important for 
understanding trade unions’ capabilities (Levesque and Murray 2010; Offe and Wiesenthal 
1980). As Mahoney has emphasized, power explanation stress that institutions provide actors 
with uneven resources and access options, resulting in differing interests toward institutional 
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reproduction (Mahoney 2000). For example, Streeck has highlighted how the European setting 
systematically favors employers’ interests, because they have more to gain from noncooperation 
with trade unions, leaving trade unions in a weak position (Streeck 1998: 11). Mazey and 
Richardson have pointed out that interest groups can exploit EU opportunity structures, thereby 
creating a transnational lobbying structure that, as it becomes institutionalized, may have long-
term effects on actors’ behavior (Mazey and Richardson 2015). 
In the development of a European federation, power can play out in five ways. First, struggles 
can take place between different administrative logics of a union: for example, between the 
European federation’s administration and the administration of one or several national affiliates. 
Second, the affiliates might also develop mechanisms of power reproduction. Disputes might 
arise between different factions based on nationality, identity, or political views. Following the 
idea that institutions reinforce power inequalities (Thelen 1999), the power relations existing in 
the early years of an organization might be reproduced. The largest national affiliates can 
dominate discussions and shift decisions in their favor, thus creating a structure favoring their 
own preferences. For example, research has shown that the German union IG Metall has been 
able to transfer parts of the German union model to the European level (Rüb 2009). Reutter has 
noted that the permanent “Exit Option” of strong national affiliates poses a permanent threat 
to the transnational federation (Reutter 1998: 19). Third, conflict might also arise between union 
officials (the logic of administration) and the membership of a union (logic of membership). The 
detached and complex setting of a European union federation might provide union officials with 
room to develop an independent logic of administration. For example, it has been argued that a 
“labor diplomacy” type of administration has been established on the European level (Hyman 
2005a; Müller et al. 2010). This might make it more difficult for lay members to participate on 
the European level. Fourth, power can play out between the union and its institutional 
environment (logic of influence). Power struggles typically arise between employer federations 
and unions and/or between government organizations and unions.  
RESOURCE DEPENDENCE 
Resource dependence refers to the process of an organization’s increasing dependence on 
external resources (Pfeffer 1981; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). This mechanism also describes a 
potentially self-reinforcing process of power relations that situates the power relation between 
the organization and its external environment. The gist of resource dependence theory is that 
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an organization’s reliance on external resources leads to dependence on the supplying 
organizations in its environment (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). The need to secure external 
resources makes it necessary for the organization to continually engage with the source of the 
resources in order to secure the provision of funds (Beyers and Kerremans 2007). The structure 
and activities of the organization develop in conjunction with the external resource provision. In 
such a setting, existing dependencies might be strengthened since the loss of autonomy might 
leave the organization even less able (and/or inclined) to search for alternatives. For example, 
Beyers and Kerremans have emphasized the critical resource dependency of national interest 
groups on their national constituents, explaining why many interest groups have not been able 
to influence European policymaking (Beyers and Kerremans 2007). It has been argued that in the 
case of ETUC, this embeddedness in national membership has been overridden by the 
dependency on Commission funding, which has had much more influence on trade union 
Europeanization than have the transnationalization intentions of unions themselves (Martin and 
Ross 1999b, 2001; Turner 1995). In such a case, the dependency on EU funding may have set into 
motion a spiral of expectations. The organization relies on external funding and is less inclined 
to develop independent funding mechanisms or alternative organizational repertoires. 
Within an organization, such a process can lead to a spiral of decoupling due to diverging 
resource dependencies. Whereas at the national level the organization’s financial dependency is 
based on the logic membership, at the supranational level, the inherent tension between the 
logic of membership and the logic of influence can tip toward a dominance of the logic of 
influence. The extent to which European federations are dependent on these external resources 
shapes their organizational structure and strategy. It is likely that as external resources become 
more important, the logic of membership becomes less significant. The external resource 
provider then becomes the one the organization is accountable to. This might lead to a 
decoupling of the membership and the administrative structure. During this process the 
administration will probably become more important as the professionals develop strategies and 
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3.5.3 STABILIZATION AND (LIMITED) OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 
Over time, the repetitive pattern of reinforcing mechanisms can lead to lock-in, which is an 
important element when it comes to distinguishing institutionalization from path-dependent 
processes (Berthod 2011). The lock-in phase can be visualized by imagining a corridor of possible 
actions leaving very little scope for deviation from the path (Schreyögg and Sydow 2011).  
Figure 3: The Constitution of an Organizational Path  
(Schreyögg and Sydow 2011) 
 
In organizational theories of path dependence, change is almost improbable due to self-
reinforcing mechanisms outside the grasp of the organization or any individual within the 
organization (Schreyögg and Sydow 2011). As Pierson and Thelen have noted, in complex and 
“murky” political processes, path dependence is not always precise and deterministic but is more 
often characterized by slow-moving and gradual processes (Pierson 2000, 2004; Thelen 1999). 
These processes are principally open to institutional change (Beyer 2006; Lütz 2006). Over time, 
these incremental changes, as Thelen and Streeck have argued, can become transformative 
(Streeck and Thelen 2005). However, path dependence points to exactly those situations where 
transformative change is deeply restricted. In economic terms, a lock-in describes a situation in 
which actors are no longer able to choose rationally to achieve an optimal solution. For the 
organization to be path-dependent, the outcome must provide some indication of inefficiency, 
and a better alternative must be available (Arthur 1989). However, although this depiction of a 
lock-in may be useful for technological developments such as the keyboard standard QWERTY, 
it is in danger of blending out opposing social streams or suppressed developments that might 
resurface (Pierson 2000). In political settings, inefficiency is often a matter of perspective, not a 
matter of fact. Or, as Beyer has stated, “In a context of social science, the inefficiency argument 
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only plays a secondary role. The effect of norms, traditions, power, bounded rationality or 
functional logics leaves little room for assuming that (economic) efficiency consideration alone 
would guide actor’s behavior” (Beyer 2006: 21). Thornton and Ocasio have also highlighted the 
potential room for change in settings shaped by conflicting logics: at the core of their institutional 
logics approach lies the idea that the social and institutional context of an organization both 
steadies organizational behavior and opens up opportunities for agency and change (Thornton 
and Ocasio 2008). In lieu of arguing that one solution is “inefficient,” in political settings, multiple 
equilibriums are possible with different benefits and drawbacks for different groups of actors 
(Aoki 2001; Pierson 2000). An example from comparative politics exemplifies this argument. In 
the comparative social models literature, several different national paths have been identified: 
the social democrat model, the conservative model, the Anglo-Saxon model, and, depending on 
the authors, several more (Arts and Gelissen 2002; Esping-Andersen 1990). However, although 
all models have their benefits and downsides, it is clear that each model has developed its own 
path. 
In membership associations such as ETUFs, the question of inefficiency is not the central issue. 
Trade unions represent collective interests. Their strategic rationale is not only determined by 
their organizational structure but also by their membership. Unions are open systems that are 
home to diverse influences and at times conflicting positions. It may well be that a solution that 
is suboptimal for one member may be perfect for another. Path-dependent processes play out 
differently in such open systems. In a system dominated by social interaction, power structures, 
and collective decision-making, changing a trodden path can always be an option (Pierson 2000: 
257). Thus, path-dependent processes in membership federations most likely do not lead to a 
frozen, locked-in path, but change is merely limited. 
 
3.6 SUMMARY 
An examination of the literature on trade union internationalization in Chapter 2 has shown that 
trade union organization on the European level may develop into different modes: forum, 
instrument, coordination, steering and monitoring, supranational steering, and transnational. In 
principle, three arenas of activity are available: the European level, the national level, and the 
international level. The reality of ETUFs shows that the organizational function of European 
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federations across sectors seems to be systematically set in a coordinating role. Three logics 
influencing the configuration of ETUFs are derived from the literature on organized interest 
associations: the logic of membership, the logic of administration, and the logic of influence. 
Among these three logics, a number of structural tensions emerge. Path dependence theory 
offers mechanisms explaining how these tensions can become self-reinforcing and highlights the 
importance of early events and critical junctures. By transferring this approach to the analysis of 
ETUFs, this chapter provides a framework for analyzing key junctures of trade union 
Europeanization. Six main mechanisms are identified that could explain how the current form of 
Europeanization has emerged.  
To summarize, this chapter integrates three theoretical frameworks: a theory of trade union 
internationalization, organizational theories of trade unions, and path dependence theory. 
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CHAPTER 4 




This chapter introduces the methodological framework of the thesis and provides information 
about the data collection and data analysis: a process that Dey describes as finding the “hidden 
treasure” (Dey 1993: 96). The next section explains why this thesis uses a longitudinal single case 
study of European labor organization in the construction sector as the main case. Section 4.3 
describes how the data for the study was collected, and Section 4.4 outlines the process of data 
analysis, how the logics described above were researched, and how to analyze critical junctures. 
 
4.2 CASE SELECTION 
4.2.1 CONSTRUCTION SECTOR 
During the case selection phase of this dissertation from September to November 2009, the 
author spent some time at the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) in Brussels and participated 
in various conferences and meetings of European federations and other European institutions 
related to different sectors and labor topics. At the ETUI, the author talked to a number of helpful 
researchers and experts about possible research strategies. The observation of the construction 
sector as an extreme case with an important role among the European federations and little 
existing research on the EFBWW’s organizational structure led to the selection of the 
construction sector as the thesis’ main case. The observation that, “unlike any other federation,” 
the EFBWW has been shaped by European integration was particularly compelling (Platzer and 
Müller 2009: 584). Memos of the issues discussed in the individual conversations and meetings 
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were used as background material for the case selection. This study focuses on the EFBWW, and 
particularly on the organization of the construction sector within the EFBWW.  
The following section briefly outlines the main characteristics of the construction sector as an 
extreme case of Europeanization: first, the construction industry has been at the center of the 
debate on working conditions in Europe, especially since ECJ rulings on the Posting of Workers 
Directive (Clarke et al. 2003; Druker 1998; Kahmann 2006; Lillie and Greer 2007; Sandberg et al. 
2004; Woolfson and Sommers 2006). Both the Laval (2007) and Rüffert (2008) cases emanated 
from disputes in the building sector, highlighting the sector’s crucial role in social dumping and 
labor rights discussions. The building sector is a political heavyweight and a key industry in 
Europe, employing roughly 14.8 million workers (Stawinska 2010: 1). According to the EFBWW, 
each job in construction usually creates two additional jobs in other sectors (EFBWW 2011b).  
Second, both competitive pressures and options for cooperation in the construction sector are 
particularly strong, thereby making the case interesting for theory development on trade union 
Europeanization. Based on the legal and institutional push factors, a strong impetus for 
cooperation on the European level is assumed. As Sadowski and colleagues have noted, the 
incentive for employers to engage in European collective agreements and achieve a level playing 
field regarding major working conditions might also be stronger in sectors such as construction 
where cross-border labor mobility is high (Sadowski et al. 2002: 22). On the other hand, the 
competitive challenges in the labor market have also been particularly strong in the construction 
industry (Platzer and Müller 2009: 584), thus potentially leading to less coordination and more 
nationalistic approaches. 
Third, construction is an extremely work-intensive sector: about half of the returns in 
construction are based on labor productivity, and the often-aggressive struggle to secure 
contract work is directly linked to driving down wages (Cremers 2006a: 172). A relatively high 
turnover of firms due to bankruptcies accelerates the competitive pressures, making the industry 
extremely responsive to excessive competition resulting from a race-to-the-bottom of labor 
conditions (Cremers 2006a: 172). 
Fourth, the European Single Market has significantly altered the sector, which, as Hans Baumann 
from the European Institute for Construction Labour Research (CLR) has noted, has largely been 
confined to the regional and national levels in the early years of European integration (Baumann 
et al. 1996: 325f). Since the industry is especially attractive for migrant workers (Lubanski and 
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Pedersen 2004: 12), EU enlargement rounds and free movement of workers (labor migration) 
and services (cross-border subcontracting) are felt strongly (Cremers 2006a: 106). Cheap labor 
moves to high-wage countries (with good labor protection), and firms’ exit options are limited 
due to onsite work. However, this does not mean that companies have no leverage; instead, as 
Lillie and Greer have pointed out, construction firms profit from a large pool of labor willing to 
work under conditions customary in their home countries rather than being oriented toward the 
conditions in the country where the construction site is located (Lillie and Greer 2007: 552). Local 
workers are thus personally confronted with competition (Erne 2008: 94). These factors have led 
to a mismatch between traditional national logics of organizing/bargaining and European 
integration logics (European Commission 2014b).  
The existing studies on European trade unions concentrate on the umbrella organization ETUC 
(Dølvik 1999, 2000; Martin 1996: 12; Taylor and Mathers 2004) and the manufacturing sector, 
especially the metalworking sector (Henning 2010; Rüb 2009) and the service sector (Rüb and 
Platzer 2015). Only limited empirical work has been conducted on the organizational 
development of the EFBWW (Buschak 2003; EFBWW 2008a; Platzer 1991; Platzer and Müller 
2009). Platzer and Müller’s handbook provides an extremely valuable overview of the 
organizational structure of the ETUFs, but it does not focus on the mechanisms driving the 
development of the federations. However, considerable research has been done on the 
development of the construction sector and the strategies of (national) trade unions in the sector 
to react to Europe (Baumann et al. 1996; Clarke et al. 2003; Druker 1998; Erne 2008; Kahmann 
2006; Krings 2009; Lillie and Greer 2007; Sandberg et al. 2004; Woolfson and Sommers 2006). By 
using this research as background material, a focus on the EFBWW allows for a more detailed 
and focused look at the logics explaining the organizational form. 
 
4.2.2 A LONGITUDINAL SINGLE CASE STUDY  
In order to understand the research questions outlined above, this dissertation applies a process-
tracing approach (Bennett and Elman 2006; Collier et al. 2004; George and Bennett 2004; Tarrow 
2004) to study the path of the EFBWW as a single extreme case including embedded subunits, 
namely the national affiliates (Seawright and Gerring 2008; van Evera 1997: 91; Yin 2009: 50). 
The case study approach allows for in-depth analysis of long-term and multifaceted 
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developments (Seawright and Gerring 2008; Yin 2009), which are particularly complex in the 
multilevel environment of the EU.  
The study of a hypothesized path-dependent process from the preformation phase to the lock-
in phase requires a detailed portrayal of institutional origins and a careful investigation of the 
mechanisms of reproduction (Bennett and Elman 2006; Pierson 2004). Moreover, the intricate 
nature of the dynamics within and among membership, administration, and influence makes 
extensive empirical inquiry necessary. While stylized models are useful in order to insulate 
potential underlying frictions, historical analysis is required to determine how exactly these 
dynamics unfold (Jackson and Muellenborn 2012: 493). The case study method was therefore 
ideal for this theoretical framework. Furthermore, ETUFs have only recently come under the 
scrutiny of European industrial relations researchers. Therefore, there is still need for theory 
development on the process of Europeanization in European trade unions. Detailed case studies 
are prerequisites for understanding the way in which ETUFs have formed and which factors 
explain their constraints. Therefore, this thesis uses a case study approach to contribute to the 
knowledge on the Europeanization of a membership association, using an exploratory single case 
study to identify the social mechanisms driving its development. 
The rationale for a single case study in this dissertation is twofold. The first rationale for selecting 
a single case is that the study is longitudinal (Yin 2009: 49). Path dependence theory concentrates 
on explaining stability over long time periods. Only if the time period analyzed is long enough is 
it possible to specify which mechanisms of reproduction have evolved over time (Siggelkow 
2007). David’s study on QWERTY is a famous example: without the alternative keyboard 
arrangements that have emerged decades after the establishment of QWERTY, he would not 
have been able to convincingly single out the self-reinforcing mechanisms that persuaded 
readers of QWERTY’s path dependence. However, the long and detailed time period required for 
the analysis makes it difficult to study more cases.  
The second rationale is that the case is an extreme case. Case studies can be selected to 
represent different types among a population: typical, diverse, extreme, deviant, influential, 
most similar, and most different cases (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 301). Due to the limited 
knowledge available concerning the historical mechanisms shaping ETUFs, the case selection of 
an extreme case is justified as an exploratory measure (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 297). 
However, Bennett and Elman have pointed out that for single case studies using a process tracing 
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method, standard selection bias critiques do not apply, because “causal inference arises from its 
evidence that a process connects the cause and the outcome” (Bennett and Elman 2006: 260). 
 
4.3 COLLECTING THE DATA 
Following Langley’s guide to studying processes, the first step was to develop a “process 
database” (Langley 1999: 693). Based on the principle of triangulation, a variety of data sources 
provided information for the empirical analysis. The data collected for this study is both 
qualitative and quantitative, although the vast majority is qualitative. As Bennett and Elman have 
concluded, when studying complex feedback loops and critical junctures, the qualitative method 
is especially useful for finding causal relationships, “even when scholars study only one or a few 
cases” (Bennett and Elman 2006: 261). Based on the research questions and the selected case, 
the timeframe of the study covers the years from 1951, when the European Coal and Steel 
Community came into being, until 2014. The study covers 60 years with the goal of unraveling 
recurring mechanisms unfolding over a long period of time. The gist of the empirical study covers 
the years from 1974 – the year of the founding of the European Federation of Building and 
Woodworkers in the Community (EFBWWC), now the EFBWW – onwards. 
Due to the long timeframe of the historical study, the data collection procedure could not be the 
same for all periods. Most importantly, the data stems from document analysis and interviews. 
For the first years from 1952 until 1963, the data originates from documents from the EFBWW, 
secondary literature, and reports of the German construction labor union Industriegewerkschaft 
Bauen-Agrar-Umwelt (IG BAU) from the trade union archive in Hanover. For the years from 1964 
until 2000, archival data was also available from the Archive of Social Democracy of the Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung in Bonn, Germany. For the years from the early 1980s until the present, additional 
data stems from the EFBWW itself; the European Commission; interviews; documents from 
unions, employers, and government institutions; and further secondary sources. The table below 
provides an overview of all sources. 
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Table 7: Overview of Data Sources 
DOCUMENTS AND DATA 
Trade union archives Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie (Archive of Social Democracy), Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung Bonn 
Gewerkschaftsarchiv (trade union archive) Hannover 
EFBWW documents 
and data 
Project documentation, financial reports, work programs, press releases, 
conference material, minutes from meetings, other archival material 
European Commission 
documents and data 
European Financial Transparency Register, project funding data received 
from direct inquiries with the Commission, Sectoral Social Dialogue Text 
Database, Commission reports (e.g., on EWCs), project guidelines, etc.  
ETUI databases EWC database, Social Dialogue outcomes 
Articles by 
practitioners/unionists 
in the labor and 
construction sector 













EFBWW/CLR/BWI: 14 (including all EFBWW secretary generals; time 
covered: 1980–2014)1 
EFBWW affiliates: 8 
Commission: 2 
(Background interviews with field researchers: 10) 
Interviews from 
secondary sources 
Interviews with unionists and labor professionals in trade union publications 
(e.g., CLR News, WSI Mitteilungen, Grundstein, newspapers etc.) 
OTHER LITERATURE 
Background literature Case studies, handbooks, publications by (former) staff members 
OBSERVATION (only during case selection phase; see Chapter 4.3) 
Participant observation  ETUI September to November 2009 
 
DOCUMENTS AND DATA 
Document analysis provided the main data resource for this study. By using a variety of 
documents from different sources, it was ensured that different perspectives were included in 
the analysis. The essential part of the material provides information on debates, decisions, 
activities, and organizational structure. Quantitative data was obtained, for example, for 
describing membership development, affiliation payments, project funding, activity types, or 
overall sectoral trends. This set of data includes documents and financial data from the EFBWW 
itself (archive, website, office in Brussels), documents and statistical data from the European 
                                                        
 
 
1 Since the organizations are rather small, more detailed information on the role of the interviewees within the 
EFBWW/CLR/BWI cannot be provided in order to protect the interviewees anonymity. 
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Commission, documents from the employer organization FIEC, and joint publications by the 
social partners from the Sectoral Social Dialogue.  
The main archive of the EFBWW until 1999/2000 is in Bonn, Germany at the Archive of Social 
Democracy of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. The archival data begins in 1964 with the EFBWW 
predecessor organizations. The material covers correspondence, documents, and protocols from 
the executive committee (1976–1999). The EFBWW has five main decision-making bodies: the 
Executive Committee, which meets twice a year; a Management Committee responsible for the 
implementation of decisions; the Auditing Committee; and two Standing Committees, one for 
the building industry and one for the woodworking and forestry industries (EFBWW 2015c). The 
General Assembly is formally the main democratic decision-making body of the EFBWW. Its 
members come from all affiliated unions. The General Assembly can decide on changes and 
amendments to the constitution and is the place where all decisions regarding the EFBWW’s 
organizational structure are taken. It deals with financial issues (affiliation fee, resources for the 
secretariat in Brussels, control of the Auditing Committee and its reports) and elections of the 
main decision-making bodies (Executive Committee, the president, the vice-presidents, the 
general secretary, the Auditing Committee, and the Standing Committees) and defines the main 
outline of the future policy program as well as discussions of the past policies (and work of the 
Executive Committee). Apart from these supervisory and financial planning tasks, the General 
Assembly discusses the main agenda of the Standing Committees on Building and 
Wood/Furniture/Forestry and the work of the coordination groups for health and safety and 
EWCs (EFBWW 2015c; EFBWWC 1978d). Data on the General Assembly is provided from 1976 
until 1999. A further valuable resource was the data on the Social Dialogue documented for the 
founding years from 1990–1996. Information concerning the activities of the managing 
secretary, newsletters and correspondence with ETUC/ETUI, and documents from one larger 
project are also included. In addition, meetings of the industry committees are also in the archive 
for the years from 1979 to 1987. In order to maintain focus, the analysis concentrated on 
protocols from the executive committee, activity reports (including financial reports), and 
documents from the General Assemblies. These three sources provided information concerning 
the general development of the organization, discussions, and resources. As detailed in the 
section on data analysis, additional information related to the research tasks was searched as 
needed. For the years after 2000, data was obtained from online documents provided on the 
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EFBWW’s website and documents provided directly to the author by the EFBWW. The ETUI 
provides overviews and databases on EWCs and Social Dialogue outcomes, which were also used 
for this study. 
Documents from the European Commission concern various publications related to the 
construction sector, legislation and jurisdiction on labor and social issues, reports on the social 
partners and developments in industrial relations, and social policy in general. One valuable 
resource was the Financial Transparency Register, which provides data on Commission funding. 
The data from the register was used to analyze the resources received from the Commission and 
identify potential patterns in Commission funding. Since the Transparency Register only covers 
the years since 2007, additional information was requested directly from the Commission. The 
Sectoral Social Dialogue Text Database, a library on the Sectoral Social Dialogue, contains 
information on the topics discussed among labor and employers. Data from the employer 
organization FIEC mainly contained press releases, project reports, and policy statements.  
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
A time span of about 30 years (from the early 1980s until 2014) was covered by the interviews. 
The interviews were semi-structured interviews. An interview guideline clustered the interview 
into thematic blocs, and additional questions that arose during the interview were followed up 
directly. The goal was twofold: first, to gain a better understanding of the EFBWW’s 
organizational development; second, to uncover interests and internal debates among the 
members; and third, to better understand the administration’s role and the federation’s 
responsibilities. The phone interviews lasted approximately 50 to 120 minutes (see attachment). 
Three interviews were conducted via email and concerned more precise follow-up questions. 
Care was taken to include the perspectives of the national affiliates and European federation 
unionists, staff members with tasks related to different projects and policy areas, senior and 
junior levels, and former and current staff members. The latter aspect enabled the gathering of 
insights into the current situation as well as the possibility of enabling reflections on past events 
and consequences.  
Even though attention was paid to considering different attributes, some problems remained. 
Most importantly, there is a bias in the geographical distribution toward interview partners from 
continental Europe, particularly Germany. There are several reasons for this bias: first, the 
historical approach of the case study made it necessary to find interview partners that could 
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cover the founding years of the EFBWW. During this time, Eastern enlargement was still far away, 
and the six founding affiliates of the EFBWWC provided most of the limited resources and staff 
members. The second reason is that access to new member states was difficult, and inquiries of 
a number of affiliates from Central and Eastern Europe resulted in only limited response, possibly 
since the affiliates there are often understaffed and have little resources for additional 
interviews. A further reason is that since the research was conducted in Germany, access to 
German interview partners was facilitated. This home country setting was particularly important 
in the early stages of research when the first interviews and conversations enabled access to the 
field. Moreover, the German IG BAU provided a number of presidents and vice-presidents, 
making German interview partners valuable witnesses to history. Apart from geographical 
diversity, there was a bias in the interviews related to the responsibilities of the interviewees. 
The national union staff members interviewed are all unionists that have in some way dealt with 
EU-related issues. These staff members do not represent the majority of the national trade union 
members. However, as members of their national organizations they are representatives of 
national perspectives and were thus valuable sources of information about the membership of 
the organization. In addition, all interviewed parties were professionals; no lay members were 
interviewed. This bias was justified due to the organizational focus of this study. 
All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity. An initial set of key interviewees was contacted 
based on two criteria: a) a previous or current role in the organization and ability to answer 
questions related to the research tasks, and b) recommendations from fellow researchers (Yin 
2009). During these initial interviews, other names often came up and were followed up. With 
such a snowballing system, interviews were conducted until a saturation of the field was 
achieved, although not all of the names suggested were available for interviews. This meant that 
no new names came up that were not followed up. 
In general, the interviewees were very forthcoming about providing insights into their daily work 
and the historical development of the organization, but collecting data on financial issues proved 
to be difficult. The interviewees themselves often viewed the Europeanization of labor issues 
with some concern and were interested in examining the role of the organization in more detail. 
However, there were difficulties during the interviews when it came to reflecting on the 
organization’s own role. This was naturally easier for those unionists whose active years had 
already passed. Since interview partners were generally more willing to talk about the past than 
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the present, data material from interviews, especially concerning the administrative logic during 
the first decade of this century (the Noughties) was limited. A number of interviews related to 
European labor issues were also collected from trade union publications. 
BACKGROUND: SECONDARY LITERATURE 
Background information was also collected from case studies in secondary literature. Three types 
of secondary literature were used: handbooks on international trade unionism, case studies on 
different areas of activity, and publications by (former) staff members or researchers close to 
the union movement. In the first category, this study uses the valuable overview on the EFBWW 
from the German handbook on global and ETUFs by Platzer and Müller (2009). An example from 
the second category is a single case study by three researchers from Leeds with previous 
experience in the construction sector, which provides valuable information on the emergence 
and difficulties of the European Migrant Workers Union (Greer et al. 2011). An example from the 
third category is a study by three labor union professionals that provides an understanding of 
the beginnings of collective bargaining coordination in the construction sector (Baumann et al. 
1996).  
A further important source was “Construction Labour Research,” a network of researchers and 
trade unionists focusing on labor in the building sector founded in 1996. Construction Labour 
Research was founded following an initiative by the EFBWW and thus provides valuable insights 
into the discussions led in relation to European construction labor. Leading staff members of the 
EFBWW have regularly published articles in the newsletter, which has been issued since 2001. 
The newsletter appears four times per year and is usually devoted to a specific topic. In addition, 
the newsletter contains minutes of the annual general meetings of the CLR, workshops reports 
and papers, and articles concerning current developments in the sector. Fifty editions of the 
newsletter were reviewed and analyzed to understand the debates, issues, and sectoral 
developments of European construction labor. 
 
4.4 ANALYZING THE DATA 
4.4.1 PROCESS TRACING 
In order to make sense of the collected data, a process tracing approach was adopted that uses 
both categories deducted from theory and inductively gained categories from the text analysis 
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(Dey 1993; Langley 1999; Mayring 2005: 11f; Pettigrew 1997). The first set of categories helped 
to keep the original research tasks in mind, while the additional categories allowed the 
researcher to use alternative explanations that emerge from the data. Indeed, Langley has 
argued that theory building involves a third element apart from deduction and induction: 
“inspiration,” the source of which often cannot be pinpointed (Langley 1999). This research 
strategy is particularly suitable for explorative research where the researcher can extract a 
number of possible explanations for the research puzzle but theory development is still in its 
early stages (George and Bennett 2004). Process tracing is especially fitting for the study of 
constraints – and therefore path dependence – since “process tracing can assess to what extent 
and how possible outcomes of a case were restricted by the choices made at decision points along 
the way.” (George and Bennett 2004). In Sidney Tarrow’s words, a process tracing approach 
makes it possible to “connect the phases of the policy process and enable the investigator to 
identify the reasons for the emergence of a particular decision through the dynamic of events” 
(Tarrow 2004).  
The following sections proceed with the following steps: first, the deductively gained dimensions 
guiding the empirical analysis of the logics of influence, membership, and administration are 
described. The second section focuses on how to identify critical junctures and uncover 
mechanisms driving stabilization. 
 
4.4.2 DESCRIBING THE ORGANIZATIONAL FORM AND RESEARCHING LOGICS  
The first research question of this thesis is “How has the form of Europeanization adopted by 
the EFBWW been shaped by the competing organizational logics of membership, influence, 
and administration?” In order to analyze this question, the main task is to trace the development 
of each logic in order to explain the organizational form. 
The description of the organizational form was developed based on the evolutionary system of 
Europeanization outcomes described in Chapter 3. Based on the variety of possible responses to 
European integration from “weak” (unions remain mainly national) (1) to “strong” (supranational 
European or transnational union) (6), the organizational outcome was categorized based on 
keywords associated with these modes. For example, the recurring keyword conclusion of “non-
binding joint agreements” in the Social Dialogue was a strong indicator for the coordinating role 
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(3), and accounts of steering functions and autonomy of the EFBWW in coordinating EWCs were 
indications of a stronger regulatory role (4). In practice, this could also lead to hybrid results 
where a federation has an organizational steering role in some policy areas and coordination 
functions in others.  
Table 8: Modes of transnational Organization and Keywords 











































“International Trade Union,” transnational union has 
same responsibilities as national union, services for 
individual members, joint strikes, joint collective 
bargaining 









National members transfer core competencies to the 
international level, steering, top-down 
4 International 









Negotiation of binding standards (e.g., collective 
bargaining), limited regulatory steering functions for 
transnational federation (e.g., transnational works 
councils), autonomy of federation’s organizational 
structure in certain policy areas (e.g., Social Dialogue), 








Negotiation of non-binding standards (e.g., collective 
bargaining), coordination via joint agreements or codes 
of conduct, coordination platform, network, limited 







Labor diplomacy, exchange of information, exchange of 
experiences, network, federation non-political, not 
autonomous in day-to-day work  




(Re)nationalization  Instrument, information services, competition, 
federation non-political, not autonomous in day-to-day 
work 
 
For the purpose of this study, the organizational mode served to indicate a trend that could then 
be explained and elaborated on in more detail by the logics leading to this specific organizational 
structure. At the same time, researching the logics also provided deeper information on the 
organizational structure, making it necessary to continuously reconnect data for all categories. 
Thus, the research process was characterized by an iterative process with feedback loops 
between pinpointing the organizational mode and describing the logics developed in Chapter 3. 
These logics each imply a number of subvariables. For the study of ETUFs, the dimensions 
described below are particularly important.  
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The logic of influence explains the organization’s interaction with its institutional environment. 
It is determined by the institutional and political setting in which the association can exert its 
influence. In simple terms, the logic of influence is a) the goal addressee of the organization and 
b) a provider of essential resources. In order to examine this function, it is necessary to inspect 
the main bargaining partners for trade unions in a tripartite setting: government institutions and 
employer associations. In order to examine the second function as a provider of resources, it is 
necessary to investigate how the access options for trade unions have developed in terms of 
information and consultation rights (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 30ff). These access 
options also concern the development of European competencies in policy areas that touch upon 
core responsibilities of trade unions: working conditions, health and safety issues, and other 
social policy fields. The following dimensions were central for the analysis: the first cluster 
concerns the political and institutional development of the EU in the fields of industrial relations 
and social policy. Therefore, the opportunities for tripartite and bipartite dialogue and the 
general openness to trade union issues are important, because they shape the access points for 
trade union organizations. European Union legislation and jurisdiction with a particular impact 
on the construction sector was also considered. The sectoral development and its consequences 
for labor are outlined to explain the specific sectoral setting in which the federation operates. 
The second cluster focuses on the development of the employer federation in the construction 
sector (FIEC) and the relationship with FIEC. This includes the development of Social Dialogues 
and projects conducted jointly with FIEC. The outcomes of these Social Dialogues were grouped 
according to activity area, themes, and addressees. That way, it was possible to infer patterns 
and general developments. The cross-sectoral relations between ETUC and the employer side 
were also considered as background information to gain a deeper understanding of the field. 
The logic of membership describes the process of goal formation within an association. The logic 
of membership relates to the interests of the workers themselves. The members aim to extract 
resources from being active in an association. These resources can be financial, personal, or 
political benefits, such as exerting collective influence in order to achieve beneficial legislation 
for workers. The process-tracing approach for organizations means that this study focuses on 
the actions and practices of the organization, which, as Schatzki has argued, constitute “the 
happening of an organization” (Schatzki 2006: 1863). In order to investigate the logic of 
membership, this thesis focuses on three aspects, the first of which was the development of the 
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number of affiliates and represented members and their diversity in terms of resources, size, 
geographical distribution, and political cleavages. A second and related aspect concerns 
competition and interdependence among the members. Third, interests and factions among the 
membership concerning the transnational organization are important. This particularly includes 
discussions about organizational alternatives and initiatives regarding European representation 
among the membership. Finally, discussions within the ETUC were considered since the ETUC’s 
logic of membership has repercussions for the sectoral organizations affiliated within the ETUC.  
The administrative logic is concerned with the implementation of the organization’s goals by the 
administration. In essence, it describes the interests and role of the staff. In order to analyze the 
development of the logic of administration, this research focused on the number of staff 
members and the role and responsibilities of the administration within the federation as 
described by themselves as well as by affiliates. This part of the empirical research turned out to 
be the most difficult and challenging to analyze since the amount of information available is 
scant. The role of the administration also manifests itself in the projects conducted by the 
administration and the focal points they set in their day-to-day work. A further aspect of the 
analysis was the way in which responsibilities are divided between the international federation 
BWI and the EFBWW.  
This study concentrates on the time from the founding of the EFBWWC in 1974 until 2014. The 
gist of the data also stems from these four decades, although the early years of the EFBWWC’s 
predecessor are also taken into account. Since data material for the founding years of the 
EFBWW is scarce, the narrative of this first phase is largely based on a chronological description 
created from archival material. As the data material becomes more diverse, the analysis 
becomes denser and the description of the logics more detailed. For the phase beginning in the 
Noughties, the data material is mixed: since much of the information retrieved for this phase 
stems from interviews and interview partners were more open to talking about the past than 
about the present, the information about this era, especially concerning the logic of 
administration, is less detailed than for the first and second phases. 
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Table 9: Overview of Case Analysis 
Case EFBWW 
Subunits National affiliates 
Timeframe 1958–2014 
 
General Category Information on 
Organizational Form  Mode of transnational problem-solving 
Role of European organization 
 
Logic of  
Influence  
Political and institutional setting in the EU, particularly regarding industrial 
relations and social policy 
Access points and constraints for trade unions 
Policies, legislation, and jurisdiction influencing construction sector 
Sectoral conditions 
Employer organizations 




Quantity and diversity of affiliates (resources, membership, geographical 
distribution, political cleavages) 
Competition and interdependence 
Interests/factions concerning transnational organization 




Quantity of staff members 
Role of staff members in the federation 
Type of union professional 
Implementation of organizational goals and contact with members 
Position and identity of (leading) staff members within the federation 
Multilevel division of labor (BWI and EFBWW) 
 
 
4.4.3 THREE LOGICS, ONE STORY 
As Pettigrew has highlighted, the core of processual analysis is the interaction between agency 
and context (Pettigrew 1997). The focus on the three logics already embeds this interaction. 
However, although the list of dimensions guiding the data analysis may indicate otherwise, these 
three logics are not clearly divided from one another. As Langley has pointed out, process 
phenomena are “difficult to analyze […] they often involve multiple levels and units of analysis 
whose boundaries are ambiguous” (Langley 1999: 692). In the qualitative empirical analysis, the 
“stories” of the logics overlap and interact. However, it is exactly this relationship between 
context and organizational structure that can help uncover self-reinforcing processes leading to 
path dependence (Koch 2011). In the writing process, it was necessary to decide under which 
“logic” to place a story. For example, the discussions on the role of the secretariat could be 
placed in the logic of membership, because they illustrate the varying interests and alternatives 
that have been discussed among the members. However, they are also an important part of the 
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logic of administration, because they portray the way in which the understands its role, 
highlighting the role and responsibilities of the administration. Another example is the role of 
the EFBWW in the European Social Dialogue. The Social Dialogue is a part of the interactions with 
the state and employers and thus the logic of influence. However, where considerations of the 
national affiliates come into play, the story of the Social Dialogue becomes part of the logic of 
membership. This ambiguity was a challenge for the writing process but also a chance to 
demonstrate the interactions between the logics. A third example is the EFBWW’s relationship 
with the international federation in the construction sector (BWI). This is part of the logic of 
membership because it concerns multilevel membership, but it is also part of the logic of 
administration because it deals with the division of labor between the international and 
European federations. In this study, the first empirical chapter is grouped into three 
organizational phases, which are then explained by the interaction between the three logics. The 
attribution of stories of overlapping logics to a particular logic in the empirical chapter was 
decided pragmatically based on the best fit of the main storyline with the dimensions identified 
for each logic. The second empirical chapter is concerned with the way in which critical junctures 
create long-lasting effects for the EFBWW’s organizational development.  
 
4.4.4 DATA ANALYSIS AND ANALYZING JUNCTURES 
Although Chapter 5 is devoted to explaining the organizational outcome in the light of the logics 
of influence, membership, and administration, it is also a crucial step to answering the second 
research question of this thesis: "What key critical junctures explain the formation and 
stabilization of the present form of Europeanization?" In order to answer this research 
question, the first step is to explain how to empirically establish a juncture. Chapter 5, which 
explains the organizational form and tells the story of the logics shaping the organization, lays 
the groundwork for this step. The historical retrospective Chapter 5 provides identifies shifts in 
the organizational form and points to key events within each logic explaining these shifts. The 
analysis in the second empirical chapter (i.e., Chapter 6) builds on this foundation and analyzes 
how the dynamics following the critical junctures have formed and stabilized the EFBWW’s 
current organizational form.  
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The analysis of critical junctures requires an event-centered approach in order to uncover the 
initial conditions and triggering events leading to path-dependent processes (Aminzade 1992; 
van Diel 2013). A part of these initial conditions is to highlight actors’ preferences, which might 
have the power to steer future events according to their preferences (Aminzade 1992). Indeed, 
process data is mostly comprised of “stories about what happened and who did what when” 
(Langley 1999). The events in this phase leading to stabilization can be “small or big and/or 
decisions” (Koch 2011). In order to make sense of these events in a chronology, the process is 
grouped into “periods” by identifying specific events or turning points as particularly relevant 
(Lieberman 2001). Informed by path dependence theory, these periods can then be grouped into 
a preformation phase, critical juncture/formation phase, and stabilization phase. In a first step,  
the EFBWW’s organizational development was outlined, since this is what is supposed to be 
explained. In the second step, a series of major events in the influence logic were traced since 
the institutional development of the EU and European industrial relations is the best researched 
and most intuitive starting point for the periodization of events. The data was subjected to a 
coding procedure with an initial list of codes based on the three logics and was supplemented as 
the process went along (Mayring 2005: 12). In parallel, a detailed narrative was written up 
(Langley 1999; Pierson 2004) by working out the preceding, simultaneous, and responding 
actions within the logics of membership and administration, paying attention to changes or 
patterns of actions (Pentland 1999: 714). This first step provided a dense description of the case 
and a good sense of defining periods in the story and – based on the theoretical assumption of 
potential self-reinforcing mechanisms – some ideas about the driving forces of the EFBWW’s 
development. The empirical analysis of Chapter 5 revealed where critical junctures were at play, 
meaning moments that significantly altered an organization’s room to maneuver. The critical 
nature of critical junctures often only becomes apparent in hindsight. Thus, a researcher’s task 
is to go back in time and unravel at which points the organization made a turn from which it 
became increasingly difficult to deviate. This thesis assumes that tensions between any of the 
two logics can result in a situation in which one of the logics acquires greater or less strength in 
the organization over time. A central empirical task was to define if (and when) such an inherent 
tension tips, setting off a lasting legacy driven be self-reinforcing mechanisms.  
Chapter 6 is devoted to answering the core of the second research question: "What key critical 
junctures explain the formation and stabilization of the present form of Europeanization?" 
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First, by identifying patterns in the EFBWW’s organizational development, the initial section of 
the chapter summarizes the organizational configuration that has been stable over time – the 
critical juncture’s legacy’s core attributes, as Collier and Collier call them (Collier and Collier 1991: 
31). In order to explain the stabilization, the path dependence approach points to mechanisms 
of reproduction that are set into motion following a critical juncture. These mechanisms describe 
a string of behavioral patterns positively reinforcing each other so that sticking with one pattern 
leads to benefits in using this pattern, which again results in maintaining the same pattern, and 
so on. However, what initially might have been sensible can become antiquated as 
environmental conditions change.  
In an iterative process, all evidence of constraints were identified and grouped in order to find 
“constraint clusters” whose labels were informed by the self-reinforcing mechanisms outlined in 
the theoretical chapter. These constraint clusters were linked with a) tensions between the logics 
and b) phases identified in the chronology. As such, constraint patterns and causal chains 
became visible. In practice, certain text passages that seemed in any way interesting or struck a 
chord were identified. Citations with a common explanatory perspective or belonging to a joint 
issue area received a common label. Recurrent arguments became apparent during this 
procedure. Following the logic of triangulation, multiple sources of data were used to close 
information gaps during the process of data analysis. When all the material was analyzed, a 
second (and sometimes third, fourth, and fifth) round served to validate the initial categories 
(Mayring 2005: 12). Thus, purely descriptive categories increasingly became analytic categories.  
A final step was to determine suppressed trajectories and alternatives that might enhance the 
claim of stability by arguing that other options might also have been possible (Aminzade 1992), 
which this author refers to as the “dark side” of the pattern. Basically, counterfactual analysis 
asks, “What if something different had happened?” (Mordhorst 2008). The general idea is based 
on the argumentation that patterns of persistence will most likely be apparent in relation to a 
changing environment. Counterfactual analysis can help assess at what point choices made 
constrained future decisions (George and Bennett 2004). As Aminzade has pointed out, however, 
counterfactual analysis is “highly problematic [… since it] requires evidence suggesting the 
possibility of alternative paths as well as historical analogies to identify the likely consequences 
of possible alternatives” (Aminzade 1992). This dissertation follows a twofold strategy to deal 
with this problem: first, since historical analogies are limited for the unique supranational setting 
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of the EU (Leibfried 1993), a number of hypothetical organizational options were established in 
Chapter 2. This dissertation thereby follows Mahoney’s understanding of counterfactual 
analysis, which can help single out critical junctures by “[imagining] an alternative option” 
(Mahoney 2000). Second, in the empirical section, one research analysis task was to pay 
attention to discussions concerning alternative pathways or attempts to establish different 
organizational structures. If such alternatives could were found, this researcher asked, “Were 
these alternatives realized? If not, what reasons can be identified?” Such discussions and 
attempts at organizational reform can be indications of path-dependent persistence.  
However, path dependence research must avoid the danger of only searching for theory-
confirming facts. Thus, a third section of the chapter looks for the “bright side” of the pattern 
and asks if and how the EFBWW’s organizational configuration might have different benefits or 
how it could be used by the actors within the EFBWW in a way that would promote their goals. 
In addition, the focus on stability can lead to a neglect of organizational shifts below the 
empirically clearly observable main pattern.  
The analysis ends with a conclusive discussion of the second research question that debates the 
evidence discussing how and if critical junctures have set off lasting patterns fueled by self-
reinforcing mechanisms. 
Table 10: Research Questions in Chapters 5 and 6 
Research Question #1: 
How has the form of Europeanization 
adopted by the EFBWW been shaped by 
the competing organizational logics of 
membership, influence, and 
administration? 
 Organizational Form (dependent 
variable) 
-> explained by 
 Conflicting logics of membership, 
influence, and administration 
(independent variables) 
 
Chapter 5:  
Organizational analysis, 
tensions, and groundwork for 
analysis of identification and 
effects of critical juncture 
  
Research Question #2: 
What key critical junctures explain the 
formation and stabilization of the present 
form of Europeanization? 
 Initial conditions and triggering 
events (chronology of 
organizational form) 
 Shift in organizational 
form/critical juncture (chronology 
of organizational form) 
 Key critical junctures in each logic 
 
 Stable organizational form? 
 Constraints from conflicting logics 
resulting in self-reinforcing 
mechanisms? 
 Alternative trajectories? 
Chapter 6: 
Explanation of stabilization of 
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4.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter developed the research tasks based on the literature review and the theoretical 
framework of this study. It explained why the investigation of these tasks was conducted based 
on the case of the EFBWW, which represents a case in which pressures from European 
integration have been particularly extreme. This chapter outlined the process of case selection 
and explained how the data for the case was collected and analyzed. The main data sources were 
document analysis of archival material and interviews. Problems related to the data collection 
were also discussed. The data was examined and explored based on qualitative process tracing, 
which is closely linked to the categories defined in the theoretical framework but is also open to 
alternative and/or unknown explanations. The aim of the chapter was to enable the reader to 
interpret the findings of the case study in light of the methodological approach. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 THE CONSTRUCTION CASE: HOW MEMBERSHIP, INFLUENCE, AND 
ADMINISTRATION EXPLAIN THE FORM OF EUROPEANIZATION 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter investigates the first research question of this thesis: “How has the form of 
Europeanization adopted by the EFBWW been shaped by the competing organizational logics of 
membership, influence, and administration?” In addition, this chapter lays the groundwork for the 
second research question regarding critical junctures by tracing shifts in the organizational form and  
key events in each logic. Three phases of the EFBWW’s organizational development are identified 
based on the typology of organizational outcomes described in Chapter 2. Each of these outcomes 
can be explained by the specific interplay between the logics of influence, membership, and 
administration. The following sections each begin with a brief description of the organizational form 
during this phase and then illustrate how the three logics formed this outcome. 
 
5.2 INFORMATION ONLY: EARLY 1950s TO MID-1980s 
5.2.1 PREFORMATION PHASE: “DEEPLY ASLEEP” 
The EFBWW began as a “Joint Committee” within the International Federation of Building and 
Woodworkers (IFBWW). When this Joint Committee was created in 1958, the main goal was to 
“maintain contact” between Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands 
(EFBWWC 1978d). 
The predecessor of the EFBWW served as an instrument with “the task of collection, studying 
and exchanging social and economic data” (EFBWWC 1978d). It worked alongside the IFBWW 
and kept in regular contact with the main office in Geneva but was organizationally embedded 
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in one of the six affiliates’ national trade union offices (EFBWWC 1978d). Despite the increasing 
importance of the European Community as a supranational organization, it took more than a 
decade after the Treaty of Rome to establish an independent organization of European Economic 
Community (EEC) construction unions: in 1972, the Joint Committee unanimously decided that 
they would need to “display a more united front” and reorganize their European work (EFBWW 
2008a: 10). When the EFBWW was founded in 1974, it became an organization for 
“communicative rapprochement”: an organizational form in which the affiliates use the 
federation as a platform for national trade unions to explore European issues of joint interests 
and exchange their national experiences with these issues (EFBWWC 1974). The EFBWW was 
responsible for “representational work and a limited amount of information-gathering” (EFBWW 
2008a: 19). The first organizational phase of the EFBWW was characterized by a representative, 
non-political role with functions as a “reciprocal information organ” (EFBWWC 1978d: 3). With 
these limited functions, harmonizing sectoral trade union policy or joint standpoints on union 
issues were not part of the picture. More “political” issues such as campaigns or lobbying work 
were left to the IFBWW (Cremers 1991; EFBWWC 1978d). 
Table 11: Development of the Organizational Mode of EFBWWC and Its Predecessor (the Joint Committee) 
 (EFBWWC 1978b, 1978d) 
 Main Tasks Organizational Mode Role of Transnational Organization 
Joint 
Committee 





“reciprocal information organ” 
(EFBWWC 1978d)  
Will to “display a more united front” 
(EFBWW 2008a) 
“political” issues left to IFBWW 
(Cremers 1991) 
“the secretariat was responsible for 
representational work and a limited 
amount of information-gathering.” 
(EFBWW 2008: 19) 
Communicative 
rapprochement  
Forum for information exchange (2) 
 
As the following sections show in more detail, the organizational form can be explained by the 
interplay between (1) limited opportunity structures for exerting influence on the European level 
favoring national over joint European representation (influence), (2) a membership base that 
was divided regarding the main tasks of the federation and who had found the lowest common 
denominator in receiving information on European policies and maintaining national autonomy 
(membership), and (3) a weak administrative position with a representative and non-political 
role and without an independent European secretariat (administration).  
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5.2.2 INFLUENCE: LIMITED OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES AND EMPLOYER OPPOSITION 
When the Treaty of Paris established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, 
the main concern was to bring Europe back to a stable and competitive economy. Workers’ rights 
were embedded in the general goal of “improving the living and working conditions of the labor 
force” (ECSC 1951: Article 46). Perhaps surprisingly, this first treaty foresaw labor representation. 
Of the nine members of the High Authority, one member was a labor representative (EurWORK 
2011). In addition, a further step toward providing access to workers was made by creating a 
Consultative Committee to the High Authority including equally represented 
workers/consumers, dealers, and producers (ECSC 1951: Article 18). This committee was the first 
example of a European consultation mechanism in a supranational setting. The tripartite 
dialogue established by the treaty moved “beyond traditional social dialogue” as a former 
president of the ECSC Consultative Committee recalls, particularly since it covered a vast array 
of issues apart from purely social topics in the coal and steel sectors (Gibellieri 2002: 3). 
Unsurprisingly, the committee praised its own work as “a unique example of fruitful sectoral 
dialogue between the European Commission and industry” contributing to industrial peace and 
transparency (Consultative Committee of the ECSC 1999: 5). The tripartite agency Eurofound 
commented on the “remarkable quality of this European labor law and policy” in this first treaty 
(EurWORK 2011). 
However, what might have been an historical trajectory for tripartite dialogue on the European 
level was not repeated in the Treaty of Rome six years later. The Treaty of Rome added the EEC 
and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC), establishing the European Community and 
famously laying out the “four freedoms” of goods, capital, persons, and services based on the 
principle of free competition. Institutionally, the Treaty of Rome established the Commission, 
the Council, the European Parliament, the Court of Justice, and, in an advisory function, the 
European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). Other than within the Consultative Committee 
to the ECSC, the more than 300 members of the EESC – a broad spectrum of societal groups 
including “representatives of producers, agriculturists, transport operators, workers, merchants, 
artisans, the liberal professions and of the general interest” (EEC 1957: Article 193) – are 
appointed by the national governments. For trade unions, the interactions with the state in the 
original setup of the European Community was therefore geared toward national 
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representatives of labor and employers, not toward representation by a unitary European 
association.  
Less known is the influence of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe founded by 
Jean Monnet in 1955, which invited unions and political leaders from the six founding EEC 
members to cooperate for greater economic cooperation, a common market, and harmonizing 
social policies (Monnet 1955). The committee assembled a number of influential national unions: 
the French Socialist Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO), the German 
metalworkers’ union IG Metall, the German Trade Union Confederation (DGB), the Italian Social-
Democrat Unione Italiana del Lavoro (UIL), and the Belgian General Federation of Labour (FGTB) 
(CVCE n.a.). By bringing together this committee, Monnet made sure that he would receive 
political support for his supranational European project from those groups that had previously 
been rather reluctant to transfer decision-making powers (Deschamps 2015). In return, trade 
unions had an informational advantage in national debates and received a guarantee that their 
direct involvement would be incorporated in the Treaty of Rome (Suzuki 2009: 64f). 
Since the Treaty of Rome foresaw "close collaboration between Member States in the social field” 
(EEC 1957: Article 118), the Commission soon began to plan provisions and initiated 
consultations with the tripartite EESC (EurWORK 2007). What could have led to a European path 
of social consultations, however, was greatly disputed among the six governments. In the end, 
the Council made clear that it was not the Commission’s role to develop European social policies 
(EurWORK 2007). This led the Commission to focus on health and safety issues, as Levi Sandri, 
commissioner for social affairs, recalls (Sandri 1966: 5ff). These had a more technical aspect and 
thus might have seemed less threatening to the sovereignty of the member states in social 
issues. However, legislation in this field was never high-profile and mostly a side-effect of 
harmonizing different national market regulations (EU-OSHA 2015).  
The Union des Industries de la Communauté européenne (UNICE), now Businesseurope, was 
founded in March 1958 in order to monitor the impacts of the Treaty of Rome on national 
industries (Businesseurope 2016). During this first phase, a genuinely European employer 
association in the construction industry did not exist. The construction industry was organized in 
an international federation: the Fédération Internationale du Bâtiment et des Travaux Publics 
(FIBTP). After the signing of the Treaty of Rome, a European subdivision emerged as a Comité 
Permanent for the EEC. This subdivision of the international employer federation consisted only 
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of EEC associations and laid the groundwork for the future lobbying organization FIEC (Bollinger 
2005: 30).  
In the early to mid-1960s it became increasingly important for the Commission to include the 
social partners into deliberation processes at the European level. Both then-President of the 
Commission Hallstein and Commissioner for Social Affairs Sandri argued that contact with the 
social partners needed to be intensified (Hallstein 1964; Sandri 1966). Germany had begun to 
recruit the first guest workers from Italy in 1955. Inevitably, the booming 1960s and the 
intensified economic cooperation across Europe led to questions about how to regulate social 
issues. Beginning with an advisory committee on Social Security for Migrant Workers in 1959, a 
number of “Cross-industry advisory committees” were set up with six members per state each – 
two government officials, two employers, and two union members. Five additional advisory 
committees followed: the European Social Fund in 1960, the Free Movement of Workers in 1961, 
Vocational Training in 1963, Health and Safety in 1974, and Equal Opportunities in 1981 
(Commission of the European Communities 1996: 28). The goal was to institutionalize bipartite 
dialogue with the aid of the Commission by concentrating on simple, technical issues 
(Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften 1972a: 1ff).  
However, in contrast with the Commission’s attempts to get laborers and employers to the same 
table, the employer organization in the construction industry meanwhile decided in 1963 “that 
it was ‘inopportun ... de créer avec les représentants ouvriers un organisme permanent’ 
(‘inopportune ... to set up a permanent structure with the workers’ representatives’)” (Bollinger 
2005: 31). For the employer organization in construction, the most important issue in the 1960s 
was equal access to public procurement: they said that “under no circumstances” should a 
formalized dialogue be established (Bollinger 2005: 31). This setting made it difficult for the 
Commission to achieve social partner involvement in the construction sector; the situation was 
similar in other sectors. An example illustrates the long road to bipartite dialogue: the 
Commission had worked on a study on employment practices and difficulties in the construction 
sector since the early 1960s. In 1969, the EU budget foresaw several new joint committees, 
among them the committee for the construction sector (Kommission der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften 1972a: 3). In 1971, both employers and unions had given feedback on the study, 
naming numerous points that needed to be discussed by the social partners. One year later, 
Fernandez, a construction worker representative, remarked in frustration, “Since then we 
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haven’t come one step further” (Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften 1972a: 3). It then 
took until October 1972 – more than 10 years after the project began – for the first official 
bipartite meeting to take place (Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften 1972b).  
In 1970, the Standing Employment Committee was set up, which was a tripartite body with the 
goal of promoting “continuous dialogue, joint action and consultation” between government 
bodies, employers, and workers regarding harmonizing national employment strategies 
(70/532/EEC 1970: Article 2). Sixteen years later, the Commission came to the conclusion that 
its ambitions of joint action “ha[d] been realized only to a very limited extent“ (Commission of 
the European Communities 1996: 9). According to a study by Goetschy, this committee was 
doomed to be ineffective due to the high number of participants, the formalities, the 
unwillingness of the labor ministries to handle employment issues on the European level, and 
the oppositional attitude of the employer organization UNICE (Goetschy 1999: 188).  
In 1972, the Directorate General for Social Affairs initiated a special service called “Professional 
relations – mixed or paritarian Commissions” designed specifically to support bipartite sectoral 
dialogue (Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften 1972a: 2). For the EU Commission, the 
social partners were vitally important for gathering support for the coming economic and 
monetary union. Coppé, the Commissioner for Social Affairs, emphasized, “We need the 
spontaneous support from the social partners, if we want to achieve a true Economic and 
monetary union” (Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften 1972a: 2). The Commission 
provided all of the technical support necessary.  
In a meeting with construction unions, General Director for Social Affairs Rifflet firmly stressed 
the need for social partnership and a social policy accompanying European economic policies 
(Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften 1972a: 1). For the EU commission, the 
construction sector was viewed as a vitally important instrument for influencing the economy, 
therefore making it absolutely indispensable that the construction sector be organized 
(Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften 1972a: 2). Meanwhile, the employer Comité 
began setting up a professionalized “Bureau” in Brussels with four working groups for specific 
issues (Bollinger 2005: 33). The Comité of the construction industry was also successful in setting 
up a “central contact point” within the Commission: during the presidency of François-Xavier 
Ortoli and initiated by the Comité, a construction unit was installed in the Directorate General 
“Internal Market” in 1977 (Bollinger 2005: 33).  
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In summary, during the preformation phase the logic of influence was characterized by a strictly 
national representative rationality. Social policy and industrial relations were discussed and 
organized on a national level, and the European founding members were not willing to 
institutionalize social partner involvement on a European level. In the mid-1970s, the rationale 
shifted slightly when European policy-makers began establishing structures to support dialogue 
among the social partners in order to rally support for stronger integration. Furthermore, the 
employer organizations were not willing to engage in any form of structured dialogue at the 
European level, thus setting a limit on any form of European negotiation of common rules. 
Table 12: Influences Shaping the Organizational Mode of EFBWWC and Its Predecessor (the Joint Committee) 
 (EFBWWC 1978b, 1978d) 
 European Industrial 
Relations (IR) 
Employer Federation Organizational Mode of 
European Construction 
Sector Unions 




No European IR, access 
for labor via national 
labor representatives  
No interest in European 











dialogue on social issues 




forum for information 
exchange (2) 
 
5.2.3 MEMBERSHIP: DIVERGING INTERESTS  
For a long time, there was no common idea among the European trade unions regarding how to 
react to Europe, let alone how to mobilize support as, for example, the farmers had done for 
their cause (Buschak 2003: 2; European Communities 1970: 3). Instead, from very early on the 
trade union movement had been deeply divided between supporters and skeptics of 
Europeanization (European Communities 1970, 1972a, 1972b; Geyer 1993; Hyman 2005b; Stöckl 
1986). Hyman has pointed out that the German union’s support originated from the fact that the 
ECSC provided an opportunity structure to regulate the coal and steel sectors – both 
representing the largest DGB membership – including participation in the ESCS High Authority 
(Hyman 2005b: 16). Internationally, the trade union movement was separated into communist, 
Christian, and “free” trade union federations. The Communist World Federation was a vehement 
critic of the European Community. The origins of the Christian trade union movement in Europe 
had a very clear focus on transferring national trade union structures to European institutions 
(European Communities 1972b: 3). This focus on European institutional structures stood in 
contrast to the more reluctant position of the European Confederation of Free Trade Unions, 
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which viewed itself primarily as a federation for representation and information (European 
Communities 1972a). The European trade union committees from all sectors regularly met to 
exchange information on current issues. In 1963, the committees strengthened their will to be 
represented on a joint European committee (European Communities 1972b). Ten years later, the 
European Confederation of Free Trade Unions in the Community (ECFTU, later ETUC) was 
created. Unlike the construction Joint Committee within the IFBWW, ETUC was not confined to 
the member countries of the EEC but to “democratic unions from democratic countries” as 
recalled by Georges Debunne, former ETUC president (Debunne 1998). The idea behind ETUC’s 
all-European membership policy was that the European Community “would have such an 
economic, social and political impact upon the countries outside the Community that they ought 
to be able to exert an influence over the policy to pursue in relation to the Community” (EFBWWC 
1978d). 
In the construction sector, the EFBWW predecessor, the Joint Committee, was a small committee 
with affiliates confined to the six member countries of the EEC (Belgium, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Italy, and Luxembourg). 
Table 13: Members of the Joint Committee within the IFBWW  
Belgium Algemene Centrale ABVV 
France Fédération Générale F.O. Bâtiment, Bois, Papier, Carton, Céramique 
Germany Industriegewerkschaft Bau-Steine-Erden – now IG BAU  
Gewerkschaft Holz und Kunststoff (G.H.K.) – now IG Metall 
Italy Federazione Nazionale Edili Affini e del Legno – FeNEAL-UIL  
Federazione Italiana Lavoratori Costruzioni & Affini – FILCA-CISL 
Luxembourg Syndicat Bau und Handwerk – OGB-L 
Netherlands Bouwbond NVV, now Bouw en Houtbond FNV 
 
There were controversial debates among ETUC’s founding members about whether to maintain 
the restriction to Western Europe or whether the new confederation should encompass all of 
Europe. In particular, the Danish unions were fearful that a restriction to EEC countries might 
divide the established cooperation with their Scandinavian partners, while the German unions 
favored a narrow option (Buschak 2003: 4; Degryse 2013: 21). ETUC’s decision sparked the 
construction sector unions to reconsider their restrictive EEC membership. Realizing that 
decision-making on market-related issues was happening mostly without unions or social 
dialogue on the European level, the Joint Committee members in the construction sector agreed 
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on the necessity of stronger organizational representation within the community (EFBWW 
2008a: 10). It became clear that the federation, with only six member countries, was a thing of 
the past. A reform was needed. Three different options for the future of a European building and 
woodworkers’ organization were discussed among the members (EFBWWC 1978d). 
The first proposal suggested maintaining the affiliation to the IFBWW and forming a regional 
European organization within the IFBWW. This regional organization included 14 countries: the 
nine EEC countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Italy, 
Luxembourg, and the UK) plus Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. The second 
proposal argued that the European organization should be independent and restricted to the 
nine Common Market countries. The third proposal was to create a European organization 
independent from the IFBWW in which potential members would have to be affiliates of the 
IFBWW.  
The result was a compromise: The newly founded organization had no connection with the 
IFBWW and was restricted to the EEC countries (EFBWWC 1978d). The only precondition for 
membership in the EFBWWC was the affiliation of the national confederation with ETUC. Parallel 
to the founding of a new federation in Europe, the IFBWW maintained a committee for the 
European Free Trade Association. The EFBWWC was created on May 5, 1974 in Salerno, and its 
founding affiliates came from the six original EEC countries and had all been the original 
members of the Joint Committee.  
Table 14: Options for Membership in 1973 for a New European Construction Sector Trade Union Federation 
 (EFBWWC 1978d) 
Preferences of Joint 
Committee Members 
Options for Membership  Options for Relationship to IFBWW 
Italy Affiliates from EEC countries  
plus Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and 
Switzerland  
Regional organization of IFBWW 
Belgium, Denmark, 
France 
Affiliates from EEC countries  
 




Affiliates from EEC countries that are IFBWW 
affiliates  
 
Independent European organization 
 Result EFBWWC 1974 Affiliates from EEC countries plus affiliation with 
ETUC or IFBWW 
Independent European organization 
 
The diverse positions on the membership of the federation were also reflected in the discussions 
of the main tasks of the organization. When the EFBWW was founded, a minority of the members 
already had other ideas for the federation (EFBWWC 1978d). During a lengthy deliberation 
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process over three years with several discussions among the Executive Committee, a General 
Assembly in 1976, and a working party that made suggestions, two different options were 
debated among the affiliates (EFBWWC 1976, 1977, 1978a, 1978b, 1978c, 1978d: 3ff). 
One perspective was that the EFBWW ought to limit itself to the “exchange of information and 
the study of the social and economic problems” within the sector (EFBWWC 1978d). The 
secretariat would have the tasks to encourage “the exchange of ideas and experience,” acquire 
“information as to what is happening in the wood and construction industries,” and supply 
affiliates with the information obtained (EFBWWC 1978d).  
Other affiliates such as Italy or the Netherlands wished to expand the tasks and jurisdiction of 
the federation. These organizations also favored an informative role but wanted to go further in 
harmonizing policies among the affiliates in order to strengthen joint actions at the community 
level (EFBWWC 1978d). This proposal would have entailed financial consequences and more 
staff resources for the newly founded EFBWW and was not accepted by the majority. 
In summary, during the preformation phase the logic of membership was defined by a 
membership base that was divided in terms of the strategic goals for a federation in the 
construction sector and its relationship to the IFBWW. The organizational result was a federation 
whose role was limited to the provision of information.  
Table 15: Options for Organization in 1973 for a New European Construction Sector Trade Union Federation 
 (EFBWWC 1978d) 
Preferences of Joint Committee 
Members 
Options for Organizational Mode Options for Role of Transnational 
Organization 
Germany, France, Belgium 
 
Communicative rapprochement Forum for information exchange (2) 
Italy, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Denmark 
International negotiation of non-binding 
or binding standards  
Coordination and 
harmonization/steering (3) 
 Result EFBWWC 1974 
 
Communicative rapprochement Forum for information exchange (2) 
 
DISCUSSING ALTERNATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES 
In April 1976, the Executive Committee of the EFBWW created a working party that was 
supposed to reevaluate the secretariat’s work and the structure of the EFBWW (EFBWWC 1976). 
Since 1974, the number of affiliates in the EFBWW had risen significantly. With the first 
enlargement of the EEC, three more affiliates joined. In the same year as the EFBWWC’s founding 
(1974), Ireland’s General Transport Workers’ Union and the UK’s Union of Construction, Allied 
Trades and Technicians joined, and Denmark followed in 1976. The working party aimed to 
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expand the EFBWWC’s influence and representative role vis-à-vis European institutions and 
increase the EFBWWC’s sphere of influence (EFBWWC 1976). However, the working party was 
divided in the assessment of how such an expanded role for the secretariat should be 
coordinated, as the protocols of the meetings reveal. An interview partner described the 
affiliate’s positions within the EFBWW as follows: “The British were eurosceptics. That was not a 
question. The Dutch were euphoric Europeans, the Dutch, the Belgians. The Germans were fully 
committed to the European Community” (EFBWW Rep7 2011). Two opinions were put forward 
(EFBWWC 1976): (1) that the secretariat should be equipped with a full-time secretary plus 
administrative staff, and (2) that the part-time secretariat should be maintained and limited to a 
coordinating role among the affiliates, whereby the lobbying and organizational work for the 
building and woodworkers committees should be assigned to the affiliates of the chairmen of 
these committees.  
In order to find a compromise between these two positions, the General Assembly instructed 
the Executive Committee to draft a proposal for the future functioning of the federation 
(EFBWWC 1976). The discussions within the Executive Committee showed how controversial an 
expansion of the EFBWWC’s role was, especially when it came to concrete financial and staff 
matters. Although the Executive Committee decided to expand the federation’s role following 
the working party’s proposal, the affiliate representatives in the committee had different ideas 
regarding how to reach this goal (EFBWWC 1977, 1978c). Some of the affiliates, particularly 
Belgium and Germany, were in favor of maintaining a part-time secretariat. The Belgian 
EFBWWC President André Vanden Broucke wanted to keep the secretariat in the Centrale 
Générale, and the German representative Rudolf Sterner argued in favor of limiting the 
secretariat’s role to “information only” (EFBWWC 1977). The UK representative argued that the 
EFBWWC needed to carry out work that was more “constructive and more realistic than in the 
past” (EFBWWC 1977). One argument against more expenses and a full-time secretariat was that 
more results depended upon the cooperation of the affiliated organizations, which, however, 
were hesitant to transfer additional resources to the federation (EFBWWC 1977). Other affiliates, 
such as Italy, wanted to enlarge the office with a full-time secretary general and the necessary 
staff. An Italian representative was eager “to have better co-ordination and better functioning of 
the EFBWWC,” including more staff in the secretariat (EFBWWC 1977). He also made a motion 
 
Henni Appell  Workers of Europe Unite!? - Explaining the Form of European Labor Organization 121 
that Enrico Kirschen (who would eventually become secretary in 1981) become a candidate for 
the position of secretary (EFBWWC 1977). 
In the archival material concerning the discussions of the EFBWWC structure, the reader gets a 
glimpse into the power struggle among the members: the Belgian Federation had paid and 
hosted the secretary since 1968, and first Vice-President, then President Calso also came from 
the Belgian Centrale Générale. The Italian federation, however, was eager to increase its 
influence and even offered to pay salary plus any other arising costs (EFBWWC 1977). In another 
meeting, an Italian representative argued that the EFBWW needed to “arrive at a better balance 
of power” (EFBWWC 1978c). The Italian affiliates voiced fears of discrimination and wanted to 
strengthen contacts with other Southern countries (EFBWWC 1977). However, the other 
members argued in favor of a secretary belonging to the same organization as the president 
(EFBWWC 1978c). What is more, other members argued that the generous proposal of the Italian 
Federation would lead the EFBWWC into obligations that could perhaps not be met later on, 
positing that financial obligations should be divided proportionally among all affiliates (EFBWWC 
1977). In particular, the German “hegemony” diagnosed in many international trade union 
federations (Hyman 2002a: 3) is apparent in these discussions. German unions, which are 
traditionally strong and centralized organizations, were able to mobilize more personnel and 
finances than other organizations. When the German representative argued that “running the 
Secretariat depended in essence upon the affiliated organizations” and the role of the Federation 
“must remain a role of information only,” it was clear that further steps toward a stronger 
harmonization role for the EFBWW would be very difficult (EFBWWC 1977). As one interview 
partner put it, “Yes, these were people that were born before the war, the older ones. And they 
had another picture of Europe. […] I wouldn’t say ‘Germany is the best’, Germany is a bit of a 
forerunner. That way it happened that maybe the Southern countries, but also France, […] didn’t 
carry much weight” (EFBWW Rep6 2011). 
However, it was not only the German affiliate’s hesitancy that led to a temporary stalemate in 
the discussions. In April 1978, after almost two years of intensive deliberation, the decision 
regarding the EFBWWC’s organizational future was postponed once more, although the goal 
remained to reorganize the secretariat (EFBWWC 1978a, 1978c). In particular, the discussion 
centered on the question of whether the EFBWWC should become more “operational and more 
committed” (EFBWWC 1978a). In a contact meeting between several EFBWWC representatives 
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and the IFBWW it became clear that there was very little support for raising levies significantly, 
no support for an independent European secretary, and no support for harmonizing or 
establishing policies at the European level (EFBWWC 1978a). Germany, the affiliate with the 
most payments to the federation, opposed a full-time secretary before clear tasks were defined 
(EFBWWC 1978c). For the representative from the UK, it was clear that the EFBWWC should 
maintain a “role of coordination and information and not of general policy” (EFBWWC 1978c). 
Not all members were equally convinced of the necessity to enhance the EFBWWC’s role, and 
dwindling membership in national organizations made it more difficult to transfer money to 
European bodies. At this meeting, mainly the Netherlands and Italy were strongly in favor of 
clear political standpoints from the federation (EFBWWC 1978a). Specifically, the Italian 
federations were very eager for the working parties to “function more independently, act more 
on their own initiatives and intensify their activities” (EFBWWC 1978a). For the Italian federation, 
the commitment would not only include building and woodworking matters, but general trade 
union policy and “own initiative with regard to the development of the European trade 
conception” (EFBWWC 1978a). For the Southern representatives, it was important to play a 
greater part in the EEC and thus “prevent discrimination” (EFBWWC 1978a).  It was also the 
Italian federation that stressed the importance of closer contacts with those Southern unions 
that were not members of the EEC (in particular, Greece, Portugal, and Spain) (EFBWWC 1978d). 
In the end, a compromise very close to the one suggested by the working party was 
implemented. The position of a mere information provider was maintained until the General 
Assembly of 1979. At that time, it was generally agreed that enhanced international organization 
and coordination were necessary, particularly in campaigning for and defending better working 
conditions and health, pension, and education policies (European Communities (DG X 
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Table 16: Options for Organizational Mode for the EFBBWC (1974–1983) 
 (EFBWWC 1978d) 
Members  Preferences (Examples) Options for Organizational 
Mode 




Belgium, the UK, 
Ireland 
Germany: “information only” 
(EFBWWC 1977) 
UK: “role of coordination and 










“Bigger Impact and larger sphere of 
influence” (EFBWWC 1978d)  
“EFBWW should make European 
organisations and institutions […] aware 
of the views of building and wood 
workers“ (EFBWWC 1978d) 
 
International negotiation of 
non-binding standards (3–4) 
Coordination by part-time 
Secretary General plus shared 






I, NL, LUX, DEN:  “harmonize the 
respective policies of the different 
organizations” and “joint action with 
regard to concrete objectives”(EFBWWC 
1977) 
Italy: “more operational and more 
committed, taking ‘its own initiative’” 
(EFBWWC 1978a) 
Netherlands: “clear political 
standpoints must be adopted” 
(EFBWWC 1978a) 
International negotiation of 
binding standards (3) 
Coordination and 
harmonization 
Steering and monitoring with 
full-time SG in Brussels plus staff 
 Result 
EFBWW 1983 
“EFBWWC activities should no longer be 
restricted to a role of mainly providing 
information but instead should be 
expanded to actively coordinate the 
interests of building and woodworkers 
in Europe.” (EFBWW 2008a) 
International negotiation of 
non-binding standards (3) 
Forum for information 
exchange and coordination of 
interests 
 
In 1983, after more than seven years of negotiation, the EFBWWC’s constitution was amended 
and it was decided to enhance the EFBWW’s role to “actively coordinate the interests of building 
and woodworkers in Europe” (EFBWW 2008a: 12). 
 
5.2.4 ADMINISTRATION: REPRESENTATION AND INFORMATION 
As the discussions about the role of the EFBWW during the 1970s have demonstrated, the 
envisaged organizational form was often controversial, oscillating between a coordination of 
common interests and a purely service-oriented information and formal representation 
organization. However, the organizational form that developed from the membership and 
influence dynamics is also shaped by the administrative logic within the EFBWW. During the 
years of the Joint Committee and the early years of the EFBWWC, the role of the secretary and 
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administration enhanced the organizational development as a service provider with a 
representative role (and not, as was also discussed, with the task of harmonizing and creating 
joint standards).  
The Joint Committee secretariat began in 1958 with one part-time staff member located within 
the offices of the Bouwbond NVV in Amsterdam. The management of the Joint Committee 
secretariat changed on the basis of a voluntary rotating principle (EFBWW Rep1 2011). Members 
paid “a very small contribution,” and the secretariat was mostly funded by the hosting affiliate 
(EFBWW 2008a: 9). After six years, the committee moved its main office to IG Bau-Steine-Erden’s 
headquarters in Frankfurt, Germany. Five years later, in 1969, the administration moved to the 
Belgian Central Générale. For the first time, the committee actually had an office in Brussels (see 
Table 17).  
Table 17: Rotating Principle and Nationalities of Secretary General of the Joint Committee (1958–1981) 
(EFBWW 2008a, 2015a) 










0.5 Heinz Umrath Netherlands, Bouwbond 













0.5 Juan Fernandez Belgium, Centrale Générale Brussels Centrale 
Générale 
 
Juan Fernandez had the position of secretary beginning in 1969 and maintained his position 
when the EFBWWC was founded in 1974. The secretariat’s tasks in the first years of the EFBWWC 
were to prepare the meetings of the General Assembly and the Executive Committee and to 
ensure contact between the Committees of Building and Woodworking and the Executive 
Committee (EFBWW 2007b; EFBWWC 1978d). In addition to the six-member Joint Committee, 
the IFBWW had established a separate European Committee for the countries which were part 
of the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) in 1965. The goal of this IFBWW European 
Committee was to “establish contact with the EEC unions and gather information on the work of 
the Common Market and the European trade union secretariat” (Gemeinsamer Ausschuss der 
Bau- und Holzarbeiter in den EG Informationen 1965/II: 8). With the establishment of this 
committee, the building and woodworking sector had a double structure that also had to be 
coordinated, as a retired interviewee remembered: “So that was […] a problem for the 
 
Henni Appell  Workers of Europe Unite!? - Explaining the Form of European Labor Organization 125 
international, which also had a Committee. There weren’t many people, so that was one of the 
problems, it was a practical problem” (EFBWW Affiliate5 2012).  
In the first years of the EFBWWC, the secretary fulfilled his task in addition to his job at the 
hosting trade union Centrale Générale. The fact that there was no independent Brussels office 
for the EFBWWC meant that the secretary was perceived as a representative of the hosting 
federation and not as an organizational part of the EFBWWC (EFBWW Affiliate5 2012; EFBWWC 
1977). The dual role of the EFBWWC and the affiliate representative was inherent in the part-
time arrangement of the 1970s in which the secretary was employed 50% by the EFBWWC and 
50% by the home affiliate. In the early years of the EFBWWC when the role of the secretary was 
discussed repeatedly, a major argument was that the secretary should come from the same 
affiliate as the president in order to assist the president in administrative and technical matters 
(EFBWWC 1977). Apart from these internal information and coordinating activities, one of the 
main responsibilities was to maintain relations with the EEC Commission (EFBWWC 1978d). 
However, a large part of this work was representational, not “political” in the sense of lobbying 
work for standpoints of European construction workers (EFBWW 2008: 19; EFBWWC 1978c). In 
a discussion of the role of the secretary in 1978, several participants stressed that the “Secretary 
was a Federation officer and not a political figure” (EFBWWC 1978c). This function was 
reinforced by the practice of the time to send “end of career” officers to Brussels. As one 
interview partners stated quite bluntly, “Honestly, the situation was the following, as they say in 
Germany ‘Den Opa schick ich nach Europa’. It was a bit, you know, an end of career, a post for 
colleagues, which have been interested in European international work, who could continue to 
work for a while. And political cooperation was not part of it“ (EFBWW Rep1 2011). A BWI 
representative described the daily work of the federation by saying, “it was more or less don’t 
know how, don’t know what” (BWI1 2012). Another interviewee stated, “So Brussels was also a 
luxury retreat. Many trade unions pushed off their people to Brussels if they couldn’t use the 
people nationally any longer, off to Brussels. […] That was a type of people that were used off 
nationally, that one wanted to let go. […] And the person got sent to Brussels, far away, can’t do 
any harm any more nationally, and the person got something good in Brussels. […] But people 
that don’t perform well nationally, well if you send them to Brussels you can’t expect something 
good to come of that” (EFBWW Rep3 2011). 
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In summary, the logic of administration in the preformation phase followed a rationale of 
national embeddedness with representative and information functions. The administration did 
not have an independent European role but remained part of one of the affiliates’ administrative 
settings. The secretary’s role was functional, not “political,” with a focus on service provision to 
the affiliates with respect to European issues.  
Table 18: Role of Administration Preformation Phase 
Examples Role of Administration Organizational Mode Role of Transnational 
Organization 
“Secretary was a Federation officer and not a political 
figure” (EFBWWC 1978c). 
“It was a bit, you know, an end of career [post]. […] And 
political cooperation was not part of it“ (EFBWW Rep1 
2011). 
“Many trade unions pushed off their people to Brussels 
if they couldn’t use the people nationally any longer, off 
to Brussels” (EFBWW Rep3 2011). 
“it was more or less don’t know how, don’t know what” 
(BWI1 2012).  
Formal representation (not 
political) 
Information service for 
affiliates  





Forum for Information 
Exchange (2) 
 
5.3 FROM INFORMATION TO COORDINATION: THE 1980s and 1990s 
5.3.1 CRITICAL JUNCTURE: “AWAKENING” AND FORMATION PHASE 
It seems that the verdict of Jan Cremers, longtime secretary general of the EFBWW in the 1990s, 
was not exaggerated: the EFBWW was “deeply asleep until the 1980s” (Cremers 1991: 153). 
Whereas the distribution of construction-related information was still a primary task during the 
1980s, the reform of 1983 in which it was decided that the EFBWW should “actively coordinate” 
(EFBWW 2008a: 12) set the stage for further changes in the early 1990s. The changes identified 
here did not occur at one specific point in time or during a singular event, but instead describe a 
combination of organizational roles that together shape the organizational mode of the EFBWW. 
After the EFBWW had been given the task to “actively coordinate” in 1983, the organizational 
role became more pronounced during the 1990s. In these years, the organizational form of the 
EFBWW shifted to an organizational mode in which the EFBWW slowly began taking up a role of 
negotiating non-binding standards in the fields of social dialogue and company representation. 
In the mode of “international negotiation of non-binding standards,” national strategies are 
coordinated on the international level via joint agreements or codes of conduct (Platzer and 
Müller 2009: 46; Rüb 2009: 87). The transnational organization functions as a coordination 
platform for these activities. Two activity areas exemplify this organizational mode. 
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First, in the field of social dialogue, the EFBWW was given the task of preparing the introduction 
of a Social Dialogue in the construction sector in 1989 (EFBWW 2008a: 12). In the following years, 
the EFBWW began to negotiate non-binding declarations on vocational training, health and 
safety issues, and the free movement of labor (EFBWW 2008a; EFBWW Rep8 2011; European 
Commission 2014b; Laux 2006). In addition, the EFBWW began developing joint information 
projects for the sector with the employer federation FIEC (European Commission 2014b). 
Second, in the field of European company representation, the EFBWW’s role was to coordinate 
the creation of EWCs and establish a network to create joint standards (EFBWW 2008a: 12). In 
the early 1990s, the EFBWW received a mandate from its members to initiate EWCs (Keller and 
Sörries 1999: 121). 
Third, the EFBWW took over the role of a coordinator for information exchange on collective 
bargaining and employment conditions (Baumann et al. 1996; Dufresne 2011; Laux 2008a). 
The EFBWW’s organizational role was also defined by limited steering functions. During the 
1990s, the EFBWW strengthened and redefined its role as a European interest representation 
for its affiliates by lobbying in the field of European labor legislation (Arnold 2008; Christine 
Oliver 1991; Clarke et al. 2003; Cremers 1991, 1998; Druker 1998; EFBWW Rep8 2011). This 
steering and coordination role in lobbying issues is apparent in the mandate for the organization 
to lobby for a Posted Workers Directive.  
Table 19: Development of the Organizational Mode of the EFBWW 





“actively coordinate the interests of building 




Forum for information 
exchange plus coordination 
(2–3) 
ca. 1990s  Negotiation of non-binding standards in 
Social Dialogue (and joint projects with 
employer federation) 
 Coordination of EWC representation 
 Lobbying for European labor legislation 
(e.g., posted work, health and security) 
 Information (e.g., industrial policy, 
collective bargaining coordination) 
International negotiation 
of (mainly non-)binding 
standards  
Coordination, limited steering 
functions (3–4) 
 
As the following sections show in more detail, this organizational outcome can be explained by 
the interplay between the following dynamics: (1) a newly developed approach for promoting a 
“Social Europe” by the Delors Commission in combination with legislative threats to national 
social models (influence), (2) a growing and more heterogeneous membership base that was 
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eager to defend the autonomy of national social models and was willing to coordinate to achieve 
this goal (membership), and (3) a changed and very active administration in a newly established 
Brussels office that seized the opportunity of European industrial relations instruments and took 
up more responsibilities for political representation (administration). 
 
5.3.2 INFLUENCE: DEVELOPING EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
Obtaining social partners – and with them, it was hoped, the European workforce behind them 
– was becoming more important when the EEC grew to the north to include the UK, Denmark, 
and Ireland in 1973 and Greece in the South in 1981. “Eurosclerosis” and fears of the Single 
Market had raised labor opposition toward the Commission and European integration. The tide 
changed when Jaques Delors took over the presidency in 1985. Delors, a founding member of 
the French union Confédération française démocratique du travail (CFDT), was eager to establish 
a worker-friendly European community and complete the internal market with a social outlook. 
He is famous for his fulminant plea for Europeanization in front of Euro-skeptic TUC unionists in 
London (Delors 1988). 
VAL DUCHESSE 
The impact a change in Commission presidency had on European trade unions is illustrated by 
the access options the social democrat Delors initiated for unions. The so-called “Val Duchesse” 
process was spurred immediately after Delors’ election in 1985. Val Duchesse had been the place 
of informal labor-employer meetings since the mid-1960s, but without any perceptible result 
(Degryse 2006: 33). In an attempt to foster a more formalized bipartite dialogue on the EU level 
and alleviate the purely economic character of the European Community, Delors invited the 
employer organizations UNICE (private sector) and the European Centre of Employers and 
Enterprises providing Public Services (CEEP, public sector) as well as ETUC to negotiate. The idea 
was to begin modestly and set the scene for EU-level industrial relations. Delors knew that if the 
European project were to progress, it would be necessary to add a social dimension and get trade 
unions on board. This negotiation in the “shadow of hierarchy” (SMISMANS 2008)  was helpful 
for establishing a culture of consultation. 
However, the bargaining partners unsurprisingly had opposite opinions on how these 
consultation rights should be structured (Falkner 1995: 11). UNICE’s mandate was clear: maintain 
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subsidiarity and avoid an additional “layer of transnational bargaining” (UNICE 2004: 2). UNICE 
preferred an autonomous bipartite dialogue without the intervention of the Commission (UNICE 
1998). ETUC, on the other hand, favored European social legislation and joint bargaining spaces 
(ETUC 29/06 - 02/07 1999: 2f) but had no mandate to conclude any bargaining agreements 
(particularly since not even many of the national confederations – most importantly the British 
TUC and the German DFG – had a respective mandate). However, the consensual, voluntary 
character of the first negotiations left little room for conflictive action anyway. The consultations 
were not a forum for contentious debate. The results of these first negotiations were not binding 
and were often regarded as symbolic politics (Degryse 2011: 13; Keller 1996: 208).  
THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT AND COMMISSION RESOURCES 
In 1986, the Single European Act (SEA) transferred the Commission’s support for social partner 
activities into treaty law, explicitly laying out the option that social dialogue could lead to 
independent agreements (European Community 1986). In response to the new article, the 
Commission set up two budget lines run by the directorate-general for employment and 
supporting social dialogue and information and training measures. The Social Dialogue budget 
headings thus became autonomous, meaning that they are embedded in Commission duties 
because they result directly from the SEA (DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 2015). 
One EFBWW official remembered how these new budget lines changed the availability of 
resources for the European federation: “I mean, if we go back [to the mid-1990s] to the EFBWW 
almost I’m exaggerating a bit; they almost had to call to the responsible person at the commission 
saying that they need to organize a couple seminars, can you send us money for this? – ‘Okay. 
How much do you need?’” (EFBWW Rep8 2011). Another EFBWW unionist confirmed this 
memory: “When programs were funded by the Commission, in general the people that carried 
out the projects were financed. That was never restricted […]. We brought forward a proposal, 
expressed what we wanted and then that was funded” (EFBWW Rep7 2011). In addition, the 
meetings of the General Assembly were supported by the Commission by providing Commission 
interpreters for the assemblies. An interview partner highlights that this support was substantial 
for the EFBWW:  “And that was a very big chunk, which would have cost us a lot of money” 
(EFBWW Rep7 2011). Another interview partner remembers that this financial support was 
provided “quick ‘n’ easy”, including “office support and translation support, conference money 
and so on,“ (EFBWW Rep5 2011). This fits with Ross’ citation from a staff member of the Delors 
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Commission’s Directorate General (DG) Employment, describing the DG as a “union lobby 
organisation, old style” (Ross 1994: Commission). 
The SEA not only opened the door for Commission funding, but it also strengthened European 
competencies in the field of health and safety for workers by introducing qualified majority 
voting (European Community 1986: Article 118a). In addition, a framework directive from 1989 
and several subsequent directives covering individual health risks laid the legal groundwork for 
European action in the field of health and safety (Gehring 2001). In other more encompassing 
social policy matters, qualified majority voting was expressly ruled out (European Community 
1986: Art. 110a). This provision more or less confined the future path of social policy issues to 
the more technical aspects of health and safety and thus defined the issues in which trade unions 
could most effectually influence European policy-making. The Commission’s funds additionally 
promoted the focus on health and safety issues, most importantly by supporting a technical 
advisory body for ETUC, the Trade Union Technical Bureau, in 1989 (which in 2005 became the 
European Trade Union Institute’s health and safety department) (Martin and Ross 1995: 10f) or, 
on a smaller scale, by supporting individual sectoral projects such as guidelines for the 
construction sector on a health and safety Commission directive (Eisenbach 2006: 20).  
MAASTRICHT AND SOCIAL DIALOGUE 
Six years after the negotiations of Val Duchesse castle, the social partners agreed on a formal 
concept for the Social Dialogue, which was then introduced into the Maastricht Treaty (Rhodes 
2005: 288). For the first time, a treaty foresaw the transformation of European social partner 
agreements not only into voluntary agreements but also into European law. The treaty’s annex, 
the Maastricht Protocol on Social Policy, continued along the path laid out in the Community 
Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers from 1989, setting minimum social 
standards for the European member states (1989). From then on, social dialogue had the 
additional benefit that the social partners had to be consulted on all community initiatives 
regarding social policy (European Community 1992: Art. 3.1 and 3.2). The Maastricht Treaty was 
the turn of the tide for social partner involvement (Gajewska 2009: 109). The new legal basis 
opened up new “policy spaces” (Rhodes 2005: 298) and brought “tremendous new momentum” 
(Ross 1997: 5). With the Maastricht Treaty, the “preconditions for sectoral corporatism” were 
“significantly altered” (Falkner 1995: 24). Despite this new treaty base, the goal of the first Social 
Dialogues was modest, producing “Joint Opinions,” which were documentations of the outcomes 
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with a voluntary character. The right to initiate a transnational strike and issues regarding “pay, 
the right of association, […] or the right to impose lock-outs” was ruled out, thus putting close 
bounds on an independent Social Dialogue (European Community 1992: Art. 2.6). This limits 
bargaining to relatively innocuous topics in which a European-level common resolution is 
accepted and “soft” law regulations may be effective. 
For the employer organizations, the meetings were both carrot and stick: they had an appeal 
since they saw the opportunity to influence the Commission’s legislative recommendations to 
the Council (carrot), but on the other hand, this risk of stricter legislative action by the 
Commission ensured that the employer organization took part in these meetings (stick) (Keller 
1996: 209). UNICE’s main strategy was to prevent any meaningful European dialogue (Ross 1997: 
6). For ETUC, on the other hand, the appeal of the modified Maastricht article lay in the 
possibility of strengthening the social partners and opening the outlook on independent 
collective (wage) bargaining (Keller 1996: 209). Therefore, the choice to pursue an independent 
agreement lies with the social partners.2  
In the construction sector, a Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee was officially founded in 1996, 
although unofficial talks with the employer organization FIEC had been held since 1990 (EFBWW 
Rep1 2011; Laux 2006: 10). From then on, the Social Dialogue was crucial for the EFBWW, since 
it enabled the federation to influence EU legislation for the sector (EFBWW Rep4 2012a).  
However, as one EFBWW member recounted, “In the beginning we said: ‘We don’t need the 
Commission.’ We wanted it that way – in the same way as tariff autonomy is an essential feature 
of the talks at national level, that way we also wanted it on the European level. […] So the first 
years were sustained by the EFBWW and FIEC“ (EFBWW Rep1 2011). The EFBWW had been 
rather critical of the official Social Dialogue, arguing that its impact has been limited and “that 
the Commission constantly proceeds on the basis of giving legitimacy to its own policy” (European 
                                                        
 
 
2 On cross-industry level, seven autonomous agreements have been concluded. These concern parental leave 
(1995, revision 2009), part-time work (1997), fixed-term contracts (1999), telework (2002), work-related stress 
(2004), harassment and violence at work (2007) and inclusive labor markets (2010). Three “frameworks of 
action” have been drafted on gender equality (2013), youth employment (2005) and lifelong learning (2002). 
The Commission can always follow up upon this initiative and take up the standard legislative procedure. 
However, this only happened once with the European Works Council Directive from 1994 (Lapeyre (2015: 13). 
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Commission 1996). In 1998, when the Commission began to officially support sectoral social 
dialogue committees, the EFBWW and FIEC decided to apply for official recognition in 1999 
despite these doubts (European Commission 2010b; Pochet 2005). The focus on the official 
Social Dialogue was reinforced by Commission funding, which supported the Social Dialogue with 
roughly €115,000 yearly (DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 2016; European 
Commission 2015a). ‘But in the beginning,’ the interview partner recounted, ‘that was clearly 
not our intention. We said, ‘We don’t want any kind of political or other interference. That is our 
collective bargaining autonomy, which we are developing in Europe’” (EFBWW Rep1 2011). 
FIEC and the EFBWW met twice a year in addition to two expert groups on health and security 
and vocational training (Cremers 1991: 156). This was facilitated by a German FIEC head who 
seems to have personally transferred the German social partnership idea to the European level: 
“And he supported this German idea of partnership on the European level. And that was an 
advantage. When he wasn’t president any longer, with his French successor, it was much more 
difficult” (EFBWW Rep2 2011). The construction employers’ association FIEC also saw the 
benefits of the Social Dialogue: one of the main advantages was the Commission’s obligation to 
inform the social partners, as a German FIEC representative recalled: “from that time on FIEC 
had to be consulted […]. FIEC subsequently made frequent use of this right to put forward the 
views of the construction industry in numerous proposals for directives” (Bollinger 2005: 70).  
With this willingness to negotiate, the construction employers explicitly distanced themselves 
from UNICE’s position. This is partly explained by the specific characteristics of the sector, which 
is more affected by the European free movement of workers and services than any other sector 
due to its particular labor-intensive structure with high labor mobility. Posted workers are usually 
employed by temporary work agencies and subcontractors and subject to aggressive 
competition (IDEA Consult and ECORYS Netherlands 2011: 170). Weather and overall economic 
conditions have stronger implications for construction than for most other sectors. The 
establishment of the European Common Market led to two coping strategies by construction 
firms (Cremers 1991: 155): first, new forms of European cooperation, such as in consortia or 
working groups, emerged, whereby the firm increasingly bought shares of foreign companies in 
order to gain access to new markets. Second, acquisitions of firms in strategically relevant 
markets increased. This process, as Cremers has concluded, led to an increasingly complex 
network of transnational companies in the 1980s, which made European cooperation absolutely 
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indispensable (Cremers 1991: 155). The construction sector is characterized by “fierce 
competition” and an extremely decentralized structure with minimally educated employees, 
numerous subcontractors, and small- and medium-sized companies (IDEA Consult and ECORYS 
Netherlands 2011: 164). The industry’s reliance on external influences means that “[a] smooth 
execution of the work combined with some degree of flexibility can only be achieved if employers 
and workers sit around the table and resolve their problems” according to EFBWW staff member 
van Buelen (European Commission 2014b: 26).  
For Ernst-Ludwig Laux, chair of the Social Dialogue for the EFBWW for eight years, the second 
reason for the early start of social dialogue in the construction sector is its strong national 
collective bargaining structure (Laux 2006: 9). Both FIEC and the EFBWW were perceived as the 
main representative bodies by the European institutions and had the backing of their national 
affiliates, which sent the “heavyweights of national collective bargaining” into important 
negotiations (Cremers 2006b: 6). With this approach, it was also guaranteed that the outcomes 
were accepted by the affiliates, as Cremers highlighted: “the outcome of these deliberations had 
to be taken seriously; the negotiations were built up on the balance of power at the national level 
and internal discipline was guaranteed” (Cremers 2006b: 6). However, neither FIEC nor the 
EFBWW had the mandate to negotiate any binding agreements. Therefore, the newly initiated 
Social Dialogue was rather pragmatic. The idea behind these first meetings was to find common 
ground by, for example, discussing recent Commission publications or the legislative agenda 
concerning the sector. The early Social Dialogues, which were not related to posted work, started 
out by providing information services for FIEC’s and the EFBWW’s members. In the fields of 
health and safety and vocational training, these could be instruction manuals or easily 
understandable best practice guides on complex Commission directives: “This had the primary 
objective of making the […] European health and safety provisions […] more easily 
understandable, with the secondary aim of also countering a degree of latent scepticism about 
directives if not also about Europe” (Eisenbach 2006: 20). 
In addition, cross-national differences in how cooperation among unions and employers was 
perceived among the affiliates led to an approach of identifying those common sectoral interests 
in which dialogue was possible:  
“FIEC has always been strongly focused on German and French entrepreneurs. That 
was difficult; [the Germans] had a very different understanding of tariff communities 
 
Henni Appell  Workers of Europe Unite!? - Explaining the Form of European Labor Organization 134 
between employers and workers than the French. And many things, which [were] 
discussed in Germany with the people responsible at FIEC, were prevented by the 
French employers. There were not a lot of commonalities, because the understanding 
between the tariff partners, as we have them, as the Scandinavians, Dutch and 
Belgians have them, that is very different in France and in Belgium. So that was 
mainly focused on issues in which we had common interests, for example in the 
Posting Directive" (EFBWW Rep7 2011).  
The danger of unfavorable legislation also made it easier to get the social partners to one table 
(Cremers 2006b: 4). The issues were therefore largely set by the plans for European lawmaking, 
focusing on health and safety, vocational training, and the free movement of labor (European 
Commission 2014b, 2016). The fact that both sides were willing to establish a bilateral dialogue 
before it was officially established by the Commission indicates that both employers and trade 
unions saw it as necessary to jointly influence European policies in the construction sector.  
EUROPEAN COMPANY REPRESENTATION 
The creation of EWCs in 1994 was a further milestone for European industrial relations, and a 
huge step after years without legislative backing for European company bargaining. An early 
incentive, the “Vredeling Directive” of the late 1970s, had not succeeded due to severe 
opposition from the UK and UNICE’s lobbying efforts (Martin and Ross 1995: 21). The first 
initiatives for European company representation had begun in the 1980s with voluntary 
consultation. The international counterpart, the International Framework Agreement (IFA) has 
existed since the late 1980s. The new EWC Directive laid out core information and consultation 
rights for workers on issues of European-wide relevance in firms with more than 
1,000 employees within the member states and more than 150 employees in each of at least 
two member states. The details of these rights have to be negotiated by the EWCs themselves. 
Between 1994 and 1996, when the Directive was transposed into national law, a “window of 
opportunity” opened up and ignited a race to conclude EWCs in the construction sector and 
other sectors: the so-called “Article 13” EWCs allowed for much less formal and voluntary 
consultation mechanisms than the “Article 6” EWCs concluded after September 1996. 
Companies were eager to establish EWCs under this more flexible regulation. In the building and 
woodworking sector, 41 agreements were concluded between 1994 and 1996 alone, which was 
a unique peak in the EWC development. This makes up more than half of the total number of 
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EWCs (79) in this sector (ETUI 2016). With the EWC directive and Social Dialogue established, the 
collective bargaining options of the ETUFs had enlarged significantly.  
POSTED WORKERS DIRECTIVE 
Amidst the establishment of new instruments for European industrial relations by the European 
Commission, the EFBWW developed its role as a lobbyist for the interests of its affiliates. With 
the discussions on cross-border work in the Social Dialogue and the newly established 
information exchange concerning national collective bargaining, it was a logical step for the 
EFBWW to focus on fighting for a directive regulating the free movement of workers so that 
national social models would not be endangered (Laux 2008a: 11). The Commission’s plans to 
introduce such legislation through the Social Charta had prompted activity among the European 
trade union movement (Cremers 1995). This lobbying effort consisted of two pillars: (1) rallying 
the affiliates within ETUC to join the construction sector’s goals (Sörries 1997), and (2) engaging 
in the Commission-funded dialogue with the employer federation FIEC (EFBWW and FIEC 1997). 
Beginning in 1993, the EFBWW and FIEC wrote up several joint opinions on the directive, calling 
for the respect of national collective agreements and coordination via the national social 
partners (EFBWW and FIEC 1997). Ernst-Ludwig Laux, Vice President of the EFBWW from 1995 
to 2005, recounted, “Employers and unions saw eye to eye [on the issue of posting] and had a 
good position due to the positive economic outlook in the mid-nineties“ (Laux 2005). At FIEC, the 
German influence of bitartite negotations seemed to be important in enabling a culture of 
cooperation. According to one interview partner, the German managing director (beginning in 
1994) as well as the German president(s) seemed to have an important role in moderating and 
enabling social dialogue within FIEC (EFBWW Rep6 2011). Another interviewee from Germany 
remembered the German partnership as being positive for the Posted Workers Directive: “we 
were more in favor of partnership, in particular in Europe, more than other countries. And that 
also showed in FIEC’s relationship to us. The German employers and we often tried to cope 
together, for example regarding the Posted Workers Directive […] The employer’s interests were 
not very different from ours” (EFBWW Rep7 2011).  
In 1996, the joint awareness-raising efforts of the EFBWW and FIEC resulted in the Posted 
Workers Directive (PWD), which set out minimum standards for the treatment of migrant 
workers (1996). The directive is based on the “host country principle” and lays out the member 
states’ need to ensure that existing national regulations and collective agreements are 
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guaranteed (1996: Art. 3(1)). For the EFBWW, the directive was a “landmark in the European 
trade union movement’s attempt to influence EU legislation” (EFBWW n.a. [2009]). For one 
interview partner, the fight about the PWD is the “trailblazing story, which has shown to be 
groundbreaking in hindsight” (EFBWW Rep6 2011). 
AMSTERDAM 
One year after the PWD, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 followed in the footsteps of the 
Maastricht Treaty (Weber 1997). However, an important addition was the inclusion of a Social 
Chapter, which was a revised version of the Maastricht Treaty’s Social Protocol that now also 
included the UK. The Treaty of Amsterdam also put a greater focus on employment issues, 
increasing the community’s responsibility to devise joint employment strategies. This increased 
focus on cooperation in social issues bears the imprint of the unique political setting at the time, 
with 13 out of 15 governing coalitions including social democrats or socialists (Pollack 2000: 288). 
Thus, by the end of the 1990s, the political and institutional setting for ETUFs has changed 
significantly, prompting an increased presence in Brussels (EFBWW 2015a).  
In summary, the logic of influence during the 1980s and 1990s was marked by an “enabling 
rationale” by the Commission, which was eager to promote a stronger social Europe. An upsurge 
in social policy legislation (for construction, particularly in health and safety) and instruments for 
European coordination in labor issues (EWCs, Social Dialogue) and the availability of resources 
to fund these coordination activities provided a fruitful ground for European trade union 
activities. In addition, perceived threats to national autonomy such as the free movement of 
workers provided a working basis for increased sectoral coordination. In collective bargaining 
coordination, the cross-sectoral and regional coordinating attempts set the scene for 
coordinating attempts in the construction sector. The employer organization FIEC, on the other 
hand, was willing to use the Commission’s access points in order to bring forward their own 
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Table 20: Influences Shaping the Organizational Mode of the EFBWW 
 European Industrial Relations Employer Federation Organizational Mode of 
European Construction 
Sector Unions 




Emerging European industrial 
relations with financial 
support for bipartite Social 
Dialogue policy areas with 
access points for unions (e.g., 
health and safety) 
 
Limited willingness to 
engage in Social Dialogue 
Communicative 
rapprochement  
Forum for information 
exchange plus 
coordination (2) 
Mid-1990s– European industrial relations 
with financial support for 
company regulation (EWCs), 
Social Dialogue, and 
information and training 
measures 
PWD: “landmark in the 
European trade union 
movement’s attempt to 
influence EU legislation” 
(EFBWW n.a. [2009]). 
“trailblaizing story,  
which has shown to be 
groundbreaking in hindsight” 
(EFBWW Rep6 2011). 
Increasing willingness to use 
Social Dialogue as 
information platform: “from 
that time on FIEC had to be 
consulted […]. FIEC 
subsequently made 
frequent use of this right to 
put forward the views of the 
construction industry in 
numerous proposals for 
directives” (Bollinger 2005: 
70). 
On the FIEC president: “And 
he supported this German 
idea of partnership on the 
European level. And that 
was an advantage” 








5.3.3 MEMBERSHIP: DIVERSITY AND COORDINATION 
GROWING MEMBERSHIP  
Amidst the increasing pull toward European coordination with transnational Social Dialogue or 
company representation during the 1980s, the EFBWW also shaped up its internal organization 
with a new office in Brussels and an increasing number of affiliates. In 1987, Spain became part 
of the member circle. That year, the EFBWW had 23 member unions from 10 member countries 
(EFBWW 2008a, 2012b, 2014b). In this phase, the European trade union structures in the 
building and woodworking sector were confusing and divided, with at times up to five 
federations in the construction sector – the European Christian Federation, the Christian World 
Federation of Building and Woodworkers’ Unions, The European Committee within the IFBWW, 
the EFBWW, and the Nordic European Federation of Building and Woodworkers (NFBWW) – all 
engaging in European politics in parallel. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a number of decisions 
integrated these divided structures and significantly broadened the once-limited membership of 
the EFBWW.  
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The starting point was the EFBWW’s wish to be recognized by the ETUC. In 1983, in order to fulfill 
the requirements of the ETUC, the constitution was changed and the former EFBWWC simply 
became the EFBWW. In the mid-1980s, faced with the upcoming Common Market, the German, 
Danish, and Benelux affiliates had begun to argue for stronger professionalization (EFBWW Rep1 
2011). In 1989, in order to discuss the fall of the Berlin Wall, increasing European Community 
(EC) competencies, and the Single Market, ETUC set up an internal working group headed by the 
Dutch trade union leader Johan Stekelenburg. The “Stekelenburg Report” unraveled a deep need 
for organization reform, voiced especially by the Italian, Belgian, and Spanish unions and the 
French CFDT (Degryse 2013: 75). When the reform was launched in 1991, the ETUC’s Executive 
Committee was endowed with additional powers and the ETUFs, including the EFBWW, were 
given seats on the committee and were allowed to vote (except on financial issues) (Dølvik 2000). 
In the early 1990s, it was by no means evident that the industry federations would become 
central actors in European trade unionism. By giving the sectoral federations a greater role, local 
unions now could influence matters of sectoral importance within ETUC directly via their 
European sectoral federations without having to take the longer route via their national 
confederations. For industry federations such as the EFBWW, this was one stepping stone for a 
stronger European organization since it was now the sectoral federation’s responsibility to 
develop transnational collective bargaining coordination (Waddington 2006b: 645). The growing 
importance of the European federation was mirrored at the EFBWW congress in 1991, at which 
the membership fees were doubled without a negative vote (EFBWW 1991; EFBWW Rep1 2011). 
Between 1987 and 1994, the affiliation fees were tripled (Platzer and Müller 2009: 564).  
Within the EFBWW, the name change to gain ETUC’s recognition was followed up by several 
decisions to broaden the scope of the EFBWW’s membership. First, in 1989, Christian unions 
were allowed to join the EFBWW after the European Christian secretariat was dissolved (EFBWW 
2008f: 13). Nationally, the division along religious lines was particularly strong in Belgium and 
the Netherlands (Sadowski et al. 2002). With this decision the EFBWW followed ETUC, which had 
already opened up to 12 Christian union federations in 1974 (Buschak 2003: 4; Gabaglio 2001). 
Thus, instead of choosing an exclusive strategy of union building, the EFBWW chose an inclusive 
strategy in which a variety of members were included based on a concept of joint strength. 
Second, in 1990, with Bruno Köbele as the newly elected president of the EFBWW, the 
geographical scope was broadened to include all countries within the European Free Trade 
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Agreement (BWI1 2012). Again, ETUC had already admitted EFTA countries and has had EFTA 
members since its founding year in 1973 (Trade Union Division of the Directorate-General for 
Information 1985: 2).  
Third, in 1991, the EFBWW’s General Assembly again decided to reevaluate the geographical 
membership constrictions and voted to include all construction unions from countries in the 
Council of Europe (EFBWW 2008f: 13). Thus, with Switzerland joining the EFBWW in 1991, the 
organization started to become a regional trade union organization that was not exclusively 
confined to members of the EU. In 1992, the Nordic unions (Finland, Iceland, Norway, and 
Sweden) joined, and Turkey became a member in 1993 (EFBWW 2008a). According to a high-
ranking interview partner, including the Scandinavian unions was a challenging task: “It became 
difficult with the Scandinavian unions, which were very active in the international trade union … 
in the IFBWW. It took many personal talks to gain trust, that the Scandinavian take part” (EFBWW 
Rep7 2011). The accession of the Nordic members was particularly important for the federation 
because of their sound financial background: “Because the Germans and the Belgians and the 
Dutch, those were the ones that secured the financial foundation of the European federation. […] 
These six ‘classic’ countries, the countries that had founded the European Community, [plus 
Denmark], those were the ones giving financial support” (EFBWW Rep7 2011). Bruno Köbele, 
president of the EFBWW from 1991 to 1995, emphasized that the German trade union was eager 
to invest in European representation, since it feared that lesser involvement would endanger 
nationally established collective bargaining agreements: “What we can’t shape together in 
Europe brings Germany in a disadvantaged position” (Kohl 1993: 339). According to Hyman, 
cooperating internationally became a matter of survival for Western unions (Hyman 2002a: 3).  
In 1993, the number of countries represented had increased to 17. With this change of political-
geographical scope away from only EC countries toward an association spanning the EFTA 
countries, the geographical scope and regional distribution of the organization broadened 
significantly. The integration of the Scandinavian countries also meant that a fixed regional group 
was part of the EFBWW. Since the seven Danish unions had joined in 1976, the EFBWW now had 
“triple members” in international organizations: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and 
Sweden were simultaneously members of the EFBWW, the BWI, and the Nordic Federation of 
Building and Woodworkers, which also coordinates the political activities of their member unions 
on an international level. With the accession of Austria in 1995, the EFBWW then had a total of 
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50 member unions spanning from Southern to Northern Europe and including both EC and non-
EC countries.  
DISCUSSING DEEPER COOPERATION 
In the mid-1990s, during the debates on posted work, the EFBWW began to discuss the joint 
recognition of membership across national union boundaries in order to help posted workers in 
labor disputes (EFBWW Rep1 2011). For these cases, a guideline for joint recognition was drafted 
in 1995/1996, but it never gained a more formal status than a recommendation (EFBWW Rep1 
2011). However, the Nordic countries had concluded numerous bilateral agreements among 
each other, whereby the host country’s legislation and collective agreements applied to all 
posted workers (Cremers 2010). Since the mid-1990s, all members of unions within the NFBWW 
have been able to transfer their membership automatically if they work in another country for 
more than six months (EFBWW Affiliate4 2012). 
The rise of instruments for European industrial relations during the 1990s also gave rise to 
increased cooperation among the members. One issue was especially important for the EFBWW 
membership during the 1990s: the possibility of establishing EWCs spurred increased 
coordination activities among the membership. Although there was now a formal access point 
for European company bargaining, there were fears that existing regulations might be 
endangered since several established national rights (e.g., co-determination) were not required 
(Waddington 2011: 509). A survey by the European Industrial Relations Observatory from 1998 
found that “trade unions are afraid that the development of EWCs could lead to some sort of 
company trade unionism which might undermine the role of unions, or to the creation of new 
alliances (e.g. between more prosperous national operations, or between management and 
higher-skilled or less-unionised workers) which might reduce wider solidarity among workers” 
(Pedersini 1998). Despite these reservations, however, the European sectoral federations 
welcomed the new “industrial relations instrument” EWCs as a means to enhance European 
solidarity and provided the EFBWW with the mandate to create EWCs (EFBWW Rep1 2011; 
EFBWW Rep7 2011). The memories of a leading EFBWW representative illustrate the role EWCs 
played for the development of a European labor identity: 
“By the way, we played a leading role there. The European Federation had the first 
European Works Councils […] when there was no clear guideline on that […]. And that 
was of course extremely helpful, to emphasize tariff unity a bit more in the European 
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countries. Through the discussion of the Works Council representatives among each 
other, there was a possibility that they said in their countries: ‘Why don’t we have a 38-
hour-week, in Germany they have that […].’ The fact that […] the firms which were 
operating throughout Europe had a joint Works Council, that had added to the 
harmonization and above all to the realization in different countries, that they are 
disadvantaged. That led to a greater willingness to fight, to introduce these issues 
more into their regional collective agreements. Well, I think, that this, in the European 
movement, has most contributed to the harmonization of working rules. And that was 
helpful, because we [the EFBWW] were able to inform the Works Councils in the 
multinationals [about regulations]. […] And they were able to uncover cases. There was 
a case, where the Works Council called the customs office and said ‘There is a firm here 
with us, that can’t be right.’ Such things happened regularly and increased the 
‘cleanliness’ of the work relationships. That is an achievement of these European Works 
Councils.” (EFBWW Rep7 2011) 
In addition, trade unions in Europe had also begun to attempt initiatives for collective bargaining 
coordination. Already in the late 1960s and early 1970s the metal sector had attempted to 
establish cross-border bargaining coordination (Glassner and Pochet 2011; Pernicka and 
Glassner 2014). In the Nordic countries, the regional union federation Nordisk Metall founded a 
platform for information exchange on collective bargaining, while a German-speaking alliance of 
unions in the metalworking and manufacturing sectors (DACH initiative) agreed on joint 
standards for bargaining rounds (Traxler et al. 2008). Almost 20 years later, the DOORN initiative 
committed the participating unions to a joint minimum bargaining formula in which wage 
increases should seek to integrate national inflation and productivity growth (Dufresne and 
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Table 21: Overview of Cross-Sectoral Collective Bargaining Coordination in Europe and Building and Woodwork 
(Dufresne and Mermet 2002; Pernicka and Glassner 2014: 11; Platzer and Müller 2009: 581) 




from Germany, Austria, 
and Switzerland 
(German-speaking) 







Iceland, Norway, and 
Sweden) 





(Germany, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg) 
 Commitment to seek, in national bargaining negotiations, 
increases that fully offset national inflation and 
productivity growth 
 Sum of inflation and productivity increases as the target 




 Sum of inflation and productivity increases as the target 




 Common platform for the cross-border exchange of CB 
information, the European Collective Bargaining 
Coordination Network (Eucob@n) 
1999 
 
 Building and 
Woodwork  
 Exchange of information on comparative bargaining 
trends and regulations 
 Information exchange on general employment standards 
and social issues (not wage-related) 
ca. 1995 
 
Shortly afterward, several European federations began developing information exchange on 
collective bargaining, most prominently within the network Eucob@n. The metal sector was also 
a forerunner in non-wage-related coordination (e.g., regarding working time) and pioneered a 
number of instruments to monitor bargaining rounds and settlements. Instead of establishing 
European collective bargaining targets as the metal sector had done, the EFBWW members 
decided on a more informal coordination. This approach differs significantly from other sectors, 
since the construction affiliates did not agree on any standard bargaining formula (Dufresne and 
Mermet 2002). The impulse for coordination stemmed from a German initiative, resulting in a 
project comparing collective bargaining standards in the construction sector (Der Tagesspiegel 
1998; Platzer and Müller 2009: 581). Instead of focusing on wage-related issues, the focus of this 
initial project was on comparing non-wage-related standards. A specialty of the construction 
sector is the fact that many Western countries have national paritarian social funds to mediate 
 
Henni Appell  Workers of Europe Unite!? - Explaining the Form of European Labor Organization 143 
the effects of sector-related labor flexibility (Laux 2008a: 9). Thus, the starting point of the first 
coordination attempt was to exchange data on these funds and – in the long run – find common 
ground for European paritarian funds. For example, an initial result of this information exchange 
was that Dutch employers contributed to the German paid leave funds of their German 
employees, and vice versa (Der Tagesspiegel 1998). At the EFBWW General Assembly in 1999, 
the EFBWW affiliates voted to synchronize their collective bargaining terms, but only bilaterally, 
not with EFBWW coordination (Platzer and Müller 2009: 581). For the EFBWW coordinator Laux, 
the conferences and Social Dialogues surrounding this decision were “an important milestone 
[…] in certain aspects we are going ahead on the thorny path of coordinating European collective 
bargaining” (Laux 2001: 4). However, the affiliates in general seemed to be reluctant to 
established fixed rules and – as a decentralized sector of small businesses - favored a “bottom-
up” approach, as an interviewee from the sector highlighted in an article by Dufresne and 
Mermet (2002: 18). The same authods also cite an interview with EFBWW Secretary General 
Harrie Bijen (2000-2007), who argued “that the standard must be “sensed by the membership, 
and cannot be imposed from above” (2002: 18). An external observer remembered the meeting 
where a comparative study on wages in Europe was presented: “The whole attempt to achieve 
not only comparability, but also cooperation, was followed by a deafening silence. There is no 
coming through there” (CLR Member2 2011). The EFBWW is viewed as a forum for exchange and 
information on employer strategies and government regulation rather than a coordinator of 
fixed collective bargaining regulations. The external observer noted, “I know it is one of the 
hottest topics, where they differ completely” (CLR Member2 2011).  
Meanwhile, after the German IG BAU had taken the initial steps, the EFBWW Standing 
Committees on building and woodwork soon took over the task of comparing wages and wage 
structures. Today, both Standing Committees regularly have comparative bargaining trends on 
their agenda, but without a standard coordinating rule. As an alternative, issues discussed 
concern more general aspects of working life, such as pension age, precarious work, and working 
time (EFBWW 2015b). With this strategy, the EFBWW has focused on exchanging information 
concerning those issues where members could benefit from “best practice” experience.  
In summary, the logic of membership during the 1980s and 1990s was characterized by a growing 
diversity among the members and the perception that coordinating joint standpoints was both 
beneficial and necessary. Members from the Christian and communist federations were 
 
Henni Appell  Workers of Europe Unite!? - Explaining the Form of European Labor Organization 144 
integrated into the EFBWW, and the regional and political heterogeneity within the Federation 
grew. At the same time, the EFBWW now had members that were represented in triple European 
structures (the NFBWW, the IFBWW, and the EFBWW), enhancing the coordination needs within 
the federation. The development of the European Single Market and the upcoming economic 
and monetary integration led to increased activities among the affiliates, such as in the sharing 
of collective bargaining information or joint recognition of membership. However, a rationale of 
national autonomy prevailed, which shows in the affiliate’s position on collective bargaining 
agreements. 
 
5.3.4 ADMINISTRATION: LEADERSHIP AND AUTONOMY 
A NEWSDESK IN BRUSSELS 
When the affiliates decided to enlarge the EFBWWC’s responsibilities during the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, one of the major discussion points was whether or not the secretary should receive 
full-time status and more staff. As Table 22 shows, there were four options for working time 
arrangements, and the affiliates differed in their will to strengthen the secretariat (EFBWWC 
1977, 1978b, 1978d). In 1982, the affiliates found a compromise that maintained the secretary’s 
position as a part-time task but added one administrative staff member to the team. The 
EFBWWC now had its own secretariat in Brussels. 
Table 22: Options for Working Time of Secretariat for a New European Construction Sector Trade Union Federation 
 (EFBWWC 1978d) 
Members Administration 
Italy, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Denmark 
Secretary general: 1 
Administration: 1 
Germany  Secretary general: 1 
Administration: 0 
France, the UK Secretary general: 0.5 
Administration: 0 
Belgium Secretary general: 0.5 
Administration: 1 
 Result EFBWWC 1982 Secretary general: 0.5 
Administration: 1 
 
Enrico Kirschen became the secretary of the EFBWWC that year. Enrico Kirschen had been a 
member of the EESC in his position as a delegate of the Italian NEAI-UIL since 1974, and the 
Italian federation in particular had endorsed his candidature (Economic and Social Committee of 
the European Communities 1975: 31; EFBWWC 1978d). With this experience, he was a classical 
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Euro-diplomat, experienced in the Brussels scene and “well acquainted with European problems” 
(EFBWWC 1978d). He was, according to one observer, “a really nice guy, who was mainly active 
in the Economic and Social Committee of the EC (EESC) at that time and has mainly financed 
himself via this Economic and Social Committee. He was released from his duties by the Italians 
in terms of remuneration [to work for the EFBWW]” (EFBWW Rep7 2011). Members of the EESC 
do not receive any remuneration, but allowances for meetings and travel costs are reimbursed 
(European Economic and Social Committee 2012: 10). When the Italian federation proposed 
Kirschen’s candidature, it was under the condition that his seat as the Italian member of the EESC 
was renewed (EFBWWC 1978d). In practice, this indicates that although the EFBWW’s financed 
its own secretary general at that time, the EC reimbursed at least parts of the additional costs. 
This setting may have set the tone for the administration, which was partly dependent upon 
external financing in its daily work. 
Table 23: Nationalities of Secretary Generals of the Joint Committee (1958–1981) and the EFBWW (1974–2014) 
(EFBWW 2008a, 2015a) 
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With this first independent secretariat in Brussels, the administration slowly began to take on a 
greater role within the EFBWW. However, in the 1980s, the EFBWW secretariat’s major task 
remained as a “newsdesk” for all European topics concerning the sector. As one interview 
partner remembered, “Today we have the internet and we have access to much more European 
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information. That was not the case in the 1980s. […] The EFBWW works in seven languages. In 
other sectors, Metal and so on, two or three – but with us seven. […] There was always a 
takeaway for us” (EFBWW Rep6 2011). 
ACTIVE LEADERSHIP AND GOAL IMPLEMENTATION 
When the EFBWW began to integrate new members, the administration of the federation also 
started to change. In 1991, Bruno Köbele from Germany became president of the organization. 
At the congress of the same year, a decision was made to enlarge the office with four extra staff 
members: two for administrative aspects and one person each for the woodworking and building 
sector (EFBWW 2008a: 14). 
In 1988, Jan Cremers became secretary general when Enrico Kirschen retired. Cremers’ 
appointment together with Bruno Köbeles’ strong European role marked a turning point in the 
EFBWW’s administration. One interview partner recalled this appointment as a defining shift, 
stating that “Jan really stirred things up” (BWI1 2012) and that “[h]e was the ‘new dynamic man.’ 
For the first time, there was something like a European perspective. Before him, it was more or 
less ‘don’t know how, don’t know what.’ And with Jan the realms of influence became more 
apparent” (BWI1 2012). A retired interviewee who remembers these times also mentioned this 
shift: “So before [the eighties] you had another kind of secretary” (EFBWW Affiliate5 2012). In 
terms of political agenda, to Cremers the “fight against social dumping” was the core issue 
during the 1990s, in particular the guarantee of nationally established labor rights for all 
construction workers and general social security issues (Cremers 1998: 339). According to one 
EFBWW staff member, “[Jan Cremers] was very active. On the lobbying dimension, on the trade 
union dimension vis-à-vis ETUC and vis-à-vis the affiliates. And in the founding phase of the EWCs 
– he was able to fulfill everything” (EFBWW Rep4 2012b). Another interview partner described 
the leading officials before Cremers as “another generation. A lot was different” (EFBWW Rep6 
2011). An interview partner with leading functions in the EFBWW emphasized the impression of 
change: “Jan Cremers was the one who brought the Federation forward the most” (EFBWW Rep7 
2011). An interviewed staff member described the changed self-perception of the new Brussels 
office leading to greater autonomy of the administration: “If you draw a very long line I would 
say in the early days of the EFBWW’s development and the development of the office here in 
Brussels, from the mid-1980s, there was a lot of autonomy. And the secretary general said to his 
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president: ‘Look, you’re sitting there and I’m sitting here [in Brussels], I’m doing the daily work 
and we’ll discuss the rest later’” (EFBWW Rep4 2012a). 
Cremers’ vision for the EFBWW was one of a flexible network with short decision-making 
structures with the EFBWW’s office as an enabler of collaboration among the affiliates: 
“Cooperation in the EFBWW is useful when there is little hierarchy and bureaucracy. If we in the 
union movement want to be able to intervene swiftly then we must keep searching for the right 
forms of delegation and coordination, for efficient communications, and aim to become ‘lean and 
mean’” (Cremers 1997: 637). Based on these descriptions, the secretary general of the 1990s 
represented a desire for change, quick decisions, and proactive leadership, which was a very 
different understanding of the administration’s role than that of previous years.  
This leadership role was enhanced with ETUC’s reform of 1991. With this change, the sectoral 
union federations were able to increase their European importance not only within ETUC but 
also vis-à-vis their national affiliates. According to a high-level interview partner active in the 
EFBWW during the time of recognition by ETUC, “This recognition by ETUC, it gave us real 
independence, meaning the freedom to be active in the building and woodworking sector” 
(EFBWW Rep7 2011). At the same time, the early 1990s not only changed the administrative tide 
of the EFBWW but of the European trade union organization in general. With ETUC’s new 
Secretary General Emilio Gabaglio, the ETUC’s “tired, routinized leadership, committed to a 
modest lobbying role” was replaced with a much more ambitious leading team (Martin and Ross 
1995: 13). 
The EFBWW’s administration initiated numerous activities by, for example, creating a “think 
tank” for European issues in the construction sector: the European Institute for Construction 
Labor Research (CLR Member1 2011). One member of the EFBWW is always on the board of this 
research support network, with about 500 members across Europe. This enabled the EFBWW to 
support broader discussions on the future of the construction sector, collective bargaining, or 
posted work without having to adhere to the more formal rules of the EFBWW (CLR Member2 
2011). The network publishes a quarterly newsletter on construction research and organizes 
seminars and workshops. The advantage of such a network, as one interview partner described, 
is that the discussion culture within CLR organized seminars is much more open in comparison 
to EFBWW meetings (CLR Member1 2011). Beginning in 1990, the EFBWW also invited 
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colleagues from member unions to work on joint projects for short periods of approximately 
three to four months (EFBWW Rep1 2011).  
From 1991 onward, the EFBWW administration also intensified its coordinating role with the so-
called “EFBWW Multiprojects” (EFBWW Rep4 2012b; EFBWW Rep9 2012). The initial idea of this 
approach was to coordinate company representatives and information on sectoral issues all over 
Europe in order to establish multinational works councils (EFBWW & IG BAU 2004: 11). Some 
interview partners recalled that the EFBWW administration had played a leading role and ha 
already begun to negotiate European consultation rights in 1991 (EFBWW Rep1 2011; EFBWW 
Rep7 2011), which resulted in one EWC before the directive came into force in 1994 (ETUI 2016). 
The EFBWW used the additional Commission funds to promote company agreements in the 
sector: “[In particular in the field of European Works Councils], the EFBWW came off well. And 
all our proposals were accepted” (EFBWW Rep2 2011). 
After the EWC Directive had come into force, the EFBWW organized a network of company 
representatives in the EFBWW Multiproject Coordinators Group to network, coordinate the EWC 
work, and exchange information (EFBWW 2008a: 23). For two years, the EFBWW also had a full-
time employee to coordinate these multiprojects (EFBWW & IG BAU 2004: 11). In these projects, 
the EFBWW encouraged and supported the organization of migrant workers on transnational 
construction sites (Cremers 2001a). This, as one interviewee recollected, “was a chance for us 
to be seen and to provide a service, to take care of workplace security and be there as a point of 
contact“ (EFBWW Rep4 2012b). One EFBWW representative recounted the boost in these kinds 
of projects with the new administration and recounts that “In the 1990s” much more 
multiprojects were conducted than in the Noughties (EFBWW Rep9 2012). In addition, at the 
General Assembly in 1995, the EFBWW decided to intensify the coordination on transnational 
sites (Gross 2001: 37). Two pilot projects in Denmark/Sweden and Germany were selected, 
which concluded with a list of “best practice” examples for so-called “Eurosite” cooperation and 
were followed up with a number of Commission-funded projects (European Commission, DG 
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 2015; Platzer and Müller 2009). One interviewee 
described the secretary general’s ability to receive funds: “He had a lot of influence in the 
Commission and was able to design projects which were co-financed by the Commission” 
(EFBWW Rep7 2011). 
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At the same time, the fall of the Berlin Wall also had implications for international trade union 
work in the building and woodworking sector. The new colleagues in the East were supposed to 
be strengthened and supported. However, this task was not taken over by the EFBWW but rather 
by the IFBWW, which was traditionally responsible for building up union structures and 
conducting solidarity work. The Eastern European countries had not been admitted to the 
EFBWW yet and were thus responsibility of the IFBWW. After the IFBWW’s European Committee 
had been laid to rest in 1985, it took up its work again in 1990 with the task of coordinating trade 
union development in the Eastern European countries (BWI1 2012). Thus, during the 1990s the 
European administrative structures were tripled, and the administration of the EFBWW, the 
IFBWW (later called BWI), and the NFBWW had to take care to establish independent realms of 
influence that would not interfere with the other European partners in the sector.  
Figure 4: Parallel Structures of Trade Unions in the Building and Woodworking Sector in Europe 
(Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2009; Rütters and Zimmermann 2005) 
 
The triple or even quadruple structures that some members had to fulfill made it difficult to 
maintain an overview: “In Geneva they say, ‘That’s how it is done, and these are our positions,’ 
and in Brussels someone else said something else. The coordination wasn’t always that good. […] 
And we said, on the European level, we need to know if we’re implementing the same activities 
which are also implemented by the BWI via other trade unions. That wasn’t easy I must say, and 
in particular since the Christian federation also had their own federation. They had their own 
preferred organizations in Middle and Eastern Europe: Solidarnosc, Podrepa, Alfa Cartel … That 
doesn’t strengthen the unions” (EFBWW Rep2 2011). In order to define their respective 
responsibilities, the three federations thus initiated a regular dialogue from 1990 onward in 
which they discussed their cooperation (EFBWW 2008a: 25). This was even more important since 
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the German Köbele had been EFBWW president from 1991 to 1995 and also became president 
of the BWI from 1993 to 1997. For another interviewee, however, this rotation of union officials 
between the European and international federations also led to an appeasement: “The 
dissonance between the two organizations was less pronounced when Köbele also became 
President of the International Federation – the discord was united in one person and there were 
no more problems” (EFBWW Rep7 2011).  
In 1995, the Swedish union leader Owe Bengtsberg was elected president, symbolizing the 
Swedish commitment to the European federation. In the same year, the office was enlarged 
again to include a staff member for health and safety topics following the increased significance 
of these issues for the federation (Eisenbach 2006). The health and safety strategy consisted of 
gathering information, coordinating national member strategies, lobbying, campaigning, and 
negotiating within the Social Dialogue (Cremers 2011). Rolf Gehring, a health and safety 
specialist at the EFBWW, recalled that “when the European social policy was first created, health 
and safety matters at the work place was rather an exclusive topic” (Gehring 2001: 6). The 
EFBWW administration used this specialized access point to enhance its lobbying activities by, 
for example, suggesting multilingual security information on construction sites or proposing 
security committees (Cremers 1991: 154f). The first construction sector-related Directive on the 
politically “less sensitive” issue of health and safety was viewed as an “opportunity to argue the 
case for greater coordination” according to Cremers (Cremers 2001a: 5). A major push factor for 
this strategic choice was the realization of the danger of asbestos and the emotional importance 
of this topic for construction workers (Kazan-Allen 2000). With the addition of an officer for 
health and safety issues, the EFBWW administration was able to set the agenda on issues such 
as carcinogenic work environments, health protection and prevention of accidents, and more 
general environmental issues (EFBWW 2010). A further dimension in the health and safety field 
thus enhanced the administration’s intermediary role as a goal implementer. Since this issue 
area was both highly specialized and immediately important for its affiliates, the administration 
was able to carve out a genuine benefit of European cooperation for its members. In addition to 
its work on company representation, the initiation of social dialogue, and increasing work on 
health and safety issues, the EFBWW’s secretary general was at the core of lobbying initiatives 
for the Posting of Workers Directive (Druker 1998; Lillie and Greer 2007; Sörries 1997). In a study 
on European labor bargaining, an ETUC interviewee even stated, “the Posting of Workers 
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Directive was basically their [the EFBWW’s] Directive” (Seeliger and Wagner 2016: 12). These 
activities surrounding the Posting of Workers Directive gave the administration a new position 
as central lobbying organization in Brussels vis-à-vis its members, which from then on saw the 
EFBWW as “their” lobbying institution (EFBWW Affiliate3 2012; EFBWW Affiliate5 2012; EFBWW 
Rep7 2011; Leeuw 2012).  
In summary, the administrative logic of the 1980s and 1990s was characterized by increasing 
independence in the Brussels office and an outspoken and active unionist figure at the center of 
the EFBWW administration. The leadership of the EFBWW office used the upsurge in European 
industrial relations instruments to establish cooperation projects at the European level. The 
autonomous position was enhanced by the structural reform within ETUC, which provided the 
sectoral representation with a stronger voice. At the same time, the parallel structures of 
European unionism in the sector made it necessary for the EFBWW administration to define its 
role in contrast with the solidarity work of the IFBWW, which had been revived in Europe after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
 
Table 24: Role of Administration mid 1980s to 1990s 
Examples Role of Administration Organizational Mode Role of Transnational 
Organization 
“from the mid-1980s, there was a lot of autonomy. And 
the Secretary General said to his president: ‘Look, you’re 
sitting there and I’m sitting here [in Brussels], I’m doing 
the daily work and we’ll discuss the rest later.’” (EFBWW 
Rep4 2012a) 
“He was the new dynamic man. For the first time, there 
was something like a European perspective.” (BWI1 
2012) 
“[He] was the one who brought the Federation forward 
the most.” (EFBWW Rep7 2011) 
“This recognition by ETUC [in 1991], it gave us real 
independence” (EFBWW Rep7 2011) 
health and safety as “opportunity to argue the case for 
greater coordination” (Cremers 2001a: 5). 
 
Proactive, large degree of 
autonomy 
Coordination of networks 
Negotiation in the Social 
Dialogue and EWCs 
Lobbying (Posted Work, 
health and safety) 
Information service for 
affiliates (e.g., collective 
bargaining coordination) 
Division of labor between 
the IFBWW (solidarity work) 
and the EFBWW 
(information and 
coordination) 
International negotiation of 
(non-)binding standards  
Coordination, limited 
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5.4 BALANCING FREE MOVEMENT AND PROTECTIONISM: THE NOUGHTIES 
5.4.1 WEATHERING CHALLENGES: THE EFBWW AS A COORDINATOR WITH LIMITED 
STEERING FUNCTIONS 
Over the years, the EFBWW has maintained and deepened its organizational role of coordination 
with limited steering functions and maintained the mode of negotiating non-binding standards. 
The EFBWW sees itself as a coordinator of European (BWI1 2012) lobbying work, particularly 
regarding (a) the regulation of free movement of labor and services, (b) health and safety issues, 
and (c) representing sectoral interests in the European Social Dialogue. In 2005, the BWI was 
founded as a unifying organization from the IFBWW and the Communist World Federation of 
Building and Woodworkers union (BWI 2006a). According to one EFBWW representative, in 
contrast with the BWI, the EFBWW’s role is not about solidarity work for weaker unions: “It´s 
about coordination, coming to a European standpoint and influencing the EU and doing social 
dialogue. It´s not about one union or a number of unions helping other unions. That´s more BWI 
business” (EFBWW Rep8 2011). Another affiliate stated, “The EFBWW does a very good job in 
Brussels influencing people, lobbying, meeting people” (EFBWW Affiliate3 2012). Others said, 
“EFBWW is a kind of lobby organization” (EFBWW Affiliate5 2012), and “You can say we 
outsourced the European lobby work to the EFBH (EFBWW Affiliate7 2012). Another affiliate 
added, “The EFBWW has the organizational role of coordinating common goals among the 
affiliates in order to find common lobbying positions” (EFBWW Affiliate6 2012). This also fits with 
the general strategy of the EFBWW, which one EFBWW officer explained: “Our instruments [to 
achieve political goals] are foremost lobbying with the European Commission and on the national 
level” (van der Straeten 2008). In terms of policies, health and safety and legislation related to 
the free movement of workers and services remain the top issues for the Federation (Cremers 
et al. 2007; EFBWW 2010; Eisenbach 2006). The EFBWW’s mandate for European negotiations 
is indirectly implied in Article 11 of its statutes, which states that “the Executive Committee, 
acting on a proposal of the […] Management Committee, shall adopt internal regulations by a 
simple majority” (EFBWW 2007b). Although this regulation does not explicitly grant negotiation 
rights to the EFBWW, it indicates the implicit willingness of the affiliates to permit independent 
dialogue with the employers (Eurofound 2015: 60). 
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Apart from the lobbying work, the EFBWW is also viewed as a “short line to Brussels” providing 
information on sectoral and industrial policy (EFBWW Affiliate3 2012). In this position, the 
EFBWW fulfills the organizational service of information providers on new and important topics 
concerning the sector (Leeuw 2012). Apart from these tasks, the EFBWW’s activities concentrate 
on coordinating European company representation (Clarke et al. 2003; Dufresne 2011; EFBWW 
2008a: 12; EFBWW Rep8 2011; Johannson 2012; Laux 2008a). The EFBWW also coordinates 
information exchange on collective bargaining but does not have any steering capacities in this 
matter (EFBWW 2015b; Laux 2001, 2006, 2008b). 
 
Table 25: Development of the Organizational Mode of the EFBWW (Noughties ) 
 Main Tasks Organizational Mode Role of Transnational 
Organization 
Noughties  Negotiation of non-binding standards in Social Dialogue 
(and joint projects with employer federations) 
 Coordination of EWC representation 
 Lobbying for European labor legislation (e.g., posted 
work, health, and security) 
 Information (e.g., industrial policy, collective bargaining 
coordination) 
International negotiation 
of (mainly non-)binding 
standards  
Coordination, limited steering 
functions (3–4) 
 “It´s about coordination, coming to a European 
standpoint and influencing the EU and doing social 
dialogue.” (EFBWW Rep8 2011). 
 “Coordination of common goals in all countries, 
education on EWCs and to get guidelines. Health & 
security is big issue in EFBWW, here we can find common 
ground.” (Johannson 2012)  
  “influencing people, lobbying, meeting people.” (EFBWW 
Affiliate3 2012) 
 “EFBWW is a kind of lobby organization.” (EFBWW 
Affiliate5 2012) 
 “Specialized in lobby work. […] they give us quite a lot of 
information on new topics.” (Leeuw 2012) 
 
The following sections explain this organizational outcome via the interplay between the logics 
of influence, membership, and administration: (1) the European construction unions faced 
dangers to national union autonomy from European legislation, combined with the continuing 
opportunity to receive funding from the European Commission for specific issues (influence); (2) 
the EFBWW’s organizational form was shaped by a faster growing and more heterogeneous 
membership base than ever that was at once eager to defend the autonomy of national social 
models and occupied with mergers and declining membership rates at home (membership); and 
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(3) the EFBWW’s organizational form was developed by a continuously active administration that 
used European Commission funding to implement the goals of the federation (administration). 
 
5.4.2 INFLUENCE: LOBBYING TO RESTORE NATIONAL AUTONOMY 
The Noughties were characterized by accelerating integration in economic issues and deepening 
interdependence in employment policies. Three major developments influenced the European 
landscape in the Noughties: the implementation of the European Monetary Union, the accession 
of 12 new member countries between 2004 and 2007, and the financial crisis, which hit the 
construction sector hard. In terms of industrial relations, new regulations for company 
representation, four ECJ cases, and the debate surrounding posted work and the Service 
Directive shaped the setting for the EFBWW’s development. 
Beginning with the European Employment Strategy (EES) in the late 1990s, the EU member states 
introduced several measures to enhance employment cooperation. The EES, which had was 
intended to coordinate employment policies among the member states, provided increased 
incentive for the social partners to make their positions heard at the European level. The “Lisbon 
Strategy,” devised in 2000, was accompanied in 2003 by the introduction of a social partner 
advisory board: the Tripartite Social Summit. In the same year, the Treaty of Nice was ratified. In 
terms of European social partner involvement, the treaty altered little (Degryse 2013: 104). 
Instead, the treaty granted the member states the option to implement directives through social 
partner negotiations (Article 137 TFEU). The changes in the Treaty of Lisbon, concluded in 2007 
and ratified in 2009, were much more significant. It enlarged the employment and social policy 
areas in which qualified majority voting was required. Social partner involvement in the Tripartite 
Summit was given additional recognition (Article 152 TFEU). The EFBWW welcomed the Treaty 
of Lisbon and the accompanying Charter of Fundamental Rights since it set out to level the 
“playing field of social rights and fair competition” (EFBWW n.a. [2010]). However, despite the 
enhanced options for including social issues in the legal framework of the EU, the way in which 
these social rights should be enforced was highly disputed (Bieler 2006; Bieler and Erne 2014; 
Busemeyer et al. 2008; Dølvik and Visser 2009; Taylor and Mathers 2002). As a representative of 
the construction sector with a highly mobile workforce, the EFBWW was heavily affected by the 
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intensifying discussions on balancing the free movement of labor and services and safeguarding 
national social models against social dumping. 
In the mid-2000s, the European political tide shifted to a conservative/liberal majority after years 
of a social democrat/labor majority. The underlying assumption is that social democratic parties 
establish a more worker-friendly climate, enabling unions to thrive (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 
[1981]) as, for example, the industrial relations instruments introduced by the Delors 
Commission indicate. From 2004 onwards, both the European parliament and the Commission 
president were from a conservative/liberal faction. 
Table 26: Leading Party in the EU Parliament 










Table 27: Presidents of the European Commission 





 Jean Monnet*   
1958–1967 Walter Hallstein No (Christian Democrat) 9 
1967–1970 Jean Rey No (Liberal Democrat) 3 
1970–1972 Franco Maria Malfatti No (Christian Democrat) 2 
1972–1973 Sicco Mansholt Yes (Socialist) 1 
1973–1977 François-Xavier Ortoli No (Christian Democrat) 4 
1977–1981 Roy Jenkins Yes (Socialist) 4 
1981–1985 Gaston Thorn No (Liberal Democrat) 4 
1985–1995 Jacques Delors Yes (Socialist) 10 
1995–1999 Jacques Santer No (Christian Democrat) 4 
1999 Manuel Marin (interim) Yes (Socialist)  
1999–2004 Romano Prodi Yes (Socialist) 5 
2004–2014 Manuel Barroso No (Christian Democrat) 8 
2014– Jean-Claude Juncker No (Christian Democrat) 2 
*President of the High Authority of the European Economic and Steel Community 
In the following years, a Commission proposal for the Service Directive, four ECJ cases, and the 
financial crisis put enormous pressure on the European trade union movement. 
SERVICE DIRECTIVE 
The “Bolkestein Directive,” first brought forward by liberal Commissioner for the Internal Market 
Frits Bolkestein in 2004, had foreseen a “home country principle,” meaning that services could 
have been applied based on the regulations of the country of origin. For trade unions, this version 
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of the Service Directive would have inevitably meant a race to the bottom in which services could 
be provided at the costs of the lowest-paying member state. For the EFBWW affiliates, their 
nationally established social models were at stake. During the negotiations, the EFBWW followed 
a two-tiered lobbying strategy. 
First, the EFBWW assembled its affiliates in order to lobby their national governments and exert 
pressure on ETUC to find a common position for the European labor movement. Originally, ETUC 
had not been concerned with the issue and the EFBWW assembled its national affiliates to exert 
pressure on the responsible ETUC administration (EFBWW Rep2 2011). Within ETUC, the EFBWW 
was able to provide important expertise on the implications for the construction sector. As a 
result, the EFBWW was able to successfully insert its sectoral position into ETUC’s position 
(Arnold 2008: 16). This input in turn strengthened the EFBWW’s perception as a forerunner for 
other sectors and a strong representative on the European level (Erne 2008: 95). The 
mobilization preceding the directive then followed in the footsteps of the mobilization 
concerning posted work: ETUC, the EFBWW, and other federations rallied their forces with major 
demonstrations in Brussels and Strasbourg in 2004 and 2005 and continuous lobbying work with 
the Commission (EFBWW Rep2 2011; ETUC 2006).  
Second, the EFBWW forged a coalition with the employer federation FIEC to make the sectoral 
position heard. An interview partner describes how the EFBWW’s political network together with 
FIEC enabled the EFBWW to take a forerunner position: “We have the advantage that we have 
many contacts in the European Parliament and in the Commission […]. For example, when the 
Service Directive was prepared we had a discussion with one of the civil servants at the 
Commission, one of those that transcribed the debate […]. And that was five months before it 
was made public. And FIEC and we had a talk with him and he explained to us what the directive 
would contain. So we knew five months in advance what would be approaching. […] So we were 
the first federation that published a position paper” (EFBWW Rep2 2011). In 2004, an additional 
working group on employment was set up within the Social Dialogue, strengthening the focus 
on joint actions concerning free movement and EU enlargement (Cremers 2006b: 7; Laux 2006: 
13). The Service Directive then spurred a number of joint statements and recommendations on 
the interpretation of the free movement of trade (European Commission 2016). A leading 
EFBWW official explained the cooperative nature of these Social Dialogues with the threat of 
legislation: “If they don´t see anything bad coming from the Commission, then it´s not that likely 
 
Henni Appell  Workers of Europe Unite!? - Explaining the Form of European Labor Organization 157 
that they want to talk with us” (EFBWW Rep8 2011). This has been the case from the very 
beginnings of the Social Dialogue, as former Secretary General Jan Cremers recounted: “the will 
to negotiate came about more rapidly if there was a threat of legislation” (Cremers 2006b: 4). 
The European Parliament eventually excluded the home country principle, partly based on the 
massive pressure from the construction sector (Arnold 2008; Cremers 2006a; Dølvik and 
Ødegård 2009; Seeliger and Wagner 2016). Similar to the Posting Directive strategy, the Service 
Directive lobbying strategy thus strengthened the EFBWW’s role as a lobbying partner for its 
national affiliates. This necessity to engage in European-level lobbying intensified when several 
rulings by the European Court of Justice severely shook the structure of European industrial 
relations. 
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE RULINGS AND THE ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE 
In the aftermath of EU enlargement, from May 2007 until December 2008, four cases landed 
before the ECJ that reinterpreted the Posted Workers Directive: these cases were Laval, Viking, 
Rüffert, and Luxembourg. More than a quarter of posted workers have a job in the construction 
sector, making the Posting of Workers Directive a central legislation for the industry (IDEA 
Consult and ECORYS Netherlands 2011: 168). The gist of the cases concerned the balance 
between two principles: the freedom of cross-border movement (e.g., to provide services as a 
foreign firm in a host country) and the fundamental right to take collective action for posted 
workers and host country workers alike (e.g., to force service providers by strike to guarantee 
host country conditions). Although the ECJ ruled in the Viking case that the right to collective 
action must be guaranteed, this right only applies when it does not interfere disproportionally 
with the employer’s freedom to provide service (European Commission Legal Service 2008b). A 
couple of days later, the Laval case ruling confirmed and strengthened this perspective and 
significantly altered the setting for European trade unions. The Laval ruling gave the right of firms 
to freedom of movement precedence over the right of unions to initiate a strike (European 
Commission Legal Service 2008a). The Laval case especially concerned the EFBWW, since it 
emanated from a dispute in the building sector. In a strategy paper following the rulings, the 
EFBWW concludes: “To put it bluntly, the judgments give reasons to question whether what we 
thought were important and lasting trade union victories in the history of EU social legislation – 
the Posting Directive and the outcome of the Service Directive process – now in one fatal blow 
are erased” (EFBWW 2008b: 3). ETUC also harshly criticized the rulings, stating that the Laval 
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ruling “amounts to a license for social dumping, and key features of national industrial relations 
systems face being superseded by the free movement provisions.” (ETUC 2013a). 
A further ruling in the construction sector, the Rüffert case, concerned the obligation of firms to 
comply with nationally negotiated standards when applying for public tenders. The ECJ ruled 
that requirements to pay collectively agreed-upon wages would discriminate against foreign 
firms, which could compete by providing services at a lower cost (via lower wages). After the 
long fight for a Posted Workers Directive, this ruling enraged the EFBWW: “It is evident from the 
Laval and Rüffert Cases that the ECJ has embarked on an interpretation of the Posting of Workers 
Directive to the sole benefit of the employers’ freedom to provide services. […] It should […] be 
clear to everyone involved that these two judgments will have serious implications in all Member 
States, and in particular for the construction sector” (EFBWW 2008d: 5). The Luxembourg case 
further strengthened the ECJ’s interpretation by condemning Luxembourg for transposing the 
Posting of Workers Directive into national law in a way that requires firms to comply with 
Luxembourg regulations for posted workers in Luxembourg.  
Table 28: ECJ Rulings – The “Laval Quartet” 
Case Ruling Issue 
Viking 2008 The right to collective action must be guaranteed, but only 
if it does not interfere disproportionally with the employer’s 
freedom to provide service 
 
Host country principle of posted worker 
directive vs. freedom of service 
Laval 2008 Right of firms to freedom of movement takes precedence 
over the right of unions to initiate a strike 
 
Host country principle of posted work 
directive vs. freedom of service 
Rüffert 2008 Requirements in public tenders to pay collectively agreed-
upon wages would discriminate against foreign firms that 
could compete by providing services at a lower cost  
Working conditions in public 
procurement vs. freedom of service 
Luxembourg 
2008 
Condemned Luxembourg for transposing the Posting of 
Workers Directive into national law in a way that requires 
firms to comply with Luxembourg regulations for posted 
workers in Luxembourg 
Host country principle of posted work 
directive vs. freedom of service 
 
For the EFBWW, the question now was how to react to these rulings. As a trade unionist from an 
affiliate recounted, these rulings “spurred up European cooperation” (EFBWW Affiliate5 2012). 
For one EFBWW representative, the rulings were the key to understanding the importance of 
the EFBWW’s lobbying work: “in parts at least of the federation understood the European 
dimension of what they [the EFBWW administration] were doing” (EFBWW Rep8 2011). The 
“Laval quartet,” as the rulings are also called, deepened the divide between supporters of 
European market integration and EU skeptics, as described by former EU Commissioner Mario 
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Monti: “Between 2007 and 2008 the European Court of Justice decisions […] revived an old split 
that had never been healed: the divide between advocates of greater market integration and 
those who feel that the call for economic freedoms and for breaking up regulatory barriers is code 
for dismantling social rights protected at national level” (Monti 2010: 68). For the EFBWW, its 
raison d’être – maintaining the national autonomy of its members – was again at play. Thus, the 
EFBWW used a twofold lobbying strategy: first, the EFBWW tried to insert its sectoral positions 
into ETUC’s strategy by forging an alliance with the transport workers’ and agricultural workers’ 
federations, which were equally affected by labor mobility (EFBWW 2013b, 2013c; EFBWW & 
EFFAT 2012; Seeliger and Wagner 2016); and second, the EFBWW lobbied the EU institutions 
independently, but at the same time continued its pragmatic approach to bipartite dialogue and 
drafted joint opinions with the employer federation in order to receive stronger recognition 
within the Commission on cross-national issues (EFBBW & FIEC 2011, 2012). 
For the EFBWW, the basic route was clear: the rulings increased the incentive to push for hard 
law and, in effect, a renewed revision of the Posted Workers Directive: “This calls for a serious 
reassessment from the part of EFBWW, including strategies to achieve in-depth modifications in 
the current state of Community law” (EFBWW 2008c: 6). Sam Hägglund, General Secretary of the 
EFBWW, was clearly in favor of amending the Posting Directive in order to prevent 
interpretations such as Laval and enhance the abilities of member states to enforce equal 
treatment (EFBWW 2009b). For the EFBWW, it was central to strengthen the ability of the EU 
members to enforce the posting regulations nationally (EFBWW 2013c; EFBWW & EFFAT 2012). 
However, the EFBWW did not want to install a new enforcement directive for the Posted 
Workers Directive at any cost and opposed compromises that would potentially weaken the old 
regulations. 
With this position, the cooperation between the EFBWW and ETUC on a revision of the Posting 
of Workers Directive (“Enforcement Directive”) was conflictual, as Seeliger and Wagner have 
described in a study of this internal decision-making process. ETUC seemed to be willing to 
accept smaller improvements and engage in further dialogue even if the results were not hard-
law regulations, whereas the sectoral federations EFFAT (agriculture), ETF (transport), and the 
EFBWW did not want “an agreement at all costs” as one trade unionist was cited (Seeliger and 
Wagner 2016: 14). Since the EFBWW had very similar issues to take into consideration as the 
transport and agricultural sectors, the three federations rallied their forces within ETUC and tried 
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to influence the labor association’s position jointly (EFBWW 2013b; EFBWW & EFFAT 2012). The 
EFBWW positioned itself against voluntary agreements: “In the light of the new political 
circumstances, the ETUC and its affiliates should be prepared to use those arguments, in order to 
push their agenda for a social dimension of Europe. The goal should be to achieve hard-law 
amendments, instead of opting for soft-law declarations and non-binding social protocols” 
(EFBWW 2008c: 6). Two years before, the EFBWW had already opted out of the cross-sectoral 
discussions on an agreement on crystalline silica dust, arguing that only legislation could ensure 
harmonized regulation (Pochet 2009: 53). One EFBWW representative has been quoted as 
saying, “You pour a lot of water into your wine, but there is an agreement. Will it be beneficial? 
Well, that’s another issue” (Seeliger and Wagner 2016: 16). As a result, the EFBWW did not agree 
on a compromise and labeled the resulting directive “[a] disappointing agreement with low 
ambitions” (EFBWW 2013c). 
The rulings not only led to frictions within the trade union movement regarding how to react 
adequately, but also in the previously rather pragmatic relationship with FIEC. An EFBWW 
representative described in greater detail how these rulings altered the way the organization 
cooperated with the employers: “Well, I found that the agreements we made in some sense with 
the European building employers became a bit obsolete; the ones related to posting, because the 
posting situation changed and the situation regarding fundamental rights changed dramatically 
with the four judgments. And that meant that all of the organization had to refocus on these 
judgments and restoring the rights and it meant also that – well, regarding posting, especially 
social dialogue was refocused and they had to work very much on these matters by ourselves 
towards the European institutions, because the employers were having a different opinion on 
this” (EFBWW Rep8 2011). However, despite these reservations, the EFBWW and FIEC continued 
their talks until another event led the construction sector to focus on common issues.  
CRISIS 
In 2008, the financial crisis overshadowed the discussion about how to enforce the Posting of 
Workers Directive. The crisis hit the construction sector particularly hard since the economic 
downturn added to the tough competition from posted work. During the crisis, the vulnerability 
of the sector became particularly apparent, and many workers lost their jobs. The sector’s 
character as forerunner of the general economy was apparent and competition increased, 
because about 2 million jobs in construction were lost in the EU from 2009 to 2013 (European 
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Commission 2013). In 2009, 17% of all workers employed in the sector were temporary 
employees and 22.3% were self-employed; both numbers exceed the average of other sectors 
(IDEA Consult and ECORYS Netherlands 2011: 165ff). The EFBWW described the situation in the 
sector as “fiercely competitive,” which was apparent in the volatile nature of the sector with 
many bankruptcies (EFBWW 2011b). The EFBWW followed a multilevel strategy: first, it 
promoted national agreements in an attempt to show how strong industrial relations with 
“paritarian social funds, joint lobbying and flexible collective agreements [could be] used as 
levers” for mitigating the effects of the crisis (European Commission 2014b: 27). Second, both 
FIEC and the EFBWW put their differences aside and agreed to use the central position of the 
construction sector in the general economy to lobby for further investments in sustainable 
infrastructures (Europäische Kommission 2009: 5). One EFBWW representative recalled, “we 
cooperated very well. Often we didn’t have the same opinion of course. But we said, ‘We’ll 
concentrate on the issues we can agree on and we’ll work on these and find common positions. 
And that always worked well“ (EFBWW Rep2 2011). FIEC and the EFBWW also initiated several 
projects to alleviate the crisis’ impacts on the construction sector, such as a joint publication on 
the integration of young people into the workplace (European Commission 2015b: 103).  
The crisis, together with the challenges from the ECJ cases and enlargement, thus set into motion 
an increased exchange among the social partners in the construction sector, as the outcomes of 
the Social Dialogue indicate: from 2007 to 2015, the construction Social Dialogue developed into 
one of the top four active sectors, adopting 17 joint opinions (Degryse 2015: 39). Thus, instead 
of bringing the social partners apart as one might have expected after the differences on the 
posting directive, the social partners in construction became more active than ever.  
Unlike in previous years when broader economic issues were often left to ETUC (EFBWW 
Affiliate1 2010), the Social Dialogue outcomes also discussed general economic policies on 
“Emerging from the Crisis” and their consequences for the construction sector (EFBWW and FIEC 
2009, 2010). As an analysis of the addressees of the outcomes demonstrates, the sectoral 
dialogue was increasingly used as a lobbying platform in the aftermath of the crisis and ECJ cases 
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Figure 5: European Social Dialogue in Construction: Addressees of Outcomes (1992–2014) 
(ETUI and Observatoire Social Européen 2010; European Commission 2016) | For a full list of Outcomes see Appendix 8.5 
 
The effort to find common standpoints is also apparent in the type of outcome generated in the 
Social Dialogue, which has resulted in a – in comparison to other sectors – steady pattern of joint 
opinions over the years (Degryse 2015; Pochet et al. 2009). By focusing on this type of non-
binding agreement, the EFBWW was also able to rally its members more easily than by 
attempting to establish binding agreements. Binding results would be “agreements” (which 
could be transposed into European law) or “process-oriented texts” such as codes of conduct, 
none of which have been concluded in the construction Social Dialogue (European Commission 
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Figure 6: European Social Dialogue in Construction: Types of Outcomes (1992–2014) 
(European Commission 2016) | For a full list of Outcomes see Appendix 8.5 
 
Table 29: European Social Dialogue: Types of Outcomes 
(Degryse 2015: 39; European Commission 2010b: 9) 
Category Type of Outcome  Description 
Agreements Agreement Binding standards, follow-up, monitoring 
 Based on Art. 155 of the Lisbon Treaty, can 
be transposed into a directive 
Process-
oriented texts 
Framework of action, code of 
conduct, policy orientation 
Non-binding standards, follow-up, monitoring 
Joint opinions Joint opinion, declaration, tool Influencing policies, providing information 
 
Meeting Meeting Conference, workshop, roundtable 
 
 
According to Laux, a leading figure of the Social Dialogue for the EFBWW, the European agenda 
was to conclude voluntary agreements: “From the outset, both sides in the construction social 
dialogue have never seen themselves as substitute bargaining parties at the European level, i.e. 
the aim was rather to hold discussions and consultations rather than adopt binding agreements” 
(Laux 2006: 14). In addition, FIEC only has issue-specific mandates for negotiations and cannot 
take up dialogue without consulting its members (Eurofound 2015: 60). With the non-binding 
approach, the EFBWW emphasized its position toward its affiliates:  
first, the non-binding approach enables the EFBWW to lead negotiations and issue positions 
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difficult to justify toward its affiliates. What is more, Ernst-Ludwig Laux has also pointed out that 
binding results could hardly be implemented since effective national social partners in some 
countries do not even exist (Laux 2006: 14). The joint opinions proved to be quite forceful 
instruments for defending the sectors interests, as the Posting Directive and the sector’s 
successes in the Service Directive prove (European Commission 2010b: 9). They were thus able 
to exert considerable influence toward the Commission and within their cross-sectoral 
federations ETUC and Businesseurope. This strong standpoint both vis-à-vis the Commission and 
ETUC in turn guaranteed the EFBWW the recognition of its members as a strong European 
negotiator. 
Second, for the EFBWW, this approach is the guarantee for the national affiliates that their 
national autonomy is safeguarded and their employment standards will not be pitted against 
each other. This voluntary approach also made it easier for the affiliates to concede negotiation 
mandates to the EFBWW. Former Secretary General Cremers stated, “From the very beginning 
collective bargaining on primary working conditions or working time was not envisaged, but also 
items linked to information/consultation and European works councils never figured on [the 
social partner’s] agenda” (Cremers 2006b: 7).  
Third, the EFBWW holds to a position of hard law before soft law and has shown to follow 
through on this position. If the social partners would have concluded binding agreements 
without legislative backing, the EFBWW’s role as a hard law negotiator might have been 
endangered. By maintaining a “lobbying” Social Dialogue instead, the EFBWW reaffirmed its 
position as a safeguard of national social models.  
In 2011 and 2012, the EFBWW also found common ground with FIEC on a new Enforcement 
Directive and again used the Social Dialogue as a lobbying instrument for the sector to bring forth 
opinions on working conditions and the free movement of trade and labor (EFBBW & FIEC 2011, 
2012). FIEC representative Campogrande also highlighted the similarities with regard to posted 
work: “Within FIEC we have […] a similar approach as within the EFBWW as regards the fight 
against any form of unfair and illegal practice” (European Commission 2014b: 26). A negotiation 
partner from the EFBWW explained how the negotiation process worked: “We made a statement 
[…] to building employers related to the enforcement proposals on the posting. And then we took 
out the things that were not that controversial, like ID cards and the implementation of rules. [… 
w]e deleted everything that was too controversial to deal with” (EFBWW Rep8 2011). Another 
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EFBWW representative emphasized the consensual approach: “Discussions are only possible if 
we manage to put aside ‘ideological differences’” (European Commission 2014b: 26). Both FIEC 
and the EFBWW concentrated on sectoral issues that were deemed beneficial for both sides 
(Cremers 2006b: 3). One trade unionist from an affiliate described this approach, saying, “We 
need to work together with the employers. It is easier to find some kind of consensus because the 
issues are so specific to the sector” (EFBWW Affiliate3 2012). The FIEC representative 
Campogrande also mentioned the “pragmatic” approach: “A major and strong common 
denominator between the EFBWW and FIEC is that both of us are really engaged in establishing 
a long-term sustainable construction industry, where the concerns of the workers and contractors 
are equally important” (European Commission 2014b: 26). However, this consensual-pragmatic 
approach also means that other issues are left aside, as one affiliate described: “Sometimes it is 
more difficult. We have discussions on self-employment and bogus-self-employment. That is very 
difficult to get it on the table in Europe. The employer federations are not really interested to talk 
about that” (Leeuw 2012).  
COMMISSION FUNDING AND JOINT PROJECTS WITH FIEC 
The pragmatic approach is also apparent in the way in which the EFBWW and FIEC jointly address 
the resources provided to them by the Commission. As an analysis of the 70 Commission-funded 
projects with EFBWW participation from 1999 to 2013 reveals, over time, joint projects with the 
employer federation FIEC have taken up an important part of project work conducted by the 
EFBWW (EFBWW 2008a; EFBWW Rep8 2011; European Commission 2014b; Laux 2006). 
Financed by the Commission’s Directorate General Employment, the social partners have 
embarked upon 26 joint projects from 1999 to 2014, with a growing focus on joint projects (see 
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Figure 7: Commission-Funded EFBWW Projects: Joint Projects with Employers (FIEC/CEI Bois, 1999–2014) 
(DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 2016; European Commission 2015a) 
For a full list of Commission funded projects see Appendix 8.4 
 
This figure presents the number of projects the EFBWW has been active in together with either 
FIEC or CEI Bois. The figure shows the projects for both the construction and woodworking 
sectors, since Commission funding is granted to the organization EFBWW, not to individual 
sectors within the federation. Twelve of the analyzed commitments directly funded the 
European Social Dialogue or projects related to the Social Dialogue in the member states. Other 
projects funded by the Social Dialogue budget are mostly products such as booklets, comparative 
reports, and information devices (EFBWW Rep8 2011). This increase is supported by incentive 
structures in the Commission, as an EFBWW representative explained: “If we do something 
together with the employers we will get funded normally” (EFBWW Rep8 2011). Both 
organizations have used their combined expertise to provide services to their members by, for 
example, establishing information platforms. Since FIEC is partly financed by European 
Commission funding, the employer federation also has an interest in applying for joint projects 
(EFBWW Rep4 2012a). The latter two of the EFBWW’s recent major information projects aiming 
at individual workers – the website on posted work and the website on youth unemployment – 
have been conducted jointly with the employer organization FIEC (EFBWW and FIEC 2014, 2015). 
Another project on asbestos information modules can be used as the basis for lobbying work 
with the Commission and parliament or for services in the member states (EFBWW Rep4 2012a; 
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application is not possible. In practice, this means making compromises. For example, the 
EFBWW wanted to establish minimum standards for qualifications. However, FIEC was not 
willing to create any form of binding standards and therefore the project was renamed 
“information modules” (EFBWW Rep4 2012a). 
However, this close collaboration was not welcomed by all EFBWW members equally, as an 
EFBWW representative recounted: “The establishment of working groups in the Social Dialogue 
directly resulted in more projects. And these more practical things are seen more critical” 
(EFBWW Rep4 2012a). Another observer recalled, “We recently had our annual meeting, where 
[EFBWW representative X] presented the common position on the economic crisis. And in the end 
the position is always we need economic growth. And there is nothing on issues such as wage 
inequality. And then I said this to [X] and [X] says: ‘Yes, but these are controversial issues’ we 
won’t reach an agreement on these issues [with FIEC].’ And that was very defensive. And that is 
the standard with all the Joint Opinions. And these are almost employer positions. Maybe that is 
a bit polemic, but I find this incredibly defensive. We have been pushed into the defensive in the 
Social Dialogue” (CLR Member2 2011). Additionally, this interview partner expressed his 
frustration that this joint approach is an essential part of the Social Dialogue: “This is inherent in 
the Social Dialogue. As a fixed institution financed by the Commission, this is incremental to the 
Social Dialogue. I can’t remember any topic where a controversial issue was discussed” (CLR 
Member2 2011). This observation was shared by an EFBWW staff member who emphasized the 
Commission’s role in fostering a consensual Social Dialogue: “[The] Commission wants a 
‘harmless’ and non-critical ESD” (Buelen 2014: 5). This perception is also shared by other sectors. 
For example, Turnbull has described how the ITF “feared” the ETF’s cooperation with employers 
in the Social Dialogue regarding Commission legislation because “the technocratic bias of 
conventional union activities would shift the focus […] from questions of principle […] to detail ” 
(Turnbull 2006: 313). 
EWC CHANGES 
Apart from the ECJ rulings concerning the free movement of workers, improving company 
representation in Europe was a central issue. For ETUC, which led the negotiations concerning a 
European Company Statute, it was clear that the rules needed to be stricter than those laid out 
for EWCs (Degryse 2013: 156). In 2004, the European Company (SE) came into force, establishing 
an SE representation (European Council 2001). The SE regulations foresaw transnational labor 
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participation at the board level and require the firm to negotiate some form of worker 
participation rights in order to be registered. Just as with EWCs, the details of the actual 
consultation rights are limited; only the negotiation process is obligatory. However, the 
assessment of co-determination on the SE’s supervisory boards is much more critical than in 
EWCs (Böckler-Stiftung 2009; Müller and Girndt 2009). In the construction sector, STRABAG SE 
was the first SE created in 2006. The transformation of the previous EWC into a “worker 
representation body” was coordinated by the EFBWW and financed by the European 
Commission with €58,000 (EFBWW 2008g; European Commission 2015a).  
In 2009, the old EWC directive’s voluntary approach was replaced by a new directive 
guaranteeing EWCs more far-reaching rights than before. According to ETUC, this directive was 
the direct result of their lobbying efforts (ETUC 2008a, 2008b). The new directive includes a 
definition of the terms “information and consultation,” clarifies the transnational tasks of EWCs, 
and facilitates training and the provision of resources (such as facilities) (ETUI 2014). Most 
importantly, however, the directive improves the role of the European federations, since it 
contains the obligation to inform the European social partners of negotiations (ETUI 2014). For 
the EFBWW, the new directive “offers new opportunities” for coordination among worker 
representatives regarding information and consultation rights (EFBWW 2012a: 22), although at 
the time of writing of this dissertation it remained unclear how these new information and 
consultation rights were transferred into actual agreements. 
In summary, the logic of influence during the Noughties was marked by challenges and a sense 
of urgency: an acceleration of European legislation and jurisdiction in labor market issues 
combined with the accession of the new member states and the financial crisis tested the 
strength of the construction sector. The Service Directive and the Laval quartet posed significant 
threats to the achievements of national social models and national collective bargaining 
agreements. These shifts provided an increased incentive to develop joint responses within the 
labor movement, which resulted in discussions of a new Enforcement Directive for the Posted 
Workers Directive. The financial crisis and its impacts on the construction sector forged a bond 
between labor and employer federations, which used the Social Dialogue to make joint positions 
on the crisis heard. As one trade unionist put it, “If you really want to influence something, you 
need to do that with the employers” (EFBWW Affiliate3 2012). 
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Table 30: Influences Shaping the Organizational Mode of the EFBWW 
 European Industrial Relations Employer Federation Organizational Mode of 
European Construction 
Sector Unions 
Role of Transnational 
Organization 
Noughties European industrial relations with financial 
support for company regulation (EWCs), 
Social Dialogue, and information and 
training measures 




These rulings “spurred up European 
cooperation” (EFBWW Affiliate5 2012).  
“in parts at least of the federation 
understood the European dimension of 
what they [the EFBWW administration] 
were doing.” (EFBWW Rep8 2011) 
Enforcement Directive 
Financial crisis and enlargement 
Increasing willingness to 
use Social Dialogue as 
information platform 
and commitment to joint 
lobbying (e.g., in matters 












steering functions (3–4) 
 
 
5.4.3 MEMBERSHIP: SEARCHING FOR ALTERNATIVES 
GROWING NUMBER OF AFFILIATES AND DIVERSITY 
Whereas the EFBWW’s influence logic was determined by the intense discussions on combining 
European integration and social protection, the EFBWW’s membership also changed significantly 
(Figure 8: Number of Affiliates (Countries and Unions) in the EFBWW (1958–2015)). After the 
EFBWW’s membership almost doubled in the early 1990s, there followed a decade of relative 
stability in terms of the number of affiliates. This lasted until 2004, when the EU enlargement 
wave increased the membership of the EFBWW from 48 affiliates to 77 national member unions 
from 34 countries all over the European continent (EFBWW 2015d).  
With the continuously rising membership, the heterogeneity of interests increased. While the 
first members comprised a closely connected hub in the middle of Europe, the present-day 
EFBWW spans from Portugal in the West to Turkey in the East. Of the current EFBWW members, 
all 27 EU member states are represented, and 15 affiliates are from countries outside of the EU 
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Figure 8: Number of Affiliates (Countries and Unions) in the EFBWW (1958–2015) 
(EFBWW 2008a, 2012b, 2012c, 2014b, 2015d) | For a full list of affiliates  see Appendix 8.2 
 
One affiliate described how the accession of the new members changed decision-making within 
the federation:“It is a little more difficult now; so many countries are member of the federation. 
[…] For example for the EWC work it should be logical that all the countries involved are there, 
but not all of the countries are represented” (EFBWW Affiliate7 2012). The EFBWW has described 
the consequences as follows: “In many cases, seats allocated to certain countries in the EWCs 
are still not taken up by national representatives, for example those in the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, Switzerland, the UK and the Netherlands. Furthermore, the EWCs can only 
operate effectively if the representatives of a country in the respective EWC are able to have 
discussions at the national level with the other representatives of the same company” (EFBWW 
2012a: 23). A survey among EWCs revealed that a majority of EWC representatives are heavily 
reliant on support from national unions, resulting in massively uneven distribution of resources 
among the EWC representatives (Waddington 2011: 527). An EFBWW representative described 
this effect, saying, “Travel costs are reimbursed by the affiliates; we pay for rooms and 
translation. Affiliates which don’t have much money are simply not there” (EFBWW Rep4 2012a). 
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The coordination of this diversity has implications for the EFBWW’s work: “What used to work 
as a relatively small trade union network of colleagues which helped out once a year to a 
federation, which has collected I don’t know how many associations from many countries. That 
is a huge difference” (EFBWW Rep1 2011). 
With the integration of the new member states into the EFBWW, the diversity of resources 
among the membership increased and added to the financial difficulties (EFBWW Rep2 2011; 
EFBWW Rep4 2012a). While some unions such as the German IG Metall or the UK’s merged 
union UNITE have millions of members and large resources in terms of personnel and finances 
at their disposal, other unions hardly have a secretariat to participate in EFBWW activities. 
Interviewees recount that it is sometimes even difficult to receive an answer from some affiliates 
because their personnel resources are so low (EFBWW Rep4 2012a). While some unions are so 
small that they have zero capacity for personnel devoted to European issues, other unions have 
a department dedicated to EU issues including several English-speaking staff members (EFBWW 
Affiliate2 2012; EFBWW Affiliate4 2012; EFBWW Affiliate5 2012). 
With EU enlargement, the EFBWW had to deal with a much more deregulated and fragmented 
situation of the national partners in the construction industry: the former EFBWW Secretary 
General Jan Cremers even called the situation in the new member states “the law of the jungle” 
(Cremers 2006b: 8). High levels of unemployment in the new member states and the limited 
organizational means of the national trade unions resulted in a weak position of the sectoral 
federations and a declining level of company agreements (Clarke et al. 2003). By supporting the 
new affiliates, the federation tried to promote capacity building, but this support did not always 
fall on fertile ground (Clarke et al. 2003; EFBWW Affiliate2 2012; EFBWW Affiliate3 2012; Laux 
2008a). “It is not easy,” one affiliate sighed in an interview when discussing seminars to support 
Eastern European affiliates (EFBWW Affiliate2 2012). Another interview partner remarked, 
“There are only costs at the moment; there are no rewards” (Lokhorst 2012). This perception, 
particularly regarding the Polish affiliate, was apparent in another interview as well: “We have 
tried. We have tried to get involved with the Polish, but we haven’t really succeeded. We have a 
cooperation pilot project with the Latvian organization. […] We have contacts in Poland to 
disseminate information, but we haven’t been very successful in establishing a cooperation” 
(EFBWW Affiliate4 2012). Another affiliate enhances this impression with another observation: 
“In some countries they don’t even want to improve the situation, for example in Poland. They 
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don’t have the culture of doing union work. And you can’t impose that on other countries. It has 
to do with the social culture and the history. Even if you want to help, if you don’t have a union 
structure, it is very difficult to do anything together” (EFBWW Affiliate3 2012). This indicates that 
the political differences could not easily be swept aside, as Cremers remarked: “The duplication 
of trade unions, sometimes also employers’ organizations, by a Western sponsored opposition to 
the communist successor federations, has not contributed to a more effective representation of 
the social partners. Their political preoccupations tend to divert energies away from the economic 
representation of membership” (Cremers 2006b: 8). 
The institutional background of strong national social partnership, which enables a European 
representation, has not always evolved in the new member states. One EFBWW representative 
described this, betraying a bit of frustration: “One pillar is the strength of trade unions – but if 
the people aren’t interested in unions such as in Poland, then these kind of structures are difficult 
to build up” (EFBWW Rep4 2012a). This has also made decision-making after enlargement more 
difficult, as one affiliate described: “Sometimes it is very difficult to get the Eastern European 
countries on board. They participated quite a lot [in the beginning] but nowadays they are not 
very many at the meetings. They have quite a difficult position inside their countries, the political 
situation is difficult, but it is a pity” (Leeuw 2012). However, it is not only differences between 
the old and new member states that make decision-making more difficult; it is also achievements 
in collective bargaining among the Western member states or the underlying difference between 
collective wage agreements and minimum wage agreements between the Northern and 
Southern models (Laux 2006). Furthermore, with more affiliates, cultural and language 
differences become more pronounced, as one affiliate described: “One of the biggest issues is 
cultural issues. For example, French people speak a lot; it would be rude not to speak a lot. But in 
Finland, they don’t say much. But when we are absolutely opposed, we say ‘NO.’ Then the 
Southern countries don’t know that we are interested in something because we express is 
differently. And the leadership of many unions don’t speak very many languages. […] And I have 
wondered how European work works at all” (EFBWW Affiliate3 2012). 
MERGERS 
At the same time as the EFBWW’s number of affiliates grew – and with it the diversity of national 
affiliates, national collective bargaining models and cultural variety – many affiliates faced a 
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phase of turmoil and intense internal restructuring. Between 1993 and 2008, 18 affiliates of the 
EFBWW merged with other affiliates or previously non-affiliated unions.  
 
Figure 9: Mergers Among EFBWW Member Unions (1958-2014) 
(EFBWW 2008a: and own data) | For a full list of all mergers see Appendix 8.2 
 
The figure above illustrates the increase in mergers since the mid-1990s among the EFBWW 
affiliates, including those cases in which a smaller union was absorbed by a larger affiliate. The 
reasons for these mergers are manifold. In some cases, dwindling industrial branches with 
declining membership rates weakened smaller unions to such an extent that they merged with 
a larger union (Waddington 2006b: 639). Such an example is the Gewerkschaft Holz und 
Kunststoff (Union for Wood and Synthetics), whose members were adopted into Germany’s 
largest union, IG Metall (IG Metall n.a.). Other reasons can include strategic decisions to combine 
into one large and powerful union, as was the idea behind the new British/Irish union UNITE 
(UNITE 2007). For the newly founded national federations, this often means that the new 
sectoral structures follow a different logic than those of the European federations. The merger 
wave of the 1990s and 2000s means that national industry federations are often double or triple 
members in European federations. For example, the Belgian ACV Bouw, Energie en Industri and 
the German IG Metall are members of both the EFBWW and IndustriALL. The IG BAU has been a 
double member of the textile federation EFFAT and the EFBWW since the merger of the German 
trade unions in the agricultural and construction sectors. UNITE is a member of basically all 
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construction sector today have broader membership domains than construction and wood, 
covering other sectors with similar interests or identities (Eurofound 2015: 18). Thus, the diverse 
background of the affiliates makes deepened transnational cooperation even more difficult 
(Ebbinghaus 2002: 448). In addition, the broadening of the sectoral domains means that where 
there is more than one national union related to the sector, competition for members is more 
likely (Eurofound 2015: 24).  
MEMBERSHIP DECLINE AND AFFILIATION FEES 
The merger rate is closely associated with the rate of membership growth among the affiliates 
(Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]: 27). All over Europe, unions have been facing declining 
membership rates and the construction sector has been no exception to this rule. Decreasing 
rates of standard employment relationships, a high rate of labor volatility in the sector, 
increasing numbers of migrant workers without trade union affiliations, and a lack of attempts 
to unionize this changing workforce are responsible for the declining rates of membership in the 
sector (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1998; Frege and Kelly 2003; Visser 2007a). The decline in union 
density began in the 1980s and 1990s when changing employment structures and 
unemployment were on the rise (Waddington et al. 1997: 466). In 1979, with only 19 affiliates 
from nine member countries, the EFBWW represented “more than two million workers” (more 
detailed data is not available) (European Communities (DG X Information) 1979: 12). In 1995, the 
EFBWW spoke for 2.65 million workers from 51 affiliates (EFBWW 2008a: 13; Platzer and Müller 
2009: 265). The number of members decreased to 2.5 million in 2000 and about 2 million 
workers today, though the number of affiliates has increased to 77  (EFBWW 2015a; Zühlke-
Robinet 2000).  
The situation, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, is dramatic: “The decrease in capacity, 
loss of members and even disappearance of trade union organizations […] is a threat to the entire 
European building and wood trade union movement” (EFBWW 2012a: 26). One affiliate stated, 
“The problem is that the foundations of the new member unions, the structure is so bad, they 
only have a leader and no members, somebody travelling around Europe. […] the Estonian 
construction union only has about 25 members” (EFBWW Affiliate3 2012). Although the EFBWW 
is making efforts to integrate the new affiliates from the new member states, the inequality is 
difficult to balance: “The trade unions there are weak don’t have many members, don’t have a 
lot of own funds, are very dependent, and so on. That has improved bit by bit. But that is still 
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difficult. We still have special affiliation fees, because their own power is so little“ (EFBWW Rep2 
2011). The loss of members is particularly important since the EFBWW’s finances are based on 
the number of individual members per affiliate. 
 
Figure 10: Number of Represented Workers (Millions) in the EFBWW and Affiliation Fees (Millions) 
(Degryse 2013; EFBWW 2008a: 13, 2015a, 2016b; Platzer and Müller 2009: 265; Zühlke-Robinet 2000: 160) 
For a full list of all affiliates see Appendix 8.2 
 
GREEN: Number of affiliates 
PINK: Affiliation fees 
 
Declining membership among the affiliates means that the EFBWW has to service more affiliates, 
whereas the resources to provide services are diminishing. The Central and Eastern European 
countries have started out by paying 10% of the regular fee and this percentage has been rising 
since 2003 (Platzer and Müller 2009: 564). In the EFBWW, the rising need for additional financing 
has been met by increasing affiliation fees, but only in very small steps which have in sum only 
led to small increases during the Nineties and Noughties, in particular when considering the 
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explained, “People don’t want to raise the fees. It is not that anyone would leave the federation, 
but the EU work, we are doing it ourselves as well” (EFBWW Affiliate3 2012). Another affiliate 
emphasized the importance of the Nordic Federation: “We already have a Nordic Federation, so 
paying more to the European Federation is difficult” (Johannson 2012). For another affiliate, 
raising affiliation payments is also an indication of general support for Europe, and since this is 
viewed critically in his country, raising payments to a European federation might be problematic: 
“We don’t have more capacity. It is also a political choice of course. But we are a very Europe-
friendly trade union. But the whole country is pretty skeptical towards Europe, so it might be a 
result of that” (Leeuw 2012). 
Exact data is only available for the years 2011 to 2015 and single information for some years 
since 2000, but the general trend of increasing responsibilities and diminishing resources was 
also stressed by the interview partners (EFBWW Rep4 2012a; Johannson 2012; Lokhorst 2012). 
One interview partner summarized the dilemma by saying, “Not all countries have the same 
opinion on raising membership fees. Unions have problems for themselves. A lot of people are 
self-employed; there are more foreign workers. It is more difficult to pay more contributions. But 
there is no discussion on how important that is, but you have to be in the situation to pay” 
(Lokhorst 2012). Another affiliate described the difficulties his union is facing and why it is so 
difficult to argue for enhancing payments to the EFBWW: “We must reduce incomes in our own 
country; that is why you can imagine that it is the same in the European federation” (Johannson 
2012). The IG BAU, for example, has faced several restructuring processes, has reduced the 
number of employees and their wages, and has opposed rising affiliation payments (EFBWW 
Affiliate1 2010; EFBWW Rep4 2012a). Another affiliate stated, “It is a rather difficult problem for 
the unions. The unions have lost members in the last ten years and it is not so easy to say ‘you 
should pay more’” (EFBWW Affiliate5 2012). An EFBWW representative asked, “[Under these 
circumstances], how can one explain that expenses for Europe are rising?” (EFBWW Rep4 2012a). 
INTEGRATING MIGRANT WORKERS AND DISCUSSING ALTERNATIVES: A EUROPEAN TRADE UNION?  
Witnessing this dramatic decline in membership and the rise of migrant work through EU 
enlargement, the affiliates had different ways of approaching the problem, mostly on a national 
level. Faced with problems related to posted work, the Continental and Nordic unions in 
particular started national programs (EFBWW Affiliate3 2012). The EFBWW, as one interviewee 
explained, was less involved: “I mean that was a kind of thing between the strong unions that 
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had some resources. Let´s say German union, Swedish unions, and some others” (EFBWW Rep8 
2011). Another affiliate representative also pointed to the limited ability of the EFBWW to 
coordinate a common approach regarding migrant work: “But it has been difficult […] because 
we didn’t all agree. And then the Federation couldn’t do anything at all” (EFBWW Affiliate3 2012). 
Some affiliates such as Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, and Norway have established 
advisory services for migrant workers and paperless workers (Johannson 2012; Pedrina 2008: 
16). The Swedish unions cooperate closely with NGOs such as an association for paperless 
workers (EFBWW 2013a: 28). The Swiss trade union UNIA has been successful with a new 
organizing strategy based on the idea of the trade union as a multilingual and multicultural 
movement working through foreign language activist groups and organizing language courses or 
support for “sans papiers” (Burger 2008: 22f). Other unions such as those in Belgium, Denmark, 
and the Netherlands have supported posted and migrant workers with special information 
projects for these groups (Schiavi 2008: 33). Some unions, such as the Finnish Rakennusliitto or 
the German IG BAU have established offices in Tallin or Warsaw to inform migrants about 
working conditions in the host countries (EMWU 2016; Rakennusliitto 2018).  
The merger wave also led to increased discussions within the EFBWW, as one representative 
recalled: “I remember […] that certain colleagues said ‘yes, instead of continuing to merge in 
Germany, it wouldn’t be a bad idea if the IG BAU merged with the Dutch construction union’ or 
… you know? That were the thoughts at the time. […] Because frontiers don’t play a role anymore 
for larger construction firms. And there really were debates: yes, we should cooperate more 
closely with our colleagues close to the border” (EFBWW Rep1 2011). However, none of these 
plans were realized in the construction sector. A number of Interregional Trade Union Councils 
(IRTUCs) for information exchange have been founded on the cross-sectoral level, but without 
the aim of becoming a “transnational union” (ETUC 2013b). 
Another discussion concerns the cross-national acceptance of union memberships (Cremers 
2010). Although the EFBWW had drafted a recommendation in the mid-1990s, the members had 
not developed a binding agreement on accepting memberships from other EFBWW affiliates. 
Instead, mutual agreements for migrant workers have been established, but this mostly includes 
information services (EFBWW 2013a; Lokhorst 2012). Early examples include the German-
Portuguese agreement between SETACOPP and IG BAU from 1996 and a German-Italian 
agreement from 1998 (Schulten 1998). Other unions also concluded bilateral or trilateral 
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arrangements, such as the Norwegian and Latvian construction unions, and the Austrian, 
Belgian, Dutch, Polish, and Swiss associations with the very active German construction union 
(Delbar and Walthéry 2000; EFBWW 2013a: 21; Erne 2008: 92). A further example including an 
Eastern European member is the bilateral agreement between Austrian and Hungarian unions 
(IFBWW 2004: 34; Leeuw 2012). For example, for further services, a Polish worker working in 
France would have to join a French union. Other unions, such as the Belgian and Dutch unions, 
agreed on “mutual recognition,” whereby posted workers can rely on the collective agreement 
of their own union as long as it is more favorable (Cremers 2010). Among the members, there 
have also been discussions about a European trade union passport (EFBWW Affiliate4 2012; 
Leeuw 2012). For example, such a joint passport could be useful for organizing workers on large 
construction sites such as in Eeemshaven or at the European Central Bank in Frankfurt (Leeuw 
2012). However, even though the EFBWW officials encouraged such an exchange of membership 
services and in 2013 committed itself to discussing a “multilateral model agreement,” such 
agreements are not standard procedure (EFBWW 2013a: 34). In a study on barriers to 
transnational unionism in the construction sector, Greer et al. conclude, “[The EFBWW] members 
are reluctant even to accept transnationally portable union membership, much less shift one of 
their core functions – the organization and representation of individual workers – to a 
transnational body” (Greer et al. 2013: 10). However, it is not only reluctance that hinders closer 
cooperation. In an EFBWW conference on the issue, the weakness of many unions was cited as 
one of the central reasons hindering implementation, along with different national organizing 
structures (company vs. sectoral organization) (EFBWW 2013a: 21). Difficulties in the 
transferability of membership also arise, particularly due to the different services provided by 
unions, such as the coupling of unemployment benefits and union membership in the Nordic 
countries. 
Probably the most prominent attempt at including more workers while at the same time 
organizing posted workers across Europe is the European Migrant Workers Union (EMWU). The 
EMWU was initiated by the German IG BAU and founded in 2004. By bringing into play a 
transnationally transferable union membership in a supranational European trade union, the 
EMWU model challenged the EFBWW’s focus on national autonomy and bilateral agreements. 
A high-ranking EFBWW official remembered discussions in the early 1990s that had already taken 
up the issue of a transnational union: “This discussion, I had tried to take it up. I wanted to rename 
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the European Federation of Building and Woodworkers ‘European Trade Union of Building and 
Woodworkers.’ That was the basic idea I had with some of my colleagues. It failed, because those 
unions, which were nationally strong, said: ‘No, we won’t pass over any rights. We want to 
determine our collective bargaining contracts by ourselves,’ for example” (EFBWW Rep7 2011).  
The IG BAU had become unpopular for migrant workers due to its campaigns against illegal work 
on construction sites (Kahmann 2006: 190). One of the German founders explained, “We 
founded the EMWU, because Polish workers won’t join a German union” (Laux 2005). For IG BAU, 
it was a change in strategy: instead of protecting national workers from lower paid competition 
from CEE countries, the goal of the EMWU was to include these workers and give them a voice 
within the trade union system (Greer et al. 2013: 10f). What is more, the EMWU was supposed 
to be a genuinely European trade union following a service model and mostly providing legal 
advice (Greer et al. 2013: 12). The EMWU’s original aim was to install offices in all the major 
home countries of posted workers and, in the long term, include other sectors in its work 
(Kahmann 2006: 191).  
However, the hopes associated with the EMWU for the IG BAU were not fulfilled, partly because 
the EMWU did not attract as many members as hoped among the highly mobile workforce, partly 
because of the large costs of the project (EFBWW 2013a: 28; Pedrina 2008: 17). Eventually, the 
EMWU members became members of either the Polish or German construction union. In 2009, 
the idea of the EMWU as an independent trade union was given up and the EMWU was 
integrated into the IG BAU (EFBWW 2013a: 28). In 2016, the EMWU employed six staff members 
in Germany and Poland (EMWU 2016). Although the EMWU has not been able to develop into a 
“European trade union,” it did seem to inspire additional cross-sectoral service activities in 
Germany. Three of the six staff members are now part of a cross-sectoral union venture: since 
2011, the EMWU has participated in a larger service project focusing on “fair mobility” organized 
by the German DGB and financed by the European Social Fund (DGB 2016). The EMWU is 
responsible for one of the six local advisory centers that have been established for the project.  
However, the EFBWW – which seems predestined to be involved in the project – was not part of 
the creation of this attempt at a new European trade union. One interview partner argued, “The 
reason is always the same, and that is also the case with the migrant workers association in 
Germany – the reason is always that the EFBWW does not do enough. And we need something 
in addition to the EFBWW” (EFBWW Rep3 2011). This interview partner also recounted why the 
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IG BAU proposed the EMWU within the BWI instead of the EFBWW: “And then it was often the 
case, for example, the IG BAU, they paid and didn’t get anything out of it. There was the proposal 
[…] because of the posted workers problem […] and the EFBWW didn’t react to that“ (EFBWW 
Rep3 2011). However, not all interview partners agreed on this explanation. When asked why 
the IG BAU presented the proposal of a European network within the BWI and not at an EFBWW 
Assembly, an EFBWW representative instead explained this in terms of the Germans’ leading 
role within the BWI. The German Köbele had been president of the BWI from 1993 to 1997 (and 
EFBWW President from 1991 to 1995), and his successor as IG BAU president, Klaus Wiesehügel, 
led the BWI from 2005 to 2013. “I mean the German unions have been more active within the 
BWI and they had presidency of that. […] They have the presidency of the international one for 
some time now. So that´s why they are more active in these matters in the BWI” (EFBWW Rep8 
2011). In addition, for this EFBWW representative, discussion a new supranational trade union 
was simply not the job of the EFBWW: “The European federation is not dealing with setting up 
unions or things like that; it´s dealing with influencing the EU and participating in social dialogue, 
but not setting up unions. It´s out of the field, in some sense, of the European federation” (EFBWW 
Rep8 2011). 
Among the EFBWW affiliates, the EMWU was regarded critically and viewed as competition to 
the nationally established representation of workers (Kahmann 2006: 194). An EFBWW officer 
recounted how the EMWU was presented at a BWI meeting in Sofia (the fact that it was not 
presented at an EFBWW meeting was in itself symbolic): “And it was opposed by everyone, in 
particular by the unions from the new member states. They said, ‘Don’t do this. We need a strong 
European Federation. The Federation should do this work on a European level. The BWI needs to 
do this work on the world scale, they need to cooperate,’ and so on, and so on. ‘A new initiative, 
a new federation on the European level, that won’t help us. That won’t be interesting for people 
[…] It will weaken our position, since they [the migrant workers] should be members of our 
federation, of our affiliates, when they work in Germany, France or wherever’” (EFBWW Rep2 
2011).  
However, not all attendees were skeptical in the beginning, as one affiliate recounted from one 
of the first meetings: “In the beginning we were quite positive. [… There] was an initiative by 
UNIA, a comparable initiative, and they had a website in many languages and we supported that 
as well” (Affiliate7 2012). Another external observer who recounted this meeting highlighted the 
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reluctance of the other affiliates: “The others didn’t want to hear of it. That was an attempt to 
found a European Migrant Workers Organization, but it stayed a German organization” (CLR 
Member2 2011). Apparently, there were reservations among the affiliates about following a 
German leadership initiative: “The organizations are fighting tooth and nails. So for some it was 
a thorn in the flesh that the IG BAU is so large and rich, so they said, ‘Just because the IG BAU is 
so large and rich doesn’t mean that they can set the tone’” (EFBWW Rep3 2011). Another 
interviewee phrased this competitive behavior more bluntly: “Many of the German colleagues 
or maybe in general the colleagues think they are the best anyway” (EFBWW Rep6 2011). In the 
end, this perception was what might have led the IG BAU to pursue a “European trade union” 
unilaterally. One of the EFBWW representatives who was part of the initiating team summarized 
his feelings by saying, “And that, as Europe is today, failed because of national egoisms. There is 
no doubt about that. I gave up then, because I saw, that makes no sense, because one can work 
for something for years. But when you see that you have no chance against these egoisms, that 
didn’t make any sense. But my idea has been at that time to see if such a union could work” 
(EFBWW Rep7 2011). 
Two groups in particular seemed to reject the idea: the strong Scandinavian and British unions 
were critical of a transnational approach or an intensified European trade union cooperation 
since they feared that such a union would eventually need collective bargaining and regulation 
rights, which they did not want to transfer (EFBWW Rep7 2011; Keller and Sörries 1999: 121; 
Lillie and Greer 2007: 575). For example, an affiliate from a Nordic union described these 
reservations, saying, “It will become a real problem if you have a side organization. Because how 
can they negotiate for a national agreement? To succeed with an organization like that you must 
connect that to the already existing affiliates and you must have an administration” (Johannson 
2012). 
Many Eastern European unions also opposed the idea, fearing that the EMWU would take away 
members from them and promote a double structure (EFBWW Rep2 2011). It seems that many 
were also afraid that the EMWU would be a rival to their own organization, and in the words of 
one German interview partner, “that produced many skeptics” (EFBWW Affiliate1 2010). 
Another interview partner highlighted the importance of national unions as “real unions”: “We 
opposed that idea. We think migrant workers should become members of a real trade union, in 
our opinion that won’t work. We have done a lot of work organizing Polish workers and we feel 
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that is the only way to go. So we have rejected that idea from the beginning” (EFBWW Affiliate4 
2012). 
Table 31: Discussions of the Organizational Mode for European Trade Union Cooperation 
Members  Discussions (Examples) Organizational Mode of 
European Construction Sector 
Unions 
Role of Transnational 
Organization 
Germany Founding of EMWU (Greer et al. 2013) 
Discussion about renaming the EFBWW 
“European Trade Union of Building and 
Woodworkers” (EFBWW Rep7 2011) 
 
Transnational labor cooperation Transnational representation (6) 
Germany, the 
Netherlands 
Cross-national mergers (EFBWW Rep1 
2011; EFBWW Rep7 2011) 
 
Hierarchical direction of 
supranational organization 
Supranational authority (5) 
Spain, Portugal Stronger role of federation (EFBWW 
Rep1 2011) (Degryse 2013: 75) 
Communicative 
rapprochement, international 
negotiation of binding 
standards 




Proposal of European Migrant Workers 




negotiation of non-binding 
standards 






No transnational union, but strong 
national affiliates in European 
federation; did not want to transfer 
collective bargaining and regulation 
rights (EFBWW Rep2 2011; EFBWW 
Rep7 2011; Keller and Sörries 1999: 121; 
Lillie and Greer 2007: 575) 
Communicative 
rapprochement, international 
negotiation of non-binding 
standards 




ETUC as lobbying platform for removing 
restrictions on free movement of 
workers (Seeliger and Wagner 2016) 
Communicative rapprochement Forum (2) 
 Result 
EFBWW 
“The European federation is […] dealing 
with the influencing the EU and 
participating in social dialogue.” 
(EFBWW Rep8 2011) 
“It´s about coordination, coming to a 
European standpoint and influencing 
the EU and doing social dialogue.” 
(EFBWW Rep8 2011)  
Coordination, limited steering 
functions 
International negotiation of 
(non-)binding standards (3) 
 
Despite the affiliates’ different positions on how to organize migrant workers, the three 
federations in Europe decided to take up the issues raised by the affiliates and react 
pragmatically. The many discussions on the integration of migrant workers also set into motion 
an increased focus on cooperation and information exchange (BWI 2006d; EFBWW 2013a). Both 
the BWI and the EFBWW were part of a steering committee on migration including the NFBWW 
as a third partner (Schiavi 2008). At the annual meeting of the European section of the BWI in 
Palermo in 2007, the Swiss union UNIA and the German union IG BAU proposed a “European 
migrant workers network” (BWI 2007; Schiavi 2008). The idea of the UNIA/IG BAU proposal was 
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to establish a systematic Europe-wide cooperation with the goal of supporting local unions in 
receiving countries in organizing posted workers (BWI 2007: 5). This was supposed to be 
achieved by collecting and exchanging information between home and host countries of posted 
workers, developing an information website, and promoting bilateral agreements between 
construction trade unions (Schiavi 2008: 33). Thus, the proposal followed a different approach 
than the EMWU, since this project utilized the BWI’s expertise in supporting local organizing 
work without taking up supranational steering responsibilities. 
The idea was for each organization to use its organizational capacity to apply for funds with the 
EU, the ILO, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), or the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (BWI 2007: 8). The BWI had already established a Global 
Migration Network in 2006 without external funding, which was an “email network of trade 
union leaders and activists who are actively involved in addressing the issues of migrant workers” 
(BWI 2006c). However, the activities of the network remained embryonic and – judging from the 
portrayals on the website – did not evolve into the envisaged global network website (BWI 
[n.a.]). In 2007, the BWI and the EFBWW were successful with a joint project financed by the 
European Commission with about €62,000 focusing on EWCs as levers for global cooperation 
(EFBWW 2008e; European Commission 2015a). The EFBWW has since followed up with further 
projects and has received several Commission grants for its work on posted labor. For example, 
the EFBWW received funding for a European information website on working conditions in 
Europe and, several years later, received funds jointly with FIEC for a website about national 
working conditions for posted workers (EFBWW 2009a; EFBWW and FIEC 2015). The NFBWW 
and the BWI, on the other hand, also applied for development funds from government agencies, 
particularly from the Nordic countries (EFBWW Affiliate6 2012, EFBWW Affiliate5 2012). While 
the ETUFs rely on Commission structures, the international trade union federations benefit from 
the ILO’s support infrastructure (EFBWW Rep7 2011; Waterman and Timms 2005).  
POWER RELATIONS 
The diverging positions on how to organize migrant workers and, consequently, how to organize 
the free movement of labor and services were an underlying theme within the EFBWW during 
the Noughties. Many of the affiliates’ members are – in both perception and reality – subject to 
direct competition with each other, which is becoming increasingly difficult, particularly 
regarding social and environmental requirements (European Commission 2013). Zubislav 
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Janowski, Polish Vice-President of the EFBWW, also pointed out the different interests within 
the EU: “It is not an entirely selfless act. The situation in our trade union movement affects the 
situation in ‘old’ EU countries. It is a system of connected vessels” (Croucher et al. 2003b; Harning 
and Maurer 2004; Kus 2015; van der Straeten 2008). An example of the increasing competition 
is the highly criticized campaign by the German IG BAU “Ohne Regeln geht es nicht” (“It doesn’t 
work without rules”) (IG BAU 2004). The campaign showed a small figure holding a piece of paper 
in front of a stop sign or a police signaling disk, and the IG BAU’s intention was to encourage 
workers to report illegal work and wage dumping. The campaign was quickly ended following 
harsh internal criticism for its lack of solidarity with “illegal” workers receiving dumping wages 
(Harning and Maurer 2004). The campaign’s intention reveals that competition among workers 
and subcontractors from different legal backgrounds is a part of daily life in the construction 
sector. In a study of the European Central Bank Construction Site in Frankfurt, Germany, Wagner 
and Lillie have demonstrated how transnational subcontracting is undermining national social 
models, which creates harsh competition among different regulatory regimes (Wagner & Lillie 
2014: 403). With the Laval, Viking, and Ruffert cases, competition among the members was even 
more pronounced since it was now possible for foreign subcontractors to undermine national 
wage standards.  
One frequently cited reason for Western dominance in ETUFs is that Western unionists had more 
to lose from non-cooperation (Hyman 2002a: 3). German and Scandinavian unions were keen to 
maintain their established industrial relations regimes and promote the home country rule for 
posted workers. The Nordic unions, which are also organized within the NFBWW, are a strong 
faction within the EFBWW and usually try to find a common standpoint within the NFBWW first 
in order to then lobby jointly for their position within the EFBWW (EFBWW Affiliate4 2012; 
EFBWW Rep4 2012a). For example, an affiliate from a Nordic union explained, “We try to push it 
through the NFBWW first; we try to solve with the Swedes etc. first and come to an agreement 
first. So it is always important for us to come to a common standing before we take it out to the 
EFBWW. If we can get an agreement in the Nordic Federation we want them to start deliberations 
with other important actors, for example the IG BAU. […] The reason why we coordinate in the 
Nordic region and cooperate is that we want to find a good solution in the EFBWW. If we don’t 
get the EFBWW on board, our chances on getting changes are very slim” (EFBWW Affiliate4 
2012). 
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 Other affiliates from larger countries, especially the French, Italian, and German unions, are also 
very invested in shaping EFBWW policies in order to protect national bargaining systems, as one 
EFBWW representative explained (EFBWW Rep4 2012a). Whereas the Nordic countries, France, 
and Germany were strongly in favor of legislation and saw every voluntary agreement as a 
danger to binding legislation, other affiliates such as the Belgian and Eastern European unions 
seemed to be more “pragmatic” (EFBWW Rep4 2012a).  
For Eastern European unions, enlargement had a lot to offer, particularly access to better paid 
job markets. The internal conflicts within the labor movement became apparent during the 
internal decision-making process on the Service Directive, as Dølvik and Ødegård, long-term 
observers of ETUC, have described: “The [ETUC] member organizations from the new Member 
States saw the opening of the service markets as crucial to their membership in the EU, and were 
basically positive to the Bolkestein proposal. Besides hard work to convince these member 
associations about the need for a more balanced directive, where the Polish Solidarnocs played 
a key role, part of the deal eventually made was that the ETUC should argue for lifting of the 
transitional restrictions on the free movement of workers” (Dølvik and Ødegård 2009: 10). An 
EFBWW representative explained that the Polish unionists from Solidarnosc argued that their 
most important task is to save and get jobs for their workers, even if they are paid less then local 
workers (Seeliger 2018: 84). 
 An interview partner described similar lines of conflict regarding the Posted Workers Directive: 
“So the Posted Workers Directive was a huge focus. And then you need to know, the Italians and 
the Portuguese and the Spanish had completely different views on the issue than the Germans 
and the Scandinavians. […] Quite simple, we want people employed in Germany based on our 
collective bargaining agreements. And for a Spanish worker that would have meant that if he 
came to Germany with a Spanish firm that he would have earned three times as much as in Spain. 
And they knew, because unemployment was always high in these countries, that it would become 
quite difficult to get work in Germany for the Spanish firms with their people. So there were 
intense discussions - but in the end they saw that there is no other way“ (EFBWW Rep7 2011). 
Within the EFBWW, it was difficult to bring these different positions together. Equal conflicts of 
interest also arose in matters of health and safety. For example, in the field of wood dust 
emissions, the Northern countries had an interest in maintaining their high level of labor 
protection, while the Southern countries feared that such a high level of protection would cost 
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a large number of jobs (EFBWW Rep3 2011; EFBWW Rep4 2012a). Another EFBWW 
representative described a case in which legislation would have been more advantageous and 
where the schism ran between the EMF and the EFBWW: “Yes, and the employer lobby has 
exerted considerable pressure [the interview partner talks about a specific case, but doesn’t want 
to publicly disclose any details]. And the EMF was part of that as well. And they wanted a non-
binding rule. So there was a schism among the trade union movement. And they just didn’t want 
to see that if you want legislation, you can’t have a voluntary rule” (EFBWW Rep3 2011).  
For the EFBWW, this meant that there were strong interests to support the EFBWW’s lobbying 
and coordination role in order to maintain the autonomy of national social systems. Given all 
these differences, the EFBWW’s uniting goal was to protect national social models, not to 
substitute national collective bargaining on primary working conditions (Cremers 2006b: 7). The 
successful lobbying strategy of the federation regarding the Posting and Enforcement Directives 
manifested this position (Arnold 2008; Dølvik and Ødegård 2009; Seeliger and Wagner 2016). 
On the other hand, the interests of the more powerful affiliates also excluded a stronger steering 
role of the EFBWW since this would have undermined the national bargaining ability and borne 
the danger of lowest common denominator bargaining on the EU level. “And strong unions, the 
Scandinavians, let alone the British, were not willing to surrender even the slightest rights. […] I 
mean, it was always okay when it had to do with the Commission, but as soon as it concerned 
national competencies, no one was prepared to give anything up. Except for, pff, Portugal and 
Spain, where the unions were relatively weak. There the people were more willing to let the 
Federation come in more, but they were simply too weak within the EFBWW to achieve any sort 
of change” (EFBWW Rep7 2011). Another EFBWW representative confirmed this perception of 
differences in the ability to voice opinions: “there are always those whose opinions have more 
weight, because they come from the large affiliates. And if two or three of the large affiliates 
have spoken, then no one will speak up easily” (EFBWW Rep8 2011). 
In summary, the logic of membership during the Noughties and beyond was characterized by (1) 
increasing heterogeneity in organizational capacities; (2) more pronounced differences in 
political interests and national social models; and (3) increased structural difficulties affecting 
the members at home, with declining membership rates and restructuring efforts. As a result, 
many members looked for alternatives in both organizing posted workers and organizing 
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European trade union work, and the strong affiliates in particular discussed possibilities to 
change the existing organizational structure of European trade union organization.  
 
5.4.4 ADMINISTRATION: BETWEEN COORDINATION AND CONTENTION 
While the membership of the federation grew to be more heterogeneous and was divided in its 
position on what role a European trade union should have, the administration of the federation 
continued along the path set out in the 1990s. This is also apparent in the staff resources of the 
federation: In 2014, the EFBWW employed only eight staff members: four administrative staff 
members and four political secretaries (including the secretary general). While the number of 
affiliates rose from 48 in 1999 to 77 in 2015, the number of staff members of the organization 
has remained stable since 1999 (EFBWW 2014a; EFBWW Rep8 2011).  
Figure 11: Staff Members of EFBWW (Full-Time Equivalents) 
(EFBWW 2008a, 2008f, 2014a) 
 
The EFBWW’s portfolio of activities is characterized by a strong reliance on funding by the 
European Commission: the income of affiliation fees mainly finances staff costs, structural 
meetings, and basic infrastructure; the major operational projects are all financed via EU projects 
(EFBWW 2016a; EFBWW Rep2 2011; EFBWW Rep8 2011). Together with the rising quantity and 
diversity of affiliates and the shrinking number of represented workers (Degryse 2013; EFBWW 
2008a: 13, 2015a, 2016b; Platzer and Müller 2009: 265; Zühlke-Robinet 2000: 160), this number 
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EFBWW. An EFBWW representative recalled how important the funding is for the federation: 
“But we used the funds for doing political things that we could not afford to do without the funds. 
And we had a lot of funds for such a small organization; we had really a lot of projects. We had 
some years up to – we were involved in something like 20–25 EU projects, and that´s a lot” 
(EFBWW Rep8 2011). 
About one fourth of the working time of the political officers is attributed to lobbying legislative 
activities, following EU activities, and participating in EU-related structures such as the High Level 
Tripartite Strategic Forum for Construction (European Commission 2015c). The secretary 
general’s main tasks are lobbying work and negotiations and consultations in the Social Dialogue 
(EFBWW Rep2 2011; EFBWW Rep8 2011).  
Administration members who were asked about their main responsibilities described the 
EFBWW as being devoted to gathering and spreading information about relevant European 
issues and providing support to the internal decision-making bodies (i.e., the Executive 
Committee, standing committees for wood and construction, Health and Safety Coordination 
Group, and EWC Coordinating Group) (EFBWW Rep4 2012a; EFBWW Rep8 2011).  
For example, the provision of comparative information and best practice was an important task 
during the financial crisis, as one staff member recounted: “I couldn´t say that we really were 
very deep into [the crisis], except for getting/spreading information and giving ideas on how it´s 
dealt with in different countries” (EFBWW Rep8 2011). This understanding of coordination and 
information is also reflected in the EFBWW’s activities. Of all the analyzed projects, the majority 
serve coordination and information purposes. Apart from coordination and information, projects 
in the fields of organizing, campaigning, and collective bargaining coordination are only rarely 
funded, because they have to fit within the Commission funding lines, which are divided into 
social dialogue, information and training measures, and company representatives (DG 
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 2015). An interview partner from the EFBWW described 
a discussion with a colleague from one of the affiliates who argued that the EFBWW is not “a 
real trade union” since it does not engage in campaigning and “only read[s] Commission 
documents all day” (EFBWW Rep4 2012a). One fourth of all projects focus on training, either in 
mainly informational formats or in a forum for coordination and discussion among the 
participants (DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 2016). These projects are often geared 
toward company representatives of EWCs. For the EFBWW administration, these coordination 
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activities in transnational firms are vital for establishing European collaboration: “coordination 
of the unions in multinationals is a key to creating a joint commitment to act together, to 
implement joint strategies, to avoid dissent among workers and to take measures together at 
European level” (EFBWW 2012a: 22). In line with its coordinating and information service role, 
the majority of the projects organized by the EFBWW administration with Commission funding 
address national affiliates.  
Figure 12: Commission-Funded EFBWW Projects: Addressees (1999–2013)3 




Projects that address the European social partners (FIEC/EFBWW) include the funding for Social 
Dialogues and are mainly projects in the activity area of information services – for example, 
management guides on health AND safety or instruction modules for the handling of asbestos. 
However, one interview partner in particular was intent on establishing the EFBWW as a network 
of experts instead of purely providing information: “To me it is important that we are not only 
an information platform, but also an exchange network. This communication is important“ 
(EFBWW Rep4 2012a). Apart from the biannual meetings of the EFBWW committees, the 
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federation officers are in close contact with their counterparts in the affiliates, which sometimes 
come from European or international departments and sometimes evolve around expert issues, 
particularly in the field of health and safety (EFBWW Affiliate3 2012; EFBWW Rep4 2012a). What 
began in 1994 with a conference on health and safety has developed into a “fully-fledged sectoral 
management of health in construction” according to Bernd Eisenbach, former chairman of the 
EFBWW health and safety coordinators’ group (Eisenbach 2006: 20). Only 5 of the 70 evaluated 
projects aim explicitly at individual workers. The first project of this kind was an information 
website for migrant workers launched in 2009 called European Construction Mobility 
Information Net (ECMIN), a website on posted work, and a website on youth employment 
initiatives (EFBWW 2009a; EFBWW and FIEC 2014, 2015).  
Meanwhile, the BWI remained the forum for exchange on organizing migrant workers and 
supporting local unions in organizing these groups (Bau- und Holzarbeiter Internationale 2008; 
BWI 2006d, 2007). A unionist who knows both the EFBWW and the BWI well recalled, “All these 
years there was a little discord between the European Federation and the international 
Federation, who had the say when it comes to Europe” (EFBWW Rep7 2011). However, when 
both federations were able to establish multilevel union networks combining workplace, 
national, and international levels, they were able to lead a successful campaigning strategy and 
prevent the criticized directive (Turnbull 2006). 
 A leading EFBWW member summarized, “So we cooperate trying to keep the division of labor 
between us, but we cooperate a lot on matters related to migrations” (EFBWW Rep8 2011). 
However, the relationship between the BWI and the EFBWW administration on posted workers 
was not always easy and might have led to difficulties in integrating the new members, as one 
interviewee recounted with frustration: “And [the EFBWW] made no effort to contact the Eastern 
European associations, or to deepen existing contacts. And so others did that. […] So the 
international federation did that. […] And the secretary general at that time did nothing to 
integrate the new EU members into the EFBWW“ (EFBWW Rep3 2011). Another EFBWW 
representative also described the difficulties on the administrative level: “The division of labor 
hasn’t really worked that well in the past years. For example, BWI has started and finalized 
negotiations for an IFA in a large multinational Dutch-based construction services business, and 
the EWCs and the EFBWW were not informed” (EFBWW Rep4 2012a). Another affiliate described 
the challenges of multilevel coordination work: “Take the example of European Works Councils: 
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you have these questions in the EFBWW and you also have these questions in the international 
federation. At IKEA, for example, you have an international works council and a European works 
council. Here you have a really difficult questions; you have it on an international, European, 
national, and company level – you have to involve all four levels” (EFBWW Affiliate5 2012). In the 
day-to-day work between the meetings, the administration has the role of finding compromises 
among the affiliates. One of the interview partners described this process: “[The EFBWW 
administration] play[s] an important role. If we come up with a proposal they will contact the 
other affiliates and will try to find an agreement. They are the ones putting the proposals up to 
the Executive Committee where the decisions are made. And we have many contacts on a daily 
basis with the EFBWW administration” (EFBWW Affiliate4 2012).  
The professionalization of the Social Dialogue has also changed the work of the administration 
in Brussels, which is currently much more involved in negotiations with employers than it was 
during the 1990s (EFBWW Rep1 2011; EFBWW Rep2 2011; EFBWW Rep3 2011; EFBWW Rep4 
2012a). This close relationship to FIEC in order to implement the EFBWW’s goals is central for 
the administrative logic. For the functioning of the EFBWW, the logic of personal relationships 
with the employer federation is also part of the way in which the EFBWW reaches agreements: 
“Over the course of the year the social partners meet quite often. And strategies and measures 
are discussed at these meetings, also with the goal of showing controversies. And of course it is 
clear that in between the meetings there is communication between the unions and employers; I 
communicate with them in between at home as well” (EFBWW Rep5 2011). For example, one 
interview partner talked about the frequent meetings between FIEC and the EFBWW 
representatives: “When they were sitting together with their wives or spent a weekend together, 
what do I know what they spoke about” (EFBWW Rep3 2011). This importance of individual 
preferences is also highlighted by a further interview partner in the relationship with FIEC: “[X) 
had a very close relationship with FIEC in the Social Dialogue. And [Y] always sits together with 
them and fabricates papers. That is a very close relationship. They also apply for projects together 
and get them financed together” (CLR Member2 2011). 
After the four ECJ rulings, the administration began to work mainly on these cases, as a 
Federation officer recalled: “We worked so much on the four ECJ cases that it´s almost 
dominated, at least for a couple of years of the work of the ETUC and also the federation” 
(EFBWW Rep8 2011). The EFBWW representative remembered how this forceful position 
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influenced the affiliate’s perception of the EFBWW: “It meant that the image of the federation 
was strengthened. […] they invited us instead of inviting the ETUC” (EFBWW Rep8 2011). 
While the heightened attention to European issues was important for the recognition of the 
EFBWW’s administration as lobbying experts (Johannson 2012; Leeuw 2012; Lokhorst 2012), it 
also seems to have halted the autonomy of the secretariat: “Over a longer stretch of time one 
can say that hierarchy has become more important. Today it is often said you can discuss this but 
the discussion will be taken in the Executive Committee. […] We have been controlled less before. 
The day-to-day work has gotten more bureaucratic” (EFBWW Rep4 2012a). This same EFBWW 
staff member described the increase in needs and project requests sent to the federation due to 
the rising number of European policies and project programs: “And in the Commission, they like 
to see a European project partner on board. […] We’re conducting about eight to ten projects per 
year; this number has also risen over the last years” (EFBWW Rep4 2012a).  
Apart from a shift in the administrative logic from autonomy to increased bureaucracy, the 
personal motivation of the staff members also seems to play a role in the number of projects 
conducted, as one interviewee mentioned: “That is also because [person x] did a lot of projects. 
And [for some time] there was a different person, who did very little projects” (EFBWW Rep9 
2012). Another EFBWW staff member recounted, “And when [anonymous EFBWW staff 
member] came to the stage, I’ll say, he was very apt. He always knew where to get what kind of 
money” (EFBWW Rep3 2011). Another staff member added, “The [xx] projects are lying idle at 
the moment. That also depends upon individuals” (EFBWW Rep4 2012b). Another interview 
partner described a project of his national union, which was supported by an EFBWW staff 
member who organized a workshop to start a cooperation on posted work (Leeuw 2012). An 
EFBWW representative explained that the issue of negotiation/non-negotiation was often also a 
personal decision: “What I am saying now it´s bit of my personal point of view. And it´s a bit 
different than [with another staff member]. […] I think he was more grown in to negotiate […] 
than I would be. I more on thinking, ‘Should we negotiate or not?’ And sometimes I come to the 
conclusion that we should not do it for many reasons” (EFBWW Rep8 2011).  
This type of orientation seems to correspond to what Kelly and Heery have labeled the 
regulationist type of union officer whose hallmark is “pragmatism, a capacity to correspond in 
different ways to different issues” (Kelly and Heery 1994). However, as Hyman has pointed out, 
the setting in Brussels might also promote a “labor diplomacy” (Hyman 2005b) mode of 
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administration in which union officials, detached from the national arena, have established a 
European-level administration with independent interests and an autonomous logic of 
reproduction. One interview partner described the difficulty of accessing administrative 
positions in the EFBWW: “And that is always a problem with this type of position [EFBWW staff]: 
that language skills aren’t that good in other European countries” (EFBWW Rep2 2011). In 
addition, it takes time to obtain the necessary skills, another EFBWW representative 
remembered: “In the beginning it is very difficult to understand what is different in Europe […]. 
That is due to the different interests and the whole thing with the translation and so on” (EFBWW 
Rep6 2011). 
In summary, the administrative logic of the Noughties is characterized by a growing importance 
of hierarchical structures and external funding, a logic of divided administrative responsibilities 
in Europe between the international federation BWI and the regional EFBWW, and a tension 
between cooperation and contention in the personal stance toward the Commission and FIEC. 
Table 32: Role of Administration: The Noughties 
Examples Role of Administration 
 
Role of Transnational 
Organization 
Organizational Mode 
Growing importance of Commission funding 
Role of individuals: 
“That is also because [person x] did a lot of projects. And [for some 
time] there was a different person, who did very little projects.” 
(EFBWW Rep9 2012). 
“The [xx] projects are lying idle at the moment. That also depends 
upon individuals.” (EFBWW Rep4 2012b) 
Cooperation with FIEC: 
“That is a very close relationship.” (CLR Member2 2011) 
“in between the meetings there is communication between the unions 
and employers; I communicate with them in between at home as 
well.” (EFBWW Rep5 2011) 
“Some of those that are active for our side as lobbyists in Brussels have 
forgotten over the years that they must be tough as nails in 
representing trade union interests.” (Schmidt-Hullmann 2009a) 
“I think he was more grown in to negotiate […] than I would be. I more 
on thinking, ‘Should we negotiate or not?’ And sometimes I come to 





strong role of individuals, 
project coordination with 
employers 
Information service for 
affiliates 
Support for executive 
committee 
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5.5 CONCLUSION: EXPLAINING EUROPEANIZATION OUTCOMES WITH 
COMPETING LOGICS 
This chapter is devoted to the first research question: “How has the form of Europeanization 
adopted by the EFBWW been shaped by the competing organizational logics of membership, 
influence, and administration?”  
The theoretical chapter explained that the organizational form could be a result of tensions 
between three logics. This chapter is divided into three chronological phases, each beginning 
with the specific organizational form of this phase and then describing this outcome with the 
evolution of each of the three organizational logics. This last section summarizes the 
organizational development over time and explains how the dynamics among the logics of 
influence, membership, and administration have shaped the EFBWW’s organizational form. Each 
section concludes with an overview of the identified trends or tensions.  
PREFORMATION PHASE: COMPLEMENTARY LOGICS 
In the first phase – the preformation phase in the early years of the EC – European trade unions 
in the construction sector only cooperated loosely. The EFBWW’s predecessor, the Joint 
Committee, was mainly used as an instrument to uphold communication among its members. 
When the EFBWW was initiated in 1974, the organizational form shifted to “communicative 
rapprochement” and the federation had the role of a forum for information exchange. Rather 
than being in tension with each other, the organizational logics seem to have complemented 
each other. 
In this phase, the logic of influence was characterized by limited access points on the European 
level and a Commission that was interested in showing the public that the European economic 
policy also had a social outlook. By establishing committees on technical aspects of social policy, 
the Commission hoped to get the social partners on board and in return receive recognition for 
the European project. The employer organization FIEC and its umbrella organization UNICE, 
however, had no interest in European negotiations and was thus an obstacle to any attempts at 
European corporatism. The uneven balance of power relations between employers and workers 
is nothing new for trade unions. However, on the European level, the employer side has a 
significant advantage: the development of the EU has followed a logic of economic integration, 
while social issues have largely remained matters for nation states to deal with (Dølvik 1999: 3). 
 
Henni Appell  Workers of Europe Unite!? - Explaining the Form of European Labor Organization 195 
In addition, the class struggles on the national level have not been transferred to the European 
level. This imbalance of power has put trade unions in a defensive position. For employers, on 
the other hand, it was often more beneficial to refrain from supranational action than to engage 
in dialogue with trade unions (Streeck 1998: 11). In the construction sector, this became 
apparent when the employer association did not attend the first attempts to establish joint 
dialogue in the early 1970s (Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften 1972a: 1). When FIEC 
opened an office in Brussels, its main aim was to receive information from the Commission and 
insert its own position into the process. The employer organization adopted a strong lobbying 
role and actively pursued contacts with the Commission, particularly regarding public 
procurement regulations. The EFBWW affiliates, on the other hand, were focused on extracting 
from the organization the knowledge they needed to successfully influence national 
governments. In the decades before the internet provided day-to-day information on almost 
everything, the EFBWW’s affiliates expected it to be the center of information provision on all 
issues of sectoral importance. The EFBWW received this access by participating in the 
committees the Commission had set up, both on a cross-sectoral and a sectoral level. In return, 
the EFBWW, by participating in these dialogues, provided information on the positions of 
construction labor in Europe. 
The EFBWW administration, then consisting of only one part-time employee, had the role of 
representing the federation in Brussels without engaging in “political” debates. The 
administrative logic was driven by cooperation, not contention. The staff of the EFBWWC and its 
predecessor, the Joint Committee, was tightly bound to the president and its national affiliate 
and paid by one of the national affiliates. The administration did not seem to have an 
independent standing within the federation. Even after the EFBWW was founded in 1974, the 
only “European” staff member of the construction workers was employed part-time and located 
at the Centrale Générale in Brussels. Effective goal implementation was achieved by extracting 
resources in the form of information from the European logic of influence and in return 
representing the member’s positions. With this form of “labor diplomacy,” unifying goal 
formation among the members leading to conflictive joint action in order to receive concessions 
remained a national issue. Above all, the members were concerned “with the problem of 
reconciling free movement with the nationalistic (or even protectionist) character of activities in 
the building sector” as described by an observer of the third EFBWWC Congress in 1979 
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(European Communities (DG X Information) 1979: 12). Deep reservations among the members 
toward a European social policy added to the reluctance to transfer powers to a European 
federation. Despite some members’ will to achieve better coordination at the European level, 
the affiliates actively limited the EFBWW’s activities to information services. When 
organizational alternatives were discussed among the members, national reservations against a 
more political role of the organization won out. In this phase, several constraints already seem 
to be looming in the background: deepening European integration and limited resources, 
divisions among the membership about the role of the federation, an established division of 
labor between the “political” IFBWW and the “coordinating” EFBWW, and the ability and 
willingness (or lack thereof) of its members to significantly increase affiliation fees. 
Table 33: Tensions in ETUFs 
Pairs of Organizational 
Logics 
Tension  Potentially Constraining 
Conflict 
Identified Trend in the 
EFBWW(C) 
Membership –  
Influence 
Goal formation (willingness 
to act) vs. resource exchange 
 
Resources from members 
(willingness to pay and 
willingness to act) vs. 
resources from institutional 
setting 
Resources from members 
Administration –  
Membership 
Goal implementation vs. goal 
formation  
Diplomacy vs.  
participation 
 
Labor diplomacy  
Administration –  
Influence 
Goal implementation vs. 
resource exchange 




CRITICAL JUNCTURE: EMERGING TENSIONS  
The limited organizational role changed significantly in the 1980s and early 1990s. During this 
phase, the EFBWW developed into the organizational mode “international negotiation of non-
binding standards” with the organization in a coordinating role with limited steering and 
monitoring functions. This was a “start-up” phase for the EFBWW with numerous opportunities 
for increased coordination along the road. In this phase, tensions between the three logics began 
to become apparent. 
Schmitter and Streeck have noted that associations need to assure their members that their 
intermediary function can be beneficial, thus in turn leading to a future provision with resources 
for the organization (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981]). In the 1980s and 1990s, the EFBWW 
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was able to define the added benefits of its European role. The logic of influence was 
characterized by more and more access points for European coordination.  
With the initiation of Commission funding through the Single European Act in 1986, the EFBWW 
and other European labor federations now had the means to independently conduct projects at 
the European level (BWI1 2012). For the Delors Commission it was important to gather support 
for stronger involvement of the EU in social policies and calm fears of the Single Market (Martin 
and Ross 1999b). The type of the projects was predetermined, focusing on two activities: social 
dialogue and information and training measures (DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 
2015). On the administrative side at the EFBWW, the new secretary general, Cremers, used the 
Commission’s accessibility. Soon the EFBWW received approximately one half, and sometimes 
more, of its funds from the Commission (EFBWW 2016a; EFBWW Rep1 2011; EFBWW Rep2 2011; 
EFBWW Rep8 2011). During these years the EFBWW secretariat was relatively well equipped 
with staff and resources compared to other secretariats (EFBWW Rep1 2011). 
The affiliation fees were used to pay for wages and basic infrastructure, but the project funding 
filled the EFBWW’s structure with life. Furthermore, Commission funding provided the EFBWW 
with more autonomy vis-à-vis the IFBWW (now the BWI), since the EFBWW was now able to 
access its own funding infrastructure and receive support for projects that could not be financed 
internationally (BWI1 2012; EFBWW Rep7 2011). Although the funds were minimal in 
comparison to the overall budget of the Commission, they were considerable in comparison to 
the EFBWW’s budget and enabled the federation to conduct political projects that would 
otherwise not have been possible. 
With the introduction of EWCs in 1994, Commission funding set additional incentives that 
impacted the EFBWW’s organizational development. Creating and maintaining EWCs is costly; 
translation costs, communication, and training for workers’ representatives from very different 
cultural backgrounds required financing. The Commission strongly supported these activities, 
knowing that without external funding, the logistics of EWC creation would hardly be possible. 
In turn, the new legislation and financial support spurred the EFBWW on to greater activity in 
the field of company representation. The incentive structure from the Commission was 
reinforced by the EFBWW affiliates, which gave the federation the mandate to initiate European 
company representation (Keller and Sörries 1999: 121). However, on the membership side, the 
inability – or unwillingness – to take up seats in EWCs, for example, was a problem for the 
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company representation strategy of the EFBWW, because power imbalances and a lack of 
resources seemed to prevent national representatives from taking up seats.  
In the field of social dialogue, Commission funding also seems to have influenced the course of 
the EFBWW from autonomous collective bargaining to the Commission-funded Social Dialogue 
and thus the organizational development of the EFBWW. The construction sector had started 
the bilateral dialogue in 1990 under the precondition of representing autonomous social 
partners and conducting independent collective bargaining. Despite its critical position toward 
Commission involvement, the EFBWW and FIEC applied for official recognition in order to receive 
access to information on legislation and to Commission funding. The pragmatic joint lobbying for 
the Posting of Workers Directive then gave the EFBWW administration additional legitimation to 
continue with the joint approach. The comparatively high level of commitment in the sector 
towards joint bargaining was also reflected in the gradual increase of joint EFBWW-employer 
projects. 
The creation of instruments of European industrial relations provided trade unions with the 
opportunity structure to engage in European activities and coordinate their national activities. 
With the European Social Dialogue and EWCs, the Commission now had levers to fund European 
trade unionism and strengthen the social partner involvement. For the Commission, the 
establishment of instruments for European industrial relations was a cornerstone of “Social 
Europe,” and the participation of the social partners was a key to the goal of establishing a social 
dimension to market integration. After the Maastricht Treaty, the social partners had to be 
consulted on all proposals for directives concerning the sector, and in return the Commission 
was given access to the positions of the sector and could also consult the social partners on 
various employment and social policy issues. With the new treaty provisions, the Commission 
could fund educational activities, labor-employer dialogue, and other expenses such as 
translation expenditures or research projects. In this exchange process, the EFBWW was able to 
use the Social Dialogue as a tool to enhance its central position as information provider to its 
members and shape the its negotiating role with additional material resources. For example, the 
Commission’s support meant that costly networking workshops for EWCs or larger research 
projects (e.g., on health impacts of construction materials) were now possible. This 
encouragement enabled the European federations to extract resources for their activities and 
broaden their scope of action despite reservations, for example, concerning Commission-funded 
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social dialogue. Not only did the Commission provide access points for influence, but the 
construction employers also became more open to dialogue. UNICE had maintained a dismissive 
position toward European bipartite bargaining until the end of the 1980s, when several sectors, 
including the construction sector, left the official line. FIEC was also one of the few employer 
organizations to support a stronger European Social Charta. 
In addition, the affiliates increasingly saw the need to transfer resources to the European level. 
The establishment of a European Common Market tied trade unions from the EC closer together. 
It was clear that a national strategy could no longer guarantee nationally established rights. At 
the EFBWW, the Delors Commission’s positive reinforcement was reiterated by its members, 
who doubled the membership fees in 1991. At the same time, the organization expanded to 
include members from non-EC countries and the Christian federations, adding to the 
geographical, political, and structural heterogeneity of the EFBWW. As the affiliates’ dependency 
on one another grew, the growing internal diversity called for greater coordination activities by 
the European federation. At the same time, the dual structure of European representation with 
the European Committee of the IFBWW on the one hand and the EFBWW on the other hand also 
made it necessary for the two administrative structures to clarify their respective responsibilities.  
With the European instruments for industrial relations, the federation could now focus on a 
genuinely “European” task that could not be fulfilled by the national affiliates. The European 
federation could thus demonstrate to its members that it was necessary to have a strong 
European organization. At the same time, the administrative logic of the federation shifted from 
a non-political to a proactive political understanding of goal implementation. The “awakening” 
of the organization was accelerated by new dynamic staff members who had a more 
autonomous understanding of their role. The new administration took a more independent 
stance on how to develop European cooperation among the affiliates and used the emerging 
access points to establish opportunities for European coordination. The specifics of the European 
industrial relations instruments increased the information needs of the constituents and led to 
more information services by the administration (Cremers 1991: 153). For example, the EFBWW 
took over the role of a coordinator for information exchange on collective bargaining in 1995 
(Laux 2008a). The focus on establishing European company representation during the 1990s 
paved the way for European cooperation outside the traditionally national character of the 
sector. The administration of the EFBWW in turn interpreted the affiliates’ goals of increased 
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cooperation in a way that highlighted the unique benefits of European collaboration by, for 
example, organizing projects on transnational sites. By creating networks of local representatives 
(e.g., the EFBWW Multiproject Network or the EUROSITE project), the EFBWW administration 
was able to integrate the local needs of the sector with European cooperation. The access to 
Commission funds for these coordination projects and the expertise of the European federation 
for EWCs enhanced the EFBWW’s coordination role and resulted in a mandate for the EFBWW 
to initiate EWCs (Keller and Sörries 1999: 121). Health and safety issues also provided a window 
of opportunity for promoting intensified cooperation among the affiliates. The expertise 
required to handle these issues, the easy availability of funds for health and safety-related 
research (EFBWW Rep8 2011), the attraction of the issue to employers, and the legislative option 
on the European level made the topic predestined for European cooperation. This increase of 
importance of the European representation was reinforced by the admission of the European 
industry federations to ETUC, providing the sectors with a stronger voice within the European 
trade union movement.  
In addition, the forceful and successful development of the Posted Workers Directive led to a 
new understanding of the Brussels’ secretariat as implementer of joint lobbying goals. The 
network it takes to successfully influence European authorities is vitally important for the 
administration in implementing the members’ goals. The EFBWW has close contact with the 
Commission, particularly with the Directorate General V, who deals with employment issues and 
administers the majority of the funds granted to the EFBWW (EFBWW Rep1 2011; EFBWW Rep2 
2011). These connections have a double advantage: they support the EFBWW’s access to 
Commission funds, and they enable access to the inner workings of the Commission in order to 
effectively shape policies (EFBWW Affiliate2 2012). This in turn entails recognition by its 
members. In its relations with the employer organization FIEC, the EFBWW has taken up an issue-
oriented, pragmatic approach.  
However, the flexible and multidimensional goal implementation by the administration has the 
danger of conflicting with the more time-consuming process of internal goal formulation, as 
then-Secretary General Cremers also acknowledged: “This approach (which could be described 
as a flexible response) may, however, be at odds with the necessary (but often difficult) 
democratic decision-making processes” (Cremers 1997: 637). This dilemma describes the 
constraining conflict between the trade union as participative movement and the trade union as 
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an organization with an autonomous administration (Hyman 2002a). The citation of an EFBWW 
staff member torn between flexible responses and democratic decisions illustrates this conflict: 
“In trade union work there are still hierarchies that are replicated. […] And we need to work on 
getting all levels the opportunity to engage in European projects, to provide access to them. And 
if we don’t follow the trade union decision from what-do-I-know, well then that’s how it is” 
(EFBWW Rep4 2012a). 
The expertise required to work in Brussels can bear the danger of excluding certain parts of the 
membership that lack the resources and personnel to participate. The secretary generals 
recruited were usually experienced in European policymaking and had been responsible for 
international issues within the national affiliate (EFBWW Rep7 2011). In a study analyzing early 
support for migrant workers by the Commission, Virginie Guiraudon highlighted how the funding 
approach favors project approaches based on a specific “polyglot Euro-elite” jargon over smaller 
local projects (Guiraudon 2001: 173). The difficulty with the required level of language skills and 
project management expertise is that local unionists – particularly in the more down-to-earth 
construction sector – often do not have these abilities. 
The administration, on the other hand, needs to be careful to include the membership in its 
decisions; otherwise, it takes the risk of separating goal formulation from goal implementation. 
An interview partner put it this way: “On the one hand, you need to have the knowledge on 
Europe – the intellectual or political knowledge – and that is why academics, researchers are 
indispensable, yes. But on the other hand you need the know-how: how does a trade union 
organization work? The problem was that there were too many – well I don’t mind academics or 
so – but that they weren’t so closely connected to a trade union so that they weren’t familiar with 
the appropriate means to coordinate and come to decisions” (EFBWW Rep3 2011).  
Since the coordination of the various national affiliates often cannot be conducted quickly, the 
setting in Brussels reinforces the autonomy of the union officials. For example, one staff member 
said, “I often took the mandate, simply because I had to make decisions and solve problems” 
(EFBWW Rep1 2011). Another EFBWW official stated, “And often one represented one’s own 
position and not a position, which was officially the trade union’s position” (EFBWW Rep2 2011). 
In this case, cooperative positions can result in less support from the membership, whereas 
contention can lead to a loss of lobbying power with the Commission and FIEC, eventually also 
resulting in less support from the members. Over time, this can increase the sense of detachment 
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among the membership. One of the interview partners described the resulting feeling among 
the affiliates that developed during the Noughties: “That is something you don’t want at all in an 
organization, to have a secretary general that doesn’t obey, who has his own people, yes, and 
then there is permanent war in an organization” (EFBWW Rep3 2011).  
Table 34: Identified Constraining Conflicts in the EFBWW (1980s and 1990s) 
Pairs of Organizational 
Logics 
Tension  Potentially Constraining 
Conflict 
Identified Constraining 
Conflicts in the EFBWW 
(1980s and 1990s) 
Membership –  
Influence 
Goal formation (willingness 
to act) vs. resource 
exchange 
 
Resources from members 
(willingness to pay and 




Administration –  
Membership 
Goal implementation vs. 
goal formation  
Diplomacy vs.  
participation 
 
Flexible and autonomous 
goal implementation vs. 
democratic decision-
making processes 
Administration –  
Influence 
Goal implementation vs. 
resource exchange 
Contentious politics vs. 
cooperation 
Contentious politics vs. 
cooperation with employer 
federation (sectoral 
lobbying) and Commission 
(project funding) 
 
WEATHERING CHALLENGES: TENSIONS IN A MULTILEVEL SYSTEM 
In the first decade of the century, the organizational form of the EFBWW stayed on the course 
set in the 1990s during a stormy decade for European industrial relations. The organizational 
form remained a coordinating platform with limited steering and monitoring functions, but the 
dynamics resulting in this organizational form shifted and the tensions between the logics 
became more pronounced.  
The influence logic in the 1990s was determined by several challenges to the national social 
models: first, the Bolkestein draft directive threatened the principle whereby service providers 
have to abide by the host country rules. Second, four ECJ cases called into question the 
achievements of the Posted Workers Directive, and third, the financial crisis put severe strain on 
the construction sector. In addition, the Lisbon Treaty created more room for social and 
employment issues in the EU. With deeper integration and the introduction of the Euro, 
European issues become more and more important for the affiliates, leading to a greater interest 
in the EFBWW’s role than in previous years. In terms of both the influence and membership 
logics, the enlargement of the EU to the East led to more coordination and integration needs 
from the EFBWW to balance diverging needs. The interests of its constituents have become more 
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diverse and competitive, particularly since the enlargement wave between 2004 and 2008. 
Maintaining a balance between protectionism and free movement was the cornerstone of the 
EFBWW lobbying work in the Noughties (Cremers et al. 2007; EFBWW n.a. [2009]; Seeliger and 
Wagner 2016). At the same time, the members faced challenges at home: several restructuring 
processes, mergers, declining membership, and fierce competition in the sector led to 
diminishing resources to transfer to the European level. In addition, the international federation 
BWI remained the forum for exchange on organizing migrant workers and was traditionally 
responsible for the solidarity work with the new Eastern European members. Until 2004, The 
Eastern unions had been members of the BWI and not of the EFBWW and were supported by 
the BWI in their aim to build up independent and powerful unions. The EFBWW did not see 
external relations and building up union strength as their territory. This in turn led to frustrations 
among some affiliates, which then decided to turn to the BWI for support. 
The dual (or for the Nordic members, triple) administrative structure in Europe meant that 
resources from the membership were divided. The EFBWW administration in turn implemented 
its goals by extracting resources from the influence logic: first, the federation continued to use 
Commission funds to engage in project work and provide services to its members (e.g., 
information and training measures on asbestos or coordination meetings for EWC 
representatives). With its information approach, the EFBWW takes a different stance than, for 
example, the alternative model EMWU. The goal is not to mobilize and organize workers, but to 
ensure that workers (and employers) are well informed about the working conditions in their 
host countries. This information service provided to the members can then be used by the 
affiliates for further organizing and advice. Thereby, these projects are viewed as levers to gain 
the national affiliates’ trust in a European approach. Over time, Commission funding made up 
half of the EFBWW’s funds, making the administration at least partly directly accountable to 
Commission funding logics. The BWI, on the other hand, is responsible for campaigning and 
development support for new unions and receives funds from the ILO or national development 
agencies. Thus, each federation can use its financing niche to extract resources for projects.  
The EFBWW administration also had to navigate conflicting dynamics between contention and 
cooperation: on the one hand, the federation had to show its constituents that it could represent 
their interests to employers and the Commission, while on the other hand it needed employer 
cooperation in order to jointly influence sectoral policies. Plus, in return for participation in the 
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Social Dialogue, the Commission was obliged to inform on legislative initiatives in social and 
employment issues, thus providing the members with the information they needed. For 
example, the EFBWW’s lobbying work in preventing the Bolkestein Directive was a major 
success. Because the EFBWW wanted to influence policymaking to maintain national autonomy 
(as in the Service Directive or the regulation of posted work) and address sectoral issues (as they 
did during the crisis), it made a pragmatic choice to focus on common interests with the 
employer federation FIEC in the Social Dialogue. FIEC and the EFBWW experienced enormous 
pressure in the construction sector after the borders to Eastern Europe opened. The social 
partners were therefore eager to join and prevent legislation that would lead to social dumping 
and, in the worst case, would lead to different host/home country legislation applicable to the 
same construction site. In the end, it was exactly the outspoken lobbying strategy such as that 
concerning the Service Directive that provided the EFBWW with the credentials of doing 
everything to protect its affiliates’ national autonomy. Meanwhile, the EFBWW’s strong 
positions within ETUC regarding the Service and Enforcement Directive also added to its standing 
among its members. 
In this mutual exchange process, however, some affiliates began criticizing the closeness of some 
of the negotiation partners with their employer counterparts and the cooperative position 
toward the Commission. For example, a CLR member and partner in several EFBWW projects 
described his observations as follows: “This Social Dialogue is the last resort to overcome internal 
difficulties. The EFBWW cannot succeed in the coordination of trade union policy in the member 
countries. And that is not different with FIEC or ETUC. They are basically powerless, because they 
are supposed to represent common ground where there is no common ground. And then the last 
lifeline is the Social Dialogue. And this is counterproductive, at least regarding the defense of 
trade union positions” (CLR Member2 2011). One EFBWW representative explained the pitfalls 
of the consensual approach since trade unions rely on the force of conflicts to persuade their 
members of their strength: “I always think that okay, it´s not automatic, that we should, because 
we have the power to negotiate that European level, that we should take everything and just 
negotiate. […] And my point of view is that we should see, because let´s say that the employers 
want to negotiate, because something worse is coming from the Commission. Then we have to 
think back with them: okay, they think some worse is coming from the Commission, maybe 
something better for us. That´s the way, I think, we should reason. […] But […] all kinds of things 
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related to worker´s rights, it´s not that obvious that we should negotiate” (EFBWW Rep8 2011). 
The administrative approach of close relationships was also seen as critical: “Some of those that 
are active for our side as lobbyists in Brussels have forgotten over the years that they must be 
tough as nails in representing trade union interests. […] Everything is bedded in diplomatic 
feathers” (Schmidt-Hullmann 2009a). As the international coordinator of the IG BAU, Frank 
Schmidt-Hullmann, has argued, negotiations often take place in a very amicable setting, since 
“We don’t want to be seen as opponents of European integration” (Schmidt-Hullmann 2009a). 
Thus, the organization is continuously confronted with a dilemma: on the one hand, consensual 
dialogue provides the EFBWW with more strength to influence politics on sectoral issues, and 
joint projects on sectoral issues can be funded via the Sectoral Social Dialogue. On the other 
hand, the EFBWW needs to show its members that it can take up conflictive issues and strongly 
represent its members’ interests without compromising its identity as a union. 
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pay and “willingness to 
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goal formation  


















Contentious politics vs. 
cooperation 
Contentious politics vs. 
cooperation with 
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On the other hand, the administration needs to deal with decreasing resources from its affiliates, 
which means that even if the members believe that the EFBWW is able to successfully influence 
policies, they are often not able to pay for more resources. This fragile balance between 
democratic goal formation and effective goal implementation seemed to be one of the 
underlying currents of the EFBWW's development during these years. A central part of this 
conflict appeared to be the understanding of the trade union movement’s role in Europe, which 
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is torn between goal implementation through cooperation and goal implementation through 
contention, both at the cost of a tradeoff. 
As a result, the EFBWW’s organizational form embodies the tensions between three competing 
logics: a membership with little resources to transfer more power to the European federation 
and diverging interests and abilities in European coordination, an influence logic that provides 
pull factors in the form of external resources and access in return for participation, and an 
administration that needs to fulfill the coordination needs of its members while at the same time 
maintaining the non-binding status that protects the national autonomy of its affiliates.  
As the membership adapts to the expectation that external resources will be provided and the 
administration navigates these expectations, the dependency on external resources from the 
influence logic is likely to increase over time. This thought leads into the next chapter, which 
reflects on the legacy of critical junctures, asking if the tensions embodied in the EFBWW might 
have become self-reinforcing, excluding alternative trajectories.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 THE LONG-LASTING EFFECTS OF CRITICAL JUNCTURES 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Identifying a critical juncture in retrospective translates to a simple statement: from this time 
on, the route is irreversible and it is impossible to go back to the way it was before, implying that 
some type of self-reinforcing process is at work. In Chapter 5, a shift in the organizational form 
was identified in the mid-1980s to 1990s. A number of critical junctures in the logics of 
membership, influence, and administration explain this shift. The story told in the last chapter 
involves institutionalization processes driven by social mechanisms of adaption and dependency. 
The theory of path dependence suggests that these processes, triggered by critical junctures, can 
create locked-in situations. If that is true, the medium level organizational type witnessed in the 
EFBWW is set, and there is no way out. In this line of thinking, processes are the center of analysis 
and actors lose strategic options. Such a general path dependence perspective for unions has 
been implied by Martin and Ross, who have argued that trade union are inherently “path 
dependent” (Martin and Ross 1999a: 4), and by other authors, who fear that unions are 
experiencing “strategic paralysis” when faced with external challenges (Brinkmann and 
Nachtwey 2010: 22; Deppe 2009: 15). 
In addition, the political arena in which trade unions act makes them particularly predisposed to 
path-dependent processes (Pierson 2000). Chapter 5 recounted counterfactual alternatives that 
did not succeed, suggesting some form of strategic lock-in. However, in politics, agency and 
collective action are also exactly what enable change: Brexit is a prime example. Several years 
ago, one might have said that Britain was on the “EU path,” while today it is clear that opposing 
streams have been forming alongside the established path and have changed an institutionalized 
system. Other authors have embraced the potential for change in unions and have described 
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trade union revitalization strategies in terms of “path dependent renewal” (Meise 2014; 
Nachtwey and Thiel 2014). What seems like an oxymoron, however, might simply be the 
acknowledgment that agency can make room for change within a corridor of potential options, 
and incremental changes can be transformative over time (Streeck and Thelen 2005). 
Understanding patterns of reproduction and negative effects is important when exploring 
options for change. These thoughts lead to the second research question of the thesis: What key 
critical junctures explain the formation and stabilization of the present form of Europeanization?" 
Chapter three outlined what defines path-dependent processes: developments follow a logic 
predetermined by founding conditions, and some form of critical juncture sets self-reinforcing 
mechanisms in motion that further constrain future developments and lock the organization 
onto an established path that becomes increasingly difficult to deviate from (Beyer 2006; 
Mahoney and Schensul 2006; Pierson 2004; Schreyögg and Sydow 2011). The suppressed 
trajectories and alternatives can help identify a specific pattern over time (Aminzade 1992). Self-
reinforcing mechanisms exhibiting recurrent constraint patterns are the main characteristic of a 
path-dependent organizational development. Thus, this chapter concentrates on the analysis of 
three steps: first, this chapter summarizes the findings on the prevailing organizational form and 
describes organizational trends that seem to have stabilized over time. Second, flowing from the 
tensions between the three logics, this chapter describes potentially negative effects of stability 
(the “Dark Side”) and describes in greater detail potentially self-reinforcing mechanisms that 
have contributed to the development of the EFBWW as the coordination platform it is today. In 
addition, defining the formation and stabilization of an organizational form also means 
illustrating counterfactuals – therefore, the last section also recapitulates alternative 
organizational routes. Before concluding, a final section adopts a different perspective, 
highlighting signs of change and the benefits of the EFBWW’s organizational pattern. This last 
section concludes with an assessment of the research question. 
 
6.2 A STABLE ORGANIZATIONAL PATTERN? 
COORDINATION OF NON-BINDING STANDARDS 
Path dependence theory suggests that the stable institutionalization process that has been 
described for the EFBWW can become rigid and even locked in over time. National union 
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organizations are predestined for such a label because their development is deeply embedded 
in their institutional setting (Ebbinghaus 1993; Martin and Ross 1999a). Has the 
institutionalization process witnessed on the national level also developed on the European 
level, leading to a stable matrix of union Europeanization? In the construction sector, the 
organizational form that has stabilized since the 1990s indicates that there seems to be a stable 
organizational pattern. 
Over the years, the EFBWW has maintained and deepened its organizational role as a 
coordination platform with limited steering functions and maintained the organizational mode 
of negotiating non-binding standards. The current European trade union secretariat, as one 
interview partner remarked, is a “Child of the Nineties” (Expert1 2011). During that decade, the 
EFBWW began taking up a role of negotiating non-binding standards in the fields of social 
dialogue and company representation. In the fields of health and safety and the regulation of 
free movement of labor/posted work, the EFBWW developed a steering role (DG Employment, 
Social Affairs and Inclusion 2016; European Commission 2015a). Since then the organizational 
form of the European federation in the construction sector does not seem to have changed 
significantly, indicating that Europeanization has reached a certain level at which the 
organizational form has stabilized.  
Figure 13 EFBWW (Founded 1974) and Its Predecessor the Joint Committee | Organizational Outcome (1955–2015) 
 
Several aspects exemplify the organizational pattern of the EFBWW. First, in the field of social 
dialogue, the EFBWW has had the mandate to engage in social dialogue in the construction 
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non-binding declarations on vocational training, health and safety issues, and the free movement 
of labor, and has been increasingly active in the Social Dialogue, which officially started in 1994 
(EFBWW 2008a; EFBWW Rep8 2011; European Commission 2014b; Laux 2006). Joint statements 
with employers on sectoral issues have become an essential part of the EFBWW’s work, as the 
steadily high number of joint texts from the Social Dialogue from 2001 to 2015 indicates (see 
Figure 14: European Social Dialogue in Construction: Number of Outcomes per Five-Year Period).  
Figure 14: European Social Dialogue in Construction: Number of Outcomes per Five-Year Period 
(European Commission 2016) | For a full list of European Social Dialogue Outcomes see Appendix 8.5 
 
 
Second, in the field of European company representation, the EFBWW’s role was to coordinate 
the creation of EWCs and establish a network to create joint standards (EFBWW 2008a: 12). In 
the early 1990s, the EFBWW received a mandate from its members’ initiate EWCs (Keller and 
Sörries 1999: 121). Since then, a steady pattern of newly founded EWCs with the support of the 
EFBWW has emerged after a unique peak before the introduction of mandatory EWCs between 
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Figure 15: Number of EWCs in the Building and Woodworking Sector 
(own graph based on ETUI 2016) 
 
Both of these examples are indirect consequences of the EFBWW’s organizational role as 
coordinating platform and negotiator of non-binding rules. They are, however, not proof of a 
stagnating organizational role. What these numbers indicate is that both the Social Dialogue 
outcomes and the EWC outcomes stabilized during the Noughties. However, the EFBWW’s 
organizational role was also defined by limited steering functions. With the recurrent lobbying 
patterns for the Posted Workers Directive (1996), the Services Directive (2006), and the 
Enforcement of the Posted Workers Directive (2013), the EFBWW also repeatedly confirmed its 
role as a European interest representative for its affiliates (Arnold 2008; Christine Oliver 1991; 
Clarke et al. 2003; Cremers 1991, 1998; Druker 1998; EFBWW Rep8 2011).  
COMMISSION FUNDING 
The EFBWW’s organizational development is characterized by two additional stable factors: first, 
external financing through Commission funding has become a constant pattern for the EFBWW’s 
operational work. For the years for which data is available from the Financial Transparency 
System of the European Commission, the EFBWW’s project funding has continuously risen. An 
affiliate summarized, “The membership fees is a small portion of the whole. And the project 
funding has increased over the years” (EFBWW Affiliate5 2012). The federation receives 
approximately €1 million in affiliation fees and about €1 million in project funding, making the 
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EFBWW more autonomous from its members in its projects (EFBWW Rep2 2011). In 2014 alone, 
the EFBWW received €1.1 million in funding (European Commission 2015a).4  
Figure 16: Commission Funding for EFBWW Projects 
(DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 2016; European Commission 2015a; European Commission, DG Employment, 
Social Affairs and Inclusion 2015; Financial Transparency System, Financial Reporting and Strategy 2016) 
For a full list of Commission funded projects see Appendix 8.4 
 
The structural position of funding for the EFBWW is underpinned by the role of funding for the 
European trade union movement as a whole (ETUI 2016). ETUC alone received more than €3.6 
million in project funding in 2014, and the five largest ETUFs and ETUC together received more 
than €8 million (European Commission 2015a). The European Trade Union Institute’s research 
and training activities were supported with more than €11 million (European Commission 
2015a).5  
Compared to national unions, this support is minimal: the German service union ver.di, for 
example, has a yearly budget of €475 million (Müller and Wilke 2014: 164). For the EFBWW 
however, the financial support is crucial (EFBWW Rep3 2011). For example, from 2008 to 2012 
and again in 2015, the EFBWW had to compensate for a structural underfinancing, while during 
the same time the amount of Commission funding rose compared to the previous years (EFBWW 
2016b; EFBWW Rep2 2011; European Commission 2015a). Interview partners stated that the 
affiliation fees have decreased steadily over the years despite rising fees per individual member 
                                                        
 
 
4 The data for Figure 16: Commission Funding for EFBWW Projects was received from the Directorate General Employment, 
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion following a request with the European Financial Transparency System. Data is 
available from 1999 onwards; information on project funding for the 1990s was not available. 
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(EFBWW Rep2 2011; EFBWW Rep8 2011). As one EFBWW representative summarized, 
“Financing the Federation has become more and more difficult” (EFBWW Rep4 2012a). Precise 
data on the total amount of fees is only available for the years from 2011 to 2015 (EFBWW 
2016b); during these years the EFBWW’s affiliation fees have decreased by more than 8%, which 
is quite a lot of money given the small sums the EFBWW has for its structural work.  
Figure 17: Commission Funding for Five European Sectoral Trade Union Federations and ETUC  
(own calculation based on data from (European Commission 2015a; European Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs 
and Inclusion 2015) 
 
Note: the volatility over the years is partly explained by the merger of the industry federations from the metal, chemical, 
and textile sectors into IndustriALL in 2012. This could also be an explanation for the absence of Commission funding in that 
year.  
 
DIVISION OF LABOR BETWEEN THE BWI AND EFBWW 
The division of affiliation payments between the EFBWW and the BWI also shows a stable 
distribution over time, as indicated in Figure 17. For more than 20 years (data is only available 
from 1995 until 2010), affiliation fees for the BWI have remained roughly three times as high as 
those of the EFBWW. Platzer and Müller have noted, “The (historically grown) principle we can 
witness in almost all transnational federations, that the affiliation fees to the global federation 
are higher than to the European federation, is also true in the building and woodworking sector” 
(Platzer and Müller 2009: 564). An example from a Nordic Federation illustrates these numbers: 
the affiliate pays approximately €15,000 to the EFBWW, €25,000 to the NFBWW, and €48,000 
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Figure 18: Affiliation Fees of International and European Federations in the Construction Sector (1995–2010)6 
 (EFBWW 2016b; adapted from Platzer and Müller 2009: 238, 564) 
 
The division of labor between the BWI and the EFBWW has also remained stable. The BWI is 
responsible for solidarity work and supporting unions and organizing structures in Europe, while 
the EFBWW is responsible for lobbying work and EU industrial relations (BWI1 2012; EFBWW 
Affiliate3 2012; EFBWW Rep4 2012a; Leeuw 2012). “The division of labor is from way back,” one 
affiliate summarized (EFBWW Affiliate3 2012). Whereas the BWI is strongly invested in 
campaigning for core labor standards, identifying scandals in the big multinationals, and 
organizing development projects, the EFBWW works in the strongly institutionalized setting of 
the EU: as one EFBWW representative described, “our focus is the corporatist design of labor 
relations” (EFBWW Rep4 2012a). On the other hand, “The BWI is more of getting organizing 
projects to unions or helping unions to survive. And it´s a kind of support and aid organization. 
The EFBWW is not that kind of organization,” one interviewee explained (EFBWW Rep8 2011). 
Taken together, the EFBWW’s development shows signs of stability in the interaction with 
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6.3 THE DARK SIDE OF A PATTERN: RESOURCE DEPENDENCY, ADAPTING 
EXPECTATIONS AND SUPPRESSED ALTERNATIVES 
A path dependence perspective can highlight how the tensions identified in Chapter 5 can over 
time lead to constrained response options. As the constraining conflicts tip in one direction, self-
reinforcing mechanisms affect the reactions in one logic, which has repercussions for the 
response in another logic, setting in motion a dynamic that is increasingly difficult to change.  
The institutionalization process might be fueled by initial stimuli that are beneficial for the 
involved actors. Over time, however, the road of institutionalization might lead to unintended 
consequences that hinder alternative options for organizational change. Thus, this section 
focuses on the unplanned effects of critical junctures, or the problematic side-effects of 
institutionalization processes. 
RESOURCE DEPENDENCY 
Like any member association, ETUFs worry about their members. In order to fulfill the goals 
agreed upon by the membership, the federation must address its political environment. In return 
for certain concessions (compliance, focus on specific issues, etc.), the political environment 
grants resources to the organization, which in turn transfers these resources to its memberships 
as collective benefits (e.g., privileged access to resources and information) (Streeck and 
Kenworthy 2005). Trade unions have to find a balance between securing these external 
resources and maintaining their membership’s willingness to finance and act on behalf of their 
interests (Offe and Wiesenthal 1980; van Waarden 1992: 523). 
The critical juncture for the organization’s development came about in the late 1980s to mid-
1990s when the Commission began actively and purposefully strengthening European trade 
unions and promoting a European level of industrial relations (Goetschy 1996; Martin and Ross 
1995). Martin and Ross describe this shift in a study on early Commission funding: “What 
occurred, in fact, was the development of a Commission strategy to create ‘path dependent’ 
matrices of choice to move the social partners towards such Commission goals. It would do so, 
short step by short step, by proposing policy that could lead labor and capital to see their own 
goals in more European ways” (Martin and Ross 1995: 2). Twenty years later, this study asks if 
critical events such as Commission funding have defined the future route of organizational 
development. 
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Resource dependence argues that organizations can become dependent on resources supplied 
by their environment, which makes it necessary for the organization to continuously maintain 
stable relations with the provider of the resources (Beyers and Kerremans 2007; Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978). Over time, this continuous effort to receive external resources focuses the 
activities of the federation on the conditions of external resource provision, potentially 
neglecting alternative forms of action. Learning within the administration can reinforce this 
effect. In the case of the EFBWW, the persistence is enhanced by a diminishing resource base 
from the membership, while the diversity and number of affiliates have increased, thus 
increasing the coordination needs of the federation and the expectations of the membership to 
secure external resources. In addition, co-funding of Commission-funded projects has the 
potential to enhance power divisions among the membership. The following section describes 
this process in more detail.  
After the initial phase of Commission funding in the early 1990s, during which it was fairly simple 
to receive funds, it became more difficult for the European federations to receive support 
(EFBWW Rep4 2012a; EFBWW Rep8 2011). After the mid-1990s, the budgetary situation became 
much more difficult, as several interview partners recalled, and Commission funding began to 
become an essential source of the federation’s operational work (EFBWW Rep1 2011; EFBWW 
Rep2 2011; EFBWW Rep3 2011). Internally, with the admission of the EFTA unions to the EFBWW 
in the early 1990s, the balance between larger (and wealthier) and smaller (and poorer) unions 
shifted. The new affiliates handed in their travel expenses, which the older members had paid 
for themselves, and this led to greater financial need in the federation (EFBWW Rep7 2011). 
The membership decline added to the financial difficulties, particularly since the construction 
and wood sectors are classically characterized by low rates of membership density (Eurofound 
2014: 13, 2015: 26). In addition, several affiliates dealt with mergers and had other internal 
preoccupations with organizational restructuring. In a survey concerning obstacles to 
transnational union cooperation, Larsson found that in construction, the lack of resources is 
viewed as the most important barrier to extended cooperation (Larsson 2012). The imminent 
threat of not receiving enough fees from its members has shaped the organization’s perception 
of its own strength, as one interview partner remembered from the 1990s and 2000s: “Well, that 
was … that was always ‘there is no money; members are running away’ and ‘affiliation fees are 
going down; there is no money left and we can’t finance the EFBWW’” (EFBWW Rep3 2011). The 
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increase of diversity among the membership and the rising coordinating functions of the 
organization have added to this dependency: “So I think that the enlargement of the European 
Union and the problems that arise with languages and travels and so on and so on, that that has 
led to a higher dependency, financial dependency.“ (EFBWW Rep1 2011). The EFBWW, which 
had been through difficult financial years, benefited from the positive side-effects of Commission 
funding: “Well, it´s we try to organize it effectively and within the rules, not breaking the rules of 
course, but make it in a way so that in the end we will get a small surplus. And it did work that 
way in the past, so that´s we have been able to save more than €1 million, that we have” (EFBWW 
Rep8 2011). The EFBWW-related network CLR also benefits from Commission funding. Since the 
network has no money of its own and no paid membership, the seminars are run “on a kind of 
shoestring”: for example, the network often organizes seminars running next to the Social 
Dialogue meetings (CLR Member1 2011).  
As a result, the federation seems to have become more and more dependent on Commission 
funding, as one affiliate argued: “They are depending on what is happening inside the EU. If they 
start cutting the funds, the have so little in member fees so it is unbalanced the whole time. If the 
EU would start cutting down the funds, what would happen with the federation? That is the 
question the whole time” (EFBWW Affiliate5 2012). The EFBWW itself has supported this 
conclusion and has noted that reduced affiliation fees over time “inevidently lead to less 
independence of the EFBWW” (EFBWW 2007: 4 cited in Platzer Müller 565). Another affiliate 
described how important the Commission funds have become: “Therefore it has been easier in a 
way to have external funds […]. And mostly paid at the EFBWW is project money from the EU. 
And you must remember the membership fee inside the EFBWW is not very much” (EFBWW 
Affiliate5 2012).  
The data available does not imply any direct influence by the Commission. However, the role of 
external funding is seen critically within the federation, as an IG BAU representative stated in an 
interview: “If a majority of the projects […] is funded by the EU Commission, as it is now, this 
financial dependency will mean that trade unionists won’t become too bold” (Schmidt-Hullmann 
2009a). One interview partner highlighted this difficulty when discussing the design of these 
projects: “The projects are designed in a way that they don’t target any controversies and don’t 
produce any controversies” (CLR Member2 2011). Similar criticisms have been voiced concerning 
ETUC (Degryse 2013; Seeliger and Wagner 2016). Following this interpretation, the focus on 
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project management (administration) would favor a more detached style of policy-making such 
as, for example, a more contentious, membership-oriented approach. For example, Seeliger and 
Wagner have cited a trade union representative, arguing that ETUC’s positive stance toward 
Commission proposals is due to the Commission’s financial support: “In particular, there is the 
big problem of dependency of EU funding. […] And there is too big feeling of what they call 
responsibility. If we want to be respected and to be listened to by the commission, we have to 
behave” (Seeliger and Wagner 2016: 15). Seeliger and Wagner have also cited an ETUC 
representative: “Perhaps not consciously but subconsciously or somewhere looming in the 
background of thinking, there is the idea, ‘Let’s look at the amount of money we are getting from 
the European Commission.’ And indeed it is sometimes a lot of money. So, they don’t want ... 
They might subconsciously be thinking, ‘Let’s not endanger this’”(Seeliger and Wagner 2016: 15). 
The account of a former leading EFBWW representative also indicates that such an implicit 
orientation toward Commission preferences might exist: “That is the danger – that in the end 
one has an agenda that is partly determined by the Commission. What are the priorities; what 
do they find important? So one writes – if one estimates that that is necessary – one writes such 
a project with the catchwords and ideas from the Commission documents. Therefore, one is not 
completely free to say, ‘These are our problems; these are our analyses. This is the way we will 
approach the problem; we’ll solve it so and so.’ One always looks with one eye: what does the 
Commission have, what are their priorities, and so on. Because one doesn’t want to lose the 
opportunities for projects supported by the Commission” (EFBWW Rep2 2011).  
In addition, the dependency on Commission funding is reinforced by the increasing amount of 
time devoted to managing the projects: “The accounting is much stricter […]. And that´s natural, 
because everyone is under pressure, so we have much more time and much more effort to deal 
with the accounting and the final reporting of everything. So that´s much more difficult today 
than it was before” (EFBWW Rep8 2011). Another EFBWW affiliate described how administrative 
issues often take up a great deal of time: “After the meetings it took half a year to prepare all the 
reports and all the administrative things; that took too much time” (EFBWW Affiliate7 2012). An 
EFBWW staff member who dealt with several projects also described how projects affect the 
daily administration: “And the social partner projects need to be administrated: you have 
meetings, seminars, conferences, documents that need to be written” (EFBWW Rep4 2012a). The 
EFBWW staff member also remarked that the proportion between political representation and 
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project work has shifted toward project work, although in general the amount of work in both 
fields has intensified (EFBWW Rep4 2012a). A trade unionist from one of the EFBWW affiliates 
added, “[T]he projects tend to lead a life of their own. These projects, they requires a lot of 
expertise to do these kind of projects and deal with the application. And the people involved in 
these projects and it tends to get a bureaucracy and the people involved in it feel they are part of 
something. And sometimes I feel – it might be a personal opinion – it might be that it is not so 
efficient” (EFBWW Affiliate3 2012). Thus, as the IG BAU representative summarized: “Even if 
Commission financing doesn’t lead to a political dependency, the acquired project funds tie up a 
substantial part of the working hours actually needed for direct European interest representation 
and lobbying” (Schmidt-Hullmann 2009b: 451).  
Given the scarce resources of ETUFs, it is probable that over time European federations would 
concentrate on issues likely to be funded instead of alternative courses of action for which no 
support is available. Several examples illustrate this line of reasoning. For instance, EWCs are one 
of the oldest instruments of European-level bargaining. European trade union federations have 
developed considerable competencies in establishing, training, and coordinating EWCs, while 
other forms of transnational organizing have lost momentum. One story that illustrates this is 
the EFBWW’s organizing work on international construction sites, which are called EUROSITES. 
At a transalpine tunnel construction site, the EFBWW coordinated two conferences in 2000 and 
2001 with the aim of establishing international works councils for these sites with the affiliates 
from Switzerland, Italy, Austria, Germany, and Poland (Gross 2001). However, when the project 
funding – supported by the Commission with roughly €70,000 (DG Employment, Social Affairs 
and Inclusion 2016) – ended, the EFBWW had difficulties maintaining the project. Afterward, the 
issue seemed to lose support and, as Platzer and Müller have pointed out, did not even feature 
in the EFBWW’s 2004 Action Program (Platzer and Müller 2009: 583). For example, the 
Multiprojects, where the EFBWW organized workers on large construction sites, can no longer 
be funded using Commission funds, and the EFBWW instead focuses on support for EWCs 
through conferences and training (EFBWW Rep4 2012a). 
Paradoxically, the focus on established repertoires is increased by the fact that it is difficult to 
receive follow-up funding in order to integrate and stabilize the results of innovative projects: 
“There have to be some innovative aspects, but it´s hard to do that when you are dealing with 
the same thing. […] That´s not easy” (EFBWW Rep8 2011). Another interview partner added, 
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“[Projects were rejected] because they were projects from two or three years ago. You always 
have to think of something new and renewal needs to be shown” (EFBWW Rep2 2011). In the 
Social Dialogue, the projects usually run for one year, and prolonging the projects is not possible 
(EFBWW Rep5 2011). An EFBWW representative explained that it is difficult to transfer projects 
into long-term practice: “Either the projects are over or they are supposed to be transferred into 
practice. Then you have a problem. […] But the Commission is also clear and does not fund 
ongoing tasks” (EFBWW Rep4 2012a). The Commission funds projects, not long-term structures: 
“If it was too federation-oriented, that wasn’t funded. We didn’t receive any funding for 
[structural] development or say for the financing of things a union needs to finance on its own. 
That was never the case” (EFBWW Rep7 2011). These funding lines were not devised to fund 
structures or more contentious trade union activities such as demonstrations or strikes: “For 
demonstrations, strikes, there is no funding from the European Commission” (EFBWW Affiliate2 
2012). The project lines funding European trade union activities stem from three main budget 
lines: (1) industrial relations and social dialogue, (2) information and training measures, and (3) 
information, consultation, and participation of works council representatives. The first budget 
line concentrates on social dialogue and improving expertise in the field of European industrial 
relations (European Commission 2006, 2012). The second and third budget lines fund measures 
concentrating on information services geared toward establishing and supporting European 
industrial relations instruments (European Commission 2010a, 2014a). “Traditional” union 
activities in Clegg’s sense in the areas of collective bargaining or political action are not included 
in these funding structures (Clegg 1976).  
For example, an EFBWW representative described a network project proposed together with the 
BWI on EWCs and globalization: “And this was rejected by the Commission, maybe because it was 
too little Europe in it. Or it was not only Europe” (EFBWW Rep8 2011). The result is that many 
projects bring forward new ideas (e.g., best practice guides or information websites), but within 
a “safe” corridor of Commission funding guidelines. As one interview partner summarized, “You 
can say that we have many projects according to the priorities of the European Commission” 
(EFBWW Affiliate2 2012). How difficult it may be for a federation to transfer successfully 
implemented projects into long-term structures can be illustrated by several examples. 
The project INNOtrans was supposed to develop a network for exchange about European 
strategies and labor representation (EFBWW 2007a). The follow-up project aimed at developing 
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information exchange on professional training (2009–2011). The website’s last entry is from 
March 2011; when funding was terminated, the network was no longer active (Arbeit und Leben 
Bielefeld and IG Metall 2009). A third follow-up project with Commission funding was organized 
by national project partners in Germany in coordination with Swedish and Polish trade unions 
and the EFBWW as background support (Arbeit und Leben Bielefeld e.V. 2011). The project was 
intended to support an EWC in a German furniture company. The EWC news on the website 
ended when the project ended, although the EWC database indicates that the agreement is still 
active. 
A vocational training database (dBuild) that was devised in cooperation with the CLR was 
rejected for funding (Cremers 2001b: 2; Zachmann 2001). Although a significant amount of work 
went into the development of a prototype database, the project could not be completed and 
never developed into a publicly accessible website.  
ECMIN is another example of an ambitious and helpful project that was never fully completed. 
ECMIN is an information platform for migrant workers. Only unions from 15 European countries 
participated, and the contact information provided on the website for many of the countries is 
outdated. The ECMIN website is a strong example of a European organizing project that the 
affiliates appear cautious to support (Greer et al. 2013: 17). However, the issue is more 
complicated. For one EFBWW official, ECMIN is an example of a Commission-funded project that 
has not ended with funding but has not been able to develop a structural quality due to lack of 
follow-up financing: “It´s been, we finished the project, but we haven´t sold the issue updating 
the information” (EFBWW Rep8 2011). ECMIN exemplifies how difficult it is for labor to establish 
European information structures without external support. In a Social Dialogue meeting in 2009, 
the members discussed this issue, pointing out that any regular update of the database would 
need additional (external) financial support from the European Commission, the European 
Parliament, or other sponsors (Europäische Kommission 2009: 2f). It took several years until the 
federation was able to follow up with a new posting website covering all EU countries, funded 
by the Commission in 2014 and jointly set up by FIEC and the EFBWW. This process of project 
work is a problem for the EFBWW, as a representative indicated: “Yeah, that´s one of the, 
perhaps, limitations and some of our affiliates think that we are not good enough and taking care 
of perhaps some good results we got from the project […]. So, that is sometimes the critique we 
get from them of not doing enough with the results” (EFBWW Rep8 2011). 
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A further aspect that seems to be enhanced (but not caused) by Commission funding is the 
relative stability of power relations within the federation. Funding for European projects is 
usually only granted for part of the project (usually about 70% to 90% of the total budget), and 
the remaining percentage has to be funded by the project partners (European Commission 
2015a). Thus, stronger affiliates necessarily play a greater part as project partners than affiliates 
with less resources (CLR Member2 2011; EFBWW Affiliate4 2012; EFBWW Rep5 2011). The 
federation has a history of conducting cooperative projects and supporting staff exchanges 
(EFBWW Rep1 2011). In the founding years of the EFBWW, the national affiliates were supposed 
to pay part of the salary of the secretaries. The question always was, “Who can release someone 
from his national duties for some time and co-finance the European work?” (EFBWW Rep7 2011). 
After the admission of non-EC and Christian unions to the EFBWW, the financially sound unions 
of the Northwest continued to provide the main financing for the federation. Secretary General 
Cremers, for example, received some of his salary from his Dutch union Bouw- en Houtbond FNV 
for some time (EFBWW Rep1 2011). For the lobbying on the revision of the Posting Directive, a 
Swedish affiliate financed experts to support the EFBWW (EFBWW Affiliate3 2012; EFBWW Rep8 
2011). 
In addition, there seems to be a tacit agreement that larger affiliates can nominate staff 
positions: “When staff positions are newly established […] there is a sort of informal right of 
nomination, depending on the size of the union, because we pay membership fees” (EFBWW 
Affiliate1 2010). In addition, the voting structure of the EFBWW (and most of the other ETUFs) is 
based on the number of members an affiliate has, and in the Executive Committee, the 
representation is based on members per country (EFBWW 2007b). One interview partner 
explained that increasing national strength has led to positions within the EFBWW: “In the last 
years the Southern countries and France have caught up. […] Not for nothing an Italian is now 
president; that would have been unthinkable before. It used to be Germans, Dutch” (EFBWW 
Rep6 2011). In Commission-funded projects, which make up a large part of the operational work 
of the federation, “the co-funding is mainly achieved by personnel support from the stronger 
unions” according to an EFBWW representative. “For example, in the projects on comparisons of 
wage bargaining, the IG BAU provided the person responsible for collective bargaining ‘for free’ 
and paid for the person’s travel expenses” (EFBWW Rep7 2011). Other unions have also provided 
extra support: “And the Belgian trade unions have filled up the hole again and again – they 
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always paid extra. The IG Metall [from Germany] has also been very generous; they never made 
any problems” (EFBWW Rep2 2011). 
The imbalance of resources thus in turn can lead to a self-reinforcing learning spiral: projects are 
conducted with the stronger unions, which in turn are able to set the tone of the projects. The 
ease of contact can then lead to increased exchanges in other issues concerning the federation, 
thus potentially reinforcing existing power structures. An EFBWW representatives explained, “If 
you have a hot topic you go where you know people, to people you are familiar with” (EFBWW 
Rep8 2011). Such a practice would provide more voice to members with more resources. 
However, the EFBWW is aware of this difficulty and has tried to find a balance. “We don’t want 
only the secretaries from the strong unions” an interview partner emphasized, and in terms of 
national representation in the administration, the EFBWW has made efforts to equally represent 
the different regions (EFBWW Rep7 2011). Despite these efforts, the office staff of the EFBWW 
remains mostly Western European, the secretary generals and presidents of the organization all 
come from the stronger Western European unions, and the CEE affiliates have not yet caught up 
(EFBWW 2008f, 2014a). The Managing Committee is also mostly Western European, but with an 
extra seat for the new member states (EFBWW 2008a).  
ADAPTIVE EXPECTATIONS 
As the first section described, the EFBWW seems to have developed a pattern of resource 
dependence on external funds from the Commission. This orientation toward project funding 
has been underpinned by the EFBWW’s logic of membership, which is defined by both the 
“shadow of the past” of the traditional division of labor between the BWI and the EFBWW and 
the legacy of the European trade union movement’s political and religious division. Over time, 
adaptive expectations might have led to a stabilization of the division of labor between the BWI 
and the EFBWW. Adaptive expectations describe the idea that actors adjust their behavior based 
on the anticipated actions of others (Pierson 2000: 254; Schreyögg and Sydow 2011: 325). The 
idea is that this process of adaptation leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy (Pierson 2000: 254). 
According to the established division of labor between the BWI and the EFBWW, the BWI 
functions as a solidaristic development aid organization that conducts capacity building for 
weaker affiliates. The EFBWW, on the other hand, is responsible for information services and 
lobbying the European Commission and parliament. The tensions between the European and 
international administrative levels have become more pronounced since the Central and Eastern 
 
Henni Appell  Workers of Europe Unite!? - Explaining the Form of European Labor Organization 224 
European affiliates became members of the EFBWW. Over time, this has resulted in increased 
management and coordination activities while simultaneously reducing the affiliates’ ability to 
sustain the core activities of the federation without external support. The need for coordination 
is additionally reinforced by the legacy of the dual activity structure of the BWI and the EFBWW 
in the new member states. This dual structure has the potential to reduce one of the core 
features of trade unions, namely their members’ coordinated “willingness to act” (Offe and 
Wiesenthal 1980). 
Over time, a stable pattern of affiliation fees has crystallized in which the EFBWW membership 
fees amount to roughly one third of the payments to the BWI. Since the payments to the BWI 
are transferred in Swiss Francs, which have an unfavorable exchange rate, this makes raising the 
affiliation fees difficult. This can result in a process of adaptive expectations in which members 
anticipate the federation securing resources from the Commission, therefore decreasing the 
union members’ “willingness to pay,” which is a variation of Offe and Wiesenthal’s “willingness 
to act” (Offe and Wiesenthal 1980). This process of adaptation can lead to a self-fulfilling 
prophecy (Pierson 2000: 254). The following paragraphs outline the background of this process 
in more detail. 
The division of labor between the BWI and the EFBWW continues to cast its shadow on the 
capacity of the EFBWW to unite its affiliates (BWI1 2012; EFBWW Rep4 2012a; EFBWW Rep7 
2011; EFBWW Rep8 2011). The international federation already noted during the 1970s that the 
members of the European federation seemed reluctant to pay for any plans to enhance the 
EFBWWC’s role (e.g., nominating the required staff and paying for them) (EFBWWC 1978a). Bram 
Buijs, then-president of the international federation, also positioned himself against the 
established division of labor between the IFBWW as a political forum and the EFBWWC as an 
information provider by arguing that “clear political standpoints must be adopted” (EFBWWC 
1978d). At present, the BWI maintains a regional coordination for Europe for project 
coordination and campaigning in Middle and Eastern European countries. In the early 1990s, 
both the EFBWW and the IFBWW intensified their contacts with trade unions from the former 
Soviet Union. The Eastern European states, including the Baltic states, began a very close 
cooperation with the international federation (BWI1 2012). The CEE countries all became 
members of the IFBWW, but most unions only joined the EFBWW between 2004 and 2008. This 
meant that the international federation and the European federation had exactly the same 
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membership in Europe: “In fact, we have three structures,” recounted one interview partner. 
“And the Nordic federations pay for three structures and most of the European federations pay 
for two international federations. This is complete insanity, if you think about it” (BWI1 2012). 
Another interview partner said, “We have this double structure, we have the European 
Federation […] and then we have the subsection Europe in the international Federation” (EFBWW 
Affiliate1 2010). 
The BWI views itself as a lever of transnational cooperation in Europe and holds annual European 
conferences (BWI 2006b, 2014; EFBWW Rep2 2011). For the EFBWW, this was at times seen as 
intervention on their own turf: “What I still feel today, and that has annoyed me a lot personally, 
is that the international organization had this idea, we have a regional organization in Europe as 
we have in Africa, Asia, and in Latin America. And we have a regional organization in Europe. So 
we don’t have to be downgraded, so we always said, ‘Stop with that.’ We are a European, 
independent, and autonomous organization. And we are part of the family and need to cooperate 
and so on, but we are an independent European federation. […] If you take a look at the website 
of the BWI, you can read a lot about the structure. Latin America, Africa, Asia and way down you 
can read – very small – the name of the European federation. And there were always disputes 
about matters of competence regarding specific issues among the secretary generals.” (EFBWW 
Rep2 2011). Another interview partner recalled, “All these years there was a little discord 
between the European federation and the international federation, who had the say when it 
comes to Europe” (EFBWW Rep7 2011).  
The BWI saw its role primarily as a capacity builder helping weaker unions organize and grow 
(EFBWW Rep7 2011). Thus, when the EFBWW enlarged its membership base to the East, the BWI 
maintained its development work, arguing that the EFBWW could not take up this responsibility: 
“And with the geographical enlargement came the question: How do you do this with the Turks 
or the Russians or the Ukranians or all of the other countries outside the European Union. And 
then they were forced to say, well we can’t [fulfill these high expectations].” (BWI1 2012). During 
these years, the BWI established a close cooperation with many Central and Eastern European 
trade unions, as an interview partner recounted: “So we all took them in into our international 
federation, but we were systematically excluded from the European work by the EFBWW. They 
[the Eastern unions] weren’t even invited. So we took care of these unions for twenty years and 
that is why they developed close ties to us” (BWI1 2012). Thus, the close connections and 
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resulting loyalties of the Eastern affiliates were developed within the BWI, as an interviewee 
from the EFBWW summarized: “Yes, and that is the way politics are done. With ‘Have you heard?’ 
and ‘How will we proceed?’ and ‘What do you think?’ If there are no connections to the East, that 
falls through. And the real connection came from the BWI” (EFBWW Rep3 2011). 
SUPPRESSED ALTERNATIVES 
Apart from the organizational form of the EFBWW, which has developed into a stable mode of 
Europeanization since the 1990s, a further hint for stability is to identify suppressed trajectories 
and alternatives (Aminzade 1992). The underlying question for this empirical study is if and when 
alternative organizational forms have been considered. In addition, counterfactual analysis 
presumes that in theory, alternative options could have been possible given deepening 
integration. As indicated in Chapter 2, these extreme options range between a supranational 
European trade union structure on the one hand and nationally oriented unions with weak 
European federations on the other hand. In the EFBWW, the stable pattern has persisted despite 
adaptive pressures for a more transnational organizing approach and a stronger focus on 
lobbying work. The following section briefly summarizes these alternatives, which are outlined 
in greater detail in Chapter 5. Already during the preformation phase before the EFBWW 
developed its stable organizational mode the members discussed a harmonization of policies 
and a stronger coordinating role for the EFBWWC (EFBWWC 1978b, 1978c). During the 1980s 
and 1990s, when the European Federation’s work gained momentum, the discussions on 
organizational alternatives focused on a stronger coordinating role of the EFBWW in collective 
bargaining. In addition, the members began discussing the ability to transfer national union 
membership across borders, coordinated by the EFBWW. Organizational alternatives that were 
discussed in the early years of the century included various forms of deeper Europeanization. 
The most far-reaching suggestion was an organizational form where European construction labor 
would establish an independent transnational labor union (BWI 2007; Expert1 2011; Greer et al. 
2013; Schiavi 2008). This option was eventually attempted unilaterally by the German IG BAU 
but was not pursued further by the EFBWW. 
A second and overlapping alternative that was discussed was the change of the European 
Federation of Building and Woodworkers into a European Union of Building and Woodworkers, 
whereby the European organization would have the ability to hierarchically steer the national 
affiliates and engage in collective bargaining for its members (Bieler and Erne 2014; Clarke et al. 
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2003; EFBWW Rep7 2011). Third, some members discussed developing cross-national (bilateral 
or multilateral) unions through binational or multinational mergers, whereby the cross-national 
union would have been able to engage in the international negotiation of binding standards for 
its members (Cremers 2010; EFBWW Rep1 2011). Alternative tendencies toward developing a 
more transnational organizing approach, such as the Eurosite project on the Alp-Transit tunnel, 
were also not continued. One EFBWW representative remarked, “We should do that again. For 
example on a site for building nuclear power plants, where there were deadly injuries. We should 
have been there. […] But the ten [Commission-funded] projects don’t take place in this area. […] 
Resources are diminishing and one needs to find new organizational forms for such projects” 
(EFBWW Rep4 2012a). 
Changing the focus and dependency on Commission funding has also been a repeated topic 
among the members. For example, one affiliate remarked, “We are not so interested in these 
Commission projects; they are not so important. We are interested in the normal lobbying work” 
(EFBWW Affiliate3 2012). Another affiliate noted, “Firstly you must cut down a lot of different 
projects, all these conferences. And you must cut down the staff if you can’t reach the members” 
(EFBWW Affiliate5 2012). Another affiliate voices similar concerns: “For example, one of the 
projects I mentioned we got support for building up an internal information system that was quite 
technical. Of course it is necessary, but you can discuss if this is the right way of spending time” 
(Leeuw 2012). Yet another affiliate criticized the effectiveness of Commission funding and 
instead preferred an agreement-based approach by the EFBWW. He cited the example of Poland: 
“In my opinion, the Commission money is not that effective. In my opinion anything that could 
get [affiliates] interested in more union cooperation, intra-union cooperation. Real dialogue, 
setting up agreements, talking about what to do with all the […] workers with precarious contacts 
(EFBWW Affiliate4 2012). For another interviewee, the question is about prioritizing lobbying 
work before project work: “But most importantly their task is to use people, have influence, and 
find out how the things are going. That they are doing influence on these kind of matters. […] But 
you cannot spread up yourself and then you have some projects and meetings […]. But that kind 
of meetings will not take place because there is no time; it is about the priorities” (Lokhorst 2012). 
The interviewee described the search for an alternative to the “practical approach” of 
Commission-funded projects, particularly in the Social Dialogue: “And the colleagues say: […] the 
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deciding factor is to serve the political interests on the European level, to represent the interests 
on the level of legislation and jurisdiction” (EFBWW Rep4 2012a). 
The division of labor between the BWI and the EFBWW has also repeatedly led to discussions 
among the affiliates, as a long-term staff member of a national federation and the EFBWW 
described: “And the question is, ‘Do we need two federations?’ […] And that is of course, in times 
in which the members stay away and membership fees go down, that is luxury, to have several 
federations“ (EFBWW Rep3 2011). Ever since the first discussions on the relationship between 
the IFBWW and the newly founded European federation in the 1970s, the members have 
debated whether it would be more efficient to integrate the EFBWW into the BWI for a better 
allocation of affiliation fees. Platzer and Müller have also reported discussions on this question 
during the Noughties, when it became increasingly clear that the EFBWW’s structural funds were 
diminishing (Platzer and Müller 2009: 565). Although coordination agreements with the BWI and 
the NFBWW have been concluded in order to work more effectively, according to an EFBWW 
representative, there have been “underlying debates, if these three levels make sense or if it 
might be good to have two levels or maybe one”(EFBWW Rep4 2012a). 
The feeling of “luxury” of paying for two federations is increased because the national 
federations pay their affiliation fees to the BWI in Swiss Francs (the strong Scandinavian unions 
even pay for three federations), as an EFBWW representative explained: “For all national 
federations it is a problem when it comes to costs. In Switzerland, you pay the expensive Swiss 
Francs per member. And I don’t know exactly what the difference is. But the federations pay 
about three times as much as in Brussels. And these are costs for federations that are facing 
membership decline and are having financial problems. And that is a problem; that needs to be 
said openly” (EFBWW Rep2 2011). This view was mentioned quite often in the interviews; for 
example, “They had to pay the wages in Swiss franc, which means that the value – Europeanly 
speaking – will be much higher on what they pay for the wages, and […] the affiliation fees from 
all countries outside of Switzerland will be automatically much higher. So that is a problem. That 
is very much discussed mainly within the BWI” (EFBWW Rep8 2011). Another construction 
unionist stated, “We can’t pay huge fees in two places” (EFBWW Rep7 2011). 
Altering the established pattern of distribution and increasing the EFBWW’s fees is a sensitive 
issue: “It´s more topic for the corridor talks. […] We have had some kind of gentlemen’s 
agreement; we should not talk about the other organization’s fees because we are technically 
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speaking independent. But of course we are the same in the sense that most of the members of 
the EFBWW are members of the BWI also and vice versa. […] It´s a sensitive issue, but it´s talked 
about. Yes. It´s very much. And it´s very important issue, because it´s related to the whole 
discussion of affiliation fees and what should the European federation do and what resources, 
and how are the resources in connection to the international, etc. So it´s a really an important 
issue” (EFBWW Rep8 2011). Within the EFBWW, raising membership fees has been discussed 
repeatedly, and there have been several increases in the past years. However, nominally 
speaking the fees per member have not risen significantly. In addition, weaker federations – 
particularly those from the new member states – pay less fees (EFBWW Rep2 2011; EFBWW 
Rep8 2011). Discussions about increases are difficult, since the precarious structure of many 
affiliates could always result in an exit strategy. In ETUFs, affiliates very rarely leave the 
organization; the turnover of membership within the organization is almost at 0%. Once a union 
has joined the EFBWW, it is likely to remain within the association (the only organization that 
decided to leave the EFBWW is the Turkish Yol-İş Sendikası, which resigned from the EFBWW but 
re-affiliated in 2004 (EFBWW 2008f: 34). 
Instead, members with less ability (or willingness) to pay for the federation simply circumvent 
higher fees by changing the number of individual members for whom they are paying affiliation 
fees (EFBWW Rep2 2011; EFBWW Rep7 2011). An interview partner explained, “There is a 
situation in the European Federation where certain unions have been paying membership fees 
for the same amount of members for years. So the French unions have an agreement among each 
other how these are distributed. […] You can’t do much there. […] And the Italian unions, they 
have always taken their own path. […] They don’t pay much, I must say” (EFBWW Rep2 2011). 
Another interview partner confirmed this impression: “Affiliates have more members than they 
are willing to pay affiliation fees – this is a common problem in international federations. […] I 
don’t think there is an interest to change that. I think people are happy that they are able to 
finance a certain basic structure on their own” (EFBWW Affiliate1 2010). This practice leads to a 
dilemma for the organization, as an EFBWW official summarized: “So, we also had to take into 
account, if we increase too much then some of the poor unions will just reduce the registered 
membership and the result will be zero” (EFBWW Rep8 2011). Since the affiliates can be relatively 
certain that their operational work is funded by the Commission, the incentive for such an exit 
strategy may be even greater.  
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Since the accession of the new members between 2004 and 2008, the membership of the two 
organizations in Europe is almost congruent, leading to increased discussions of a merger of the 
two federations. In 2006, the BWI came together with the EFBWW and the NFBWW and agreed 
on a coordination program focusing on the migration policy and the inclusion of migrant workers 
in trade union work (BWI 2006b; Pedrina 2008); all federations intended to renew this 
cooperation in 2014 (BWI 2014). In 2009, the discussion of a potential merger of the EFBWW and 
the BWI was put to an end by a resolution at the BWI congress in Lille, during which a clear 
majority of the European trade unions voted for preserving two independent organizations 
(EFBWW Rep8 2011). Apart from the clear political will to maintain the autonomous EFBWW, it 
was also important that the BWI and the EFBWW rely on different funding structures that could 
not be used as they currently are if the two federations merged: “One needs to pay for two 
different organizations and one has the idea, I think, if the two merge one can reduce costs. But 
that doesn’t work. The BWI works in Geneva, it has the support and the facilities of the ILO; we 
have that in Brussels” (EFBWW Rep2 2011). Another EFBWW representative also described this 
division of resource provision: “The BWI is linked with the ILO […] the European federation works 
in a strongly institutionalized setting” (EFBWW Rep4 2012a). While the ETUFs rely on 
Commission structures, the international trade union federations benefits from the ILO’s support 
infrastructure (EFBWW Rep7 2011; Waterman and Timms 2005). Furthermore, the BWI is able 
to extract resources from development agencies such as the German Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation 
and development aid from the Swedish or Norwegian governments (EFBWW Affiliate3 2012; 
EFBWW Affiliate4 2012; EFBWW Affiliate5 2012). The provision with external funds stabilized 
the division of labor and might have provided an incentive to maintain the two-tiered 
representation. Faced with developing parallel initiatives such as the EMWU, the EFBWW has 
instead reiterated its existing organizational structure based on coordination, lobbying work, and 
information services. For example, the EFBWW has continued its lobbying activities with regard 
to posted work to ensure the affiliates’ national autonomy, and it has followed its 
information/coordination role by initiating information projects for migrant workers funded by 
the Commission.  
 
6.4 THE BRIGHT SIDE OF A PATTERN 
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However, the focus on critical junctures also has its pitfalls: path research tends to focus on those 
issues that suggest stability or feedback processes in the aftermaths of supposed junctures, but 
have difficulty defining when a “legacy” is over and where changes or disruptive patterns 
develop. Furthermore, an organizational or institutional path might exist alongside more open 
and versatile structures that have not become path-dependent. In the research process, the 
danger of a path dependence framework is that it can let alternative routes and stories that do 
not fit onto the path fall off the radar. Thus, an important methodological issue in a study 
informed by path dependence theory is to keep one’s eyes open for processes that point to 
changes or alternative explanations. In political contexts, radical change is always possible. In 
practice, where expectations adapt and actors learn to navigate dependencies, agency is 
involved, and agency invites room for shifts. Thus, path-dependent processes in membership 
federations most likely do not lead to a frozen, locked-in path; rather, change is merely limited. 
The multitude of actors and the unpredictability of large-scale movements and revolutionary 
events always leave the door open for fundamental change. On a smaller, less revolutionary 
scale, these characteristics also open the door for more gradual change. New political majorities, 
influential individuals, or institutional entrepreneurs might influence the “path” to such an 
extent that it ceases to be clearly visible. Research concentrating on institutional change has 
taken up these concerns (Deeg 2001; Mahoney and Thelen 2009; Streeck and Thelen 2005). 
Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman have posited, “Hard times may lead to strategic paralysis, but 
can also stimulate the framing of new objectives, new levels of intervention, and new levels of 
action” (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013: 192). 
In the case of the EFBWW, more open and versatile structures seem to exist which challenge the 
idea of strategic lock-in and highlight the “bright side” of the EFBWW’s organizational pattern. 
Although it is difficult to deviate from the established system of external resource dependency, 
the EFBWW has also been able to use the benefits of Commission support to its advantage. 
Furthermore, commission funding can help reduce power asymmetries vis-à-vis industry 
federations, a system which Greenwood has called “empowered pluralism” (Greenwood 2011). 
Within this realm of possibility, the EFBWW took the coordination and information focus of 
Commission projects and used these projects to “feed” campaigns with background information. 
For example, two campaigning projects were used to raising awareness on (bogus) self-
employment and undeclared labor (DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 2016; EFBWW 
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and FIEC 2008). The EFBWW also launched an asbestos campaign lobbying the European 
institutions and providing publicity and information on health risks for workers (EFBWW 2010, 
2011a). The Commission funded training information on asbestos for workers, which the EFBWW 
devised together with FIEC, along with information on asbestos-related diseases and e-learning 
modules on working with asbestos (Banduch and Lißner 2013; EFBWW 2010, 2011a; EFBWW 
Affiliate2 2012). As an EFBWW policy officer described, the ideal is that Commission funding 
functions as a lever for increased European action (van der Straeten 2008). 
Among the ETUFs and the EFBWW, changes in the type of project conducted by the federations 
seem to have emerged. For example, the federations have begun to venture toward more 
coordinated projects. In 2014, seven ETUFs launched a Commission-funded campaigning project 
called “Europe: End Precarious Work Now! – Decent Work and Equal Treatment for All” (ETUC et 
al. 2016). The multi-sectoral project was co-financed by the Commission with roughly €345,000 
under the Commission heading “Information and Training Measures for Workers” and had the 
goal of devising a joint strategy supported by campaigning/information materials and legal 
advice (EFFAT 2014; European Commission 2015a). In the same year, a cross-sectoral campaign 
called “Enough of Their Crisis” was initiated by the metal, transport, food, services, and 
construction and wood industries, demanding immediate action from European institutions on 
youth unemployment (back2ourfuture.org 2014). The Commission funded the initial conference 
of the campaign with more than €370,000 (European Commission 2015a).  
On the one hand, these activities fit with the assumption of a path since the Commission funds 
important elements, and parts of the campaigns (e.g., on asbestos) are jointly conducted in the 
context of social dialogue with the employer federation. Commission funding has enabled the 
federations to conduct costly conferences and provide in-depth information services: features 
that they would not have been able to provide otherwise. On the other hand, the projects 
indicate that political dependency, the fear of which was voiced by some unionists, does not 
seem to have manifested itself.  
 
 
6.5 CONCLUSION: HOW CRITICAL JUNCTURES SET IN MOTION SELF-
REINFORCING DYNAMICS  
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The value of the concept of critical junctures lies in its focus on early events leading to the 
unfolding of mechanisms that over time constrain the organization’s options. The critical 
juncture leaves a legacy, whereby the stabilization of the organizational form is sustained by self-
reinforcing mechanisms, eventually excluding alternative trajectories (Beyer 2006; Collier and 
Collier 1991; Mahoney and Schensul 2006; Pierson 2004; Schreyögg and Sydow 2011). This 
chapter concludes with an assessment of the second research question: "What key critical 
junctures explain the formation and stabilization of the present form of Europeanization?" 
In the case of the EFBWW, the initial conditions of the EFBWW’s path are described as including 
a federation “deeply asleep” (Cremers 1991: 153), employer federations opposing any form of 
cooperation, and an institutional setting favoring national representation. A critical juncture has 
been identified in the mid-1980s to early 1990s, when two triggering developments set the 
federation on a course: first, the introduction of funding instruments for European industrial 
relations and related projects (logic of influence), and second, the establishment of a 
professionalized European administration in Brussels with a strong leadership figure willing to 
implement the organization’s goals autonomously (logic of administration). This juncture was 
enhanced by the increased heterogeneity of the EFBWW’s affiliates, which had increased 
information requirements and needed the EFBWW to coordinate joint European positions (logic 
of membership). Balancing the different logics produced tensions for the federation, which then 
resulted in a repeated pattern of constrained options. 
Commission funding provided the organization with the means to provide services for its 
members. However, by extracting these resources from the Commission, the European 
federation had to comply with the rules and regulations of Commission funding and became less 
dependent on its members’ affiliation fees. This shifting focus to Commission resources occurred 
at the same time that the membership of the organization changed significantly. While both 
number and diversity of the EFBWW’s membership increased with enlargement, the number of 
actually represented workers has steadily decreased since the mid-1990s. Since the affiliation 
fees of the EFBWW are based on the number of represented members of each federation, this 
meant that the EFBWW had to provide services to more members with fewer resources. Raising 
affiliation fees was difficult, since the affiliates were facing difficult times themselves and the 
federation feared “exit options” such as reducing the number of registered members. In order 
to deal with the discrepancy between income and required expenditure, the EFBWW had to gear 
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its activities toward Commission-funded projects. Over time, a stable pattern emerged: the 
Commission funded the operations of the EFBWW, and the members funded the staff. The 
pattern of affiliation fees to the BWI and the EFBWW has remained relatively stable at about 3:1. 
The division of labor between the BWI and the EFBWW has also remained stable despite changes 
in the membership structure and overlapping responsibilities, particularly regarding organizing 
migrant workers from Eastern European countries. Over the years, several alternative 
trajectories for deeper cooperation and more supranational structures were discussed and 
brought forward by different members, but the EFBWW’s organizational structure remained 
stable despite these options. 
In economic understandings of path dependence, an organizational path always implies that the 
development is potentially suboptimal. In a membership organization, what is suboptimal can 
vary significantly depending on the viewpoint of the member. The European trade union 
movement has been criticized repeatedly for its closeness to the Commission (Degryse 2013; 
Schmidt-Hullmann 2009a). The EFBWW’s focus on Commission funding implies a dependence on 
external resources, which could distance the organization from its membership. Project work, 
especially the more “pragmatic” type, is viewed critically by some of the members, which 
highlights the importance of classical lobbying work. However, the principle of national co-
funding can also enhance solidarity among the affiliates and increase the feeling of responsibility 
toward the organization. The interaction with employers in the Social Dialogue can bear the 
danger of concentrating too much on non-binding results instead of lobbying for hard legislation. 
On the other hand, it is very difficult to say if another path would have been better for the 
organization and its members. The EFBWW was also able to use commission funding to enhance 
cooperation and provide addiational information to its members on health and safety issues or 
working conditions. Social partnership has been a central element of social models in Continental 
Europe. With enlargement, the expenditures of the ETUFs have risen considerably. Without 
external support, communication and cooperation would be almost impossible. The established 
division of labor with the BWI also has drawbacks and coordination costs but does create 
advantages, since the EFBWW is embedded in the institutional structure of the EU, whereas the 
BWI concentrates on global campaigning and development work.  
The point of this dissertation was to demonstrate why this specific type (and not another) of 
organizational structure has emerged. The established organizational form in turn makes it 
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difficult to develop alternatives such as a European supranational union with more organizing 
power, a joint European representation inside the BWI, or a federation with an even stronger 
focus on lobbying and political representation. In this understanding of “path” based on multiple 
possibilities, questions of efficiency withdraw to the background. In this chapter, resource 
dependence and adaptive expectations have been identified as mechanisms driving the 
EFBWW’s path. For the EFBWW, it is almost impossible to deviate from the established pattern 
because its members’ resources are decreasing and Commission funding provides the basis for 
its projects. However, although the above indications could suggest an institutionalized, path-
dependent structure of trade union Europeanization, the way in which open spaces are used to 
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CHAPTER 7 
 CONCLUSION  
 
7.1 SUMMARY AND GOAL OF THE STUDY 
In this thesis, the European construction workers’ federation served as a case study for the way 
in which labor has adapted its organizational representation to increasing European integration 
from the Treaty of Rome until today. The construction case was selected for its extreme 
susceptibility to shifts in European integration – both pressures for coordination and competition 
are particularly high in this sector - and its relevance in the political debate. When thinking about 
the free movement of workers, what typically comes to mind is the migrant workers travelling 
from one construction project to the other, the building site as a small locus of solidarity and 
competition among workers. In this industry, pressure for European coordination is exceptionally 
intense, and the changes from the Single Market have been particularly strong. Where cross-
border activities are frequent and competitive challenges are high, impetus to find European 
solutions and coordinate trade union work transnationally is particularly high. As a sector heavily 
influenced by the free movement of labor and services, the construction industry has been at 
the heart of a number of legal disputes regarding working conditions in Europe (Clarke et al. 
2003; Druker 1998; Kahmann 2006; Lillie and Greer 2007; Sandberg et al. 2004; Woolfson and 
Sommers 2006). In addition, the building sector is a core industry, since jobs in the construction 
sector have a strong impact on overall employment trends (Stawinska 2010: 1). The 
comparatively high rate of bankruptcies enhances the competitive pressures, making the 
industry extremely responsive to pressures for lower national labor standards (Cremers 2006a: 
172).  
One goal of this study was to develop an explanatory framework for analyzing ETUFs. Two 
contrary assumptions led to the research question: on the one hand, there was the expectation 
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that trade unions would not cooperate because of competitive pressures, while on the other 
hand there was the expectation that trade unions would develop a powerful system of 
transnational solidarity when faced with European integration. An overview of ETUFs indicated 
that most federations seem to have developed into coordination platforms with limited 
resources. Since neither expectation manifested itself, the question is what has been driving – 
and constraining – European trade unionism. An organizational perspective on trade union 
associations has provided the basis for analyzing the dynamics of membership associations. 
Literature from Europeanization research and industrial relations offers hypothetical options for 
trade union internationalization. Additionally, path dependence theory offers a framework for 
analyzing long-term developments and singling out critical junctures and mechanisms 
reinforcing the pattern of trade union Europeanization. 
The main claim of the theoretical discussion was that European federations can only be explained 
by the interplay of influence, membership, and administration, and that tensions among these 
logics can lead to tradeoffs explaining organizational outcomes. This thesis argues that a path 
analysis could bring an important contribution to the debate, since it points to the importance 
of timing and sequence in the resolution of conflict between these logics. The focus on historical 
reconstruction as an analytical framework guides the researcher to watch out for critical 
junctures, social mechanisms, and driving dynamics in the history of the organization. Searching 
for these mechanisms can open up new interpretations, particularly for explaining the puzzling 
discrepancies between a changing European institutional setting on the one hand and the 
challenge for unions to find adequate organizational replies to these changes on the other hand. 
This study offers several contributions to the existing literature: first, this thesis develops a 
broader framework for understanding union Europeanization based on tradeoffs between the 
logics of influence, membership, and administration. An approach focusing on different logics 
shaping an organization makes it possible to integrate competing value systems within an 
organization and combines both macro and micro perspectives. Thus, instead of looking only at 
the European influence dimension (which is common for studies of the European industrial 
relations structure) or only at membership logics (as many case studies of cross-border 
mobilization do), this framework integrates these perspectives into a more comprehensive 
picture of logics shaping trade union development. In addition, this thesis outlines three main 
pairs of tensions within a trade union organization and demonstrates how the multilevel setting 
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of the EU enhances these tensions. In return, these tensions can explain how conflicting logics 
can impede both a stronger European role and a stronger national role. 
Second, this thesis’ findings indicate that in the construction sector, horizontal trade union 
Europeanization seems to be defined by several organizational patterns that have remained 
stable over time. What the analysis indicates is that trade unions in the construction sector have 
expanded their organizational spectrum and activities across national boundaries, just as they 
have done when nation-building processes were underway in the 19th century. The current form 
of Europeanization was established in the mid-1980s to 1990s when critical developments in all 
three logics set the federation in its current organizational form: Commission funding and Posted 
Workers legislation triggered increased joint activities coordinated by the European federation, 
a highly motivated administration had the will and energy to create European organizational 
structures and a growing and more diverse membership needed a European federation to 
provide information and conduct lobbying activities.  
The conclusions indicate that although unions in the construction sector have expanded their 
organizational activities across national boundaries, two self-reinforcing processes resulting 
from the interplay among the three logics partly seem to explain the stabilization of the current 
form: resource dependence and adaptive expectations. The first result suggests a pattern 
whereby organizational development adjusts to external project funding, potentially 
overshadowing alternative forms of action. What this study demonstrates for the EFBWW is that 
the federation has used the resources provided by the Commission to provide services to its 
affiliates in order to establish and maintain a strong national representation. Although the 
successful lobbying regarding the Posted Workers and Service Directives have confirmed that 
the federation can use its scarce resources effectively and mobilize its members’ willingness to 
act, the federation’s operational work is mostly funded by the European Commission. Although 
early studies of European trade union structures have indicated that such a dependency might 
have been established (Martin and Ross 1995, 2001), to date this presumed pattern has not been 
substantiated in more detail in a sector influenced more than most others by European 
legislation. 
By outlining the mechanisms unfolding after a critical juncture, the concept makes it possible to 
address those unintended consequences of earlier decisions that contradict the original 
intentions. With the introduction of funding for industrial relations, the Delors Commission 
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wanted to prevent Europe from being seen only as an economic project. Since engaging in 
Brussels is costly for most non-profit organizations, this support (e.g., for translations, etc.) 
remains indispensable. The option of Commission funding was a critical juncture for enabling 
European cooperation and shows how important political support for tripartite bargaining 
structures is to enable European trade union activities. However, whereas early national trade 
unionism was successful due to its critical position toward established power and its unique 
forms of collective action, trade unionism in the EU has developed from the top (Hyman 2005a; 
Martens 2003; Martin 1996). This can lead to internal tensions between influence and 
membership when external resources are needed to maintain support for the membership but 
the membership expects a critical position toward established structures.  
The second outcome suggests that international trade union federations in the construction 
sector seem to be struggling with a two-tiered internationalization approach in which 
Europeanization and internationalization have developed parallel to each other and the 
members’ expectations have adapted to this dual structure. The established division of labor and 
adaptive expectations toward the respective roles of the federations have potentially led to a 
restricted scope of development of the European federation’s role. Within each of the three 
logics, enhancing factors such as membership competition, the struggle to find joint approaches 
for varying political economies, the EU opportunity structure for employers, or a distance 
between administration and membership reinforce the established patterns.  
 
 
7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The path framework, with its focus on constraints, is not only useful for the study of European 
issues. Many other questions in trade union research warrant closer attention to the 
mechanisms explaining restricted development, such as loss of membership, diminishing power, 
reduced collective bargaining coverage, and the increase of mergers. For research on trade 
unions, the value of the concept lies in its clear naming of mechanisms and phases, which can 
help building explanations for various trajectories of trade unionism. If the framework of path 
dependence is used in comparative research, this can be particularly helpful for singling out the 
critical junctures at and through which dynamics’ distinct “paths” have emerged and thus which 
type of political agency and choice can achieve which type of union participation. This could be 
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a fruitful addition to research focusing on typologies, or – in this terminology – “paths” of 
European trade union activities or ETUFs. Theories of union organization could benefit from the 
integration of process theories, particularly since the evolution and diversification of 
membership organizations is often a long-term and gradual process. 
The extreme case method also has its dangers. Most importantly, the researcher should avoid 
treating the unusual case as if it provides an example of the population as a whole (Seawright 
and Gerring 2008: 301). However, research on European unions is still in its infancy. A single case 
study as in this thesis can establish propositions that offer a more thorough understanding of 
certain phenomena: in this case, of the dynamics leading to a slowly emerging external 
dependency and potential neglect of alternative contentious repertoires. In comparative 
research, the concept could unfold more of its explanatory value, such as when comparing 
different (sectoral, national, organizational) responses to a defined critical juncture (e.g., 
introduction of European Commission funding) over time. For example, a comparison of sectors 
such as the agricultural or transport sector could paint a more detailed picture of trade union 
work in highly mobile and competitive sectors. 
During the research process for this study, the Eurocrisis, Brexit, and increased migration have 
changed the political setting in which trade unions act. All of these events have challenged the 
EU to its core and will have an influence on the way trade unionists see the EU. Their willingness 
to pay and act within an ETUF will depend strongly on the way in which these events are 
perceived. This study focused mostly on the organizational constraints of European labor, but 
these constraints are closely related to the role of national trade unionism and the members’ 
position toward Europe in general. The investigation of trade union Europeanization within 
national unions, such as the development of mainstreaming of EU-related issues among the 
membership or internationalization within the organization, will be important for understanding 
national dynamics. A pioneer study of this sort has been undertaken by Stefan Rüb on the IG 
Metall (Rüb 2009). However, the depth necessary for these studies often only allows single case 
studies. It would be useful to study several national industry federations in comparison, 
particularly with new member states. Deeper insights could also be gained by quantitative large-
scale studies on the sectoral variety in union responses. Such a study could shed light on 
differences in size, funding sources, engagement in EWCs, Social Dialogue coordination, lobbying 
activities, voting behavior within ETUC, and activity types, to name just a few possibilities. An 
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example of a more individual and location-based perspective on transnational organizing is 
Wagner and Lillie’s work on competition and solidarity on transnational construction sites 
(Wagner 2015a; Wagner and Lillie 2014). 
However, the focus on administrative implementation has pointed to the importance of union 
staff, especially in the expert-driven and multinational setting of the EU. Exploring in greater 
detail the career paths of trade union officials concerned with Europe, their connections to their 
national unions, and their embeddedness in national contexts could provide a more 
encompassing picture of the type of trade unionism that has emerged in Europe. Heery and 
Frege have conducted such a study for British union officials (Kelly and Heery 1994), and it could 
be a fruitful and theoretically important step to repeat such a study for ETUFs. 
Regional comparisons could provide insight into industrial relations in regional trade 
associations. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Mercado Común del Sur 
(Mercosur), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are only a few of the 
examples of regional economic associations. Similar to the EU, the goal of these organizations is 
to create common markets. However, very little is known about the role of labor organizations 
in these settings. The discussions on transnational labor standards in transatlantic trade 
negotiations highlight the consequences for democratic accountability. Comparing regional 
structures could provide insight into different regional paths of labor integration or the impact 
of national unions.  
The study also demonstrated the difficulty of coordinating multiple international levels: in the 
construction case the international, European, and – to a lesser extent – Nordic federations. 
What this study has not analyzed is the role of national confederations in this picture. As 
Waddington has described, discussions have already been had on the question of whether or 
not the sectoral funding via the European industry federations should be strengthened, 
potentially at the cost of national confederations (Waddington 2006b: 645). Another route might 
be an increased differentiation of union representation based on regional similarities. Across the 
Nordic states, several transnational trade union federations exist similar to the Nordic 
Federation of Building and Woodworkers, such as the Nordic Transport Workers Federation or 
the lobbying organization of the Nordic Financial Unions. Both federations’ goal is to maintain 
the Nordic collective bargaining model (NFU 2016; NTF 2006). The Baltic Sea Trade Union 
Network (BASTUN) is a trade union network representing political interests of union 
 
Henni Appell  Workers of Europe Unite!? - Explaining the Form of European Labor Organization 242 
confederations in the Baltic Sea region (BASTUN 2015). IRTUCs have existed since the late 1970s 
and have coordinated cross-border coordination of collective bargaining (Hammer 2010). 
Further studies on the role of these regional groupings could shed more light on their role in 
European cooperation.  
Lastly, a danger of approaching the question of European labor cooperation from an 
organizational perspective is that the political-economic conditions and/or the role of employer 
lobbying may retract to the background. A more detailed look at employer federation’s lobbying 
and decision making strategies on the influence dimension could contribute to our 
understanding of political outcomes. 
 
7.3 CLOSING REMARKS & POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This thesis concludes with a few words on the importance of unions for a democratic society. 
Trade unions protect and uphold common interests of workers vis-à-vis employers. This is the 
core and raison d’être of trade unions. The European social model includes concepts of social 
partnership and solidaristic wage setting, publicly secured social rights, and, most importantly, 
strong trade unions (Visser 2006). The financial crisis has brought the importance of a balanced 
social system back to the forefront of attention. With the Eurozone in turmoil and growing 
inequality, pressure on governments to find a social balance to the freedom of markets is 
increasing. In the context of the migration debate, unions can play an important role in 
organizing and integrating migrant workers and balancing competitive pressures among 
workers. This thesis demonstrates how unions can play a crucial part in mitigating the effects of 
European market integration such as the ETUFs have been able to achieve with their lobbying 
for maintaining host country standards in the Posted Workers and Service Directive. In these 
cases where European federations have rallied their resources and pushed for changes, they 
have been able to significantly influence policy-making. In the words of one interview partner: 
“But, I mean, if we look back in history we can see that when we´ve been active, then we have 
been pushing for things. That is when we have achieved something” (EFBWW Rep8 2011).  
The EFBWW’s approach of protecting the national autonomy of its affiliates has strengthened its 
cause for more social protection fueled by major drawbacks such as the ECJ rulings threatening 
nationally established rights. Erne has also presented unions as engines for participative 
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democracy in the EU: “[Unions] offer the possibility of greater citizen participation in the political 
system and thus an increase in its legitimacy […]. Citizens’ organizations, such as unions, also 
consolidate political democracy by holding corporations accountable when they subject citizens, 
as they frequently do, to autocratic rule in the production process or colonize the democratic 
process by pecuniary means” (Erne 2008: 1).  
A precondition for successful and strong European federations (and strong social standards) are 
powerful national unions. The power of European organizations is only based on their 
membership and willingness to act. Weak national social partners endanger the legitimacy, and 
thus the effectiveness, of social dialogue at the EU level. As Harold Lewis, former president of 
the ITF, has stated, “[If the international federation wants to reinvent itself], the affiliates will 
have to reinvent themselves first” (Lewis 2003: 344). My interview partners also reflected this: 
for example, one EFBWW staff member said, “The question is if our classical imageries of the 
organization still fit. Large demonstrations aren’t appropriate any longer; decentralized 
demonstrations fit better. More meetings are also difficult and fail due to a lack of money. We 
have to develop ideas to bring the EU to the people. And the personal meeting can’t be replaced.” 
(EFBWW Rep4 2012a).  
However, what this study also implicates is that it is not enough to discuss strategies within the 
established system of European industrial relations. While employment options have become 
transnational, social regulation remains bound to the national territory (Wagner 2015b). This 
poses challenges that are beyond simple organizational answers. The complex interactions 
between market integration, labor migration, and asymmetric power distribution favoring 
employers on the European level make it extremely difficult for even the best endowed unions 
to better employment conditions, as Berntsen and Lillie have concluded from the example of a 
Dutch construction site (Berntsen 2016; Berntsen and Lillie 2016). The implication of this thesis’ 
analysis is government support for union representation structures is indispensable. Legislation 
securing joint standards along the production chain and strong labor participation rights are vital 
for maintaining a sense of participation and mitigating feelings of injustice among workers.  
It is fitting to close this thesis with words of the Webbs in their classic book Industrial Democracy. 
More than 100 years ago, they emphatically described the importance of labor unions for 
democracy and the wellbeing of a society in general: “When the conditions of employment are 
adequately regulated as to secure adequate food, education and leisure to every capable citizen, 
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the great mass of the population will, for the first time, have any chance of expanding in 
friendship and family affection, and of satisfying the instinct for knowledge or beauty” (Webb 
and Webb 1902: 849). 
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 APPENDIX: THE EFBWW 
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8.1 OVERVIEW OF LOGICS SHAPING EUROPEAN TRADE UNION ORGANIZATION IN THE CONSTRUCTION SECTOR 
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PREFORMATION PHASE: TRADE UNIONS SECRETARIATS  
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JUNCTURE   
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alternative organizational 
forms (i.e., harmonization of 
affiliate’s policies and 
stronger coordinating role) 
2000s: Discussion on merger with BWI, 
Founding of EMWU by German IG BAU, 
discussions on cross-national mergers, 
several initiatives for integrating migrant 
workers 
1990s: Discussion of 
stronger coordinating role 
(i.e., in collective 
bargaining) 
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8.2 LIST OF EFBWW(C) AFFILIATES 


















Belgium: Algemene Centrale ABVV (AC ABVV) 
France: Fédération Générale F.O. Bâtiment, Bois, Papier, Carton, 
Céramique 
Industriegewerkschaft Bau-Steine-Erden 
Gewerkschaft Holz und Kunststoff (G.H.K.) 
Federazione Nazionale Edili Affini e del Legno (FeNEAL-UIL) 
Federazione Italiana Lavoratori Costruzioni & Affini (FILCA-CISL) 
Syndicat Bau und Handwerk - OGB-L 
Bouwbond NVV, in 1972 after the merger with Bouw- en Houtbond NKV, 
this became the Bouw- en Houtbond FNV 
1974 7 10 
 
Ireland, UK Services Industrial Professional Technical Union (SIPTU) 
1975 8 11 
  
Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians (UCATT) 
1976 9 19 
 
Denmark Danish Blik- og Rørarbejderforbundet 
Danish Dansk El-Forbund 
Danish Malerforbundet i Danmark 
Danish Murerforbundet i Danmark 
Danish Snedker- og Tømrerforbundet i Danmark 
Danish Specialarbejderforbundet i Danmark (S.i.D.) 
Danish Træindustriarbejderforbundet 
Federazione Italiana Lavoratori Legno Edilizia Industrie Affini ed estattive 
(FILLEA-CGIL) 
1977 9 19 
   
1978 9 19 
   
1979 9 19 
   
1980 9 19 
   
1981 9 20 
  
Fédération Nationale des Salariés de la Construction et du Bois - CFDT 
1982 9 21 
  
Furniture, Timber and Allied Trades' Union (FTAT) 
1983 9 21 
   
1984 9 21 
   
1985 9 21 
   
1986 9 21 
   
1987 10 24 1.900.000 Spain Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU) 
Federación Estatal de Madera, Construcción y afines (FEMCA-UGT) 
Federación de la construcción y la madera (ELA/STV) 
1988 10 24 
   
1989 10 26 
  
Belgian Christelijke Centrale der Houtbewerkers en Bouwvakkers (CCHB) 
Dansk Metalarbejderforbund 
1990 11 30 
 
Portugal General, Municipal, Boilermakers and Allied Trades'Union (GMB) 
Letzebuerger Chreschleche Gewerkschafts-Bond (LCGB) 
Hout- en Bouwbond CNV 
Sindicato dos Empregados, Técnicos e Assalariados da Construç_o Civil, 
Obras Públicas e afins (SETACCOP) 
1991 12 34 2.544.600 Switzerland Danish Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund i Danmark 
(HK/INDUSTRI) 
Fédération BATI - MAT - T.P. / CFTC 
Gewerkschaft Bau und Holz (G.B.H.) 
Christlicher Holz- und Bauarbeiterverband der Schweiz (C.H.B.) 
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1992 16 51 2.486.600 Finland, Iceland, 
Norway, Sweden 
Rakennusliitto (Finnish Building workers' union) 
Maaseututyöväen Liitto Ry (Finnish Forestry and Agricultural Workers' 
union) 
Puutyöväen Liitto Ry (Finnish Woodworkers' union) 
Suomen Sähköalantyöntekijäin Liitto Ry (Finnish Electric Workers' union) 
Rafiðnaðarsamband Islands 
Samband Byggingamanna SMB 
Norsk Arbeidsmandsforbund 
Norsk Elektriker- og Kraftstasjonsforbund 
Norsk Treindustriarbeiderforbund 
Fellesforbundet 
Federación Industria Construcción y Madera (FECOMA-CC.OO.) 
Svenska Bleck- och Plåtslagareförbundet 
1992: Svenska Träindustriarbetareförbundet 
1992: Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundett 
1992: Svenska Elektrikerförbundet 
1992: Svenska Målareförbundet 
1992: Svenska Skogsarbetareförbundet 
Gewerkschaft Bau und Holz (G.B.H.) changes its name to Gewerkschaft 
Bau und Industrie (G.B.I.) 
1993 17 52 
 
Turkey Maaseututyöväen Liitto and Puutyöväen Liitto merge to form Puu-Ja 
Erityisalojen Liitto 
Manufacturing, Science, Finance (MSF) 
Samband Byggingamanna merges with a number of other unions in 
Samiðn Samband Iðnfélaga 
Türkiye Yol, Yapi, In_aat I_çileri Sendikasi (Yol-IS) 
1994 17 50 2.254.400 
 
Danish Murerforbundet merges with S.i.D. 
FTAT merges with GMB 
1995 18 51 2.764.200 Austria Austrian Gewerkschaft Bau und Holz (GBH) 
1996 18 51 
  
Danish Snedker-og Tømrerforbundet and Træindustriarbejder-forbundet 
merge into Forbundet Træ-Industri-Byg i Danmark (TIB) 
Suomen Sähköalantyöntekijäin Liitto Ry changes its name into 
Sähköalojen ammattiliitto Ry 
Industriegewerkschaft Bau-Steine-Erden changes ist name to 
Industriegewerkschaft Bauen - Agrar - Umwelt (IG- 
BAU) 
Svenska Industritjänstemannaförbundet (SIF) 
1997 18 52 2.557.100 
 
Belgian Christelijke Centrale Diverse Industrieën (CCDI) 
1998 18 48 
  
Belgian CCHB and Belgian CCDI merge into ACV Bouw en Industrie 
FEMCA-UGT merges with the Spanish metal union into MCA-UGT 
Svenska Träindustriarbetareförbundet merges with Svenska 
Skogsarbetareförbundet into Svenska Skogs-och Trä-facket 
CHB changes its name into SYNA 
1999 18 48 2.486.000 
 
Norsk Elektriker- og Kraftstasjonsforbund merges in EL&IT Forbundet 




G.H.K. merges with IG Metall 
Bouw-en Houtbond FNV changes its name into FNV Bouw 
Svenska Bleck- och Plåtslagareförbundet merges with Svenska Byggnads 




2002 17 49 2.396.300 
 
Toimihenkilöunioni (Union of salaried employees TU) 
2003 17 48 
  
Spanish ELA/STV merges with IGEKO into HAINBAT/ELA 
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Bulgarian FCIW - Podkrepa – Federation Construction, Industry and 
Water Supply Podkrepa,  
Hrvatski Sindikat Sumarstva – Croatian Forestry union 
Czech OS STAVBA CR – Trade Union of Building Workers 
MSF merges with AMICUS to become AMICUS/MSF 
Romania FGS Familia 
FSCR – Federation of cement producers trade unions in Romania 
2005 24 56 2.355.200 Estonia, Hungary HK/INDUSTRI changes its name into HK/Privat 
S.i.D. merges with other unions into Fagligt Fælles Forbund (3F) 
EMT – Trade Union of Estonian Forest Industry Workers 
Hungarian EFEDOSZSZ - Federation of Building, Wood and Building 
Industry Workers Unions 
Merger of GBI with other unions into UNIA 
2006 26 61 2.350.700 Poland, Slovak 
Republic 
ZZ Budowlani 
FSLIL – Romanian Federation of Wood Workers 
Solvak, OZ STAVBA SR – Construction Workers Trade Union 
FSLIL – Romanian Federation of Wood Workers 
Swedish SEKO – Union of Service and Communication Employees 
2007 28 68 2.350.000 Malta, 
Slovenia 
Bulgarian CITUB – Federation of Independent Construction Trade Unions,  
Bulgarian FSOGSDP – Federation of Trade Union Organisations in Forestry 
and Wood Processing Industries 
Croatian SGH – Trade Union of Construction Industry of Croatia 
Czech OS DLV CR – Wood, Forestry and Water Industries’ Workers’ Trade 
Union 
Malta: GWU – General Workers’ Union 
Hout- en Bouwbond CNV changes its name into CNV Hout en Bouw 
Solidarnosc 
Slovenian SDGD – Trade Union of Construction Workers 
2008 30 71 2.350.000 Latvia, Lithuania SSDPIH – Autonomous Trade Union of Timber, Wood and Paper 
Processing Industry of Croatia 
TGWU and AMICUS/MSF merge to become UNITE THE UNION 
LCA – Latvian Builders Trade Union 
LMNA – Forest Sphere Trade Union of Latvia  
MPF - Lithuanian Forest and Wood Workers Federation 
Merger of SIF and HTF into Unionen 
2009 30 71 
   
2010 30 71 
   
2011 30 71 2.322.017 
  
2012 31 72 
 
Cyprus SEK – Cyprus Construction Workers and Miners Federation 
2013 31 72 
   
2014 33 75 
 
Greece, Serbia OMTSIM - Greek Fed. of Workers & Employees in Cement Industry 
SGIGM - Trade Union of Construction and Building Materials Industry 
Workers 
SSPS - Autonomous Trade Union of Road Maintenance Workers 
2015 34 77 2.000.000 Macedonia SGIP - Trade union for Construction, Industry and Planning of the 
Republic of Macedonia  
SSHDE - Trade union of the workers in Forestry, Wood Industry and 
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8.3 LIST OF MERGERS OF EFBWW UNIONS 





Merged Unions Merged to… 
1972 The 
Netherlands 
Bouwbond NVV  
Bouw- en Hout-bond NKV 
Bouw- en Houtbond FNV (today: FNV 
Bouw) 
1993 Finland Maaseututyöväen Liitto  
Puutyöväen Liitto 
Puu-Ja Erityisalojen Liitto 
1993 Iceland Samband Byggingamanna and other non-
EFBWW unions 
Samiðn Samband Iðnfélaga 
1994 Denmark Murerforbundet  
S.i.D. 
S.i.D. 
1994 GB FTAT  
GMB 
GMB 
1996 Denmark  Snedkerog Tømrerforbundet 
Træindustriarbejder-forbundet 
Forbundet Træ-Industri-Byg i Danmark 
(TIB) 
1996 Germany IG Bau – Steine – Erden Gewerkschaft 
Gartenbau, Land- und Forstwirtschaft 
IG BAU 
1998 Belgium CCHB 
CCDI 
ACV Bouw en Industrie 
1998 Spain FEMCA-UGT and 
Spanish metal union 
MCA-UGT 
1998 Sweden  Svenska Träindustriarbetareförbundet 
Svenska Skogsarbetareförbundet 
Svenska Skogs- och Träfacket 
1999 Norway Norsk Elektriker- og Kraftstasjonsforbund 
EL&IT Forbundet 
EL&IT Forbundet 
2000 Germany Gewerkschaft Holz und Kunststoff  
IG Metall 
IG Metall 
2000 Sweden  Svenska Bleck- och Plåtslagareförbundet 
Svenska Byggnads 
Svenska Byggnads 
2003 Spain ELA/STV 
IGEKO 
HAINBAT/ELA 
2004 GB MSF  
AMICUS 
AMICUS/MSF 
2005 Denmark S.i.D.  
Other non-EFBWW unions 
Fagligt Fælles Forbund (3F) 
2005 Switzerland GBI 
Other non-EFBWW unions 
UNIA 
2008 GB TGWU 
AMICUS/MSF  
UNITE THE UNION 
2008 Sweden SIF  
HTF 
Unionen 
2010 Belgium ACV Bouw en Industrie  
ACV Energie-Chemie 
ACV Bouw, Industrie & Energie 
2014 Belgium Centrale Générale de la FGTB  
FGTB Textile-Vêtement-Diamant 
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8.4 LIST OF EFBWW PROJECTS (COMMISSION FUNDED) 
(DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 2016; European Commission 2015a; European Commission, DG Employment, 






Year Subject of the grant Total 
amount 
(Euro) 
 1999 TRANS-EUROPEAN NETWORK PROJECT N0 2 - Phase II 
44.730,00 




1999 SECTORAL MEETING FOR THE SCAFFOLDING SECTOR 
67.490,00  
1999 EUROSITE IV - ALP TRANSIT - INFORMATION AND CONSULTATION PROCEDURES 
AND CO-ORDINATION OF TRADE UNIONS ON BIG INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS, 
APPLICATION OF " GUIDEBOOK OF GOOD PRACTICE" 68.515,00 
EFBWW-
Employer 
1999 COMPARISON OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING SYSTEMS IN CONSTRUCTION IN 
EUROPE. 99.500,00 
 2000 LES COLS BLANCS DANS LES ENTREPRISES EUROPÉENNES DU SECTEUR 
CONSTRUCTION ET BOIS 44.940,00 
 2000 SÉMINAIRE DES COORDINATEURS EFBWW MULTIPROJECT 
59.300,00 
 2000 MISE EN OEUVRE DE LA DIRECTIVE 94/45/CE DANS LES SECTEURS 
PROFESSIONNELS DES PANNEAUX À BASE DE BOIS, DE LA PEINTURE INDUSTRIELLE 
ET DU DRAGAGE 164.420,00 




2003 "STRESS-STRESSANTS-STRESSES - SENSIBILISATIONS ET ACTIONS" 
91.180,04 
 2003 10 YEARS OF EUROPEAN WORKS COUNCILS IN THE CONSTRUCTION AND WOOD 
SECTOR 92.136,58 
 2003 EXTENSION DES CEE EXISTANTS AUX PAYS ADHÉRENTS À L'UE 
68.409,98 
 2003 EU-ERWEITERUNG, EUROPÄISCHE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT UND DURCHSETZUNG 
DER RECHTE AUF INFORMATION UND KONSULTATION 89.411,82 
 2003 DIRECTIVE 96/71 EC ON THE POSTING OF WORKERS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE 
PROVISION OF SERVICES 129.789,60 
EFBWW-
Employer 
2004 FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR SECTORAL SOCIAL DIALOGUE - CONSTRUCTION 
INDUSTRY 118.170,07  




2004 DIRECTIVE 2001/45/EC ON "WORKING AT HEIGHTS" 
119.643,02 
 2006 EUROPEAN CONFERENCE AND AWARENESS CAMPAIGN REGARDING PREVENTING 
REDUCING AND COMBATING UNDECLARED LABOUR IN THE CONSTRUCTION 
INDUSTRY 186.255,52 








2007 PROMOTING PARITARIAN SOCIAL FUNDS IN HUNGARY POLAND CZECH REPUBLIC 
AND SLOVAK RE 135.150,00 
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2007 FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR SECTORAL SOCIAL DIALOGUE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
2007 2008 114.359,62 
 2007 GLOBALISATION EUROPEAN WORKS COUNCILS OF THE CONSTRUCTION SECTOR 
WORKING AS LEVE 62.230,00 
 2007 STRABAG SE WORKER REPRESENTATION IN THE SUPERVISORY BODY 
57.960,00 
 2007 INEFBWWTRANS - EUROPEAN NETWORK OF UNION AND COMPANY ACTORS 
FROM THE TIMBER AND FURNITURE SECTOR  
 
 2008 EUROPEAN CONSTRUCTION MOBILITY INFORMATION NET ECMIN 
164.920,34 




2008 FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE SECTORAL SOCIAL DIALOGUE CONSTRUCTION 
INDUSTRY 2008 2009 114.280,00 
EFBWW-
Employer 
2008 NANOTECHNOLOGIES IN THE EUROPEAN CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY STATE OF 
THE ART 2008 111.836,38 
EFBWW-
Employer 
2008 THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN WOOD BASED PANELS INDUSTRY FROM A SOCIAL 
DIALOGUE PERSPECTIVE 106.030,00 
 2008 A SWEDWOOD EWC 
67.415,62 
 2009 EXCHANGE OF BEST PRACTICES ABOUT INFORMATION, CONSULTATION, 
PARTICIPATION AND TRANSNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS IN EWCS FROM THE 
CONSTRUCTION AND WOOD SECTORS 249.874,98 
EFBWW-
Employer 




2009 EUROPEAN CONFERENCE AND AWARENESS CAMPAIGN ON SELF EMPLOYMENT 
AND BOGUS SELF EMPLOYMENT IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 143.974,34 
EFBWW-
Employer 
2009 FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE SECTORAL SOCIAL DIALOGUE CONSTRUCTION 
INDUSTRY 2009 2010 113.305,24 
 2009 COMMUNICATION IN EWCS FROM THE CONSTRUCTION AND WOOD SECTORS 
113.028,50 
 2009 TRAINING OF WORKER REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE NEW MEMBER STATES AND 
CANDIDATE COUNTRIES IN THE EWCS OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND WOOD 
SECTORS 103.499,64 
 2009 OPEN COORDINATION METHOD OF WORKING TIME AND RECONCILING 
PROFESSIONAL, FAMILY AND PRIVATE LIVES IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 98.384,38 
 2009 IMPROVING BEST PRACTICES ON THE WORKING AND LIVING CONDITIONS OF 
POSTED WORKERS 94.327,06 
 2009 SETTING UP EUROPEAN WORKS COUNCILS IN MULTINATIONALS FROM THE 
SPANISH CONSTRUCTION/SERVICES SECTORS 62.724,75 
 2009 OPEN COORDINATION METHOD OF WORKING TIME AND RECONCILING 
PROFESSIONAL, FAMILY AND PRIVATE LIVES IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 40.001,33  
2010 OPEN COORDINATION METHOD OF (EARLY) RETIREMENT SCHEMES - 
UNDERSTANDING EARLY RETIREMENT SCHEMES AND END OF CAREER 
BENCHMARKING IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 144.064,90 
EFBWW-
Employer 




2010 PROMOTING PARITARIAN SOCIAL FUNDS IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY - 2ND 





2010 FOSTER VET MOBILITY 
98.557,97 
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EFBWW-
Employer 
2011 NANO IN FURNITURE - STATE-OF-THE-ART 2011 
187.855,00  
2011 CAPACITY BUILDING FOR SETTING UP PARITARIAN FUNDS IN CENTRAL AND 
EASTERN EUROPEN COUNTRIES 144.315,55 
EFBWW-
Employer 




2011 FINANCIAL SUPPORT SECTORAL SOCIAL DIALOGUE CONSTRUCTION 2011-2012 
116.860,00  




2011 EU SECTORAL SKILLS COUNCIL FOR CONSTRUCTION : FEASIBILITY STUDY  
85.525,00* 
 2012 ASBESTOS RELATED OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES IN EUROPE 
179.127,39 
 2012 STRENGTHENING SOCIAL INCLUSION OF MIGRANT WORKERS IN THE EUROPEAN 
CONSTRUCTION AND WOOD INDUSTRIES 164.740,18 
EFBWW-
Employer 
2012 JOINTLY PREVENTING WOOD DUST 
125.893,23  
2012 TRAINING OF WORKER REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE NEW MEMBER STATES AND 








2012 SODICO - POST CRISIS SOCIAL DIALOGUE IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
182.836,00*   
2013 BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF ¿ARDUOUS OCCUPATIONS¿ WITHIN THE EUROPEAN 
PENSION DEBATE 202.255,49 
EFBWW-
Employer 




2013 DISSEMINATION OF THE EFBWW-FIEC ¿GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING A H&S 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM¿ AND ¿INFORMATION MODULES FOR THE SAFER 
HANDLING OF ASBESTOS¿ 165.618,88 
EFBWW-
Employer 
2013 SOCIAL LABEL FOR FURNITURE - FEASIBILITY STUDY 
151.475,72  
2013 OPTIMISING THE USE OF INFORMATION AND CONSULTATION RIGHTS IN 
ANTICIPATING AND GUIDING RESTRUCTURING PROCESSES 144.741,04 
EFBWW-
Employer 
2013 TACKLING DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES IN THE WOODWORKING INDUSTRY 
(COORDINATOR: FIEC) 111.664,92 
EFBWW-
Employer 
2013 INITIATIVES FOR YOUTH EMPLOYMENT IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
(Coordinator: FIEC)  * 
 2014 Empowering the integration of younger workers in the European Metal, Transport, 
Food, Services, Construction and Wood Industries (Joint Project with 5 other 
ETUFs) 370.878,90 
 2014 Europe: End Precarious Work Now! - Decent Work and Equal Treatment for All 
(Joint project with 6 other ETUFs) 347.407,06 
 2014 ENFORCEMENT STAKEHOLDERS COOPERATION (Joint Project with 7 other 
NGOs/State Agencies/ETUFs) 336.732,61 
 2014 The implementation and Application of the European Public Procurement 
Directive 322.512,44 
 2014 Practical EWC guide on Information and Consultation 
298.872,46 




2014 UPDATE AND PROMOTION OF THE FIEC-EFBWW POSTING WEBSITE (Cooperation 
with FIEC) 176.824,55 
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 2014 Optimising the use of information and consultation rights in anticipating and 
guiding restructurings processes (part II) 120.260,52 
 2014 SETTING UP NEW EWC IN MULTINATIONALS FROM THE BUILDING AND 
WOODSECTORS 86.772,00 





Commission Funding in European Sectoral Federations Plus ETUC and ETUI (2007–2014) 
(European Financial Transparency System 2015) 
  EFBWW ETUC IndustriALL * UNI Europe EPSU ETF ETUI 
2007 €880,747.10 €1,640,103.00 €421,633.00 €889,793.00 €232,192.00 €716,523.00 €9,800,000.00 
2008 €697,647.56 €2,691,856.00 €193,940.00 €1,622,399.00 €652,576.00 €385,885.00 €9,800,000.00 
2009 €1,179,096.28 €3,362,220.00 €732,242.00 €1,397,378.00 €373,830.00 €566,144.00 €10,462,574.86 
2010 €356,060.47 €2,082,418.00 €853,897.00 €1,377,379.00 €379,001.00 €1,448,873.00 €10,094,000.00 
2011 €650,466.22 €1,923,022.00 €166,289.00 €1,380,434.00 €594,453.00 €748,676.00 €10,674,350.07 
2012 €652,030.78 €4,225,352.00 Merger €1,477,054.00 €476,107.00 €1,394,632.00 €10,478,180.00 
2013 €945,320.00 €2,435,023.00 €771,225.00 €1,536,831.00 €283,780.00 €224,439.00 €10,721,905.00 
2014 €1,122,421.96 €3,653,713.00 €1,036,60.00 €1,258,392.00 €533,318.00 €487,593.00 €11,064,839.00 
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8.5 OUTCOMES OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL DIALOGUE IN CONSTRUCTION 
(European Commission SSD 2010, Degyrse Worker Participation, EFBWW Website, FIEC Website; typology adapted from 
Degryse 2010 (typology Social Dialogue text database)) 
 
Year  Title Outcome Addressee Issue 
2015 Joint position against social fraud, in particular in the 
cross-border provision of services 
Joint Opinion European 
institutions 
Free movement of 
trade 
2014 Joint position on the Proposal for a Directive on single-
member private limited liability companies  
Joint Opinion European 
institutions 
Labor representation 
2013 Joint position letter on the proposed Enforcement of 
Posting Directive 
Joint Opinion National institutions Free movement of 
labor 
2013 Joint statement on the proposed Enforcement of Posting 
Directive  Joint Opinion European and national institutions Free movement of labor 
2012 Joint opinion on the new Health & Safety Strategy Joint Opinion European 
institutions 
Health & safety 
2011 Joint position in support of a compromise to the directive 
on Intra-corporate transfers (ICT) 
Joint Opinion European 
institutions 
Free movement of 
labor 
2011 Joint position letter on the proposal for a directive on 
Intra-corporate transfers (ICT) 
Joint Opinion European 
institutions 
Free movement of 
labor 
2011 Joint position paper on the proposal for Directive on 
“Conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of seasonal employment” 
Joint Opinion European 
institutions 
Free movement of 
labor 
2011 Joint position on Action Program on reducing 
administrative burdens 





2010 Joint recommendations on employment and bogus self-
employment 
Joint Opinion National institutions Working 
conditions/labor 
policy 
2010 The global economic crisis and its consequences for the 
European construction industry: positive measures and 
concerns of the European social partners 




2009 Joint position on third-country contractors and seasonal 
worker movement of labor 
Joint Opinion   
2008 Joint declaration on paritarian funds Joint Opinion National affiliates Social security 
2007 Joint position on the European commission's 
communication on posting workers within the framework 
of the provision of services 
Joint Opinion European 
institutions 
Free movement of 
trade 
2006 Rules of procedures - Construction Proecudral Text European social 
partners 
Social Dialogue 
2006 Joint recommendation on the prevention of work-related 
stress 
Policy Orientation National affiliates Health & safety 
2005 
 
Joint statement on the European Commission’s Proposal 
for a Directive on Services in the Internal Market  
Joint Opinion European 
institutions 
Free movement of 
trade 
2005 Joint statement on young people Declaration European 
institutions 
Employment policy 
2004 Joint declaration on the occasion of the European Health & 
Safety Summit 
Declaration European social 
partners 
Health & safety 
2004 
 
Second joint statement on the European Commission’s 
proposal for a directive on services in the internal market 
Joint Opinion European 
institutions 
Free movement of 
trade 
2004 Joint statement on the European Week for Safety and 
Health at Work ‘Building in Safety’ 
Joint Opinion European social 
partners 
Health & safety 
2004 
 
Joint statement on the European Commission’s proposal 
for a Directive on Services in the Internal Market 
Joint Opinion European 
institutions 
Free movement of 
trade 
2003 Brochure on tutorship for young people Tool National affiliates (Vocational) training 
2003 
 
Joint declaration regarding the proposed Directive relating 
to entry and residence conditions for workers who are 
nationals of other countries 
Declaration European 
institutions 




Recommendations regarding implementation of the 
Directive on ‘working at heights’ 
Joint Opinion National affiliates Health & safety 
 
Henni Appell  Workers of Europe Unite!? - Explaining the Form of European Labor Organization 257 
  
2003 Guide of best practices on the co-ordination of health and 
safety 
Tool National affiliates Health & safety 
2000 Joint declaration on posted workers  Declaration European 
institutions 
Free movement of 
labor 
1997 Joint position on the “posting of workers” Directive  Joint Opinion European 
institutions 
Free movement of 
labor 
1996 Communication of the social partners issued at the seminar 
on safety and health in construction 
Declaration National affiliates Health & safety 
1994 Seminar Health & Safety Meeting 
1993 Conference Vocational Training Meeting 
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 APPENDIX: DATA 
 
9.1 OVERVIEW OF DATA SOURCES 
DOCUMENTS & DATA 
Trade Union 
Archives 
Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie (Archive of Social Democracy), Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung Bonn 
Gewerkschaftsarchiv (Trade Union Archive) Hannover 
EFBWW 
documents & data 
Project documentation, financial reports, work programs, press releases, 
conference material, minutes from meetings, other archival material 
European 
Commission 
documents & data 
European Financial Transparency Register, project funding data received from 
direct inquiries with the Commission, Sectoral Social Dialogue Text Database, 
project guidelines, etc.  
Social partner 
documents 
Minutes from Sectoral Social Dialogue meetings, outcomes from Social Dialogue 
FIEC (employers) 
documents 




EFBWW/CLR/BWI: 14 (including all EFBWW secretary generals, time covered: 
1980–2014)7 
EFBWW affiliates: 8 
Commission: 2 
(Background interviews with field researchers: 10) 
Interviews from 
secondary sources 
Interviews with unionists and labor professionals in trade union publications 




Case studies, handbooks, publications by (former) staff members 
 
  
                                                        
 
 
7 Since the organizations are rather small, more detailed information on the role of the interviewees within the 
EFBWW/CLR/BWI cannot be provided in order to protect the interviewees anonymity. 
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9.2 INTERVIEW GUIDELINE 
The interview guideline illustrates the standard flow of the interviews conducted for this thesis 
and the issues addressed during these interviews. The interviews were conducted as semi-
structured questionnaires, and the questions and topics were adapted depending on the 
interviewee’s involvement with the construction sector. Usually, I asked a number of follow-up 
questions, particularly regarding change over time: Has this always been this way? How has this 
changed over the years? As many of the interviews were conducted during the early stages of 
research, I often had general questions (e.g., on Commission funding) that became more detailed 
(e.g., regarding specific projects) in later interviews. In many cases, I was aware of specific issues 
that other interviewees had told me about or that I had read about in other sources. In these 
cases, I specifically asked the interviewees about their experiences with this issue. In particular, 
these issues could relate to specific conflicts with employers, certain Commission-funded 
projects, projects such as the EMWU, various lobbying activities, or thematic issues regarding 
other federations or the BWI. 
 
BLOC 1 | PERSONAL BACKGROUND 
 Role in national federation/European federation: You have been [insert position] at the 
EFBWW (or related organization) since [insert year] – could you describe your area of work? 
 Professional background 
 
BLOC 2 | MANDATE OF THE ORGANIZATION AND ALTERNATIVES 
 How would you describe the current mandate of the EFBWW (follow up on sectoral policies, 
wage policies, company policies, social dialogue)? How has this changed since you have 
been active in the construction sector? 
 What were the most important issues when you started and today? How have you dealt 
with them? 
 Do you remember phases of intensive debate about organizational alternatives/changing 
the mandate of the European federation? If yes: Who were the main actors/factions? How 
were these discussions resolved?  
 How would you describe the relationship between the EFBWW administration and its 
members? 
 
BLOC 3 | MEMBERSHIP 
 Who decides which projects/activities are taken up by the federation? 
 How would you describe the relationships among the EFBWW members? 
 In which matters do you cooperate with other European trade unions? 
 When are members’ sensibilities affected in a way that they would use their veto? 
 How would you describe your federation’s/union’s relationship with ETUC? In which matters 
have you cooperated and how? Which issues have been conflictual? 
 How would you describe your federation’s/union’s relationship with the BWI? In which 
matters have you cooperated and how? Which issues have been conflictual? 
BLOC 6 | RESOURCES 
 How do the unions in the construction sector fund their European cooperation? 
 Do you remember times of intensive debate on EFBWW funding? If yes: Who were the main 
actors/factions? How were these discussions resolved? 
 How important is external funding for your work (proportion in relation to structural 
income)? 
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 What types of projects are externally funded in your organization?  
 How exactly does Commission funding work (application process/funding requirements)?  
 What happens when a project is not approved for external funding? 
 What happens when external funding runs out? 
 
BLOC 4 | EXTERNAL RELATIONS 
 Who are your most important cooperation partners? 
 The federation has conducted a number of joint projects with employers. How would you 
describe your federation’s/union’s relationship with the European employers? In which 
matters have you cooperated? Which issues have been conflictual? How have you come to 
a common position on the Commission-funded projects? What happens when no consensus 
on joint projects could be reached?  
BLOC 7 | GENERAL QUESTION AND FOLLOW-UP 
 I would like to close our interview with a very general question: What, in your view, are the 
most important structural obstacles for increased international trade union cooperation? Is 
there any other aspect that you think might be important? 
 Would it be possible to establish a contact with the person who has had your position before 
you or do you have any other recommendation for me regarding people I should talk to? 
BLOC X | MEMBER UNIONS [ONLY ASKED WHEN REPRESENTATIVES FROM EFBWW MEMBER 
UNIONS WERE INTERVIEWED] 
 Is there a specific department for European issues? Is there a specific department for 
international issues?  
 In which issues do you consult the EFBWW?  
 What do you expect from being a member of the EFBWW? What would the ideal situation 
be? 
 What do you expect from being a member of the BWI? 




 Details: Could you please tell me more about this process? 
 History: Has this always been this way? Has this changed over the years?  
 Alternatives: Were alternatives discussed?  
 Problems: What were the main challenges that you encountered? How do you usually 
solve these issues? 
 Actors: With whom did you work together on this issue? Who participated in the 
solution? 













This thesis seeks to contribute to the understanding of European labor organization by focusing 
on two guiding questions: (1) How can a framework integrating (competing) logics explain the 
current form of European trade union organization? and (2) Which critical junctures explain the 
formation and stabilization of the present form of European trade union organization? The 
practical implications of the findings highlight the importance of political incentives for non-
governmental cooperation on the European level as well as the role of cross-national community 
building, lobbying activities and clear coordination strategies with global partners for European 
trade unions.  
A longitudinal single case study of the European Federation of Building and Woodworkers from 
the 1950s to ca. 2015 was selected as an extreme case since pressure for European coordination 
in this industry is particularly high while competitive pressures among workers are also especially 
intense. European associations are explained by an interplay of the multilevel logics of influence, 
membership, and administration (Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981], Child et. al. 1973; 
Donaldson and Warner 1974). These diverse logics entail conflicting rationalities leading to 
potentially constraining conflicts.  
The current form of Europeanization in the construction sector was established in the mid-1980s 
to 1990s when critical developments in all three logics set the federation in its current 
organizational form with the role of coordinating non-binding standards: Commission funding 
and Posted Workers legislation triggered increased joint activities coordinated by the European 
federation (influence), a highly motivated administration had the will and energy to create 
European organizational structures (administration) and a growing and more diverse 
membership needed a European federation to provide information and conduct lobbying 
activities (membership).  
The conclusions indicate that although unions in the construction sector have expanded their 
organizational activities across national boundaries, two self-reinforcing processes partly seem 
to explain the stabilization of the current form: resource dependence and adaptive expectations. 
The first result suggests a pattern whereby organizational development adjusts to external 
project funding, potentially overshadowing alternative forms of action. This is enhanced by a 
diminishing resource base from the membership, while at the same time the diversity and 
number of affiliates have risen. As the coordination needs of the members increase, the 
administration needs to secure external funds to implement the federation’s goals. Over time, 
the expectation of the members to implement their goals with contentious politics seemed to 
conflict with a logic of goal implementation which focuses on cooperation. And within the 
federation, democratic goal formation among the members started to conflict with flexible and 
autonomous goal implementation by the administration. 
The second outcome implies that the orientation toward project funding has been underpinned 
by the EFBWW’s logic of membership, which is defined by both the “shadow of the past” of the 
traditional division of labor between the international federation BWI and the EFBWW and the 
legacy of the European trade union movement’s political and religious division. Over time, 
adaptive expectations might have led to a stabilization of the division of labor and resources 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
 
Diese Arbeit möchte einen Beitrag zu unserem Verständnis Europäischer (Gewerkschafts-) 
Kooperation leisten, indem auf zwei Fragen fokussiert wird: (1) Welcher theoretische Rahmen 
kann die aktuelle Form europäischer Gewerkschafsorganisation erklären? und (2) Welche 
kritischen Ereignisse erklären die Herausbildung und Stabilisierung der aktuellen Form 
Europäischer Gewerkschaftsorganisation?  
Eine longitudinale Einzelfallstudie der Europäischen Föderation der Bau- und Holzarbeitervon 
den 1950ern bis ca. 2015 wurde als extremer Fall untersucht, da sowohl der Koordinationsdruck, 
als auch der Konkurrenzdruck zwischen ArbeiterInnen in diesem Sektor besonders hoch ist.  
Der theoretische Ansatz geht davon aus, dass Europäische Mitgliedsorganisationen durch ein 
Zusammenspiel von Einfluss-, Mitglieder- und Verwaltungslogik erklärt werden können 
(Schmitter and Streeck 1999 [1981], Child et. al. 1973; Donaldson and Warner 1974). 
Spannungen zwischen diesen Logiken können zu Trade-Offs führen, die erklären, warum sich 
Organisationsformen dauerhaft stabilisieren, obwohl alternative – oft bessere – 
Kooperationsformen möglich wären.  
Die Analyse zeigt, dass die gegenwärtige Form der Europäisierung im Bausektor etwa Mitte der 
1980er Jahre bis zu den 1990er Jahren erfolgte, als Entwicklungen in allen drei Logiken die 
Föderation in ihre aktuelle Rolle der Koordinatorin von nicht-bindenden Standards brachte: 
Kommissionsfinanzierung und Gesetzgebung zu Arbeitsmigration lösten verstärkte gemeinsame 
Aktivitäten aus, die von der Europäischen Föderation koordiniert wurden (Einfluss), eine 
hochmotivierte Verwaltung hatte den Willen und die Energie, eine europäische 
Organisationsstruktur aufzubauen (Verwaltung) und eine wachsende und zunehmend diverse 
Mitgliedschaft benötigte eine Europäische Föderation, um Informationen bereitzustellen und 
Lobbying-Aktivitäten zu koordinieren (Mitgliedschaft). 
Die Ergebnisse deuten an, dass - obwohl Gewerkschaften im Bausektor ihre Aktivitäten über 
nationale Grenzen hinweg ausgeweitet haben - zwei selbstverstärkende Mechanismen die 
Stabilisierung der jetzigen Form zu erklären scheinen: Ressourcenabhängigkeit und adaptive 
Erwartungen. Der erste Punkt weist auf ein Muster hin, wonach organisationale Entwicklung sich 
an externe Projektfinanzierung anzupassen scheint, was möglicherweise zu einer Überschattung 
alternativer Aktionsformen führen kann. Dies wird verstärkt durch verminderte interne 
Ressourcen von den Mitgliedern, während gleichzeitig die Diversität und Anzahl der 
Mitgliedsgewerkschaften steigt. Da auch die Koordinationsbedarfe der Mitglieder steigen, muss 
die Verwaltung externe Ressourcen sichern, um die Ziele der Föderation umzusetzen. Das zweite 
Ergebnis impliziert, dass die Orientierung auf Projektfinanzierung von der Mitgliedslogik 
verstärkt wurde, die sowohl vom “Schatten der Vergangenheit” der traditionellen 
Arbeitsaufteilung zwischen internationaler und europäischer Föderation als auch von früheren 
religiösen und politischen Differenzen geprägt war. Mit der Zeit könnten adaptive Erwartungen 
zu einer stabilen Arbeits- und Ressourcenaufteilung zwischen der internationalen und der 
Europäischen Föderation geführt haben. 
Indem diese Arbeit ein Licht auf die Rolle von gegensätzlichen Logiken und nicht-intendierten 
Konsequenzen wirft, trägt die Arbeit zum Verständnis der Faktoren bei, die das 
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